102ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
State of Illinois
2021 and 2022
SB2571

 

Introduced 2/26/2021, by Sen. Melinda Bush

 

SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:
 
10 ILCS 5/24C-15

    Amends the Election Code. Requires each election authority to conduct an audit following an election. Provides that before election day, the election authority shall notify the State Board of Elections whether it intends to conduct a random audit or a risk-limiting audit. Requires election authorities to conduct a random audit of 5% of ballots cast by mail. Provides for conduct of risk-limiting audits.


LRB102 16508 SMS 21901 b

 

 

A BILL FOR

 

SB2571LRB102 16508 SMS 21901 b

1    AN ACT concerning elections.
 
2    Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
3represented in the General Assembly:
 
4    Section 5. The Election Code is amended by changing
5Section 24C-15 as follows:
 
6    (10 ILCS 5/24C-15)
7    Sec. 24C-15. Official return of precinct; check of totals;
8audit.
9    (a) As used in this Section:
10    "Audit unit" means a precinct, a set of ballots, or a
11single ballot. A precinct, a set of ballots, or a single ballot
12may be used as an audit unit for purposes of this Section only
13if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
14        (1) the relevant vote-tabulating device is able to
15    produce a report of the votes cast in the precinct, set of
16    ballots, or single ballot; and
17        (2) each ballot is assigned to not more than one audit
18    unit.
19    "Contest" means an election for an office or for a
20measure.
21    "Random audit" means a manual tally of the votes marked on
22the permanent paper record of each ballot cast in the tested
23precinct printed by the voting system at the time that each

 

 

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1ballot was cast and comparing the results of this count with
2the results shown by the certificate of results prepared by
3the Direct Recording Electronic Voting System in the test
4precinct.
5    "Risk-limiting audit" means a manual tally employing a
6statistical method that ensures a large, predetermined minimum
7chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual
8tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the
9outcome reported by the vote-tabulating system for the audited
10contest.
11    (b) The precinct return printed by the Direct Recording
12Electronic Voting System tabulating equipment shall include
13the number of ballots cast and votes cast for each candidate
14and public question and shall constitute the official return
15of each precinct. In addition to the precinct return, the
16election authority shall provide the number of applications
17for ballots in each precinct, the total number of ballots and
18vote by mail ballots counted in each precinct for each
19political subdivision and district and the number of
20registered voters in each precinct. However, the election
21authority shall check the totals shown by the precinct return
22and, if there is an obvious discrepancy regarding the total
23number of votes cast in any precinct, shall have the ballots
24for that precinct audited to correct the return. The
25procedures for this audit shall apply prior to and after the
26proclamation is completed; however, after the proclamation of

 

 

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1results, the election authority must obtain a court order to
2unseal voted ballots or voting devices except for election
3contests and discovery recounts. The certificate of results,
4which has been prepared and signed by the judges of election
5after the ballots have been tabulated, shall be the document
6used for the canvass of votes for such precinct. Whenever a
7discrepancy exists during the canvass of votes between the
8unofficial results and the certificate of results, or whenever
9a discrepancy exists during the canvass of votes between the
10certificate of results and the set of totals reflected on the
11certificate of results, the ballots for that precinct shall be
12audited to correct the return.
13    (c) Each election authority shall conduct an audit
14following an election. Before election day, each election
15authority shall notify the State Board of Elections whether it
16intends to conduct a random audit or a risk-limiting audit.
17    (d) Prior to the proclamation, the election authority
18shall test the voting devices and equipment in 5% of the
19precincts within the election jurisdiction, as well as 5% of
20the voting devices used in early voting. The election
21authority shall also conduct a random audit of 5% of ballots
22cast by mail. The precincts and the voting devices to be tested
23and the ballots cast by mail to be reviewed shall be selected
24after election day on a random basis by the State Board of
25Elections, so that every precinct, and every device used in
26early voting, and ballot cast by mail in the election

 

 

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1jurisdiction has an equal mathematical chance of being
2selected. The State Board of Elections shall design a standard
3and scientific random method of selecting the precincts and
4voting devices that are to be tested and the ballots that are
5to be reviewed.
6    (e) The random audit shall be conducted by counting the
7votes marked on the permanent paper record of each ballot cast
8in the tested precinct printed by the voting system at the time
9that each ballot was cast and comparing the results of this
10count with the results shown by the certificate of results
11prepared by the Direct Recording Electronic Voting System in
12the test precinct. The election authority shall test count
13these votes either by hand or by using an automatic tabulating
14device other than a Direct Recording Electronic voting device
15that has been approved by the State Board of Elections for that
16purpose and tested before use to ensure accuracy. The election
17authority shall print the results of each test count.
18    (f) The State Board of Elections shall consult recognized
19statistical experts, equipment vendors, and county clerk and
20recorders in order to adopt rules for the conduct of
21risk-limiting audits and the criteria by which a contest may
22be subject to a risk-limiting audit. A risk-limiting audit
23shall begin with a hand tally of the votes in one or more audit
24units and shall continue to hand tally votes in additional
25audit units until there is strong statistical evidence that
26the electoral outcome is correct. If counting additional audit

 

 

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1units does not provide strong statistical evidence that the
2electoral outcome is correct, the audit shall continue until
3there has been a full manual tally to determine the correct
4electoral outcome of the audited contest.
5    (g) When either a random audit or risk-limiting audit is
6conducted, the The State central committee chair of each
7established political party shall be given prior written
8notice of the time and place of the random selection procedure
9and may be represented at the procedure.
10    (h) The test shall be conducted by counting the votes
11marked on the permanent paper record of each ballot cast in the
12tested precinct printed by the voting system at the time that
13each ballot was cast and comparing the results of this count
14with the results shown by the certificate of results prepared
15by the Direct Recording Electronic Voting System in the test
16precinct. The election authority shall test count these votes
17either by hand or by using an automatic tabulating device
18other than a Direct Recording Electronic voting device that
19has been approved by the State Board of Elections for that
20purpose and tested before use to ensure accuracy. The election
21authority shall print the results of each test count. If any
22error is detected following an audit, the cause shall be
23determined and corrected, and an errorless count shall be made
24prior to the official canvass and proclamation of election
25results. If an errorless count cannot be conducted and there
26continues to be difference in vote results between the

 

 

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1certificate of results produced by the Direct Recording
2Electronic Voting System and the count of the permanent paper
3records or if an error was detected and corrected, the
4election authority shall immediately prepare and forward to
5the appropriate canvassing board a written report explaining
6the results of the test and any errors encountered and the
7report shall be made available for public inspection.
8    (i) The State Board of Elections, the State's Attorney and
9other appropriate law enforcement agencies, the county chair
10of each established political party and qualified civic
11organizations shall be given prior written notice of the time
12and place of the test and may be represented at the test.
13    (j) The results of this post-election test shall be
14treated in the same manner and have the same effect as the
15results of the discovery procedures set forth in Section
1622-9.1 of this Code.
17(Source: P.A. 100-1027, eff. 1-1-19.)