720 ILCS 5/ Criminal Code of 2012.

(720 ILCS 5/4-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-3)

Sec. 4-3. Mental state.

(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7.

(b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4, 4-5 or 4-6 is applicable.

(c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an offense, is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as such.

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-4)

Sec. 4-4. Intent.

A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-5)

Sec. 4-5. Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:

(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.

(b) The result of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.

Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the term "willfully", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.

When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.

(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)

(720 ILCS 5/4-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-6)

Sec. 4-6. Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when that person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the term "wantonly", unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.

(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)

(720 ILCS 5/4-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-7)

Sec. 4-7. Negligence. A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when that person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.

(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)

(720 ILCS 5/4-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-8)

Sec. 4-8. Ignorance or mistake.

(a) A person's ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or law, except as provided in Section 4-3(c) above, is a defense if it negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.

(b) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute an offense is a defense if:

(1) the offense is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to him, and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or

(2) he acts in reliance upon a statute which later is determined to be invalid; or

(3) he acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of an Illinois Appellate or Supreme Court, or a United States appellate court later overruled or reversed; or

(4) he acts in reliance upon an official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the offense, made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute.

(c) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or reasonable belief, described in this Section 4-8 is a defense to the offense charged, he may be convicted of an included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be.

(d) A defense based upon this Section 4-8 is an affirmative defense.

(Source: P.A. 98-463, eff. 8-16-13.)

(720 ILCS 5/4-9) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-9)

Sec. 4-9. Absolute liability. A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7 if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $1,000, or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.

(Source: P.A. 96-1198, eff. 1-1-11.)

(720 ILCS 5/Art. 5 heading) ARTICLE 5. PARTIES TO CRIME

(720 ILCS 5/5-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-1)

Sec. 5-1. Accountability for conduct of another. A person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in Section 5-2, or both.

(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/5-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-2)

Sec. 5-2. When accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:

(a) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state;

(b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her so accountable; or

(c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.

When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when determining accountability.

A person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if:

(1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed;

(2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct was inevitably incident to its commission; or

(3) before the commission of the offense, he or she terminates his or her effort to promote or facilitate that commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly deprives his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that commission, (ii) gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.

(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)