Office of the Governor
207 State House
Springfield, Illinois 62706
Bruce Rauner
Governor
May
14, 2018
To
the Honorable Members of
The
Illinois House of Representatives,
100th
General Assembly:
Today
I return House Bill 1468 with specific recommendations for change.
This
legislation extends the existing 72-hour waiting period for sale or delivery of
handguns that is currently in law to a particular class of firearms. I am
further expanding the 72-hour waiting period to all firearms, no matter the
type. This achieves the bill’s intent in slowing down those who would do harm
to others, regardless of the type of weapon they may seek, and allowing more
time for detection and intervention of potentially dangerous individuals.
Further,
House Bill 1468 fails to address other key issues related to public safety and
the need to prevent mass shootings in our schools and public places, as well as
gun violence that happens every day on the streets of our cities and towns.
Nearly 25% of Illinois adults possess a Firearm Owners Identification Card and,
to many in our state, shooting sports and hunting are a core element of a
cherished culture. To others, guns represent death and violence. While the
cultural gap between these life experiences may seem vast, people from both
sides are coming together to address a common enemy: guns in the hands of
criminals or those who are dangerous to themselves or others. Illinois already
has some of the toughest gun laws in the country, but more needs to be done to
keep our schools and communities safe.
In
addition to expanding the 72-hour waiting period to all firearms, the ultimate
public safety objectives of this bill would be better served with comprehensive
solutions, including a clean ban on bump stocks and trigger cranks, enhancing
systemic transparency in our prosecutorial and sentencing requirements,
equipping schools with funding options for not only the facility upgrades they
need to increase security but also the law enforcement and mental health staff
they need to promote safe environments for our students, and reintroducing the
death penalty for the most egregious cases where no doubt is present for those
individuals who murder law enforcement officers and commit mass murders. These
issues need to be acted upon with the utmost urgency, and are therefore
included in this comprehensive amendment.
Bump
stocks and trigger cranks are accessories that in the wrong hands can be used
for mass destruction. Many public safety and legal experts agree that because
they are not firearms, banning them involves no infringement on the 2nd
Amendment. Therefore, instead of waiting for it to reach my desk, I have
included the current text of Senate Bill 2343 as part of this amendatory veto.
There
is nothing more precious than our children, and they deserve to be safe and
cared for at school. Last month, a School Safety Working Group formed by my
administration’s Illinois Terrorism Task Force submitted to me a list of 13
recommendations for action to protect students and school personnel from the
attacks that have plagued our nation. While many recommendations can be implemented
administratively, some require legislation and have been presented to the
bipartisan Legislative Public Safety Working Group we formed in March. The
meetings of that group have been productive and demonstrate the bipartisan
collaboration needed to get things done in this state. One recommendation of
the School Safety Working Group that was well-received by the Legislative
Public Safety Working Group and that requires legislation is amending the
County School Facilities Sales Tax statute to expand the authorized uses of
sales tax revenue approved by local referendum. The tax is currently restricted
to improvements in physical facilities, such as locks and security doors. I ask
that it be amended to include the hiring of school resource officers or mental
health workers based on local determination of local need. Today I exercise my
amendatory veto authority to submit to the General Assembly this important
legislation to improve and implement this school safety recommendation. I look
forward to receiving the final recommendations of the Legislative Public Safety
Working Group.
If
an individual is deemed dangerous to themselves or others, we must identify and
disarm them as soon as possible. This is why I am
exercising my amendatory veto authority to send to the General Assembly for its
concurrence the Gun Violence Restraining Order Act, which will allow for family
members and law enforcement to identify individuals who pose a danger to
themselves or others and petition a court to disarm those individuals. This
bill strikes a reasonable balance between the 2nd Amendment and
other constitutional rights of gun owners and the public interest in preventing
gun violence. This proposal includes a high level of due process protections
before a weapon may be seized, particularly regarding issuance of search
warrants by requiring that application be made by the State’s Attorney’s office
or law enforcement rather than a private citizen. It also applies only to those
cases in which less restrictive alternatives either have been tried and found
to be ineffective or would be inadequate or inappropriate under the
circumstances. It allows shifting of attorney and court fees in cases where a
petition for an order was frivolous and for vexatious reasons. These elements
ensure that the use of these measures is directed toward situations where
needed for to enhance public safety.
Once
guns are out of the hands of those who would do us harm, it is imperative that
prosecutors in the state of Illinois hold these individuals accountable for
their actions. Illinois has strong gun laws that carry stiff penalties for
crimes involving the illegal use or possession of firearms, especially for
repeat offenders. For example, last June I signed legislation that raised the
mandatory minimum for penalties and established sentencing guidelines for
repeat gun offenders. That legislation also requires judges who depart from
those guidelines to justify their reasoning for the record. However, no matter
how good the laws are or how stiff the penalties, they are no better than the
prosecutors and judges who apply them. Therefore, I am today exercising my
amendatory veto authority to send the General Assembly for its concurrence the
Gun Crime Charging and Sentencing Accountability and Transparency Act. When an
offense
involves the illegal use or possession of a firearm, State’s Attorneys should
charge the most serious readily-provable offense unless there is a written
justification provided for why an exception is appropriate. Similarly, guilty
pleas should include a plea to the most serious charged offense unless there is
a written justification submitted to the court explaining why an exception is
appropriate. When gun charges are reduced as part of a plea agreement, the
public interest demands transparency regarding the reasons.
Finally,
anyone who deliberately kills a law enforcement officer or is a mass murderer
deserves the death penalty. There are legitimate reasons for concern about the
death penalty, reasons that I take seriously. Chief among those concerns is the
alarming number of people who have been convicted by juries “beyond a
reasonable doubt” and sentenced to death, but were later exonerated based on
DNA or other evidence demonstrating that the jury convicted the wrong person. Consequently,
the only morally justifiable standard of proof in a death penalty case is
“beyond all doubt.” This standard would apply not only at trial but also on
appeal. There is ample evidence that juries and judges are more likely to
sentence black men to death than others, resulting in obvious bias based on
race and gender. If a person is justly convicted beyond all doubt of a crime
for which death is deserved by a carefully crafted definition, then the only
sentence objectively consistent with the demands of justice is death. For these
reasons and in the interest of justice in cases of mass murder or murder of a
police officer, I am exercising my amendatory veto authority to submit to the
General Assembly a statute creating the offense of “death penalty murder,”
which would: 1) apply only to persons whose crime is so heinous as to clearly
deserve to be executed; 2) require that any doubt regarding identification and
guilt be resolved in favor of the accused both at trial and on appeal; and 3)
provide that the only authorized sentence for death penalty murder is death,
with a safety valve for those for whom the death penalty would be manifestly
unjust, such as those with intellectual disability.
The
tragedies experienced by our State and Nation due to gun violence in recent
months and years compel those elected to represent, legislate, and execute the
law to come together for serious conversations and impactful solutions.
Allowing these incidents to continue unanswered is unacceptable—our families,
friends, children and communities cannot wait any longer.
Therefore,
pursuant to Section 9(e) of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, I
hereby return House Bill 1468, entitled “AN ACT concerning criminal law,” with
the following specific recommendations for change:
On
page 1, immediately below line 3, by inserting the following:
“Article 1. Gun
Violence Restraining Order Act.
Section 1-1. Short title. This Article
may be cited as the Gun Violence Restraining Order Act, and references in this
Article to "this Act" mean this Article.
Section 1-5. Legislative findings.
The General Assembly finds as a matter
of legislative determination that to protect the safety and welfare of the
public it is necessary to provide a system of identifying and disarming persons
who pose a danger of imminent personal injury to themselves or others.
Section 1-10. Definitions.
In this Act:
“Danger”
means reasonably likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.
“Firearm” has the same
meaning ascribed to the term in Section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners
Identification Card Act.
“Firearm ammunition” has
the same meaning ascribed to the term in Section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners
Identification Card Act.
