725 ILCS 5/ Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(725 ILCS 5/114-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-3)

Sec. 114-3. Motion to discharge jury panel.

(a) Any objection to the manner in which a jury panel has been selected or drawn shall be raised by a motion to discharge the jury panel prior to the voir dire examination. For good cause shown the court may entertain the motion after the voir dire has begun but such motion shall not be heard after a jury has been sworn to hear the cause.

(b) The motion shall be in writing supported by affidavit and shall state facts which show that the jury panel was improperly selected or drawn.

(c) If the motion states facts which show that the jury panel has been improperly selected or drawn it shall be the duty of the court to conduct a hearing. The burden of proving that the jury panel was improperly selected or drawn shall be upon the movant.

(d) If the court finds that the jury panel was improperly selected or drawn the court shall order the jury panel discharged and the selection or drawing of a new panel in the manner provided by law.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-4)

Sec. 114-4. Motion for continuance.

(a) The defendant or the State may move for a continuance. If the motion is made more than 30 days after arraignment the court shall require that it be in writing and supported by affidavit.

(b) A written motion for continuance made by defendant more than 30 days after arraignment may be granted when:

(1) Counsel for the defendant is ill, has died, or is held to trial in another cause; or

(2) Counsel for the defendant has been unable to prepare for trial because of illness or because he has been held to trial in another cause; or

(3) A material witness is unavailable and the defense will be prejudiced by the absence of his testimony; however, this shall not be a ground for continuance if the State will stipulate that the testimony of the witness would be as alleged; or

(4) The defendant cannot stand trial because of physical or mental incompetency; or

(5) Pre-trial publicity concerning the case has caused a prejudice against defendant on the part of the community; or

(6) The amendment of a charge or a bill of particulars has taken the defendant by surprise and he cannot fairly defend against such an amendment without a continuance.

(c) A written motion for continuance made by the State more than 30 days after arraignment may be granted when:

(1) The prosecutor assigned to the case is ill, has died, or is held to trial in another cause; or

(2) A material witness is unavailable and the prosecution will be prejudiced by the absence of his testimony; however this shall not be a ground for continuance if the defendant will stipulate that the testimony of the witness would be as alleged; or

(3) Pre-trial publicity concerning the case has caused a prejudice against the prosecution on the part of the community.

(d) The court may upon the written motion of either party or upon the court's own motion order a continuance for grounds not stated in subsections (b) and (c) of this Section if he finds that the interests of justice so require.

(e) All motions for continuance are addressed to the discretion of the trial court and shall be considered in the light of the diligence shown on the part of the movant. Where 1 year has expired since the filing of an information or indictments, filed after January 1, 1980, if the court finds that the State has failed to use due diligence in bringing the case to trial, the court may, after a hearing had on the cause, on its own motion, dismiss the information or indictment. Any demand that the defendant had made for a speedy trial under Section 103-5 of this code shall not abate if the State files a new information or the grand jury reindicts in the cause.

After a hearing has been held upon the issue of the State's diligence and the court has found that the State has failed to use due diligence in pursuing the prosecution, the court may not dismiss the indictment or information without granting the State one more court date upon which to proceed. Such date shall be not less than 14 nor more than 30 days from the date of the court's finding. If the State is not prepared to proceed upon that date, the court shall dismiss the indictment or information, as provided in this Section.

(f) After trial has begun a reasonably brief continuance may be granted to either side in the interests of justice.

(g) During the time the General Assembly is in session, the court shall, on motion of either party or on its own motion, grant a continuance where the party or his attorney is a member of either house of the General Assembly whose presence is necessary for the full, fair trial of the cause and, in the case of an attorney, where the attorney was retained by the party before the cause was set for trial.

(h) This Section shall be construed to the end that criminal cases are tried with due diligence consonant with the rights of the defendant and the State to a speedy, fair and impartial trial.

(i) Physical incapacity of a defendant may be grounds for a continuance at any time. If, upon written motion of the defendant or the State or upon the court's own motion, and after presentation of affidavits or evidence, the court determines that the defendant is physically unable to appear in court or to assist in his defense, or that such appearance would endanger his health or result in substantial prejudice, a continuance shall be granted. If such continuance precedes the appearance of counsel for such defendant the court shall simultaneously appoint counsel in the manner prescribed by Section 113-3 of this Act. Such continuance shall suspend the provisions of Section 103-5 of this Act, which periods of time limitation shall commence anew when the court, after presentation of additional affidavits or evidence, has determined that such physical incapacity has been substantially removed.

(j) In actions arising out of building code violations or violations of municipal ordinances caused by the failure of a building or structure to conform to the minimum standards of health and safety, the court shall grant a continuance only upon a written motion by the party seeking the continuance specifying the reason why such continuance should be granted.

(k) In prosecutions for violations of Section 10-1, 10-2, 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15 or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 involving a victim or witness who is a minor under 18 years of age, the court shall, in ruling on any motion or other request for a delay or continuance of proceedings, consider and give weight to the adverse impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of a child or witness.

(l) The court shall consider the age of the victim and the condition of the victim's health when ruling on a motion for a continuance.

(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-5)

Sec. 114-5. Substitution of judge. (a) Within 10 days after a cause involving only one defendant has been placed on the trial call of a judge the defendant may move the court in writing for a substitution of that judge on the ground that such judge is so prejudiced against him that he cannot receive a fair trial. Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no further in the cause but shall transfer it to another judge not named in the motion. The defendant may name only one judge as prejudiced, pursuant to this subsection; provided, however, that in a case in which the offense charged is a Class X felony or may be punished by death or life imprisonment, the defendant may name two judges as prejudiced.

(b) Within 24 hours after a motion is made for substitution of judge in a cause with multiple defendants each defendant shall have the right to move in accordance with subsection (a) of this Section for a substitution of one judge. The total number of judges named as prejudiced by all defendants shall not exceed the total number of defendants. The first motion for substitution of judge in a cause with multiple defendants shall be made within 10 days after the cause has been placed on the trial call of a judge.

(c) Within 10 days after a cause has been placed on the trial call of a judge the State may move the court in writing for a substitution of that judge on the ground that such judge is prejudiced against the State. Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no further in the cause but shall transfer it to another judge not named in the motion. The State may name only one judge as prejudiced, pursuant to this subsection.

(d) In addition to the provisions of subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section the State or any defendant may move at any time for substitution of judge for cause, supported by affidavit. Upon the filing of such motion a hearing shall be conducted as soon as possible after its filing by a judge not named in the motion; provided, however, that the judge named in the motion need not testify, but may submit an affidavit if the judge wishes. If the motion is allowed, the case shall be assigned to a judge not named in the motion. If the motion is denied the case shall be assigned back to the judge named in the motion.

(Source: P.A. 84-1428.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-6)

Sec. 114-6. Change of place of trial.) (a) A defendant may move the court for a change of place of trial on the ground that there exists in the county in which the charge is pending such prejudice against him on the part of the inhabitants that he cannot receive a fair trial in such county.

(b) The motion shall be in writing and supported by affidavit which shall state facts showing the nature of the prejudice alleged. The State may file counter-affidavits. The court shall conduct a hearing and determine the merits of the motion.

(c) If the court determines that there exists in the county where the prosecution is pending such prejudice against the defendant that he cannot receive a fair trial it shall transfer the cause to the circuit court in any county where a fair trial may be had.

(d) In all cases of change of place of trial the clerk of the court from which the change is granted shall immediately prepare a full transcript of the record and proceedings in the case, and of the petition, affidavits and order for the change of place of trial, and transmit the same, together with all papers filed in the case, including the indictment and recognizances of the defendant and all witnesses, to the proper court. If the change is granted to a part but not all of several defendants, a certified copy of the indictment or information, and of the other papers in the case, shall be transmitted to the court to which the change of place of trial is ordered, and such certified copies shall stand as the originals. Such transcript and papers may be transmitted by mail, or in such other way as the court may direct.

(e) When the applicant is in custody or confined in jail, the court shall enter an order directed to the sheriff or other officer having custody of the applicant, to remove his body to the common jail of the county to which the place of trial is changed, and there deliver him to the keeper of the jail, together with the warrant by virtue of which he is confined or held in custody, not more than 3 days next before the day upon which the trial is to commence in the court; and the sheriff shall obey such order and shall endorse on such warrant of commitment the reason of the change of custody, and shall deliver such warrant, with the body of the prisoner, to the keeper of the jail of the proper county, who shall receive the same and give to the sheriff a receipt therefor, and shall take charge of and keep the prisoner in the same manner as if he had originally been committed to his custody.

(f) When the place of trial is changed in any criminal case, the parties and witnesses, and all others who may have entered recognizances to attend the trial of such cause, having notice of the change of place of trial, must attend at the time and place at which the trial is to be had according to such change, and a failure to do so shall operate as a forfeiture of the recognizance.

(g) When the place of trial is changed the State's attorney shall have all the witnesses on the part of the prosecution recognized to appear at the court to which the change is ordered on the day upon which the trial is to commence.

(h) Upon the termination of any trial, when a change of place of trial has been obtained, the clerk of the court in which the trial is had shall submit a certified statement of all costs, fees, charges, claims and expenses resulting from such change of place of trial and necessarily incurred in connection with or incident to the trial of the case, or any appeal therefrom, or required in executing any and all orders of the court made in the case, but shall not include charges for the use of the courtroom or the facilities thereof, nor shall it include fees or salaries paid to employees of the county in which the trial is held, unless it is made necessary by reason of such trial, and when so certified, the items thereof shall be paid by the county in which such indictment or information was found to the officers and persons entitled thereto. All fines imposed and collected in the county where the trial is had, shall be paid over to the county in which the indictment or information was found.

(Source: P.A. 82-280.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-7)

Sec. 114-7. Joinder of related prosecutions.

