(720 ILCS 5/4-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-3)
Sec. 4-3.
Mental
state.
(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which
involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described
by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental
states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7.
(b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental
state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among
the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such
element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state
applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which
involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4,
4-5 or 4-6 is applicable.
(c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge
of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an
offense, is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly
defines it as such.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983 .)
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(720 ILCS 5/4-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-4)
Sec. 4-4.
Intent.
A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a
result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense,
when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or
engage in that conduct.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
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(720 ILCS 5/4-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-5)
Sec. 4-5. Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or | ||
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(b) The result of his or her conduct, described by | ||
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Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully,
within the meaning of a statute using the term "willfully", unless the statute
clearly requires another meaning.
When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally. (Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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(720 ILCS 5/4-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-6)
Sec. 4-6. Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when that person consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a
result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed
recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the
term "wantonly", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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(720 ILCS 5/4-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-7)
Sec. 4-7. Negligence. A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when that person fails to be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result
will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that
failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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(720 ILCS 5/4-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-8)
Sec. 4-8. Ignorance or mistake. (a) A person's ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or
law, except as provided in Section 4-3(c) above, is a defense if it
negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes
with respect to an element of the offense.
(b) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute an
offense is a defense if:
(1) the offense is defined by an administrative | ||
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(2) he acts in reliance upon a statute which later is | ||
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(3) he acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of | ||
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(4) he acts in reliance upon an official | ||
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(c) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or
reasonable belief, described in this Section 4-8 is a defense to the
offense charged, he may be convicted of an included offense of which he
would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be.
(d) A defense based upon this Section 4-8 is an affirmative defense.
(Source: P.A. 98-463, eff. 8-16-13.)
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(720 ILCS 5/4-9) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-9)
Sec. 4-9. Absolute
liability.
A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element
thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7
if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or
by a fine exceeding $1,000, or the statute defining the offense clearly
indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the
conduct described.
(Source: P.A. 96-1198, eff. 1-1-11.)
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(720 ILCS 5/Art. 5 heading) ARTICLE 5.
PARTIES TO CRIME
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(720 ILCS 5/5-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-1)
Sec. 5-1.
Accountability for conduct of another.
A person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if
the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he
is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in Section 5-2, or
both.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983 .)
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(720 ILCS 5/5-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-2)
Sec. 5-2. When
accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:
(a) having a mental state described by the statute | ||
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(b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her | ||
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(c) either before or during the commission of an | ||
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When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when determining accountability. A person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute
defining the offense provides otherwise, if:
(1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed;
(2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct | ||
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(3) before the commission of the offense, he or she | ||
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(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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