“Immediate family member”
means a spouse, child, sibling, parent, grandparent, or grandchild, and
includes a step-parent, step-child, step-sibling, or adoptive or foster
relationship, or any other person who regularly resides in the same household.
Section 1-15. Emergency gun violence
restraining order.
(a) Upon written
complaint for an emergency gun violence restraining order filed by a State’s
Attorney, assistant State’s Attorney, law enforcement officer, or immediate
family member supported by evidence submitted under oath or affirmation,
subject to the penalties for perjury, and stating facts sufficient to show
probable cause to believe that:
(1) the identified
person poses an imminent danger of causing death or
serious bodily injury to himself, herself, or any other person;
(2) the person
possesses or has ready access to one or more firearms; and
(3) less restrictive
alternatives either have been tried and found to be ineffective or would be
inadequate or inappropriate under the circumstances,
any judge in the jurisdiction in which
the person who is the subject of the complaint resides or is currently located
may issue an emergency gun violence restraining order prohibiting the subject
of the complaint from possessing, controlling, purchasing, receiving, or
attempting to possess, control, purchase, or receive a firearm or firearm
ammunition.
(a-5) Upon a finding
by the court supported by a preponderance of the evidence that a complaint for
an emergency gun violence restraining order is frivolous and filed for a
vexatious reason, the court shall order the complaining party to pay any
attorney’s fees and court costs incurred by the person who is the subject of
the complaint and to pay a civil penalty of at least $500 and up to $1000, to
be paid in that order of priority.
(b) In all cases in
which a complaint seeking an emergency gun violence restraining order pursuant
to subsection (a) of this Section is filed by a person other than a State’s
Attorney or assistant State’s Attorney, the judge receiving the complaint shall
promptly notify the appropriate State’s Attorney’s office of the filing of the
complaint and provide the State’s Attorney or his or her representative an
opportunity to be heard on the matter before issuing the requested order,
provided such opportunity to be heard causes no material delay.
(c) The court issuing
an emergency gun violence restraining order under subsection (a) of this
Section may order redaction of the name and any other personal identifying
information of any affiant or witness other than a law enforcement officer or
prosecutor in any copies of the complaint, order, or any related documents,
provided that the unredacted original shall be maintained in an official court
file that may be ordered sealed until further order of the court.
Section 1-20. Consideration of factors.
(a) In determining
whether grounds exist to issue an emergency gun violence restraining order, the
judge may consider, but is not limited to, evidence of:
(1) recent threats, acts, or attempted
acts of violence the person against himself, herself, or another person or
persons;
(2) a history of threats, acts, or
attempted acts of violence by the person against himself, herself, or another
person or persons;
(3) recent acts of cruelty to animals
as described in Section 3.01 of the Humane Care for Animals Act;
(4) social media posts or any other
statements or actions by such person evidencing an intent or propensity to
commit an act of violence resulting in personal injury to himself, herself, or
any other person;
(5) any previous determination that the
person poses a clear and present danger under subsection (d) of Section 8.1 of
the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and related administrative rules;
(6) failure to take medications
prescribed to control a mental illness otherwise likely to result or has
previously resulted in violent behavior;
(7) any disqualifying factor for
eligibility for a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card under the Firearm Owners
Identification Card Act;
(8) the illegal use of controlled
substances or excessive use of alcohol by the person; and
(9) any available evidence the person
does not pose an imminent danger of causing death or serious bodily injury to
himself, herself, or any other person.
(b) In considering the
weight to be given to these and any other relevant factors, the judge shall
consider the evidence as a whole.
(c) Any emergency gun
violence restraining order issued shall expire no later than 14 days from the
date the order is issued. The order shall state the date and time the order was
entered and shall expire. The order shall also contain the following statement:
“Based on credible evidence presented
to the Court, the Court finds: (1) there is probable cause to believe that the
person identified above poses an imminent danger of causing death or serious
bodily injury to himself, herself, or another person or persons; (2) the person
identified above possesses or has ready access to one or more firearms; and (3)
less restrictive alternatives to entering this order either have been tried and
found to be ineffective or would be inadequate or inappropriate under the
circumstances. Based on those findings, the Court orders that the person
identified above shall immediately surrender to the law enforcement officer or
officers serving upon him or her a copy of this order all firearms and firearm
ammunition he or she possesses, controls, or to which he or she has ready
access. Further, the person identified above is prohibited from possessing,
controlling, purchasing, receiving, or attempting to possess, control,
purchase, or receive a firearm or firearm ammunition while this order is in
effect. An evidentiary hearing shall be held within 14 days on the date and at
the time and place stated below to determine whether this temporary emergency
order should be made permanent for a period up to six months. At the hearing,
the person identified above shall have the right to appear, present evidence,
testify on his or her own behalf if he or she chooses to do so, make arguments
to the court, and be represented by an attorney retained at his or her own
expense.”
The order shall also state the date,
time, and place of the hearing.
(d) A copy of any
emergency gun violence restraining order entered shall be served on the subject
of the complaint by one or more law enforcement officers as soon as reasonably
possible after being entered. The officer or officers shall immediately take
custody of all firearms and firearm ammunition surrendered by the subject of
the complaint or in a location to which the officer or officers have or gain
lawful access, which shall be maintained in the custody of the sheriff or law
enforcement agency where the person resides or is found or the items are
surrendered until further order of the court.
(e) If no further
action is taken by the court by the date and time the order expires and if the
person who is the subject of the order is lawfully entitled to possess a
firearm, then any firearm or other items surrendered, seized, or transferred
under the emergency gun violence restraining order shall be promptly returned
to the person or transferred to an authorized representative lawfully entitled
to possess them.
Section 1-25. Gun violence prevention
search warrant.
(a) In any case in
which a judge issues an emergency gun violence restraining order or gun
violence restraining order, upon written application filed by a State’s
Attorney, assistant State’s Attorney, or law enforcement officer supported by
evidence submitted under oath or affirmation stating facts sufficient to show
probable cause to believe that:
(1) certifying that
the applicant has conducted an independent investigation and determined that no
reasonably available alternative will prevent such person from causing death or
serious bodily injury to himself, herself, or another person with a firearm or
firearms, any judge with jurisdiction where the items are located may issue a
search warrant for seizure of the firearm or firearms.
(b) An application for
a gun violence prevention search warrant may incorporate by reference any
previous complaint or other evidence submitted in the matter and the judge may
take judicial notice of any evidence presented to the court and any judicial
findings entered in any prior proceedings relating to the matter.
(c) Unless otherwise
provided in this Act, the procedures for issuance and execution of a gun
violence prevention search warrant shall conform to applicable provisions of
Article 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
(d) In determining whether grounds
exist to issue a gun violence prevention search warrant, the judge may
consider, but is not limited to, the factors described in Section 20 of this
Act.
Section 1-30. Hearing; gun violence
restraining order; and disposition of firearms.
(a) No later than 14
days after issuance of an emergency gun violence restraining order issued under
Section 15 of this Act, a court with jurisdiction where the subject of the
order resides or is found shall hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether a gun violence restraining order should be entered. At the hearing, the petitioner, or the State’s Attorney if
the petitioner was a law enforcement officer, shall have the burden of proving
all material facts by clear and convincing evidence. At the hearing, the person
who is the subject of the emergency gun violence restraining order shall have
the right to appear, present evidence, testify on his or her own behalf if he
or she chooses to do so or remain silent, make arguments to the court, and be
represented by an attorney retained at his or her own expense.
(a-5) The hearing may
be continued for up to 30 days at the request of the person who is the subject
of the emergency gun violence restraining order. If the person who is the
subject of the emergency gun violence restraining order fails to appear after
being served with a copy of the emergency gun violence restraining order or
after reasonable efforts to serve such order have failed, the evidentiary
hearing may proceed in his or her absence.
(b) In determining
whether grounds exist to issue a gun violence restraining order, the judge may
consider, but is not limited to, the factors described in Section 20 of this
Act.