The court may order 2 or more charges to be tried together if the offenses and the defendants could have been joined in a single charge. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a single charge.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-8)

Sec. 114-8. Motion for severance.

(a) If it appears that a defendant or the State is prejudiced by a joinder of related prosecutions or defendants in a single charge or by joinder of separate charges or defendants for trial the court may order separate trials, grant a severance of defendants, or provide any other relief as justice may require.

(b) In the case of a prosecution of multiple defendants for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual abuse, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse arising out of the same course of conduct, the court, in deciding a motion to sever the charges and try the defendants separately, must consider, subject to constitutional limitations, the impact upon the alleged victim of multiple trials requiring the victim's testimony.

(Source: P.A. 94-668, eff. 1-1-06.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-9) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-9)

Sec. 114-9. Motion for a list of witnesses.

(a) On motion of the defendant the court shall order the State to furnish the defense with a list of prosecution witnesses and their last known addresses, except the home address of any peace officer witness shall not be required to be so furnished, the address of his assignment station being sufficient for the purposes of this statute.

(b) The court may permit witnesses not named in an original or amended list to testify when the names of the additional witnesses were not known and could not have been obtained by the exercise of due diligence prior to trial.

(c) The requirements of subsection (a) of this Section shall not apply to rebuttal witnesses.

(Source: P.A. 77-1428.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-10) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-10)

Sec. 114-10. Motion to produce confession.

(a) On motion of a defendant in any criminal case made prior to trial the court shall order the State to furnish the defendant with a copy of any written confession made to any law enforcement officer of this State or any other State and a list of the witnesses to its making and acknowledgment. If the defendant has made an oral confession a list of the witnesses to its making shall be furnished.

(b) The list of witnesses may upon notice and motion be amended by the State prior to trial.

(c) No such confession shall be received in evidence which has not been furnished in compliance with subsection (a) of this Section unless the court is satisfied that the prosecutor was unaware of the existence of such confession prior to trial and that he could not have become aware of such in the exercise of due diligence.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-11) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-11)

Sec. 114-11. Motion to Suppress Confession.

(a) Prior to the trial of any criminal case a defendant may move to suppress as evidence any confession given by him on the ground that it was not voluntary.

(b) The motion shall be in writing and state facts showing wherein the confession is involuntary.

(c) If the allegations of the motion state facts which, if true, show that the confession was not voluntarily made the court shall conduct a hearing into the merits of the motion.

(d) The burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of proving that a confession was voluntary shall be on the State. Objection to the failure of the State to call all material witnesses on the issue of whether the confession was voluntary must be made in the trial court.

(e) The motion shall be made only before a court with jurisdiction to try the offense.

(f) The issue of the admissibility of the confession shall not be submitted to the jury. The circumstances surrounding the making of the confession may be submitted to the jury as bearing upon the credibility or the weight to be given to the confession.

(g) The motion shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion. If the motion is made during trial, and the court determines that the motion is not untimely, and the court conducts a hearing on the merits and enters an order suppressing the confession, the court shall terminate the trial with respect to every defendant who was a party to the hearing and who was within the scope of the order of suppression, without further proceedings, unless the State files a written notice that there will be no interlocutory appeal from such order of suppression. In the event of such termination, the court shall proceed with the trial of other defendants not thus affected. Such termination of trial shall be proper and shall not bar subsequent prosecution of the identical charges and defendants; however, if after such termination the State fails to prosecute the interlocutory appeal until a determination of the merits of the appeal by the reviewing court, the termination shall be improper within the meaning of subparagraph (a) (3) of Section 3-4 of the Criminal Code of 2012 and subsequent prosecution of such defendants upon such charges shall be barred.

(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-12) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-12)

Sec. 114-12. Motion to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized.

(a) A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the court for the return of property and to suppress as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that:

(1) The search and seizure without a warrant was illegal; or

(2) The search and seizure with a warrant was illegal because the warrant is insufficient on its face; the evidence seized is not that described in the warrant; there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; or, the warrant was illegally executed.

(b) The motion shall be in writing and state facts showing wherein the search and seizure were unlawful. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion and the burden of proving that the search and seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant. If the motion is granted the property shall be restored, unless otherwise subject to lawful detention, and it shall not be admissible in evidence against the movant at any trial.

(1) If a defendant seeks to suppress evidence because of the conduct of a peace officer in obtaining the evidence, the State may urge that the peace officer's conduct was taken in a reasonable and objective good faith belief that the conduct was proper and that the evidence discovered should not be suppressed if otherwise admissible. The court shall not suppress evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer who acted in good faith.

(2) "Good faith" means whenever a peace officer obtains evidence:

(i) pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant obtained from a neutral and detached judge, which warrant is free from obvious defects other than non-deliberate errors in preparation and contains no material misrepresentation by any agent of the State, and the officer reasonably believed the warrant to be valid; or

(ii) pursuant to a warrantless search incident to an arrest for violation of a statute or local ordinance which is later declared unconstitutional or otherwise invalidated.

(3) This amendatory Act of 1987 shall not be construed to limit the enforcement of any appropriate civil remedy or criminal sanction in actions pursuant to other provisions of law against any individual or government entity found to have conducted an unreasonable search or seizure.

(4) This amendatory Act of 1987 does not apply to unlawful electronic eavesdropping or wiretapping.

(c) The motion shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion. If the motion is made during trial, and the court determines that the motion is not untimely, and the court conducts a hearing on the merits and enters an order suppressing the evidence, the court shall terminate the trial with respect to every defendant who was a party to the hearing and who was within the scope of the order of suppression, without further proceedings, unless the State files a written notice that there will be no interlocutory appeal from such order of suppression. In the event of such termination, the court shall proceed with the trial of other defendants not thus affected. Such termination of trial shall be proper and shall not bar subsequent prosecution of the identical charges and defendants; however, if after such termination the State fails to prosecute the interlocutory appeal until a determination of the merits of the appeal by the reviewing court, the termination shall be improper within the meaning of subparagraph (a)(3) of Section 3-4 of the Criminal Code of 2012 and subsequent prosecution of such defendants upon such charges shall be barred.

(d) The motion shall be made only before a court with jurisdiction to try the offense.

(e) The order or judgment granting or denying the motion shall state the findings of facts and conclusions of law upon which the order or judgment is based.

(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-13)

Sec. 114-13. Discovery in criminal cases.

(a) Discovery procedures in criminal cases shall be in accordance with Supreme Court Rules.

(b) Any public investigative, law enforcement, or other public agency responsible for investigating any homicide offense or participating in an investigation of any homicide offense, other than defense investigators, shall provide to the authority prosecuting the offense all investigative material, including but not limited to reports, memoranda, and field notes, that have been generated by or have come into the possession of the investigating agency concerning the homicide offense being investigated. In addition, the investigating agency shall provide to the prosecuting authority any material or information, including but not limited to reports, memoranda, and field notes, within its possession or control that would tend to negate the guilt of the accused of the offense charged or reduce his or her punishment for the homicide offense. Every investigative and law enforcement agency in this State shall adopt policies to ensure compliance with these standards. Any investigative, law enforcement, or other public agency responsible for investigating any "non-homicide felony" offense or participating in an investigation of any "non-homicide felony" offense, other than defense investigators, shall provide to the authority prosecuting the offense all investigative material, including but not limited to reports and memoranda that have been generated by or have come into the possession of the investigating agency concerning the "non-homicide felony" offense being investigated. In addition, the investigating agency shall provide to the prosecuting authority any material or information, including but not limited to reports and memoranda, within its possession or control that would tend to negate the guilt of the accused of the "non-homicide felony" offense charged or reduce his or her punishment for the "non-homicide felony" offense. This obligation to furnish exculpatory evidence exists whether the information was recorded or documented in any form. Every investigative and law enforcement agency in this State shall adopt policies to ensure compliance with these standards.

(Source: P.A. 93-605, eff. 11-19-03.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-13.5)

Sec. 114-13.5. Evidence deposition; elder abuse. In a prosecution for abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of an eligible adult as defined in the Adult Protective Services Act, the eligible adult may give testimony in the form of an evidence deposition and not be required to appear in court to testify.

(Source: P.A. 98-49, eff. 7-1-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/114-15)

Sec. 114-15. (Repealed).

(Source: P.A. 99-143, eff. 7-27-15. Repealed by P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/Tit. VI heading) TITLE VI. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 115 heading) ARTICLE 115. TRIAL

(725 ILCS 5/115-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-1)

Sec. 115-1. Method of Trial. All prosecutions except on a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill shall be tried by the court and a jury unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing.

(Source: P.A. 87-410.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-1.5)

Sec. 115-1.5. Waiver of counsel by persons under 17 years of age prohibited. A person under 17 years of age may not waive the right to the assistance of counsel in his or her defense in any judicial proceeding. This Section does not apply to a minor charged with an offense for which the penalty is a fine only. Except for violations of Sections 11-401, 11-402, 11-501, and 11-503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, this Section does not apply to proceedings involving violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

(Source: P.A. 94-345, eff. 7-26-05.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-2)

Sec. 115-2. Pleas of Guilty and guilty but mentally ill. (a) Before or during trial a plea of guilty may be accepted when:

(1) The defendant enters a plea of guilty in open court;

(2) The court has informed the defendant of the consequences of his plea and of the maximum penalty provided by law which may be imposed upon acceptance of such plea.

Upon acceptance of a plea of guilty the court shall determine the factual basis for the plea.

(b) Before or during trial a plea of guilty but mentally ill may be accepted by the court when:

(1) the defendant has undergone an examination by a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist and has waived his right to trial; and

(2) the judge has examined the psychiatric or psychological report or reports; and

(3) the judge has held a hearing, at which either party may present evidence, on the issue of the defendant's mental health and, at the conclusion of such hearing, is satisfied that there is a factual basis that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered.

