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Illinois Compiled Statutes
Information maintained by the Legislative Reference Bureau Updating the database of the Illinois Compiled Statutes (ILCS) is an ongoing process. Recent laws may not yet be included in the ILCS database, but they are found on this site as Public Acts soon after they become law. For information concerning the relationship between statutes and Public Acts, refer to the Guide. Because the statute database is maintained primarily for legislative drafting purposes, statutory changes are sometimes included in the statute database before they take effect. If the source note at the end of a Section of the statutes includes a Public Act that has not yet taken effect, the version of the law that is currently in effect may have already been removed from the database and you should refer to that Public Act to see the changes made to the current law.
CRIMINAL OFFENSES (720 ILCS 5/) Criminal Code of 2012. 720 ILCS 5/4-3
(720 ILCS 5/4-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-3)
Sec. 4-3.
Mental
state.
(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which
involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described
by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental
states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7.
(b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental
state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among
the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such
element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state
applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which
involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4,
4-5 or 4-6 is applicable.
(c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge
of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an
offense, is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly
defines it as such.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983 .)
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720 ILCS 5/4-4
(720 ILCS 5/4-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-4)
Sec. 4-4.
Intent.
A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a
result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense,
when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or
engage in that conduct.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
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720 ILCS 5/4-5
(720 ILCS 5/4-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-5)
Sec. 4-5. Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or | | her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.
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(b) The result of his or her conduct, described by
| | the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.
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Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully,
within the meaning of a statute using the term "willfully", unless the statute
clearly requires another meaning.
When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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720 ILCS 5/4-6
(720 ILCS 5/4-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-6)
Sec. 4-6. Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when that person consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a
result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed
recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the
term "wantonly", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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720 ILCS 5/4-7
(720 ILCS 5/4-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-7)
Sec. 4-7. Negligence. A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when that person fails to be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result
will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that
failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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720 ILCS 5/4-8
(720 ILCS 5/4-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-8)
Sec. 4-8. Ignorance or mistake. (a) A person's ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or
law, except as provided in Section 4-3(c) above, is a defense if it
negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes
with respect to an element of the offense.
(b) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute an
offense is a defense if:
(1) the offense is defined by an administrative | | regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to him, and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or
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(2) he acts in reliance upon a statute which later is
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(3) he acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of
| | an Illinois Appellate or Supreme Court, or a United States appellate court later overruled or reversed; or
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(4) he acts in reliance upon an official
| | interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the offense, made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute.
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(c) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or
reasonable belief, described in this Section 4-8 is a defense to the
offense charged, he may be convicted of an included offense of which he
would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be.
(d) A defense based upon this Section 4-8 is an affirmative defense.
(Source: P.A. 98-463, eff. 8-16-13.)
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720 ILCS 5/4-9
(720 ILCS 5/4-9) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-9)
Sec. 4-9. Absolute
liability.
A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element
thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7
if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or
by a fine exceeding $1,000, or the statute defining the offense clearly
indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the
conduct described.
(Source: P.A. 96-1198, eff. 1-1-11.)
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720 ILCS 5/Art. 5
(720 ILCS 5/Art. 5 heading)
ARTICLE 5.
PARTIES TO CRIME
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720 ILCS 5/5-1
(720 ILCS 5/5-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-1)
Sec. 5-1.
Accountability for conduct of another.
A person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if
the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he
is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in Section 5-2, or
both.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983 .)
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720 ILCS 5/5-2
(720 ILCS 5/5-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-2)
Sec. 5-2. When
accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:
(a) having a mental state described by the statute | | defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state;
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(b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her
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(c) either before or during the commission of an
| | offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.
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| When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when determining accountability.
A person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute
defining the offense provides otherwise, if:
(1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed;
(2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct
| | was inevitably incident to its commission; or
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(3) before the commission of the offense, he or she
| | terminates his or her effort to promote or facilitate that commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly deprives his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that commission, (ii) gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
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(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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