(c) If, after a
hearing held pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section, the judge finds by
clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) the subject of the emergency gun
violence restraining order poses an imminent danger of causing death or serious
bodily injury to himself, herself, or any other person;
(2) the person possesses or has ready
access to one or more firearms; and
(3) less restrictive
alternatives either have been tried and found to be ineffective or would be
inadequate or inappropriate under the circumstances,
the judge shall enter a gun violence
restraining order containing the same prohibitions described in Section 15 of
this Act and ordering that any firearm and firearm ammunition surrendered or
seized under the emergency gun violence restraining order or gun violence
prevention search warrant issued under this Act shall continue to be held for
safekeeping by a designated law enforcement agency for a period not to exceed
six months. Otherwise, the judge shall order that the surrendered or seized
firearm and firearm ammunition be returned to the subject of the emergency
order.
(c-5) All firearms and
firearm ammunition surrendered or seized under this Act shall be maintained by
the law enforcement agency having custody of the items in a location and such
manner that when returned or transferred to their owner they shall be in the
same physical and operating condition as when surrendered or seized.
(d) Any person whose
firearm or firearm ammunition have been surrendered or ordered seized pursuant
to this Act, or the person’s legal representative, may transfer ownership or
possession of the items in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) of
Section 9.5 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, or other applicable
state or federal law, to any person eligible to possess a firearm under the
Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, subject to an order by the court and
agreement of the person receiving the items that they shall be maintained in a
secure manner inaccessible to the subject of an emergency gun violence
restraining order or gun violence restraining order while any such order is in
effect.
(e) If the judge at
any time determines that a firearm or other item surrendered or seized under an
emergency gun violence restraining order, gun violence restraining order, or
search warrant is owned by another person who is lawfully eligible to possess a
firearm, the judge may order the law enforcement agency having custody of the
firearm or item to deliver the firearm or item to the owner, subject to an
order by the court and agreement of the person receiving the items that they
shall be maintained in a secure manner inaccessible to the subject of an
emergency gun violence restraining order or gun violence restraining order
while any such order is in effect.
(f) At any time after
a court orders a law enforcement agency to retain a person’s firearm or firearm
ammunition under this Act, the person may petition the court for return of the
item. Upon receipt of the petition the court shall enter an order setting a
date for a hearing on the petition and inform the person and State’s Attorney
of the date, time, and location of the hearing. In a hearing on a petition
under this subsection (f), the person whose firearm or firearm ammunition has been
surrendered or seized may be represented by an attorney retained at his or her
own expense; and shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person does not pose an imminent danger of causing serious
bodily injury to himself, herself, or any other person.
(g) If, after a
hearing held under subsection (f) of this Section, the judge finds that the
person who is the subject of the complaint does not pose an imminent danger of
serious bodily injury to himself, herself, or any other person and that the
person is otherwise eligible to lawfully possess a firearm under the Firearm
Owners Identification Card Act, the judge shall order the law enforcement
agency having custody of the firearm or firearm ammunition to promptly return the
item to the person or authorized representative. The court shall direct the
Department of State Police to return and reinstate the person’s Firearm Owner’s
Identification Card if not otherwise expired, suspended, or revoked. If the
judge denies the person’s petition, the judge shall order that the firearm or
firearm ammunition surrendered or seized under this Act continue to be held by
the sheriff or law enforcement agency having custody of them for a period not
to exceed six months from the date of denial of the petition, and the person
may not file a subsequent petition until at least 90 days after the date on
which the petition was denied.
(h) Upon expiration of the
last order directing a law enforcement agency to retain a person’s firearm or
firearm ammunition under this Act, and upon request by the person who
surrendered the items or from whom the items were seized, the law enforcement
agency with custody of the items shall release the items to the person if the
person is otherwise eligible to lawfully possess a firearm to lawfully possess
a firearm under the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act. If the person fails
to request return of the firearm or firearm ammunition is ineligible to
lawfully possess a firearm and fails to transfer the firearm or other item to
another person pursuant to subsection (d) of this Section, the law enforcement
agency shall continue to retain the firearm or other item until entry of a
court order under subsection (i) of this Section.
(i) If after 5 years from
the expiration of the last order directing a law enforcement agency to retain a
person’s firearm or firearm ammunition under this Act, a firearm or firearm
ammunition continues to be held by a law enforcement agency under the order and
the person who is the subject of the order fails to request return of the item
or is ineligible to lawfully possess a firearm and fails to transfer the
firearm or other item to another person pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section, the court, after giving notice to the parties and conducting a
hearing, may order the law enforcement agency having custody of the firearm or
other item to dispose of the firearm or other item in whatever manner the court
deems appropriate.
Section 1-35. Suspension of Firearm
Owner’s Identification Card and concealed carry license
(a) Upon issuance of
an emergency gun violence restraining order under subsection (a) of Section 15
of this Act, the court shall immediately notify the Department of State Police.
The local law enforcement agency, upon direction of the court, shall
immediately mail the person’s Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and any
concealed carry license to the Department of State Police Firearm Owners
Identification Card Office for safekeeping. Upon receipt of the notice, the
Department of State Police shall immediately suspend any Firearm Owner’s
Identification Card and Concealed Carry License of the person who is the
subject of the order, pending the outcome of a hearing held pursuant to Section
30 of this Act. If, after the hearing, the court fails to issue a gun violence
restraining order the court shall immediately notify the Department of State
Police. Upon receipt of the notice, the Department of State Police shall
immediately reinstate and return the person’s Firearm Owner’s Identification
Card and any concealed carry license at no cost to the person.
(b) Upon entry of a
gun violence restraining order pursuant to Section 30 of this Act, the court
shall immediately notify the Department of State Police. Upon receipt of such
notice, the Illinois State Police shall immediately suspend any Firearm Owner’s
Identification Card and concealed carry license of the person who is the
subject of the order for the duration of the order.
Section 1-40. Military and police
firearms and personnel.
(a) Notwithstanding
any other provision of this Act, this Act shall not be construed or applied to
restrict the Illinois National Guard or Armed Forces of the United States from
issuing firearms to its personnel. Any firearm or firearm ammunition surrendered
or seized under this Act issued by or otherwise constituting property of the
Illinois National Guard or Armed Forces of the United States shall be promptly
delivered to the Illinois National Guard or appropriate branch of the Armed
Forces of the United States to be retained and used in whatever manner that
entity deems appropriate. Notice of any order entered under this Act relating
to a member of the Illinois National Guard or Armed Forces of the United States
shall be promptly provided to the Illinois National Guard or appropriate branch
of the Armed Forces of the United States.
(b) Any firearms or
firearm ammunition surrendered or seized under this act issued by or otherwise
constituting property of a law enforcement agency shall be promptly delivered to
the law enforcement agency to be retained and used in whatever manner the
agency deems appropriate, except that no such firearm or firearm ammunition may
be possessed by a person subject to an order entered under this Act. Notice of
any order entered under this Act relating to a law enforcement officer shall be
promptly provided to the person’s law enforcement agency.
Section 1-45. Penalty.
A person who knowingly violates an
emergency gun violence restraining order or gun violence restraining order entered
under this Act shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
Article 5. Gun Crime
Charging and Sentencing Accountability and Transparency Act.
Sec 5-1. Short title.
This Article may be cited as the Gun Crime
Charging and Sentencing Accountability and Transparency Act, and references in
this Article to "this Act" mean this Article.
Section 5-5. Plea agreement; State's Attorney.
In a criminal case, if a defendant is charged
with an offense involving the illegal use or possession of a firearm and
subsequently enters into a plea agreement in which in the charge will be
reduced to a lesser offense or a non-weapons offense in exchange for a plea of
guilty, at or before the time of sentencing, the State's Attorney shall file
with the court a written statement of his or her reasons in support of the plea
agreement, which reasons shall specifically explain why the offense(s) of
conviction that result from the plea agreement do not include the originally
charged weapons offense. The written statement shall be part of the court
record in the case and a copy shall be provided to any person upon request.
