(720 ILCS 5/4-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-5)
Sec. 4-5. Knowledge. A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or |
| her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.
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(b) The result of his or her conduct, described by
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| the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.
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Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully,
within the meaning of a statute using the term "willfully", unless the statute
clearly requires another meaning.
When the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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(720 ILCS 5/4-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-8)
Sec. 4-8. Ignorance or mistake. (a) A person's ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or
law, except as provided in Section 4-3(c) above, is a defense if it
negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes
with respect to an element of the offense.
(b) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute an
offense is a defense if:
(1) the offense is defined by an administrative |
| regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to him, and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or
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(2) he acts in reliance upon a statute which later is
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| determined to be invalid; or
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(3) he acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of
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| an Illinois Appellate or Supreme Court, or a United States appellate court later overruled or reversed; or
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(4) he acts in reliance upon an official
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| interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the offense, made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute.
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(c) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or
reasonable belief, described in this Section 4-8 is a defense to the
offense charged, he may be convicted of an included offense of which he
would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be.
(d) A defense based upon this Section 4-8 is an affirmative defense.
(Source: P.A. 98-463, eff. 8-16-13.)
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(720 ILCS 5/5-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-2)
Sec. 5-2. When
accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:
(a) having a mental state described by the statute |
| defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state;
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(b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her
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(c) either before or during the commission of an
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| offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.
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When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other circumstances by the trier of fact when determining accountability.
A person is not so accountable, however, unless the statute
defining the offense provides otherwise, if:
(1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed;
(2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct
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| was inevitably incident to its commission; or
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(3) before the commission of the offense, he or she
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| terminates his or her effort to promote or facilitate that commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly deprives his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that commission, (ii) gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
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(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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(720 ILCS 5/5-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-4)
Sec. 5-4.
Responsibility of corporation.
(a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the commission of an offense if,
but only if:
(1) The offense is a misdemeanor, or is defined by Sections 11-20, 11-20.1 or 24-1 of
this Code, or Section 44 of the "Environmental Protection Act", approved
June 29, 1970, as amended or is defined by another statute which clearly indicates a
legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation; and an agent of
the corporation performs the conduct which is an element of the offense
while acting within the scope of his or her office or employment and in behalf
of the corporation, except that any limitation in the defining statute,
concerning the corporation's accountability for certain agents or under
certain circumstances, is applicable; or
(2) The commission of the offense is authorized, requested,
commanded, or performed, by the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent who is acting within the scope of his or her employment in behalf of the
corporation.
(b) A corporation's proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the conduct
which is the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to
prevent the commission of the offense, is a defense to a prosecution for
any offense to which Subsection (a) (1) refers, other than an offense for
which absolute liability is imposed. This Subsection is inapplicable if the
legislative purpose of the statute defining the offense is inconsistent
with the provisions of this Subsection.
(c) For the purpose of this Section:
(1) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee, or other
person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
(2) "High managerial agent" means an officer of the corporation, or
any other agent who has a position of comparable authority for the
formulation of corporate policy or the supervision of subordinate employees
in a managerial capacity.
(Source: P.A. 85-1440.)
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(720 ILCS 5/6-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 6-2)
Sec. 6-2.
Insanity.
(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct
if at the time of
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
(b) The terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.
(c) A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense,
was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved
of criminal responsibility for his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally
ill.
(d) For purposes of this Section, "mental illness" or "mentally ill"
means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted
a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired
that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his behavior.
(e) When the defense of insanity has been presented during the trial,
the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity. However,
the burden of proof remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
each of the elements of each of the offenses charged, and, in a jury trial
where the insanity defense has been presented, the jury must be instructed
that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proving
that he is not guilty by reason of insanity until and unless it has first
determined that the State has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the offense with which he is charged.
(Source: P.A. 89-404, eff. 8-20-95; 90-593, eff. 6-19-98.)
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(720 ILCS 5/7-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-2)
Sec. 7-2. Use of
force in defense of dwelling.
(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to
the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to
prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a
dwelling. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or
likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if:
(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent, |
| riotous, or tumultuous manner, and he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent an assault upon, or offer of personal violence to, him or another then in the dwelling, or
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(2) He reasonably believes that such force is
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| necessary to prevent the commission of a felony in the dwelling.
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(b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7-4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct.
(Source: P.A. 93-832, eff. 7-28-04.)
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(720 ILCS 5/7-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-4)
Sec. 7-4.
Use of
force by aggressor.
The justification described in the preceding Sections of this Article is
not available to a person who:
(a) is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping |
| after the commission of, a forcible felony; or
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(b) initially provokes the use of force against
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| himself, with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or
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(c) otherwise initially provokes the use of force
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(1) such force is so great that he reasonably
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| believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or
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(2) in good faith, he withdraws from physical
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| contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force.
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(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983 .)
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(720 ILCS 5/7-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-5)
Sec. 7-5. Peace officer's use of force in making arrest. (a) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed
to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful
arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He
is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, to be
necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which he reasonably
believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm
while making the arrest. However, he is justified in using force likely
to cause death or great bodily harm only when: (i) he reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to
himself or such other person; or (ii) when he reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, both that:
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest |
| from being defeated by resistance or escape and the officer reasonably believes that the person to be arrested is likely to cause great bodily harm to another; and
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(2) The person to be arrested committed or attempted
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| a forcible felony which involves the infliction or threatened infliction of great bodily harm or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.
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As used in this subsection, "retreat" does not mean tactical
repositioning or other de-escalation tactics.