(Source: P.A. 82-553.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-3)

Sec. 115-3. Trial by the Court.

(a) A trial shall be conducted in the presence of the defendant unless he waives the right to be present.

(b) Upon conclusion of the trial the court shall enter a general finding, except that, when the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented during the trial and acquittal is based solely upon the defense of insanity, the court shall enter a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. In the event of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, a hearing shall be held pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code to determine whether the defendant is subject to involuntary admission.

(c) When the defendant has asserted a defense of insanity, the court may find the defendant guilty but mentally ill if, after hearing all of the evidence, the court finds that:

(1) the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged; and

(2) the defendant has failed to prove his insanity as required in subsection (b) of Section 3-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 and subsections (a), (b) and (e) of Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012; and

(3) the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally ill, as defined in subsections (c) and (d) of Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 at the time of the offense.

(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-4)

Sec. 115-4. Trial by Court and Jury.)

(a) Questions of law shall be decided by the court and questions of fact by the jury.

(b) The jury shall consist of 12 members.

(c) Upon request the parties shall be furnished with a list of prospective jurors with their addresses if known.

(d) Each party may challenge jurors for cause. If a prospective juror has a physical impairment, the court shall consider such prospective juror's ability to perceive and appreciate the evidence when considering a challenge for cause.

(e) A defendant tried alone shall be allowed 20 peremptory challenges in a capital case, 10 in a case in which the punishment may be imprisonment in the penitentiary, and 5 in all other cases; except that, in a single trial of more than one defendant, each defendant shall be allowed 12 peremptory challenges in a capital case, 6 in a case in which the punishment may be imprisonment in the penitentiary, and 3 in all other cases. If several charges against a defendant or defendants are consolidated for trial, each defendant shall be allowed peremptory challenges upon one charge only, which single charge shall be the charge against that defendant authorizing the greatest maximum penalty. The State shall be allowed the same number of peremptory challenges as all of the defendants.

(f) After examination by the court the jurors may be examined, passed upon, accepted and tendered by opposing counsel as provided by Supreme Court rules.

(g) After the jury is impaneled and sworn the court may direct the selection of 2 alternate jurors who shall take the same oath as the regular jurors. Each party shall have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror. If before the final submission of a cause a member of the jury dies or is discharged he shall be replaced by an alternate juror in the order of selection.

(h) A trial by the court and jury shall be conducted in the presence of the defendant unless he waives the right to be present.

(i) After arguments of counsel the court shall instruct the jury as to the law.

(j) Unless the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the jury shall return a general verdict as to each offense charged. When the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the court shall provide the jury not only with general verdict forms but also with a special verdict form of not guilty by reason of insanity, as to each offense charged, and in such event the court shall separately instruct the jury that a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity may be returned instead of a general verdict but such special verdict requires a unanimous finding by the jury that the defendant committed the acts charged but at the time of the commission of those acts the defendant was insane. In the event of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, a hearing shall be held pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code to determine whether the defendant is subject to involuntary admission. When the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the court, where warranted by the evidence, shall also provide the jury with a special verdict form of guilty but mentally ill, as to each offense charged and shall separately instruct the jury that a special verdict of guilty but mentally ill may be returned instead of a general verdict, but that such special verdict requires a unanimous finding by the jury that: (1) the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged; and (2) the defendant has failed to prove his insanity as required in subsection (b) of Section 3-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 and subsections (a), (b) and (e) of Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012; and (3) the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally ill, as defined in subsections (c) and (d) of Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 at the time of the offense.

(k) When, at the close of the State's evidence or at the close of all of the evidence, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding or verdict of guilty the court may and on motion of the defendant shall make a finding or direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, enter a judgment of acquittal and discharge the defendant.

(l) When the jury retires to consider its verdict an officer of the court shall be appointed to keep them together and to prevent conversation between the jurors and others; however, if any juror is deaf, the jury may be accompanied by and may communicate with a court-appointed interpreter during its deliberations. Upon agreement between the State and defendant or his counsel the jury may seal and deliver its verdict to the clerk of the court, separate, and then return such verdict in open court at its next session.

(m) In the trial of a capital or other offense, any juror who is a member of a panel or jury which has been impaneled and sworn as a panel or as a jury shall be permitted to separate from other such jurors during every period of adjournment to a later day, until final submission of the cause to the jury for determination, except that no such separation shall be permitted in any trial after the court, upon motion by the defendant or the State or upon its own motion, finds a probability that prejudice to the defendant or to the State will result from such separation.

(n) The members of the jury shall be entitled to take notes during the trial, and the sheriff of the county in which the jury is sitting shall provide them with writing materials for this purpose. Such notes shall remain confidential, and shall be destroyed by the sheriff after the verdict has been returned or a mistrial declared.

(o) A defendant tried by the court and jury shall only be found guilty, guilty but mentally ill, not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity, upon the unanimous verdict of the jury.

(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-4.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-4.1)

Sec. 115-4.1. Absence of defendant.

(a) When a defendant after arrest and an initial court appearance for a non-capital felony or a misdemeanor, fails to appear for trial, at the request of the State and after the State has affirmatively proven through substantial evidence that the defendant is willfully avoiding trial, the court may commence trial in the absence of the defendant. Absence of a defendant as specified in this Section shall not be a bar to indictment of a defendant, return of information against a defendant, or arraignment of a defendant for the charge for which pretrial release has been granted. If a defendant fails to appear at arraignment, the court may enter a plea of "not guilty" on his behalf. If a defendant absents himself before trial on a capital felony, trial may proceed as specified in this Section provided that the State certifies that it will not seek a death sentence following conviction. Trial in the defendant's absence shall be by jury unless the defendant had previously waived trial by jury. The absent defendant must be represented by retained or appointed counsel. The court, at the conclusion of all of the proceedings, may order the clerk of the circuit court to pay counsel such sum as the court deems reasonable, from any bond monies which were posted by the defendant with the clerk, after the clerk has first deducted all court costs. If trial had previously commenced in the presence of the defendant and the defendant willfully absents himself for two successive court days, the court shall proceed to trial. All procedural rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Constitution of the State of Illinois, statutes of the State of Illinois, and rules of court shall apply to the proceedings the same as if the defendant were present in court and had not either had his or her pretrial release revoked or escaped from custody. The court may set the case for a trial which may be conducted under this Section despite the failure of the defendant to appear at the hearing at which the trial date is set. When such trial date is set the clerk shall send to the defendant, by certified mail at his last known address indicated on his bond slip, notice of the new date which has been set for trial. Such notification shall be required when the defendant was not personally present in open court at the time when the case was set for trial.

(b) The absence of a defendant from a trial conducted pursuant to this Section does not operate as a bar to concluding the trial, to a judgment of conviction resulting therefrom, or to a final disposition of the trial in favor of the defendant.

(c) Upon a verdict of not guilty, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant. Upon a verdict of guilty, the court shall set a date for the hearing of post-trial motions and shall hear such motion in the absence of the defendant. If post-trial motions are denied, the court shall proceed to conduct a sentencing hearing and to impose a sentence upon the defendant.

(d) A defendant who is absent for part of the proceedings of trial, post-trial motions, or sentencing, does not thereby forfeit his right to be present at all remaining proceedings.

(e) When a defendant who in his absence has been either convicted or sentenced or both convicted and sentenced appears before the court, he must be granted a new trial or new sentencing hearing if the defendant can establish that his failure to appear in court was both without his fault and due to circumstances beyond his control. A hearing with notice to the State's Attorney on the defendant's request for a new trial or a new sentencing hearing must be held before any such request may be granted. At any such hearing both the defendant and the State may present evidence.

(f) If the court grants only the defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing, then a new sentencing hearing shall be held in accordance with the provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections. At any such hearing, both the defendant and the State may offer evidence of the defendant's conduct during his period of absence from the court. The court may impose any sentence authorized by the Unified Code of Corrections and is not in any way limited or restricted by any sentence previously imposed.

(g) A defendant whose motion under paragraph (e) for a new trial or new sentencing hearing has been denied may file a notice of appeal therefrom. Such notice may also include a request for review of the judgment and sentence not vacated by the trial court.

(Source: P.A. 101-652, eff. 1-1-23.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-4.5)

Sec. 115-4.5. Death of defendant. Whenever the prosecuting attorney learns of the death of the defendant prior to the entry of a final and appealable judgment in a criminal case, he or she shall promptly notify the other party and file a certificate of notice of the defendant's death with the circuit court before which the case is pending. Upon filing of the certificate, the court shall enter an order abating the proceedings ab initio.

(Source: P.A. 99-778, eff. 1-1-17.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-5)

Sec. 115-5. Business records as evidence.

(a) Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.

All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility.

The term "business," as used in this Section, includes business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind.

(b) If any business, institution, member of a profession or calling, or any department or agency of government, in the regular course of business or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of the same to be recorded, copied, or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, optical imaging, or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless its preservation is required by law. Such reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any proceeding whether the original is in existence or not and an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement, or facsimile does not preclude admission of the original. This Section shall not be construed to exclude from evidence any document or copy thereof which is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.

(c) No writing or record made in the regular course of any business shall become admissible as evidence by the application of this Section if:

(1) Such writing or record has been made by anyone in the regular course of any form of hospital or medical business; or

(2) Such writing or record has been made by anyone during an investigation of an alleged offense or during any investigation relating to pending or anticipated litigation of any kind, except during a hearing to revoke a sentence of probation or conditional discharge or an order of court supervision that is based on a technical violation of a sentencing order when the hearing involves a probationer or defendant who has transferred or moved from the county having jurisdiction over the original charge or sentence. For the purposes of this subsection (c), "technical violation" means a breach of a sentencing order but does not include an allegation of a subsequent criminal act asserted in a formal criminal charge.