Section 5-10. Sentencing; judge.
In a criminal case in which the original
charge is or was for an offense involving the illegal use or possession of a
firearm, if a defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty of the original charge
or a lesser offense or a non-weapons offense, in imposing sentence the judge
shall set forth in a written sentencing order his or her reasons for imposing
the sentence or accepting the plea agreement. A copy of the written sentencing
order shall be provided to any person upon request.
Article 10. Amendatory
Provisions.
Sec 10-5. The
Counties Code is amended by changing Section 5-1006.7 as follows:
(55 ILCS 5/5-1006.7)
Sec. 5-1006.7. School facility and
resources occupation taxes.
(a) In any county, a
tax shall be imposed upon all persons engaged in the business of selling
tangible personal property, other than personal property titled or registered
with an agency of this State's government, at retail in the county on the gross
receipts from the sales made in the course of business to provide revenue to be
used exclusively for (i) school facility purposes or (ii) school
resource officers and mental health professionals, or (iii) school facility
purposes, school resource officers, and mental health professionals, if a
proposition for the tax has been submitted to the electors of that county and
approved by a majority of those voting on the question as provided in
subsection (c). The tax under this Section shall be imposed only in one-quarter
percent increments and may not exceed 1%.
This additional tax may not be imposed
on the sale of food for human consumption that is to be consumed off the
premises where it is sold (other than alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, and
food that has been prepared for immediate consumption) and prescription and
non-prescription medicines, drugs, medical appliances and insulin, urine
testing materials, syringes and needles used by diabetics. The Department of
Revenue has full power to administer and enforce this subsection, to collect
all taxes and penalties due under this subsection, to dispose of taxes and
penalties so collected in the manner provided in this subsection, and to
determine all rights to credit memoranda arising on account of the erroneous
payment of a tax or penalty under this subsection. The Department shall deposit
all taxes and penalties collected under this subsection into a special fund
created for that purpose.
In the administration of and compliance
with this subsection, the Department and persons who are subject to this
subsection (i) have the same rights, remedies, privileges, immunities, powers,
and duties, (ii) are subject to the same conditions, restrictions, limitations,
penalties, and definitions of terms, and (iii) shall employ the same modes of
procedure as are set forth in Sections 1 through 1o, 2 through 2-70 (in respect
to all provisions contained in those Sections other than the State rate of
tax), 2a through 2h, 3 (except as to the disposition of taxes and penalties
collected), 4, 5, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f, 5g, 5h, 5i, 5j, 5k, 5l, 6, 6a, 6b,
6c, 6d, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 11a, 12, and 13 of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act
and all provisions of the Uniform Penalty and Interest Act as if those
provisions were set forth in this subsection.
The certificate of registration that is
issued by the Department to a retailer under the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act
permits the retailer to engage in a business that is taxable without
registering separately with the Department under an ordinance or resolution
under this subsection.
Persons subject to any tax imposed
under the authority granted in this subsection may reimburse themselves for
their seller's tax liability by separately stating that tax as an additional
charge, which may be stated in combination, in a single amount, with State tax
that sellers are required to collect under the Use Tax Act, pursuant to any
bracketed schedules set forth by the Department.
(b) If a tax has been
imposed under subsection (a), then a service occupation tax must also be
imposed at the same rate upon all persons engaged, in the county, in the
business of making sales of service, who, as an incident to making those sales
of service, transfer tangible personal property within the county as an
incident to a sale of service.
This tax may not be imposed on sales of
food for human consumption that is to be consumed off the premises where it is
sold (other than alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, and food prepared for
immediate consumption) and prescription and non-prescription medicines, drugs,
medical appliances and insulin, urine testing materials, syringes, and needles
used by diabetics.
The tax imposed under this subsection
and all civil penalties that may be assessed as an incident thereof shall be
collected and enforced by the Department and deposited into a special fund
created for that purpose. The Department has full power to administer and
enforce this subsection, to collect all taxes and penalties due under this
subsection, to dispose of taxes and penalties so collected in the manner
provided in this subsection, and to determine all rights to credit memoranda
arising on account of the erroneous payment of a tax or penalty under this
subsection.
In the administration of and compliance
with this subsection, the Department and persons who are subject to this
subsection shall (i) have the same rights, remedies, privileges, immunities,
powers and duties, (ii) be subject to the same conditions, restrictions,
limitations, penalties and definition of terms, and (iii) employ the same modes
of procedure as are set forth in Sections 2 (except that that reference to
State in the definition of supplier maintaining a place of business in this
State means the county), 2a through 2d, 3 through 3-50 (in respect to all
provisions contained in those Sections other than the State rate of tax), 4
(except that the reference to the State shall be to the county), 5, 7, 8
(except that the jurisdiction to which the tax is a debt to the extent
indicated in that Section 8 is the county), 9 (except as to the disposition of
taxes and penalties collected), 10, 11, 12 (except the reference therein to
Section 2b of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act), 13 (except that any reference
to the State means the county), Section 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the Service
Occupation Tax Act and all provisions of the Uniform Penalty and Interest Act,
as fully as if those provisions were set forth herein.
Persons subject to any tax imposed
under the authority granted in this subsection may reimburse themselves for
their serviceman's tax liability by separately stating the tax as an additional
charge, which may be stated in combination, in a single amount, with State tax
that servicemen are authorized to collect under the Service Use Tax Act,
pursuant to any bracketed schedules set forth by the Department.
(c) The tax under this
Section may not be imposed until the question of imposing the tax has been
submitted to the electors of the county at a regular election and approved by a
majority of the electors voting on the question. For all regular elections held
prior to August 23, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act 97-542), upon a
resolution by the county board or a resolution by school district boards that
represent at least 51% of the student enrollment within the county, the county
board must certify the question to the proper election authority in accordance
with the Election Code.
For all regular elections held prior to
August 23, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act 97-542), the election
authority must submit the question in substantially the following form:
Shall (name of county) be authorized to
impose a retailers' occupation tax and a service occupation tax (commonly
referred to as a "sales tax") at a rate of (insert rate) to be used
exclusively for school facility purposes?
The election authority must record the
votes as "Yes" or "No".
If a majority of the electors voting on
the question vote in the affirmative, then the county may, thereafter, impose
the tax.
For all regular elections held on or
after August 23, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act 97-542), the regional
superintendent of schools for the county must, upon receipt of a resolution or
resolutions of school district boards that represent more than 50% of the
student enrollment within the county, certify the question to the proper
election authority for submission to the electors of the county at the next
regular election at which the question lawfully may be submitted to the
electors, all in accordance with the Election Code.
For all regular elections held on or
after August 23, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act 97-542) and before
the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General
Assembly, the election authority must submit the question in substantially
the following form:
Shall a retailers' occupation tax and a
service occupation tax (commonly referred to as a "sales tax") be
imposed in (name of county) at a rate of (insert rate) to be used exclusively
for school facility purposes?
The election authority must record the
votes as "Yes" or "No".
If a majority of the electors voting on
the question vote in the affirmative, then the tax shall be imposed at the rate
set forth in the question.
For all regular
elections held on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th
General Assembly, the election authority must submit the question as provided
in this paragraph.
If the referendum is
to expand the use of revenues from a currently imposed tax to include school
resource officers and mental health professionals, the question shall be in
substantially the following form:
In addition to school
facility purposes, shall (name of county) school districts be authorized to use
revenues from the tax commonly referred to as the school facility sales tax
that is currently imposed in (name of county) at a rate of (insert rate) for
school resource officers and mental health professionals?
If the referendum is
to increase the rate of a tax currently imposed at less than 1% and dedicate
the additional revenues for school resource officers and mental health
professionals, the question shall be in substantially the following form:
Shall the tax commonly
referred to as the school facility sales tax that is currently imposed in (name
of county) at the rate of (insert rate) be increased to a rate of (insert rate)
with the additional revenues used exclusively for school resource officers and
mental health professionals?
