(735 ILCS 5/2-1401)
(from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401)
Relief from judgments.
(a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the
entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in this Section.
Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of review, and bills
in the nature of bills of review are abolished. All relief heretofore
obtainable and the grounds for such relief heretofore available,
whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be
available in every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the
nature of the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the
proceedings in which it was entered. Except as provided in the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, there shall be no distinction
between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise, as to
availability of relief, grounds for relief, or the relief obtainable.
(b) The petition must be filed in the same proceeding in which the
order or judgment was entered but is not a continuation thereof. The
petition must be supported by an affidavit or other appropriate showing as
to matters not of record. A petition to reopen a foreclosure proceeding must include as parties to the petition, but is not limited to, all parties in the original action in addition to the current record title holders of the property, current occupants, and any individual or entity that had a recorded interest in the property before the filing of the petition. All parties to the petition shall be notified
as provided by rule.
(b-5) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony;
(2) the movant's participation in the offense was
related to him or her previously having been a victim of domestic violence as perpetrated by an intimate partner;
(3) no evidence of domestic violence against the
movant was presented at the movant's sentencing hearing;
(4) the movant was unaware of the mitigating nature
of the evidence of the domestic violence at the time of sentencing and could not have learned of its significance sooner through diligence; and
(5) the new evidence of domestic violence against the
movant is material and noncumulative to other evidence offered at the sentencing hearing, and is of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the sentence imposed by the original trial court.
Nothing in this subsection (b-5) shall prevent a movant from applying for any other relief under this Section or any other law otherwise available to him or her.
As used in this subsection (b-5):
"Domestic violence" means abuse as defined in Section
103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.
"Forcible felony" has the meaning ascribed to the
term in Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
"Intimate partner" means a spouse or former spouse,
persons who have or allegedly have had a child in common, or persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship.
(b-10) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(A) she was convicted of a forcible felony;
(B) her participation in the offense was a direct
result of her suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis;
(C) no evidence of post-partum depression or
post-partum psychosis was presented by a qualified medical person at trial or sentencing, or both;
(D) she was unaware of the mitigating nature of the
evidence or, if aware, was at the time unable to present this defense due to suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis, or, at the time of trial or sentencing, neither was a recognized mental illness and as such, she was unable to receive proper treatment; and
(E) evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum
psychosis as suffered by the person is material and noncumulative to other evidence offered at the time of trial or sentencing, and it is of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the sentence imposed by the original court.
Nothing in this subsection (b-10) prevents a person from applying for any other relief under this Article or any other law otherwise available to her.
As used in this subsection (b-10):
"Post-partum depression" means a mood disorder which
strikes many women during and after pregnancy and usually occurs during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This depression can include anxiety disorders.
"Post-partum psychosis" means an extreme form of
post-partum depression which can occur during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This can include losing touch with reality, distorted thinking, delusions, auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoia, hyperactivity and rapid speech, or mania.
(c) Except as provided in Section 20b of the Adoption Act and Section
2-32 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, in a petition based
upon Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 or subsection (b-10) of this Section, or in a motion to vacate and expunge convictions under the Cannabis Control Act as provided by subsection (i) of Section 5.2 of the Criminal Identification Act, the petition
must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment.
Time during which the person seeking relief is under legal disability or
duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded
in computing the period of 2 years.
(c-5) Any individual may at any time file a petition and institute proceedings under this Section if his or her final order or judgment, which was entered based on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, has potential consequences under federal immigration law.
(d) The filing of a petition under this Section does not affect the
order or judgment, or suspend its operation.
(e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from the
record proper, the vacation or modification of an order or judgment
pursuant to the provisions of this Section does not affect the right,
title, or interest in or to any real or personal property of any person,
not a party to the original action, acquired for value after the entry
of the order or judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor
affect any right of any person not a party to the original action under
any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the petition,
pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment. When a petition is filed pursuant to this Section to reopen a foreclosure proceeding, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 15-1701 of this Code, the purchaser or successor purchaser of real property subject to a foreclosure sale who was not a party to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings is entitled to remain in possession of the property until the foreclosure action is defeated or the previously foreclosed defendant redeems from the foreclosure sale if the purchaser has been in possession of the property for more than 6 months.
(f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing right to
relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any existing method
to procure that relief.
(Source: P.A. 101-27, eff. 6-25-19; 101-411, eff. 8-16-19; 102-639, eff. 8-27-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)