(d) Upon request of the moving party and with reasonable notice given to the opposing party, in a criminal prosecution in which the defendant is accused of an offense under Article 16 or 17 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, the court may, after a hearing, for good cause and upon appropriate safeguards, permit live foundational testimony business records as evidence, subject to cross-examination, in open court by means of a contemporaneous audio and video transmission from outside of this State.

(Source: P.A. 98-579, eff. 1-1-14.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-5.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-5.1)

Sec. 115-5.1. In any civil or criminal action the records of the coroner's medical or laboratory examiner summarizing and detailing the performance of his or her official duties in performing medical examinations upon deceased persons or autopsies, or both, and kept in the ordinary course of business of the coroner's office, duly certified by the county coroner or chief supervisory coroner's pathologist or medical examiner, shall be received as competent evidence in any court of this State, to the extent permitted by this Section. These reports, specifically including but not limited to the pathologist's protocol, autopsy reports and toxicological reports, shall be public documents and thereby may be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts, findings, opinions, diagnoses and conditions stated therein.

A duly certified coroner's protocol or autopsy report, or both, complying with the requirements of this Section may be duly admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule as prima facie proof of the cause of death of the person to whom it relates. The records referred to in this Section shall be limited to the records of the results of post-mortem examinations of the findings of autopsy and toxicological laboratory examinations.

Persons who prepare reports or records offered in evidence hereunder may be subpoenaed as witnesses in civil or criminal cases upon the request of either party to the cause. However, if such person is dead, the county coroner or a duly authorized official of the coroner's office may testify to the fact that the examining pathologist, toxicologist or other medical or laboratory examiner is deceased and that the offered report or record was prepared by such deceased person. The witness must further attest that the medical report or record was prepared in the ordinary and usual course of the deceased person's duty or employment in conformity with the provisions of this Section.

(Source: P.A. 82-783.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-6)

Sec. 115-6. Appointment of Psychiatrist or Clinical Psychologist. If the defendant has given notice that he may rely upon the defense of insanity as defined in Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or the defendant indicates that he intends to plead guilty but mentally ill or the defense of intoxicated or drugged condition as defined in Section 6-3 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or if the facts and circumstances of the case justify a reasonable belief that the aforesaid defenses may be raised, the Court shall, on motion of the State, order the defendant to submit to examination by at least one clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, to be named by the prosecuting attorney. The Court shall also order the defendant to submit to an examination by one neurologist, one clinical psychologist and one electroencephalographer to be named by the prosecuting attorney if the State asks for one or more of such additional examinations. The Court may order additional examinations if the Court finds that additional examinations by additional experts will be of substantial value in the determination of issues of insanity or drugged conditions. The reports of such experts shall be made available to the defense. Any statements made by defendant to such experts shall not be admissible against the defendant unless he raises the defense of insanity or the defense of drugged condition, in which case they shall be admissible only on the issue of whether he was insane or drugged. The refusal of the defendant to cooperate in such examinations shall not automatically preclude the raising of the aforesaid defenses but shall preclude the defendant from offering expert evidence or testimony tending to support such defenses if the expert evidence or testimony is based upon the expert's examination of the defendant. If the Court, after a hearing, determines to its satisfaction that the defendant's refusal to cooperate was unreasonable it may, in its sound discretion, bar any or all evidence upon the defense asserted.

(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-6.1)

Sec. 115-6.1. Prostitution; affirmative defense.

(a) In prosecutions for prostitution, when the accused intends to raise at trial the affirmative defense provided in subsection (c-5) of Section 11-14 of the Criminal Code of 2012 and has reason to believe that the evidence presented in asserting that defense may jeopardize the safety of the accused, courtroom personnel, or others impacted by human trafficking, the accused may file under seal a motion for an in camera hearing to review the accused's safety concerns. Upon receipt of the motion and notice to the parties, the court shall conduct an in camera hearing, with counsel present, limited to review of potential safety concerns. The court shall cause an official record of the in camera hearing to be made, which shall be kept under seal. The court shall not consider the merits of the affirmative defense during the in camera review.

(b) If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the assertion of an affirmative defense under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-14 of the Criminal Code of 2012 by the accused in open court would likely jeopardize the safety of the accused, court personnel, or other persons, the court may clear the courtroom with the agreement of the accused, order additional in camera hearings, seal the records, prohibit court personnel from disclosing the proceedings without prior court approval, or take any other appropriate measure that in the court's discretion will enhance the safety of the proceedings and ensure the accused a full and fair opportunity to assert his or her affirmative defense.

(c) Statements made by the accused during the in camera hearing to review safety concerns shall not be admissible against the accused for the crimes charged.

(Source: P.A. 99-109, eff. 7-22-15.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-7)

Sec. 115-7. a. In prosecutions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, criminal sexual abuse, or criminal transmission of HIV; and in prosecutions for battery and aggravated battery, when the commission of the offense involves sexual penetration or sexual conduct as defined in Section 11-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012; and with the trial or retrial of the offenses formerly known as rape, deviate sexual assault, indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child, the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code is inadmissible except (1) as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code with the accused when this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which the offense is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be admitted.

b. No evidence admissible under this Section shall be introduced unless ruled admissible by the trial judge after an offer of proof has been made at a hearing to be held in camera in order to determine whether the defense has evidence to impeach the witness in the event that prior sexual activity with the defendant is denied. Such offer of proof shall include reasonably specific information as to the date, time and place of the past sexual conduct between the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code and the defendant. Unless the court finds that reasonably specific information as to date, time or place, or some combination thereof, has been offered as to prior sexual activity with the defendant, counsel for the defendant shall be ordered to refrain from inquiring into prior sexual activity between the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code and the defendant. The court shall not admit evidence under this Section unless it determines at the hearing that the evidence is relevant and the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence shall be admissible at trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies the evidence that may be admitted and areas with respect to which the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code may be examined or cross examined.

(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-7.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-7.1)

Sec. 115-7.1. Court may not order mental examination of sex victim. Except where explicitly authorized by this Code or by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois, no court may require or order a witness who is the victim of an alleged sex offense to submit to or undergo either a psychiatric or psychological examination.

(Source: P.A. 83-289.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-7.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-7.2)

Sec. 115-7.2. In a prosecution for an illegal sexual act perpetrated upon a victim, including but not limited to prosecutions for violations of Sections 11-1.20 through 11-1.60 or 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, or ritualized abuse of a child under Section 12-33 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, testimony by an expert, qualified by the court relating to any recognized and accepted form of post-traumatic stress syndrome shall be admissible as evidence.

(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-7.3)

Sec. 115-7.3. Evidence in certain cases.

(a) This Section applies to criminal cases in which:

(1) the defendant is accused of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, criminal sexual abuse, child pornography, aggravated child pornography, criminal transmission of HIV, or child abduction as defined in paragraph (10) of subsection (b) of Section 10-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012;

(2) the defendant is accused of battery, aggravated battery, first degree murder, or second degree murder when the commission of the offense involves sexual penetration or sexual conduct as defined in Section 11-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012; or

(3) the defendant is tried or retried for any of the offenses formerly known as rape, deviate sexual assault, indecent liberties with a child, or aggravated indecent liberties with a child.

(b) If the defendant is accused of an offense set forth in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) or the defendant is tried or retried for any of the offenses set forth in paragraph (3) of subsection (a), evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses set forth in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a), or evidence to rebut that proof or an inference from that proof, may be admissible (if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence) and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.

(c) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:

(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or

(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.

(d) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.

(e) In a criminal case in which evidence is offered under this Section, proof may be made by specific instances of conduct, testimony as to reputation, or testimony in the form of an expert opinion, except that the prosecution may offer reputation testimony only after the opposing party has offered that testimony.

(f) In prosecutions for a violation of Section 10-2, 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-3.05, 12-4, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, 12-16, or 18-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, involving the involuntary delivery of a controlled substance to a victim, no inference may be made about the fact that a victim did not consent to a test for the presence of controlled substances.

(Source: P.A. 97-1109, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13; 98-160, eff. 1-1-14.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-7.4)

Sec. 115-7.4. Evidence in domestic violence cases.

(a) In a criminal prosecution in which the defendant is accused of an offense of domestic violence as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, or first degree murder or second degree murder when the commission of the offense involves domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.

(b) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:

(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or

(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.

(c) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.

(d) In a criminal case in which evidence is offered under this Section, proof may be made by specific instances of conduct, testimony as to reputation, or testimony in the form of an expert opinion, except that the prosecution may offer reputation testimony only after the opposing party has offered that testimony.

(Source: P.A. 97-1036, eff. 8-20-12.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-8)

Sec. 115-8. A defendant may waive his right to be present during trial. However, upon motion of the State's Attorney made prior to or during trial, the court shall order the defendant to present himself in open court for the purpose of identification.

(Source: P.A. 77-1426.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-9) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-9)

Sec. 115-9. (a) In a prosecution for theft, retail theft, deceptive practice, robbery, armed robbery, burglary or residential burglary, the court shall receive as competent evidence, a photograph of property over which the accused is alleged to have exerted unauthorized control or to have otherwise obtained unlawfully, if the photograph:

(1) will serve the purpose of demonstrating the nature of the property; and

(2) is otherwise admissible into evidence under all other rules of law governing the admissibility of photographs into evidence. The fact that it is impractical to introduce into evidence the actual property for any reason, including its size, weight, or unavailability, need not be established for the court to find a photograph of that property to be competent evidence. If a photograph is found to be competent evidence under this subsection, it is admissible into evidence in place of the property and to the same extent as the property itself.