If the referendum is
to impose a tax, in a county that has not previously imposed a tax under this
Section, exclusively for school facility purposes, the question shall be in
substantially the following form:
Shall a retailers'
occupation tax and a service occupation tax (commonly referred to as a
"sales tax") be imposed in (name of county) at a rate of (insert
rate) to be used exclusively for school facility purposes?
If the referendum is
to impose a tax, in a county that has not previously imposed a tax under this
Section, exclusively for school resource officers and mental health
professionals, the question shall be in substantially the following form:
Shall a retailers'
occupation tax and a service occupation tax (commonly referred to as a
"sales tax") be imposed in (name of county) at a rate of (insert
rate) to be used exclusively for school resource officers and mental health
professionals?
If the referendum is
to impose a tax, in a county that has not previously imposed a tax under this
Section, exclusively for school facility purposes, school resource officers,
and mental health professionals, the question shall be in substantially the
following form:
Shall a retailers'
occupation tax and a service occupation tax (commonly referred to as a
"sales tax") be imposed in (name of county) at a rate of (insert
rate) to be used exclusively for school facility purposes, school resource
officers, and mental health professionals?
The election authority
must record the votes as "Yes" or "No".
If a majority of the
electors voting on the question vote in the affirmative, then the tax shall be
imposed at the rate set forth in the question.
For the purposes of this subsection
(c), "enrollment" means the head count of the students residing in
the county on the last school day of September of each year, which must be
reported on the Illinois State Board of Education Public School Fall Enrollment/Housing
Report.
(d) The Department
shall immediately pay over to the State Treasurer, ex officio, as trustee, all
taxes and penalties collected under this Section to be deposited into the
School Facility Occupation Tax Fund, which shall be an unappropriated trust
fund held outside the State treasury.
On or before the 25th day of each
calendar month, the Department shall prepare and certify to the Comptroller the
disbursement of stated sums of money to the regional superintendents of schools
in counties from which retailers or servicemen have paid taxes or penalties to
the Department during the second preceding calendar month. The amount to be
paid to each regional superintendent of schools and disbursed to him or her in
accordance with Section 3-14.31 of the School Code, is equal to the amount (not
including credit memoranda) collected from the county under this Section during
the second preceding calendar month by the Department, (i) less 2% of that
amount, which shall be deposited into the Tax Compliance and Administration
Fund and shall be used by the Department, subject to appropriation, to cover
the costs of the Department in administering and enforcing the provisions of
this Section, on behalf of the county, (ii) plus an amount that the Department
determines is necessary to offset any amounts that were erroneously paid to a
different taxing body; (iii) less an amount equal to the amount of refunds made
during the second preceding calendar month by the Department on behalf of the
county; and (iv) less any amount that the Department determines is necessary to
offset any amounts that were payable to a different taxing body but were
erroneously paid to the county. When certifying the amount of a monthly
disbursement to a regional superintendent of schools under this Section, the
Department shall increase or decrease the amounts by an amount necessary to
offset any miscalculation of previous disbursements within the previous 6
months from the time a miscalculation is discovered.
Within 10 days after receipt by the
Comptroller from the Department of the disbursement certification to the
regional superintendents of the schools provided for in this Section, the
Comptroller shall cause the orders to be drawn for the respective amounts in
accordance with directions contained in the certification.
If the Department determines that a
refund should be made under this Section to a claimant instead of issuing a
credit memorandum, then the Department shall notify the Comptroller, who shall
cause the order to be drawn for the amount specified and to the person named in
the notification from the Department. The refund shall be paid by the Treasurer
out of the School Facility Occupation Tax Fund.
(e) For the purposes
of determining the local governmental unit whose tax is applicable, a retail
sale by a producer of coal or another mineral mined in Illinois is a sale at
retail at the place where the coal or other mineral mined in Illinois is
extracted from the earth. This subsection does not apply to coal or another mineral
when it is delivered or shipped by the seller to the purchaser at a point
outside Illinois so that the sale is exempt under the United States
Constitution as a sale in interstate or foreign commerce.
(f) Nothing in this
Section may be construed to authorize a tax to be imposed upon the privilege of
engaging in any business that under the Constitution of the United States may
not be made the subject of taxation by this State.
(g) If a county board
imposes a tax under this Section pursuant to a referendum held before August
23, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act 97-542) at a rate below the rate set
forth in the question approved by a majority of electors of that county voting
on the question as provided in subsection (c), then the county board may, by ordinance,
increase the rate of the tax up to the rate set forth in the question approved
by a majority of electors of that county voting on the question as provided in
subsection (c). If a county board imposes a tax under this Section pursuant to
a referendum held before August 23, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act
97-542), then the board may, by ordinance, discontinue or reduce the rate of
the tax. If a tax is imposed under this Section pursuant to a referendum held
on or after August 23, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act 97-542) and
before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th
General Assembly, then the county board may reduce or discontinue the tax,
but only in accordance with subsection (h-5) of this Section. If a tax is
imposed under this Section pursuant to a referendum held on or after the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly,
then the county board may reduce or discontinue the tax, but only in accordance
with subsection (h-10) of this Section. If, however, a school board issues
bonds that are secured by the proceeds of the tax under this Section, then the
county board may not reduce the tax rate or discontinue the tax if that rate
reduction or discontinuance would adversely affect the school board's ability
to pay the principal and interest on those bonds as they become due or
necessitate the extension of additional property taxes to pay the principal and
interest on those bonds. If the county board reduces the tax rate or
discontinues the tax, then a referendum must be held in accordance with
subsection (c) of this Section in order to increase the rate of the tax or to
reimpose the discontinued tax.
Until January 1, 2014, the results of
any election that imposes, reduces, or discontinues a tax under this Section
must be certified by the election authority, and any ordinance that increases
or lowers the rate or discontinues the tax must be certified by the county
clerk and, in each case, filed with the Illinois Department of Revenue either
(i) on or before the first day of April, whereupon the Department shall proceed
to administer and enforce the tax or change in the rate as of the first day of
July next following the filing; or (ii) on or before the first day of October,
whereupon the Department shall proceed to administer and enforce the tax or
change in the rate as of the first day of January next following the filing.
Beginning January 1, 2014, the results
of any election that imposes, reduces, or discontinues a tax under this Section
must be certified by the election authority, and any ordinance that increases
or lowers the rate or discontinues the tax must be certified by the county
clerk and, in each case, filed with the Illinois Department of Revenue either
(i) on or before the first day of May, whereupon the Department shall proceed
to administer and enforce the tax or change in the rate as of the first day of
July next following the filing; or (ii) on or before the first day of October,
whereupon the Department shall proceed to administer and enforce the tax or
change in the rate as of the first day of January next following the filing.
(h) For purposes of
this Section, "school facility purposes" means (i) the acquisition,
development, construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, improvement,
financing, architectural planning, and installation of capital facilities
consisting of buildings, structures, and durable equipment and for the
acquisition and improvement of real property and interest in real property
required, or expected to be required, in connection with the capital facilities
and (ii) the payment of bonds or other obligations heretofore or hereafter
issued, including bonds or other obligations heretofore or hereafter issued to
refund or to continue to refund bonds or other obligations issued, for school
facility purposes, provided that the taxes levied to pay those bonds are abated
by the amount of the taxes imposed under this Section that are used to pay
those bonds. "School-facility purposes" also includes fire prevention,
safety, energy conservation, accessibility, school security, and specified
repair purposes set forth under Section 17-2.11 of the School Code.
