102ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

State of Illinois

2021 and 2022

SB2571

Introduced 2/26/2021, by Sen. Melinda Bush

SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:

10 ILCS 5/24C-15

Amends the Election Code. Requires each election authority to conduct an audit following an election. Provides that before election day, the election authority shall notify the State Board of Elections whether it intends to conduct a random audit or a risk-limiting audit. Requires election authorities to conduct a random audit of 5% of ballots cast by mail. Provides for conduct of risk-limiting audits.

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AN ACT concerning elections.

2 Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 3 represented in the General Assembly:

Section 5. The Election Code is amended by changing
Section 24C-15 as follows:

Sec. 24C-15. Official return of precinct; check of totals;
audit.

9 (a) As used in this Section:

(10 ILCS 5/24C-15)

10 <u>"Audit unit" means a precinct, a set of ballots, or a</u> 11 <u>single ballot. A precinct, a set of ballots, or a single ballot</u> 12 <u>may be used as an audit unit for purposes of this Section only</u> 13 <u>if all of the following conditions are satisfied:</u>

14 <u>(1) the relevant vote-tabulating device is able to</u> 15 produce a report of the votes cast in the precinct, set of 16 <u>ballots, or single ballot; and</u>

17 (2) each ballot is assigned to not more than one audit
 18 <u>unit.</u>
 19 "Contest" means an election for an office or for a

20 <u>measure</u>.

21 <u>"Random audit" means a manual tally of the votes marked on</u>
22 <u>the permanent paper record of each ballot cast in the tested</u>
23 precinct printed by the voting system at the time that each

ballot was cast and comparing the results of this count with the results shown by the certificate of results prepared by the Direct Recording Electronic Voting System in the test precinct.

5 <u>"Risk-limiting audit" means a manual tally employing a</u> 6 <u>statistical method that ensures a large, predetermined minimum</u> 7 <u>chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual</u> 8 <u>tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the</u> 9 <u>outcome reported by the vote-tabulating system for the audited</u> 10 <u>contest.</u>

11 (b) The precinct return printed by the Direct Recording 12 Electronic Voting System tabulating equipment shall include the number of ballots cast and votes cast for each candidate 13 and public question and shall constitute the official return 14 15 of each precinct. In addition to the precinct return, the 16 election authority shall provide the number of applications 17 for ballots in each precinct, the total number of ballots and vote by mail ballots counted in each precinct for each 18 political subdivision and district and the number of 19 20 registered voters in each precinct. However, the election authority shall check the totals shown by the precinct return 21 22 and, if there is an obvious discrepancy regarding the total 23 number of votes cast in any precinct, shall have the ballots 24 for that precinct audited to correct the return. The 25 procedures for this audit shall apply prior to and after the 26 proclamation is completed; however, after the proclamation of

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results, the election authority must obtain a court order to 1 2 unseal voted ballots or voting devices except for election 3 contests and discovery recounts. The certificate of results, which has been prepared and signed by the judges of election 4 5 after the ballots have been tabulated, shall be the document used for the canvass of votes for such precinct. Whenever a 6 7 discrepancy exists during the canvass of votes between the unofficial results and the certificate of results, or whenever 8 9 a discrepancy exists during the canvass of votes between the 10 certificate of results and the set of totals reflected on the 11 certificate of results, the ballots for that precinct shall be 12 audited to correct the return.

13 (c) Each election authority shall conduct an audit 14 following an election. Before election day, each election 15 authority shall notify the State Board of Elections whether it 16 intends to conduct a random audit or a risk-limiting audit.

(d) Prior to the proclamation, the election authority 17 shall test the voting devices and equipment in 5% of the 18 19 precincts within the election jurisdiction, as well as 5% of 20 the voting devices used in early voting. The election authority shall also conduct a random audit of 5% of ballots 21 22 cast by mail. The precincts and the voting devices to be tested 23 and the ballots cast by mail to be reviewed shall be selected 24 after election day on a random basis by the State Board of 25 Elections, so that every precinct, and every device used in early voting, and ballot cast by mail in the election 26

jurisdiction has an equal mathematical chance of being selected. The State Board of Elections shall design a standard and scientific random method of selecting the precincts and voting devices that are to be tested <u>and the ballots that are</u> to be reviewed.

6 (e) The random audit shall be conducted by counting the 7 votes marked on the permanent paper record of each ballot cast 8 in the tested precinct printed by the voting system at the time 9 that each ballot was cast and comparing the results of this 10 count with the results shown by the certificate of results 11 prepared by the Direct Recording Electronic Voting System in 12 the test precinct. The election authority shall test count 13 these votes either by hand or by using an automatic tabulating 14 device other than a Direct Recording Electronic voting device 15 that has been approved by the State Board of Elections for that 16 purpose and tested before use to ensure accuracy. The election 17 authority shall print the results of each test count.

(f) The State Board of Elections shall consult recognized 18 19 statistical experts, equipment vendors, and county clerk and 20 recorders in order to adopt rules for the conduct of 21 risk-limiting audits and the criteria by which a contest may 22 be subject to a risk-limiting audit. A risk-limiting audit 23 shall begin with a hand tally of the votes in one or more audit 24 units and shall continue to hand tally votes in additional 25 audit units until there is strong statistical evidence that the electoral outcome is correct. If counting additional audit 26

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1 <u>units does not provide strong statistical evidence that the</u> 2 <u>electoral outcome is correct, the audit shall continue until</u> 3 <u>there has been a full manual tally to determine the correct</u> 4 electoral outcome of the audited contest.

5 <u>(g) When either a random audit or risk-limiting audit is</u> 6 <u>conducted, the</u> The State central committee chair of each 7 established political party shall be given prior written 8 notice of the time and place of the random selection procedure 9 and may be represented at the procedure.

10 (h) The test shall be conducted by counting the votes 11 marked on the permanent paper record of each ballot east in the 12 tested precinct printed by the voting system at the time that each ballot was cast and comparing the results of this count 13 with the results shown by the certificate of results prepared 14 15 by the Direct Recording Electronic Voting System in the test 16 precinct. The election authority shall test count these votes 17 either by hand or by using an automatic tabulating device other than a Direct Recording Electronic voting device that 18 19 has been approved by the State Board of Elections for that purpose and tested before use to ensure accuracy. The election 20 21 authority shall print the results of each test count. If any 22 error is detected following an audit, the cause shall be 23 determined and corrected, and an errorless count shall be made prior to the official canvass and proclamation of election 24 25 results. If an errorless count cannot be conducted and there continues to be difference in vote results between the 26

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certificate of results produced by the Direct Recording Electronic Voting System and the count of the permanent paper records or if an error was detected and corrected, the election authority shall immediately prepare and forward to the appropriate canvassing board a written report explaining the results of the test and any errors encountered and the report shall be made available for public inspection.

8 <u>(i)</u> The State Board of Elections, the State's Attorney and 9 other appropriate law enforcement agencies, the county chair 10 of each established political party and qualified civic 11 organizations shall be given prior written notice of the time 12 and place of the test and may be represented at the test.

13 <u>(j)</u> The results of this post-election test shall be 14 treated in the same manner and have the same effect as the 15 results of the discovery procedures set forth in Section 16 22-9.1 of this Code.

17 (Source: P.A. 100-1027, eff. 1-1-19.)

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