(b) A law enforcement agency that is holding as evidence property over which a person is alleged to have exerted unauthorized control or to have otherwise obtained unlawfully, shall return that property to its owner if:

(1) the property has been photographed in a manner that will serve the purpose of demonstrating the nature of the property, and if these photographs are filed with or retained by the law enforcement agency in place of the property;

(2) receipt for the property is obtained from the owner upon delivery by the law enforcement agency;

(3) the prosecuting attorney who is prosecuting a case that involves the property furnishes the law enforcement agency with a written request for return of the property to its owner; and

(4) the property may be lawfully possessed by the owner.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section a court may, if a motion so requesting is filed by defendant before expiration of the time period specified in subsection (d) of this Section, order the law enforcement agency to hold such property as evidence pending completion of trial.

(d) The time period during which the defendant may file a motion with the court for retention of the property as evidence shall be as follows:

(1) if the property was being displayed, held, stored or offered for sale to the public by a person or entity holding a Retailers Occupation Tax Number issued by the State of Illinois, the time period shall expire 14 days after the arrest of the defendant;

(2) for all other property, the time period shall expire 30 days after the filing of an information or indictment, or in the case of misdemeanor charges within 30 days after the filing of a complaint.

(Source: P.A. 83-1362.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-9.2)

Sec. 115-9.2. Currency used in undercover investigation.

(a) In a prosecution in which United States currency was used by a law enforcement officer or agency or by a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer or agency in an undercover investigation of an offense that has imprisonment as an available sentence for a violation of the offense, the court shall receive, as competent evidence, a photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy of the currency used in the undercover investigation, if:

(1) the photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy will serve the purpose of demonstrating the nature of the currency;

(2) the individual serial numbers of the currency are clearly visible or if the amount of currency exceeds $500 the individual serial numbers of a sample of 10% of the currency are clearly visible, and any identification marks placed on the currency by law enforcement as part of the investigation are clearly visible;

(3) the photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy complies with federal law, rule, or regulation requirements on photographs, photostatic copies, or photocopies of United States currency; and

(4) the photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy is otherwise admissible into evidence under all other rules of law governing the admissibility of photographs, photostatic copies, or photocopies into evidence.

(b) The fact that it is impractical to introduce into evidence the actual currency for any reason, including its size, weight, or unavailability, need not be established for the court to find a photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy of that currency to be competent evidence.

(c) If a photograph, photostatic copy, or photocopy is found to be competent evidence under this Section, it is admissible into evidence in place of the currency and to the same extent as the currency itself.

(Source: P.A. 99-685, eff. 1-1-17; 100-201, eff. 8-18-17.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-10)

Sec. 115-10. Certain hearsay exceptions.

(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13, a person with an intellectual disability, a person with a cognitive impairment, or a person with a developmental disability, including, but not limited to, prosecutions for violations of Sections 11-1.20 through 11-1.60 or 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 and prosecutions for violations of Sections 10-1 (kidnapping), 10-2 (aggravated kidnapping), 10-3 (unlawful restraint), 10-3.1 (aggravated unlawful restraint), 10-4 (forcible detention), 10-5 (child abduction), 10-6 (harboring a runaway), 10-7 (aiding or abetting child abduction), 11-9 (public indecency), 11-11 (sexual relations within families), 11-21 (harmful material), 12-1 (assault), 12-2 (aggravated assault), 12-3 (battery), 12-3.2 (domestic battery), 12-3.3 (aggravated domestic battery), 12-3.05 or 12-4 (aggravated battery), 12-4.1 (heinous battery), 12-4.2 (aggravated battery with a firearm), 12-4.3 (aggravated battery of a child), 12-4.7 (drug induced infliction of great bodily harm), 12-5 (reckless conduct), 12-6 (intimidation), 12-6.1 or 12-6.5 (compelling organization membership of persons), 12-7.1 (hate crime), 12-7.3 (stalking), 12-7.4 (aggravated stalking), 12-10 or 12C-35 (tattooing the body of a minor), 12-11 or 19-6 (home invasion), 12-21.5 or 12C-10 (child abandonment), 12-21.6 or 12C-5 (endangering the life or health of a child) or 12-32 (ritual mutilation) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or any sex offense as defined in subsection (B) of Section 2 of the Sex Offender Registration Act, the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:

(1) testimony by the victim of an out of court statement made by the victim that he or she complained of such act to another; and

(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the victim describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual or physical act against that victim.

(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:

(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and

(2) The child or person with an intellectual disability, a cognitive impairment, or developmental disability either:

(A) testifies at the proceeding; or

(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement; and

(3) In a case involving an offense perpetrated against a child under the age of 13, the out of court statement was made before the victim attained 13 years of age or within 3 months after the commission of the offense, whichever occurs later, but the statement may be admitted regardless of the age of the victim at the time of the proceeding.

(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, or the intellectual capabilities of the person with an intellectual disability, a cognitive impairment, or developmental disability, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factor.

(d) The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.

(e) Statements described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall not be excluded on the basis that they were obtained as a result of interviews conducted pursuant to a protocol adopted by a Child Advocacy Advisory Board as set forth in subsections (c), (d), and (e) of Section 3 of the Children's Advocacy Center Act or that an interviewer or witness to the interview was or is an employee, agent, or investigator of a State's Attorney's office.

(f) For the purposes of this Section:

"Person with a cognitive impairment" means a person with a significant impairment of cognition or memory that represents a marked deterioration from a previous level of function. Cognitive impairment includes, but is not limited to, dementia, amnesia, delirium, or a traumatic brain injury.

"Person with a developmental disability" means a person with a disability that is attributable to (1) an intellectual disability, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or autism, or (2) any other condition that results in an impairment similar to that caused by an intellectual disability and requires services similar to those required by a person with an intellectual disability.

"Person with an intellectual disability" means a person with significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning which exists concurrently with an impairment in adaptive behavior.

(Source: P.A. 99-143, eff. 7-27-15; 99-752, eff. 1-1-17; 100-201, eff. 8-18-17.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-10.1)

Sec. 115-10.1. Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements. In all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if

(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial, and

(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and

(c) the statement--

(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or

(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness had personal knowledge, and

(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the witness, or

(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making of the statement either in his testimony at the hearing or trial in which the admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or

(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recording, or any other similar electronic means of sound recording.

Nothing in this Section shall render a prior inconsistent statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because such statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth herein.

(Source: P.A. 83-1042.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.2)

Sec. 115-10.2. Admissibility of prior statements when witness refused to testify despite a court order to testify.

(a) A statement not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as defined in subsection (c) and if the court determines that:

(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; and

(2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and

(3) the general purposes of this Section and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

(b) A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of the statement, including the name and address of the declarant.

(c) Unavailability as a witness is limited to the situation in which the declarant persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so.

(d) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim or lack of memory, inability or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.

(e) Nothing in this Section shall render a prior statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because the statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth in this Section.

(f) Prior statements are admissible under this Section only if the statements were made under oath and were subject to cross-examination by the adverse party in a prior trial, hearing, or other proceeding.

(Source: P.A. 93-413, eff. 8-5-03; 93-443, eff. 8-5-03; 94-53, eff. 6-17-05.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.2a)

Sec. 115-10.2a. Admissibility of prior statements in domestic violence prosecutions when the witness is unavailable to testify.

(a) In a domestic violence prosecution, a statement, made by an individual identified in Section 201 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 as a person protected by that Act, that is not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is identified as unavailable as defined in subsection (c) and if the court determines that:

(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; and

(2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and

(3) the general purposes of this Section and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

(b) A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of the statement, including the name and address of the declarant.

(c) Unavailability as a witness includes circumstances in which the declarant:

(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or

(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or

(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or

(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of health or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or

(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means; or

(6) is a crime victim as defined in Section 3 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act and the failure of the declarant to testify is caused by the defendant's intimidation of the declarant as defined in Section 12-6 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

(d) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.

(e) Nothing in this Section shall render a prior statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because the statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth in this Section.

(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.3)

Sec. 115-10.3. Hearsay exception regarding elder adults.

(a) In a prosecution for a physical act, abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation perpetrated upon or against an eligible adult, as defined in the Adult Protective Services Act, who has been diagnosed by a physician to suffer from (i) any form of dementia, developmental disability, or other form of mental incapacity or (ii) any physical infirmity, including but not limited to prosecutions for violations of Sections 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-3.1, 10-4, 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-11, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-3.05, 12-3.2, 12-3.3, 12-4, 12-4.1, 12-4.2, 12-4.5, 12-4.6, 12-4.7, 12-5, 12-6, 12-7.3, 12-7.4, 12-11, 12-11.1, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16, 12-21, 16-1, 16-1.3, 17-1, 17-3, 17-56, 18-1, 18-2, 18-3, 18-4, 18-5, 18-6, 19-6, 20-1.1, 24-1.2, and 33A-2, or subsection (b) of Section 12-4.4a of the Criminal Code of 2012, the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:

(1) testimony by an eligible adult, of an out of court statement made by the eligible adult, that he or she complained of such act to another; and

(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the eligible adult, describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a physical act, abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation perpetrated upon or against the eligible adult.

(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:

(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and

(2) The eligible adult either:

(A) testifies at the proceeding; or

(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement.

(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the condition of the eligible adult, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factor.

(d) The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of his or her intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.

(Source: P.A. 97-1108, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1109, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13; 98-49, eff. 7-1-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.4)

Sec. 115-10.4. Admissibility of prior statements when witness is deceased.

(a) A statement not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is deceased and if the court determines that:

(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; and

(2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and

(3) the general purposes of this Section and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

(b) A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of the statement, including the name of the declarant.

(c) Unavailability as a witness under this Section is limited to the situation in which the declarant is deceased.

(d) Any prior statement that is sought to be admitted under this Section must have been made by the declarant under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding and been subject to cross-examination by the adverse party.