(h-5) A county board
in a county where a tax has been imposed under this Section pursuant to a
referendum held on or after August 23, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act
97-542) and before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th
General Assembly may, by ordinance or resolution, submit to the voters of
the county the question of reducing or discontinuing the tax. In the ordinance
or resolution, the county board shall certify the question to the proper
election authority in accordance with the Election Code. The election authority
must submit the question in substantially the following form:
Shall the school facility retailers'
occupation tax and service occupation tax (commonly referred to as the
"school facility sales tax") currently imposed in (name of county) at
a rate of (insert rate) be (reduced to (insert rate))(discontinued)?
If a majority of the electors voting on
the question vote in the affirmative, then, subject to the provisions of
subsection (g) of this Section, the tax shall be reduced or discontinued as set
forth in the question.
(h-10) A county board
in a county where a tax has been imposed under this Section pursuant to a
referendum held on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the
100th General Assembly may, by ordinance or resolution, submit to
the voters of the county the question of reducing or discontinuing the tax. In
the ordinance or resolution, the county board shall certify the question to the
proper election authority in accordance with the Election Code. The election
authority must submit the question in substantially the following form:
Shall the school
facility and resources retailers' occupation tax and service occupation tax
(commonly referred to as the "school facility and resources sales
tax") currently imposed in (name of county) at a rate of (insert rate) be
(reduced to (insert rate))(discontinued)?
If a majority of the
electors voting on the question vote in the affirmative, then, subject to the
provisions of subsection (g) of this Section, the tax shall be reduced or
discontinued as set forth in the question.
(i) This Section does
not apply to Cook County.
(j) This Section may
be cited as the County School Facility and Resources Occupation Tax Law.
(Source: P.A. 98-584, eff. 8-27-13;
99-143, eff. 7-27-15; 99-217, eff. 7-31-15; 99-642, eff. 7-28-16.)
Section 10-10. The Firearm Owners Identification Card Act
is amended by adding Sections 8.5 and 42 as follows:
(430 ILCS 65/8.5 new)
Sec. 8.5. Suspension of a Firearm Owner’s
Identification Card under the Gun Violence Restraining Order Act. The
Department of State Police shall suspend a person’s Firearm Owner’s Identification
Card for the duration of an emergency gun violence restraining order or a gun
violence restraining order as provided in Section 35 of the Gun Violence
Restraining Order Act.
(430 ILCS 66/42 new)
Sec. 42. Suspension of a concealed carry license
under the Gun Violence Restraining Order Act. The Department of State Police
shall suspend a person’s concealed carry license for the duration of an
emergency gun violence restraining order or a gun violence restraining order as
provided under Section 35 of the Gun Violence Restraining Order Act.”; and
On
page 1, by replacing lines 4 through 5 with: “Section 10-15. The Criminal Code of
2012 is amended by changing Sections 5-1, 24-1, and 24-3 and by adding Sections
4-4.5, 5-2.5, and 9-1.5 as follows:”; and
On
page 1, immediately after line 5, by inserting the following:
“(720 ILCS 5/4-4.5 new)
Sec. 4-4.5. Purposely or purpose. In Section
5-2.5 and 9-1.5 of this Code, a person acts purposely or with the purpose when
his or her conscious objective is to cause the death of another human being.
(720 ILCS 5/5-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 5-1)
Sec. 5-1. Accountability for conduct of another. Except as provided in
Section 5-2.5 of the Code, a A person is responsible for conduct
which is an element of an offense if the conduct is either that of the person
himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable for such conduct as
provided in Section 5-2 of this Code, or both.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/5-2.5 new)
Sec. 5-2.5. Death penalty murder;
accountability for acts of others. A person is legally accountable for the
conduct of another in the commission of death penalty murder only when:
(1)
having
the purpose to cause the death of another human being without lawful
justification, the person commands, induces, procures, or causes another to
perform the conduct; or
(2)
the
person agrees with one or more other persons to engage in conduct for the
common purpose of causing the death of another human being without lawful
justification, in which case all parties to the agreement shall be criminally
liable for acts of other parties to the agreement committed during and in
furtherance of the agreement.
(720 ILCS 5/9-1.5 new)
Sec. 9-1.5. Death penalty murder.
(a)
In this Section, “human being” means a person who has been born and is alive.
(b) A person commits
death penalty murder when at the time of the commission of the offense he or
she has attained the age of 18 or more and he or she purposely causes the death
of another human being without lawful justification if:
(1) at the time of
the offense, the person caused the death of 2 or more other human beings
without lawful justification; or
(2)
the victim was a peace officer, as defined by Section 2-13 of this Code, killed
in the course of performing his or her official duties, either to prevent the
performance of the officer’s duties or in retaliation for the performance of
the officer’s duties, and the person knew that the victim was a peace officer.
(c) The
trier of fact regarding the charge of death penalty murder shall resolve any
doubt regarding identification or any element of the offense in favor of the
defendant. A defendant shall not be found guilty of the offense of death
penalty murder unless each and every element of the offense is established
beyond any doubt. If the trial is by jury, before the trial commences and again
before jury deliberations commence, the jury shall be instructed that the
penalty for death penalty murder is death.
(d) A defendant, who has been found guilty of death penalty
murder, may, at a separate sentencing hearing, present evidence of mitigating
circumstances not rising to the level of legal justification, including but not
limited to evidence of intellectual disability as provided in Section 114-15 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. The prosecution may present rebuttal
evidence. The hearing shall be before the trial judge. The judge shall sentence
the defendant to death, unless he or she finds that
the defendant has, by a preponderance of the evidence, presented sufficiently
substantial evidence to prove intellectual disability or that imposition of the death penalty would result in a
manifest miscarriage of justice, in which case the judge shall sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
(e) On appeal from a
conviction of death penalty murder, review of the facts shall be de novo. In
conducting its de novo review of the trial evidence, the appellate court shall
resolve all doubt regarding identification and guilt in favor of the defendant.
The appellate court shall conduct an independent review of the evidence without
giving deference to the judgment of the trier of fact at trial.
(f) Sentence. The
sentence for death penalty murder is death.
(720 ILCS 5/24-1) (from Ch. 38, par.
24-1)
Sec. 24-1. Unlawful use of weapons.
(a) A person commits
the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:
(1) Sells,
manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries any bludgeon, black-jack,
slung-shot, sand-club, sand-bag, metal knuckles or other knuckle weapon
regardless of its composition, throwing star, or any knife, commonly referred
to as a switchblade knife, which has a blade that opens automatically by hand
pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the
knife, or a ballistic knife, which is a device that propels a knifelike blade
as a projectile by means of a coil spring, elastic material or compressed gas;
or
(2) Carries or
possesses with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, a dagger, dirk,
billy, dangerous knife, razor, stiletto, broken bottle or other piece of glass,
stun gun or taser or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument of like
character; or
(3) Carries on or
about his person or in any vehicle, a tear gas gun projector or bomb or any
object containing noxious liquid gas or substance, other than an object
containing a non-lethal noxious liquid gas or substance designed solely for
personal defense carried by a person 18 years of age or older; or
(4) Carries or
possesses in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person except when on his
land or in his own abode, legal dwelling, or fixed place of business, or on the
land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with that
person's permission, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm,
except that this subsection (a) (4) does not apply to or affect transportation
of weapons that meet one of the following conditions:
(i) are broken down in a
non-functioning state; or
(ii) are not immediately accessible; or
(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in a
case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who
has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card; or
(iv) are carried or
possessed in accordance with the Firearm Concealed Carry Act by a person who
has been issued a currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry
Act; or
(5) Sets a spring gun;
or
(6) Possesses any
device or attachment of any kind designed, used or intended for use in
silencing the report of any firearm; or
(7) Sells,
manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries:
(i) a machine gun,
which shall be defined for the purposes of this subsection as any weapon, which
shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically
more than one shot without manually reloading by a single function of the
trigger, including the frame or receiver of any such weapon, or sells,
manufactures, purchases, possesses, or carries any combination of parts
designed or intended for use in converting any weapon into a machine gun, or
any combination or parts from which a machine gun can be assembled if such
parts are in the possession or under the control of a person;
(i-5) beginning 90
days after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General
Assembly, a bump stock or trigger crank. As used in this clause (i-5):
"Bump stock"
means any device for a weapon that increases the rate of fire achievable with
the weapon by using energy from the recoil of the weapon to generate a
reciprocating action that facilitates repeated activation of the trigger of the
weapon.
