(720 ILCS 5/5-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-3)
Sec. 5-3.
Separate
conviction of person accountable.
A person who is legally accountable for the conduct of another which is
an element of an offense may be convicted upon proof that the offense was
committed and that he was so accountable, although the other person claimed
to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted, or has
been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, or is not
amenable to justice, or has been acquitted.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
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(720 ILCS 5/5-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-4)
Sec. 5-4.
Responsibility of corporation.
(a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the commission of an offense if,
but only if:
(1) The offense is a misdemeanor, or is defined by Sections 11-20, 11-20.1 or 24-1 of
this Code, or Section 44 of the "Environmental Protection Act", approved
June 29, 1970, as amended or is defined by another statute which clearly indicates a
legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation; and an agent of
the corporation performs the conduct which is an element of the offense
while acting within the scope of his or her office or employment and in behalf
of the corporation, except that any limitation in the defining statute,
concerning the corporation's accountability for certain agents or under
certain circumstances, is applicable; or
(2) The commission of the offense is authorized, requested,
commanded, or performed, by the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent who is acting within the scope of his or her employment in behalf of the
corporation.
(b) A corporation's proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the conduct
which is the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to
prevent the commission of the offense, is a defense to a prosecution for
any offense to which Subsection (a) (1) refers, other than an offense for
which absolute liability is imposed. This Subsection is inapplicable if the
legislative purpose of the statute defining the offense is inconsistent
with the provisions of this Subsection.
(c) For the purpose of this Section:
(1) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee, or other
person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
(2) "High managerial agent" means an officer of the corporation, or
any other agent who has a position of comparable authority for the
formulation of corporate policy or the supervision of subordinate employees
in a managerial capacity.
(Source: P.A. 85-1440.)
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(720 ILCS 5/5-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-5)
Sec. 5-5.
Accountability for conduct of corporation.
(a) A person is legally accountable for conduct which is an element of
an offense and which, in the name or in behalf of a corporation, he
performs or causes to be performed, to the same extent as if the conduct
were performed in his own name or behalf.
(b) An individual who has been convicted of an offense by reason of his
legal accountability for the conduct of a corporation is subject to the
punishment authorized by law for an individual upon conviction of such
offense, although only a lesser or different punishment is authorized for
the corporation.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
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(720 ILCS 5/Art. 6 heading) ARTICLE 6.
RESPONSIBILITY
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(720 ILCS 5/6-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 6-1)
Sec. 6-1.
Infancy.
No person shall be convicted of any offense unless he had attained his
13th birthday at the time the offense was committed.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
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(720 ILCS 5/6-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 6-2)
Sec. 6-2.
Insanity.
(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct
if at the time of
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
(b) The terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.
(c) A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense,
was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved
of criminal responsibility for his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally
ill.
(d) For purposes of this Section, "mental illness" or "mentally ill"
means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted
a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired
that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his behavior.
(e) When the defense of insanity has been presented during the trial,
the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity. However,
the burden of proof remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
each of the elements of each of the offenses charged, and, in a jury trial
where the insanity defense has been presented, the jury must be instructed
that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proving
that he is not guilty by reason of insanity until and unless it has first
determined that the State has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the offense with which he is charged.
(Source: P.A. 89-404, eff. 8-20-95; 90-593, eff. 6-19-98.)
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