A peace officer is not justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm when there is no longer an imminent threat of great bodily harm to the officer or another.
(a-5) Where feasible, a peace officer shall, prior to the use of force, make reasonable efforts to identify himself or herself as a peace
officer and to warn that deadly force may be used.
(a-10) A peace officer shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that the person poses to himself or herself if a
reasonable officer would believe the person does not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to the peace officer or to another person.
(a-15) A peace officer shall not use deadly force against a person who is suspected of committing a property offense, unless that offense is terrorism or unless deadly force is otherwise authorized by law.
(b) A peace officer making an arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant
is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in
using if the warrant were valid, unless he knows that the warrant is
invalid.
(c) The authority to use physical force conferred on peace officers by this Article is a serious responsibility that shall be exercised judiciously and with respect for human rights and dignity and for the sanctity of every human life.
(d) Peace officers shall use deadly force only when reasonably necessary in defense of human life. In determining whether deadly force is reasonably necessary, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the totality of circumstances of each case, including, but not limited to, the proximity in time of the use of force to the commission of a forcible felony, and the reasonable feasibility of safely apprehending a subject at a later time, and shall use other available resources and techniques, if reasonably safe and feasible to a reasonable officer.
(e) The decision by a peace officer to use force shall be evaluated carefully and thoroughly, in a manner that reflects the gravity of that authority and the serious consequences of the use of force by peace officers, in order to ensure that officers use force consistent with law and agency policies.
(f) The decision by a peace officer to use force shall be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the same situation, based on the totality of the circumstances known to or perceived by the officer at the time of the decision, rather than with the benefit of hindsight, and that the totality of the circumstances shall account for occasions when officers may be forced to make quick judgments about using force.
(g) Law enforcement agencies are encouraged to adopt and develop policies designed to protect individuals with physical, mental health, developmental, or intellectual disabilities, or individuals who are significantly more likely to experience greater levels of physical force during police interactions, as these disabilities may affect the ability of a person to understand or comply with commands from peace officers.
(h) As used in this Section:
(1) "Deadly force" means any use of force that
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| creates a substantial risk of causing death or great bodily harm, including, but not limited to, the discharge of a firearm.
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(2) A threat of death or serious bodily injury is
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| "imminent" when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or great bodily harm to the peace officer or another person. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that, from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.
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(3) "Totality of the circumstances" means all facts
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| known to the peace officer at the time, or that would be known to a reasonable officer in the same situation, including the conduct of the officer and the subject leading up to the use of deadly force.
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(Source: P.A. 101-652, eff. 7-1-21; 102-28, eff. 6-25-21; 102-687, eff. 12-17-21.)
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(720 ILCS 5/7-5.5) Sec. 7-5.5. Prohibited use of force by a peace officer. (a) A peace officer, or any other person acting under the color of law, shall not use a chokehold or restraint above the shoulders with risk of asphyxiation in the performance of his or her duties, unless deadly force is justified under this Article. (b) A peace officer, or any other person acting under the color of law, shall not use a chokehold or restraint above the shoulders with risk of asphyxiation, or any lesser contact with the throat or neck area of another, in order to prevent the destruction of evidence by ingestion. (c)
As used in this Section, "chokehold" means applying any direct pressure to the throat, windpipe, or airway of another. "Chokehold" does not include any holding involving contact with the neck that is not intended to reduce the intake of air such as a headlock where the only pressure applied is to the head.
(d) As used in this Section, "restraint above the shoulders with risk of positional asphyxiation" means a use of a technique used to restrain a person above the shoulders, including the neck or head, in a position which interferes with the person's ability to breathe after the person no longer poses a threat to the officer or any other person. (e) A peace officer, or any other person acting under the color of law, shall not: (i) use force as punishment or retaliation; (ii) discharge kinetic impact projectiles and all |
| other non-lethal or less-lethal projectiles in a manner that targets the head, neck, groin, anterior pelvis, or back;
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(iii) discharge conducted electrical weapons in a
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| manner that targets the head, chest, neck, groin, or anterior pelvis;
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(iv) discharge firearms or kinetic impact
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| projectiles indiscriminately into a crowd;
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(v) use chemical agents or irritants for crowd
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| control, including pepper spray and tear gas, prior to issuing an order to disperse in a sufficient manner to allow for the order to be heard and repeated if necessary, followed by sufficient time and space to allow compliance with the order unless providing such time and space would unduly place an officer or another person at risk of death or great bodily harm; or
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(vi) use chemical agents or irritants, including
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| pepper spray and tear gas, prior to issuing an order in a sufficient manner to ensure the order is heard, and repeated if necessary, to allow compliance with the order unless providing such time and space would unduly place an officer or another person at risk of death or great bodily harm.
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(Source: P.A. 101-652, eff. 7-1-21; 102-28, eff. 6-25-21; 102-687, eff. 12-17-21.)
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(720 ILCS 5/7-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-8)
Sec. 7-8.
Force
likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
(a) Force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, within
the meaning of Sections 7-5 and 7-6 includes:
(1) The firing of a firearm in the direction of the |
| person to be arrested, even though no intent exists to kill or inflict great bodily harm; and
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(2) The firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which the
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| person to be arrested is riding.
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(b) A peace officer's discharge of a firearm using ammunition designed to
disable or control an individual without creating the likelihood of death or
great bodily harm shall not be considered force likely to cause death or great
bodily harm within the meaning of Sections 7-5 and 7-6.
(Source: P.A. 90-138, eff. 1-1-98.)
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