"Trigger
crank" means any device to be attached to a weapon that repeatedly
activates the trigger of the weapon through the use of a lever or other part that
is turned in a circular motion;
(ii) any rifle having
one or more barrels less than 16 inches in length or a shotgun having one or
more barrels less than 18 inches in length or any weapon made from a rifle or
shotgun, whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise, if such a weapon as
modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches; or
(iii) any bomb,
bomb-shell, grenade, bottle or other container containing an explosive
substance of over one-quarter ounce for like purposes, such as, but not limited
to, black powder bombs and Molotov cocktails or artillery projectiles; or
(8) Carries or
possesses any firearm, stun gun or taser or other deadly weapon in any place
which is licensed to sell intoxicating beverages, or at any public gathering
held pursuant to a license issued by any governmental body or any public
gathering at which an admission is charged, excluding a place where a showing,
demonstration or lecture involving the exhibition of unloaded firearms is
conducted. This subsection (a)(8) does not apply to any auction or raffle of a
firearm held pursuant to a license or permit issued by a governmental body, nor
does it apply to persons engaged in firearm safety training courses; or
(9) Carries or
possesses in a vehicle or on or about his person any pistol, revolver, stun gun
or taser or firearm or ballistic knife, when he is hooded, robed or masked in
such manner as to conceal his identity; or
(10) Carries or
possesses on or about his person, upon any public street, alley, or other
public lands within the corporate limits of a city, village or incorporated
town, except when an invitee thereon or therein, for the purpose of the display
of such weapon or the lawful commerce in weapons, or except when on his land or
in his own abode, legal dwelling, or fixed place of business, or on the land or
in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with that person's
permission, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm, except
that this subsection (a) (10) does not apply to or affect transportation of
weapons that meet one of the following conditions:
(i) are broken down in
a non-functioning state; or
(ii) are not
immediately accessible; or
(iii) are unloaded and
enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a
person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification
Card; or
(iv) are carried or possessed in
accordance with the Firearm Concealed Carry Act by a person who has been issued
a currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.
A "stun gun or taser", as
used in this paragraph (a) means (i) any device which is powered by electrical
charging units, such as, batteries, and which fires one or several barbs
attached to a length of wire and which, upon hitting a human, can send out a
current capable of disrupting the person's nervous system in such a manner as
to render him incapable of normal functioning or (ii) any device which is
powered by electrical charging units, such as batteries, and which, upon
contact with a human or clothing worn by a human, can send out current capable
of disrupting the person's nervous system in such a manner as to render him
incapable of normal functioning; or
(11) Sells,
manufactures or purchases any explosive bullet. For purposes of this paragraph
(a) "explosive bullet" means the projectile portion of an ammunition
cartridge which contains or carries an explosive charge which will explode upon
contact with the flesh of a human or an animal. "Cartridge" means a
tubular metal case having a projectile affixed at the front thereof and a cap
or primer at the rear end thereof, with the propellant contained in such tube
between the projectile and the cap; or
(12) (Blank); or
(13) Carries or possesses on or about
his or her person while in a building occupied by a unit of government, a billy
club, other weapon of like character, or other instrument of like character
intended for use as a weapon. For the purposes of this Section, "billy
club" means a short stick or club commonly carried by police officers
which is either telescopic or constructed of a solid piece of wood or other
man-made material.
(b) Sentence. A person convicted of
a violation of subsection 24-1(a)(1) through (5), subsection 24-1(a)(10),
subsection 24-1(a)(11), or subsection 24-1(a)(13) commits a Class A
misdemeanor. A person convicted of a violation of subsection 24-1(a)(8) or
24-1(a)(9) commits a Class 4 felony; a person convicted of a violation of
subsection 24-1(a)(6) or 24-1(a)(7)(ii) or (iii) commits a Class 3 felony. A
person convicted of a violation of subsection 24-1(a)(7)(i) or
24-1(a)(7)(i-5) commits a Class 2 felony and shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years, unless the
weapon or device is possessed in the passenger compartment of a motor
vehicle as defined in Section 1-146 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or on the
person, while the weapon is loaded or the device is attached to the loaded
weapon, in which case it shall be a Class X felony. A person convicted of a
second or subsequent violation of subsection 24-1(a)(4), 24-1(a)(8),
24-1(a)(9), or 24-1(a)(10) commits a Class 3 felony. The possession of each
weapon or device in violation of this Section constitutes a single and
separate violation.
(c) Violations in specific places.
(1) A person who
violates subsection 24-1(a)(6) or 24-1(a)(7) in any school, regardless of the
time of day or the time of year, in residential property owned, operated or
managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part
of a scattered site or mixed-income development, in a public park, in a
courthouse, on the real property comprising any school, regardless of the time
of day or the time of year, on residential property owned, operated or managed
by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a
scattered site or mixed-income development, on the real property comprising any
public park, on the real property comprising any courthouse, in any conveyance
owned, leased or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school
or a school related activity, in any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by
a public transportation agency, or on any public way within 1,000 feet of the
real property comprising any school, public park, courthouse, public
transportation facility, or residential property owned, operated, or managed by
a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a
scattered site or mixed-income development commits a Class 2 felony and shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 3 years and not more
than 7 years.
(1.5) A person who
violates subsection 24-1(a)(4), 24-1(a)(9), or 24-1(a)(10) in any school,
regardless of the time of day or the time of year, in residential property
owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public
housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, in a
public park, in a courthouse, on the real property comprising any school,
regardless of the time of day or the time of year, on residential property
owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public
housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, on the
real property comprising any public park, on the real property comprising any
courthouse, in any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport
students to or from school or a school related activity, in any conveyance
owned, leased, or contracted by a public transportation agency, or on any
public way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school, public
park, courthouse, public transportation facility, or residential property
owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public
housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development commits
a Class 3 felony.
(2) A person who
violates subsection 24-1(a)(1), 24-1(a)(2), or 24-1(a)(3) in any school,
regardless of the time of day or the time of year, in residential property
owned, operated or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public
housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, in a
public park, in a courthouse, on the real property comprising any school,
regardless of the time of day or the time of year, on residential property
owned, operated or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing
agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, on the real
property comprising any public park, on the real property comprising any
courthouse, in any conveyance owned, leased or contracted by a school to
transport students to or from school or a school related activity, in any
conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a public transportation agency, or
on any public way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school,
public park, courthouse, public transportation facility, or residential
property owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a
public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development
commits a Class 4 felony. "Courthouse" means any building that is
used by the Circuit, Appellate, or Supreme Court of this State for the conduct
of official business.
(3) Paragraphs (1),
(1.5), and (2) of this subsection (c) shall not apply to law enforcement
officers or security officers of such school, college, or university or to
students carrying or possessing firearms for use in training courses, parades,
hunting, target shooting on school ranges, or otherwise with the consent of
school authorities and which firearms are transported unloaded enclosed in a
suitable case, box, or transportation package.
(4) For the purposes
of this subsection (c), "school" means any public or private
elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university.
(5) For the purposes
of this subsection (c), "public transportation agency" means a public
or private agency that provides for the transportation or conveyance of persons
by means available to the general public, except for transportation by
automobiles not used for conveyance of the general public as passengers; and "public
transportation facility" means a terminal or other place where one may
obtain public transportation.