(e) Nothing in this Section shall render a prior statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because the statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth in this Section.

(Source: P.A. 94-53, eff. 6-17-05.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.5)

Sec. 115-10.5. Hearsay exception regarding safe zone testimony.

(a) In any prosecution for any offense charged as a violation of Section 407 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, or Section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule any testimony by any qualified individual regarding the status of any property as:

(1) a truck stop or safety rest area, or

(2) a school or conveyance owned, leased or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school, or

(3) residential property owned, operated, and managed by a public housing agency, or

(4) a public park, or

(5) the real property comprising any church, synagogue, or other building, structure, or place used primarily for religious worship, or

(6) the real property comprising any of the following places, buildings, or structures used primarily for housing or providing space for activities for senior citizens: nursing homes, assisted-living centers, senior citizen housing complexes, or senior centers oriented toward daytime activities.

(b) As used in this Section, "qualified individual" means any person who (i) lived or worked within the territorial jurisdiction where the offense took place when the offense took place; and (ii) is familiar with various public places within the territorial jurisdiction where the offense took place when the offense took place.

(c) For the purposes of this Section, "qualified individual" includes any peace officer, or any member of any duly organized State, county, or municipal peace unit, assigned to the territorial jurisdiction where the offense took place when the offense took place.

(d) This Section applies to all prosecutions pending at the time this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly takes effect and to all prosecutions commencing on or after its effective date.

(Source: P.A. 94-556, eff. 9-11-05.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.5a)

Sec. 115-10.5a. Admissibility of evidence concerning gang databases.

(a) In this Section, "gang database", "gang member", and "shared gang database" have the same meanings ascribed to those terms as in Section 5 of the Law Enforcement Gang Database Information Act.

(b) In all criminal cases, evidence which indicates the mere presence that the person was or is on a gang database or a shared gang database is not admissible.

(Source: P.A. 103-185, eff. 6-30-23.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.6)

Sec. 115-10.6. (Repealed).

(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13. Repealed by P.A. 99-243, eff. 8-3-15.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.7)

Sec. 115-10.7. (Repealed).

(Source: P.A. 96-377, eff. 8-11-09. Repealed by P.A. 99-243, eff. 8-3-15.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-11) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-11)

Sec. 115-11. In a prosecution for a criminal offense defined in Article 11 or in Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, when the alleged victim of the offense was a minor under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, the court may exclude from the proceedings while the victim is testifying, regardless of the alleged victim's age at the time of the victim's courtroom testimony, all persons, who, in the opinion of the court, do not have a direct interest in the case, except the media. When the court publishes to the trier of fact videos, photographs, or any depiction of a minor under 18 years of age engaged in a sex act, the court may exclude from the proceedings all persons, who, in the opinion of the court, do not have a direct interest in the case, except the media. The court shall enter its finding that particular parties are disinterested and the basis for that finding into the record.

(Source: P.A. 102-994, eff. 5-27-22; 103-154, eff. 6-30-23.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-11.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-11.1)

Sec. 115-11.1. Use of "Rape". The use of the word "rape", "rapist", or any derivative of "rape" by any victim, witness, State's Attorney, defense attorney, judge or other court personnel in any prosecutions of offenses in Sections 11-1.20 through 11-1.60 or 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 is not inadmissible.

(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-12) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-12)

Sec. 115-12. Substantive Admissibility of Prior Identification. A statement is not rendered inadmissible by the hearsay rule if (a) the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing, and (b) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and (c) the statement is one of identification of a person made after perceiving him.

(Source: P.A. 83-367.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-13)

Sec. 115-13. In a prosecution for violation of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15 or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, statements made by the victim to medical personnel for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.

(Source: P.A. 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-14) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-14)

Sec. 115-14. Witness Competency. (a) Every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and no person is disqualified to testify to any matter, except as provided in subsection (b).

(b) A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is:

(1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him or her; or

(2) Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.

(c) A party may move the court prior to a witness' testimony being received in evidence, requesting that the court make a determination if a witness is competent to testify. The hearing shall be conducted outside the presence of the jury and the burden of proof shall be on the moving party.

(Source: P.A. 85-1190.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-15)

Sec. 115-15. Laboratory reports.

(a) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of the Cannabis Control Act, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, a laboratory report from the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic Services, that is signed and sworn to by the person performing an analysis and that states (1) that the substance that is the basis of the alleged violation has been weighed and analyzed, and (2) the person's findings as to the contents, weight and identity of the substance, and (3) that it contains any amount of a controlled substance or cannabis is prima facie evidence of the contents, identity and weight of the substance. Attached to the report shall be a copy of a notarized statement by the signer of the report giving the name of the signer and stating (i) that he or she is an employee of the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic Services, (ii) the name and location of the laboratory where the analysis was performed, (iii) that performing the analysis is a part of his or her regular duties, and (iv) that the signer is qualified by education, training and experience to perform the analysis. The signer shall also allege that scientifically accepted tests were performed with due caution and that the evidence was handled in accordance with established and accepted procedures while in the custody of the laboratory.

(a-5) In any criminal prosecution for reckless homicide under Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, or driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination of both, in violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or in any civil action held under a statutory summary suspension or revocation hearing under Section 2-118.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, a laboratory report from the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic Services, that is signed and sworn to by the person performing an analysis, and that states that the sample of blood, other bodily substance, or urine was tested for alcohol or drugs, and contains the person's findings as to the presence and amount of alcohol or drugs and type of drug is prima facie evidence of the presence, content, and amount of the alcohol or drugs analyzed in the blood, other bodily substance, or urine. Attached to the report must be a copy of a notarized statement by the signer of the report giving the name of the signer and stating (1) that he or she is an employee of the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic Services, (2) the name and location of the laboratory where the analysis was performed, (3) that performing the analysis is a part of his or her regular duties, (4) that the signer is qualified by education, training, and experience to perform the analysis, and (5) that scientifically accepted tests were performed with due caution and that the evidence was handled in accordance with established and accepted procedures while in the custody of the laboratory.

(b) The State's Attorney shall serve a copy of the report on the attorney of record for the accused, or on the accused if he or she has no attorney, before any proceeding in which the report is to be used against the accused other than at a preliminary hearing or grand jury hearing when the report may be used without having been previously served upon the accused.

(c) The report shall not be prima facie evidence if the accused or his or her attorney demands the testimony of the person signing the report by serving the demand upon the State's Attorney within 7 days from the accused or his or her attorney's receipt of the report.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-16)

Sec. 115-16. Witness disqualification. No person shall be disqualified as a witness in a criminal case or proceeding by reason of his or her interest in the event of the case or proceeding, as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his or her having been convicted of a crime; but the interest or conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness. A defendant in a criminal case or proceeding shall only at his or her own request be deemed a competent witness, and the person's neglect to testify shall not create a presumption against the person, nor shall the court permit a reference or comment to be made to or upon that neglect.

In criminal cases, husband and wife may testify for or against each other. Neither, however, may testify as to any communication or admission made by either of them to the other or as to any conversation between them during marriage, except in cases in which either is charged with an offense against the person or property of the other, in case of spouse abandonment, when the interests of their child or children or of any child or children in either spouse's care, custody, or control are directly involved, when either is charged with or under investigation for an offense under Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 and the victim is a minor under 18 years of age in either spouse's care, custody, or control at the time of the offense, or as to matters in which either has acted as agent of the other.

(Source: P.A. 96-1242, eff. 7-23-10; 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-17)

Sec. 115-17. Clerk; issuance of subpoenas. It is the duty of the clerk of the court to issue subpoenas, either on the part of the people or of the accused, directed to the sheriff or coroner of any county of this State. An attorney admitted to practice in the State of Illinois, as an officer of the court, may also issue subpoenas in a pending action. A witness who is duly subpoenaed who neglects or refuses to attend any court, under the requisitions of the subpoena, shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of the court. Attachments against witnesses who live in a different county from that where the subpoena is returnable may be served in the same manner as warrants are directed to be served out of the county from which they issue.

(Source: P.A. 96-485, eff. 1-1-10.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-17a)

Sec. 115-17a. Subpoenas to crime victims. In a post conviction proceeding, before the crime victim may be subpoenaed by the defendant, the defendant must first petition the court and give notice to the victim. At the hearing on the petition, the victim shall be given the opportunity to appear and object to the requested subpoena. At the request of the victim, the State's Attorney shall represent the victim in the proceeding. The court shall grant the request for the subpoena only if and to the extent it determines that the subpoena seeks evidence that is material and relevant to the post conviction hearing. For the purposes of this Section, "crime victim" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 3 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act.

(Source: Incorporates P.A. 89-291, eff. 1-1-96; 89-626, eff. 8-9-96.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-17b)

Sec. 115-17b. Administrative subpoenas.

(a) Definitions. As used in this Section:

"Electronic communication services" and "remote computing services" have the same meaning as provided in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in Chapter 121 (commencing with Section 2701) of Part I of Title 18 of the United States Code Annotated.

"Offense involving the sexual exploitation of children" means an offense under Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-6, 11-6.5, 11-6.6, 11-9.1, 11-14.4, 11-15.1, 11-17.1, 11-18.1, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, 11-21, 11-23, 11-25, 11-26, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or any attempt to commit any of these offenses when the victim is under 18 years of age.

(b) Subpoenas duces tecum. In any criminal investigation of an offense involving the sexual exploitation of children, the Attorney General, or his or her designee, or a State's Attorney, or his or her designee, may issue in writing and cause to be served subpoenas duces tecum to providers of electronic communication services or remote computing services requiring the production of records relevant to the investigation. Any such request for records shall not extend beyond requiring the provider to disclose the information specified in 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(2). Any subpoena duces tecum issued under this Section shall be made returnable to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Circuit in which the State's Attorney resides, or his or her designee, or for subpoenas issued by the Attorney General, the subpoena shall be made returnable to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Circuit to which the investigation pertains, or his or her designee, to determine whether the documents are privileged and whether the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive.