(d) The presence in an automobile
other than a public omnibus of any weapon, instrument or substance referred to
in subsection (a)(7) is prima facie evidence that it is in the possession of,
and is being carried by, all persons occupying such automobile at the time such
weapon, instrument or substance is found, except under the following
circumstances: (i) if such weapon, instrument or instrumentality is found upon
the person of one of the occupants therein; or (ii) if such weapon, instrument
or substance is found in an automobile operated for hire by a duly licensed
driver in the due, lawful and proper pursuit of his trade, then such
presumption shall not apply to the driver.
(e) Exemptions.
(1) Crossbows, Common
or Compound bows and Underwater Spearguns are exempted from the definition of
ballistic knife as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Section.
(2) The provision of
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Section prohibiting the sale,
manufacture, purchase, possession, or carrying of any knife, commonly referred
to as a switchblade knife, which has a blade that opens automatically by hand
pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the
knife, does not apply to a person who possesses a currently valid Firearm
Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the
Department of State Police or to a person or an entity engaged in the business of
selling or manufacturing switchblade knives.”; and
By
deleting line 6 on Page 1 through line 21 on page 3; and
On
page 5, by replacing lines 2 through 11 with the following:
“(g)
Delivers any firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person,
incidental to a sale, without withholding delivery of the such
firearm for at least 72 hours after application for its purchase has been made,
or delivers any rifle, shotgun or other long gun, or a stun gun or
taser, incidental to a sale, without withholding delivery of the such
rifle, shotgun or other long gun, or a stun gun or taser for at least 24
hours after application for its purchase has been made. However, this
paragraph (g) does”; and
On
page 5, by replacing lines 23-24 with: “Illinois; (3) the sale of a firearm to a
nonresident of Illinois while at a”; and
On
page 15, immediately after line 5, by inserting the following:
“Sec 10-20. The Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 is amended by changing Sections 114-15, 119-1, and 122-2.2 as follows:
(725 ILCS 5/114-15)
Sec. 114-15. Intellectual disability.
(a) In a first degree
murder case in which the State seeks the death penalty as an appropriate
sentence or in a death penalty murder case, any party may raise the
issue of the defendant's intellectual disabilities by motion. A defendant
wishing to raise the issue of his or her intellectual disabilities shall
provide written notice to the State and the court as soon as the defendant
reasonably believes such issue will be raised.
(b) The issue of the
defendant's intellectual disabilities shall be determined in a pretrial
hearing. The court shall be the fact finder on the issue of the defendant's
intellectual disabilities and shall determine the issue by a preponderance of
evidence in which the moving party has the burden of proof. The court may
appoint an expert in the field of intellectual disabilities. The defendant and
the State may offer experts from the field of intellectual disabilities. The
court shall determine admissibility of evidence and qualification as an expert.
(c) If after a plea
of guilty to first degree murder or death penalty murder, or a finding
of guilty of first degree murder or death penalty murder in a bench
trial, or a verdict of guilty for first degree murder or death penalty
murder in a jury trial, or on a matter remanded from the Supreme Court for
sentencing for first degree murder or death penalty murder, and the
State seeks the death penalty as an appropriate sentence, the defendant may
raise the issue of defendant's intellectual disabilities not at eligibility but
at aggravation and mitigation. The defendant and the State may offer experts
from the field of intellectual disabilities. The court shall determine
admissibility of evidence and qualification as an expert.
(d) In determining
whether the defendant is a person with an intellectual disability, the
intellectual disability must have manifested itself by the age of 18. IQ tests
and psychometric tests administered to the defendant must be the kind and type
recognized by experts in the field of intellectual disabilities. In order for
the defendant to be considered a person with an intellectual disability, a low
IQ must be accompanied by significant deficits in adaptive behavior in at least
2 of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, social or
interpersonal skills, home living, self-direction, academics, health and
safety, use of community resources, and work. An intelligence quotient (IQ) of
75 or below is presumptive evidence of an intellectual disability.
(e) Evidence of an
intellectual disability that did not result in disqualifying the case as a
capital case, may be introduced as evidence in mitigation during a capital
sentencing hearing. A failure of the court to determine that the defendant is a
person with an intellectual disability does not preclude the court during trial
from allowing evidence relating to mental disability should the court deem it
appropriate.
(f) If the court
determines at a pretrial hearing or after remand that a capital defendant is a
person with an intellectual disability, and the State does not appeal pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 604, the case shall no longer be considered a capital
case and the procedural guidelines established for capital cases shall no
longer be applicable to the defendant. In that case, the defendant shall be
sentenced under the sentencing provisions of Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections.
(Source: P.A. 99-143, eff. 7-27-15.)
(725 ILCS 5/119-1)
Sec. 119-1. Death penalty abolished.
(a) Except as
otherwise provided in subsection (a-5) of this Section, beginning Beginning
on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly, notwithstanding
any other law to the contrary, the death penalty is abolished and a sentence to
death may not be imposed.
(a-5) A sentence
of death shall be imposed for death penalty murder.
(b) All unobligated
and unexpended moneys remaining in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund on the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly shall be
transferred into the Death Penalty Abolition Fund, a special fund in the State
treasury, to be expended by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information
Authority, for services for families of victims of homicide or murder and for
training of law enforcement personnel.
(Source: P.A. 96-1543, eff. 7-1-11.)
(725 ILCS 5/122-2.2)
Sec. 122-2.2. Intellectual disability and
post-conviction relief.
(a) In cases where no
determination of an intellectual disability was made and a defendant has been
convicted of first-degree murder or death penalty murder, sentenced to
death, and is in custody pending execution of the sentence of death, the
following procedures shall apply:
(1) Notwithstanding
any other provision of law or rule of court, a defendant may seek relief from
the death sentence through a petition for post-conviction relief under this
Article alleging that the defendant was a person with an intellectual
disability as defined in Section 114-15 at the time the offense was alleged to
have been committed.
(2) The petition must
be filed within 180 days of the effective date of this amendatory Act of the
93rd General Assembly or within 180 days of the issuance of the mandate by the
Illinois Supreme Court setting the date of execution, whichever is later.
(b) All other
provisions of this Article governing petitions for post-conviction relief shall
apply to a petition for post-conviction relief alleging an intellectual
disability.
(Source: P.A. 99-78, eff. 7-20-15; 99-143,
eff. 7-27-15.)
(725 ILCS 165/Act rep.)
Sec 10-25. The
Firearm Seizure Act is repealed.
Section 10-30. The Unified Code of
Corrections is amended by changing Section 5-4.5-10 and by adding Section
5-4.5-20.5 as follows:
(730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-10)
Sec. 5-4.5-10. OFFENSE CLASSIFICATIONS.
(a) FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS. Felonies are
classified, for the purpose of sentencing, as follows:
(1) First degree murder (as a separate class
of felony).
(1.5) Death penalty murder (as a
separate class of felony).
(2) Class X felonies.
(3) Class 1 felonies.
(4) Class 2 felonies.
(5) Class 3 felonies.
(6) Class 4 felonies.
(b) MISDEMEANOR CLASSIFICATIONS. Misdemeanors
are classified, for the purpose of sentencing, as follows:
(1) Class A misdemeanors.
(2) Class B misdemeanors.
(3) Class C misdemeanors.
(c) PETTY AND BUSINESS OFFENSES. Petty
offenses and business offenses are not classified.
(Source: P.A. 95-1052, eff. 7-1-09.)
(730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20.5 new)
Sec. 5-4.5-20.5. DEATH PENALTY MURDER;
SENTENCE. For death penalty murder, the defendant shall be sentenced to death,
unless the trial judge finds that the defendant has, by a preponderance of the
evidence, presented sufficiently substantial evidence to outweigh the
circumstances of the offense and the evidence presented by the prosecution at
the sentencing hearing, in which case the judge shall sentence the defendant to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Article 999. Effective
Date.”; and
On
page 15, by replacing lines 6 through 7 with: “Section 999-5. Effective date.
This Act takes effect upon becoming law.”
With
these changes, House Bill 1468 will have my approval. I respectfully request
your concurrence.
Sincerely,
Bruce
Rauner
GOVERNOR