(c) Contents of subpoena. A subpoena under this Section shall describe the records or other things required to be produced and prescribe a return date within a reasonable period of time within which the objects or records can be assembled and made available.

(c-5) Contemporaneous notice to Chief Judge. Whenever a subpoena is issued under this Section, the Attorney General or his or her designee or the State's Attorney or his or her designee shall be required to provide a copy of the subpoena to the Chief Judge of the county in which the subpoena is returnable.

(d) Modifying or quashing subpoena. At any time before the return date specified in the subpoena, the person or entity to whom the subpoena is directed may petition for an order modifying or quashing the subpoena on the grounds that the subpoena is oppressive or unreasonable or that the subpoena seeks privileged documents or records.

(e) Ex parte order. An Illinois circuit court for the circuit in which the subpoena is or will be issued, upon application of the Attorney General, or his or her designee, or State's Attorney, or his or her designee, may issue an ex parte order that no person or entity disclose to any other person or entity (other than persons necessary to comply with the subpoena) the existence of such subpoena for a period of up to 90 days.

(1) Such order may be issued upon a showing that the things being sought may be relevant to the investigation and there is reason to believe that such disclosure may result in:

(A) endangerment to the life or physical safety of any person;

(B) flight to avoid prosecution;

(C) destruction of or tampering with evidence;

(D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or

(E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.

(2) An order under this Section may be renewed for additional periods of up to 90 days upon a showing that the circumstances described in paragraph (1) of this subsection (e) continue to exist.

(f) Enforcement. A witness who is duly subpoenaed who neglects or refuses to comply with the subpoena shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of the court. A subpoena duces tecum issued under this Section may be enforced pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings.

(g) Immunity from civil liability. Notwithstanding any federal, State, or local law, any person, including officers, agents, and employees, receiving a subpoena under this Section, who complies in good faith with the subpoena and thus produces the materials sought, shall not be liable in any court of Illinois to any customer or other person for such production or for nondisclosure of that production to the customer.

(Source: P.A. 99-642, eff. 7-28-16.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-18)

Sec. 115-18. Employee protected. No employer shall discharge or terminate, or threaten to discharge or terminate, from his or her employment, or otherwise punish or penalize his or her employee who is a witness to a crime, because of time lost from regular employment resulting from his or her attendance at a proceeding under subpoena issued in any criminal proceeding relative to the crime. An employer who knowingly or intentionally violates this Section shall be proceeded against and punished for contempt of court. This Section shall not be construed as requiring an employer to pay an employee for time lost resulting from attendance at any proceeding.

(Source: P.A. 89-234, eff. 1-1-96.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-19)

Sec. 115-19. Polygraph. In the course of a criminal trial the court shall not require, request, or suggest that the defendant submit to a polygraphic detection deception test, commonly known as a lie detector test, to questioning under the effect of thiopental sodium, or to any other test or questioning by means of a mechanical device or chemical substance.

(Source: P.A. 89-234, eff. 1-1-96.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-20)

Sec. 115-20. Evidence of prior conviction.

(a) Evidence of a prior conviction of a defendant for domestic battery, aggravated battery committed against a family or household member as defined in Section 112A-3, stalking, aggravated stalking, or violation of an order of protection is admissible in a later criminal prosecution for any of these types of offenses when the victim is the same person who was the victim of the previous offense that resulted in conviction of the defendant.

(b) If the defendant is accused of an offense set forth in subsection (a) or the defendant is tried or retried for any of the offenses set forth in subsection (a), evidence of the defendant's conviction for another offense or offenses set forth in subsection (a) may be admissible (if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence) and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant if the victim is the same person who was the victim of the previous offense that resulted in conviction of the defendant.

(c) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:

(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or

(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.

(d) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.

(e) In a criminal case in which evidence is offered under this Section, proof may be made by specific instances of conduct as evidenced by proof of conviction, testimony as to reputation, or testimony in the form of an expert opinion, except that the prosecution may offer reputation testimony only after the opposing party has offered that testimony.

(Source: P.A. 90-387, eff. 1-1-98.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-21)

Sec. 115-21. Informant testimony.

(a) For the purposes of this Section, "informant" means someone who is purporting to testify about admissions made to him or her by the accused while detained or incarcerated in a penal institution contemporaneously.

(b) This Section applies to any criminal proceeding brought under Sections 9-1, 9-1.2, 9-2, 9-2.1, 9-3, 9-3.2, 9-3.3, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, or 20-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, in which the prosecution attempts to introduce evidence of incriminating statements made by the accused to or overheard by an informant.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d-5), in any case under this Section, the prosecution shall disclose at least 30 days prior to a relevant evidentiary hearing or trial:

(1) the complete criminal history of the informant;

(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or will make in the future to the informant;

(3) the statements made by the accused;

(4) the time and place of the statements, the time and place of their disclosure to law enforcement officials, and the names of all persons who were present when the statements were made;

(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony or statement and, if so, the time and place of the recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names of the persons who were present at the recantation;

(6) other cases in which the informant testified, provided that the existence of such testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or statement; and

(7) any other information relevant to the informant's credibility.

(d) Except as provided in subsection (d-5), in any case under this Section, the prosecution shall timely disclose at least 30 days prior to any relevant evidentiary hearing or trial its intent to introduce the testimony of an informant. The court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the testimony of the informant is reliable, unless the defendant waives such a hearing. If the prosecution fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the informant's testimony is reliable, the court shall not allow the testimony to be heard at trial. At this hearing, the court shall consider the factors enumerated in subsection (c) as well as any other factors relating to reliability.

(d-5) The court may permit the prosecution to disclose its intent to introduce the testimony of an informant with less notice than the 30-day notice required under subsections (c) and (d) of this Section if the court finds that the informant was not known prior to the 30-day notice period and could not have been discovered or obtained by the exercise of due diligence by the prosecution prior to the 30-day notice period. Upon good cause shown, the court may set a reasonable notice period under the circumstances or may continue the trial on its own motion to allow for a reasonable notice period, which motion shall toll the speedy trial period under Section 103-5 of this Code for the period of the continuance.

(e) If a lawful recording of an incriminating statement is made of an accused to an informant or made of a statement of an informant to law enforcement or the prosecution, including any deal, promise, inducement, or other benefit offered to the informant, the accused may request a reliability hearing under subsection (d) of this Section and the prosecution shall be subject to the disclosure requirements of subsection (c) of this Section.

(f) (Blank).

(g) This Section applies to all criminal prosecutions under subsection (b) of this Section on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly.

(Source: P.A. 100-1119, eff. 1-1-19.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-22)

Sec. 115-22. Witness inducements. When the State intends to introduce the testimony of a witness in a capital case, the State shall, before trial, disclose to the defendant and to his or her defense counsel the following information, which shall be reduced to writing:

(1) whether the witness has received or been promised anything, including pay, immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, or personal advantage, in exchange for testimony;

(2) any other case in which the witness testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, and whether the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the witness received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement; provided that the existence of such testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry;

(3) whether the witness has ever changed his or her testimony;

(4) the criminal history of the witness; and

(5) any other evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness.

(Source: P.A. 93-605, eff. 11-19-03.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-23)

Sec. 115-23. Admissibility of cannabis. In a prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of Section 4 of the Cannabis Control Act or a municipal ordinance for possession of cannabis that is punished by only a fine, cannabis shall only be admitted into evidence based upon:

(1) a properly administered field test; or

(2) opinion testimony of a peace officer based on the officer's training and experience as qualified by the court.

(Source: P.A. 99-697, eff. 7-29-16.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 116 heading) ARTICLE 116. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

(725 ILCS 5/116-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 116-1)

Sec. 116-1. Motion for new trial.

(a) Following a verdict or finding of guilty the court may grant the defendant a new trial.

(b) A written motion for a new trial shall be filed by the defendant within 30 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(c) The motion for a new trial shall specify the grounds therefor.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 116-2)

Sec. 116-2. Motion in arrest of judgment. (a) A written motion in arrest of judgment shall be filed by the defendant within 30 days following the entry of a verdict or finding of guilty. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(b) The court shall grant the motion when:

(1) The indictment, information or complaint does not charge an offense, or

(2) The court is without jurisdiction of the cause.

(c) A motion in arrest of judgment attacking the indictment, information, or complaint on the ground that it does not charge an offense shall be denied if the indictment, information or complaint apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution out of the same conduct.

(Source: P.A. 86-391.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-2.1)

Sec. 116-2.1. Motion to vacate prostitution convictions for sex trafficking victims.

(a) A motion under this Section may be filed at any time following the entry of a verdict or finding of guilty where the conviction was under Section 11-14 (prostitution) or Section 11-14.2 (first offender; felony prostitution) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or a similar local ordinance and the defendant's participation in the offense was a result of having been a trafficking victim under Section 10-9 (involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or trafficking in persons) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012; or a victim of a severe form of trafficking under the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. Section 7102(13)); provided that:

(1) a motion under this Section shall state why the facts giving rise to this motion were not presented to the trial court, and shall be made with due diligence, after the defendant has ceased to be a victim of such trafficking or has sought services for victims of such trafficking, subject to reasonable concerns for the safety of the defendant, family members of the defendant, or other victims of such trafficking that may be jeopardized by the bringing of such motion, or for other reasons consistent with the purpose of this Section; and

(2) reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(b) The court may grant the motion if, in the discretion of the court, the violation was a result of the defendant having been a victim of human trafficking. Evidence of such may include, but is not limited to:

(1) certified records of federal or State court proceedings which demonstrate that the defendant was a victim of a trafficker charged with a trafficking offense under Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, or under 22 U.S.C. Chapter 78;

(2) certified records of "approval notices" or "law enforcement certifications" generated from federal immigration proceedings available to such victims; or

(3) a sworn statement from a trained professional staff of a victim services organization, an attorney, a member of the clergy, or a medical or other professional from whom the defendant has sought assistance in addressing the trauma associated with being trafficked.

Alternatively, the court may consider such other evidence as it deems of sufficient credibility and probative value in determining whether the defendant is a trafficking victim or victim of a severe form of trafficking.

(c) If the court grants a motion under this Section, it must vacate the conviction and may take such additional action as is appropriate in the circumstances.

(Source: P.A. 97-267, eff. 1-1-12; 97-897, eff. 1-1-13; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-3)

Sec. 116-3. Motion for fingerprint, Integrated Ballistic Identification System, or forensic testing not available at trial or guilty plea regarding actual innocence.

(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the performance of fingerprint, Integrated Ballistic Identification System, or forensic DNA testing, including comparison analysis of genetic marker groupings of the evidence collected by criminal justice agencies pursuant to the alleged offense, to those of the defendant, to those of other forensic evidence, and to those maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial or guilty plea which resulted in his or her conviction, and:

(1) was not subject to the testing which is now requested at the time of trial; or

(2) although previously subjected to testing, can be subjected to additional testing utilizing a method that was not scientifically available at the time of trial that provides a reasonable likelihood of more probative results.

Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:

(1) identity was the issue in the trial or guilty plea which resulted in his or her conviction; and

(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect.

(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable conditions designed to protect the State's interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing process upon a determination that:

(1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence (i) materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence when the defendant's conviction was the result of a trial, even though the results may not completely exonerate the defendant, or (ii) that would raise a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been acquitted if the results of the evidence to be tested had been available prior to the defendant's guilty plea and the petitioner had proceeded to trial instead of pleading guilty, even though the results may not completely exonerate the defendant; and

(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.

(d) If evidence previously tested pursuant to this Section reveals an unknown fingerprint from the crime scene that does not match the defendant or the victim, the order of the Court shall direct the prosecuting authority to request the Illinois State Police Bureau of Forensic Science to submit the unknown fingerprint evidence into the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AIFIS) for identification.

(e) In the court's order to allow testing, the court shall order the investigating authority to prepare an inventory of the evidence related to the case and issue a copy of the inventory to the prosecution, the petitioner, and the court.

(f) When a motion is filed to vacate based on favorable post-conviction testing results, the State may, upon request, reactivate victim services for the victim of the crime during the pendency of the proceedings, and, as determined by the court after consultation with the victim or victim advocate, or both, following final adjudication of the case.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-4)

Sec. 116-4. Preservation of evidence for forensic testing.

(a) Before or after the trial in a prosecution for a violation of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or in a prosecution for an offense defined in Article 9 of that Code, or in a prosecution for an attempt in violation of Section 8-4 of that Code of any of the above-enumerated offenses, unless otherwise provided herein under subsection (b) or (c), a law enforcement agency or an agent acting on behalf of the law enforcement agency shall preserve, subject to a continuous chain of custody, any physical evidence in their possession or control that is reasonably likely to contain forensic evidence, including, but not limited to, fingerprints or biological material secured in relation to a trial and with sufficient documentation to locate that evidence.

(b) After a judgment of conviction is entered, the evidence shall either be impounded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court or shall be securely retained by a law enforcement agency. Retention shall be until the completion of the sentence, including the period of mandatory supervised release for the offense, or January 1, 2006, whichever is later, for any conviction for an offense or an attempt of an offense defined in Article 9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or in Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or for 7 years following any conviction for any other felony for which the defendant's genetic profile may be taken by a law enforcement agency and submitted for comparison in a forensic DNA database for unsolved offenses.

(c) After a judgment of conviction is entered, the law enforcement agency required to retain evidence described in subsection (a) may petition the court with notice to the defendant or, in cases where the defendant has died, his estate, his attorney of record, or an attorney appointed for that purpose by the court for entry of an order allowing it to dispose of evidence if, after a hearing, the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) it has no significant value for forensic science analysis and should be returned to its rightful owner, destroyed, used for training purposes, or as otherwise provided by law; or

(2) it has no significant value for forensic science analysis and is of a size, bulk, or physical character not usually retained by the law enforcement agency and cannot practicably be retained by the law enforcement agency; or

(3) there no longer exists a reasonable basis to require the preservation of the evidence because of the death of the defendant.

(d) The court may order the disposition of the evidence if the defendant is allowed the opportunity to take reasonable measures to remove or preserve portions of the evidence in question for future testing.

(d-5) Any order allowing the disposition of evidence pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) shall be a final and appealable order. No evidence shall be disposed of until 30 days after the order is entered, and if a notice of appeal is filed, no evidence shall be disposed of until the mandate has been received by the circuit court from the appellate court.

(d-10) All records documenting the possession, control, storage, and destruction of evidence and all police reports, evidence control or inventory records, and other reports cited in this Section, including computer records, must be retained for as long as the evidence exists and may not be disposed of without the approval of the Local Records Commission.

(e) In this Section, "law enforcement agency" includes any of the following or an agent acting on behalf of any of the following: a municipal police department, county sheriff's office, any prosecuting authority, the Illinois State Police, or any other State, university, county, federal, or municipal police unit or police force.

"Biological material" includes, but is not limited to, any blood, hair, saliva, or semen from which genetic marker groupings may be obtained.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/116-5)

Sec. 116-5. Motion for DNA database search (genetic marker groupings comparison analysis).

(a) Upon motion by a defendant charged with any offense where DNA evidence may be material to the defense investigation or relevant at trial, a court may order a DNA database search by the Illinois State Police. Such analysis may include comparing:

(1) the genetic profile from forensic evidence that was secured in relation to the trial against the genetic profile of the defendant,

(2) the genetic profile of items of forensic evidence secured in relation to trial to the genetic profile of other forensic evidence secured in relation to trial, or

(3) the genetic profiles referred to in subdivisions (1) and (2) against:

(i) genetic profiles of offenders maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, or

(ii) genetic profiles, including but not limited to, profiles from unsolved crimes maintained in state or local DNA databases by law enforcement agencies.

(b) If appropriate federal criteria are met, the court may order the Illinois State Police to request the National DNA index system to search its database of genetic profiles.

(c) If requested by the defense, a defense representative shall be allowed to view any genetic marker grouping analysis conducted by the Illinois State Police. The defense shall be provided with copies of all documentation, correspondence, including digital correspondence, notes, memoranda, and reports generated in relation to the analysis.

(d) Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 117) ARTICLE 117. PROBATION

(725 ILCS 5/117-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 117-1)

Sec. 117-1. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/117-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 117-2)

Sec. 117-2. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/117-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 117-3)

Sec. 117-3. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 118) ARTICLE 118. SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT

(725 ILCS 5/118-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 118-1)

Sec. 118-1. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/118-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 118-2)

Sec. 118-2. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 77-2097, eff. 1-1-73.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 119 heading) ARTICLE 119. EXECUTION OF SENTENCE

(725 ILCS 5/119-1)

Sec. 119-1. Death penalty abolished.

(a) Beginning on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly, notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the death penalty is abolished and a sentence to death may not be imposed.

(b) All unobligated and unexpended moneys remaining in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly shall be transferred into the Death Penalty Abolition Fund, a special fund in the State treasury, to be expended by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, for services for families of victims of homicide or murder and for training of law enforcement personnel.

(Source: P.A. 96-1543, eff. 7-1-11.)

(725 ILCS 5/119-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 119-5)

Sec. 119-5. (Repealed).

(Source: P.A. 93-379, eff. 7-24-03. Repealed by P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 120 heading) ARTICLE 120. APPEAL BY THE STATE

(725 ILCS 5/120-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-1)

Sec. 120-1. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by P.A. 76-1412, eff. 9-22-69.)

(725 ILCS 5/120-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-2)

Sec. 120-2. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3615.)

(725 ILCS 5/120-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-3)

Sec. 120-3. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3615.)

(725 ILCS 5/120-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 120-4)

Sec. 120-4. (Repealed).

(Source: Repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3615.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 121 heading) ARTICLE 121. APPEAL BY DEFENDANT

(725 ILCS 5/121-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 121-1)

Sec. 121-1. Application of article.

Unless otherwise provided by Rules of the Supreme Court this Article shall govern review in all criminal cases.

(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/121-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 121-13)

Sec. 121-13. Pauper appeals.

(a) In any case wherein the defendant was convicted of a felony, if the court determines that the defendant desires counsel on appeal but is indigent the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender shall be appointed as counsel, unless with the consent of the defendant and for good cause shown, the court may appoint counsel other than the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender.

(b) In any case wherein the defendant was convicted of a felony the reviewing court, upon petition of the defendant's counsel made not more frequently than every 60 days after appointment, shall determine a reasonable amount to be allowed an indigent defendant's counsel other than the Public Defender or the State Appellate Defender for compensation and reimbursement of expenditures necessarily incurred in the prosecution of the appeal or review proceedings. The compensation shall not exceed $1500 in each case, except that, in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the limits herein stated may be made if the reviewing court certifies that the payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation. The reviewing court shall enter an order directing the county treasurer of the county where the case was tried to pay the amount allowed by the court. The reviewing court may order the provisional payment of sums during the pendency of the cause.

(c) (Blank).

(Source: P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24.)

(725 ILCS 5/Art. 121A heading) ARTICLE 121A. PENDING DIRECT APPEAL AFTER DEFENDANT'S DEATH (Source: P.A. 99-778, eff. 1-1-17.)