Public Act 93-0605
SB472 Enrolled LRB093 08615 RLC 08843 b
AN ACT in relation to criminal law.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly:
Section 1. Short title. This Act may be cited as the
Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee Act.
Section 2. Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee.
(a) There is created the Capital Punishment Reform Study
Committee, hereinafter referred to as the Committee,
consisting of 15 members appointed as follows:
(1) Three members appointed by the President of the
Senate;
(2) Two members appointed by the Minority Leader of
the Senate;
(3) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives;
(4) Two members appointed by the Minority Leader of
the House of Representatives;
(5) One member appointed by the Attorney General;
(6) One member appointed by the Governor;
(7) One member appointed by the Cook County State's
Attorney;
(8) One member appointed by the Office of the Cook
County Public Defender;
(9) One member appointed by the Office of the State
Appellate Defender; and
(10) One member appointed by the office of the
State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor.
(b) The Committee shall study the impact of the various
reforms to the capital punishment system enacted by the 93rd
General Assembly and annually report to the General Assembly
on the effects of these reforms. Each report shall include:
(1) The impact of the reforms on the issue of
uniformity and proportionality in the application of the
death penalty including, but not limited to, the tracking
of data related to whether the reforms have eliminated
the statistically significant differences in sentencing
related to the geographic location of the homicide and
the race of the victim found by the Governor's Commission
on Capital Punishment in its report issued on April 15,
2002.
(2) The implementation of training for police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges as recommended
by the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment.
(3) The impact of the various reforms on the
quality of evidence used during capital prosecutions.
(4) The quality of representation provided by
defense counsel to defendants in capital prosecutions.
(5) The impact of the various reforms on the costs
associated with the administration of the Illinois
capital punishment system.
(c) The Committee shall hold hearings on a periodic
basis to receive testimony from the public regarding the
manner in which reforms have impacted the capital punishment
system.
(d) The Committee shall submit its final report to the
General Assembly no later than 5 years after the effective
date of this Act.
Section 5. The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Act
is amended by adding Section 7.2 as follows:
(20 ILCS 3930/7.2 new)
Sec. 7.2. Custodial Interview Pilot Program.
(a) Legislative findings and intent. The General
Assembly finds that technology has made it possible to
electronically record custodial interviews of suspects during
first degree murder investigations. This technology will
protect law enforcement agencies against claims of abuse and
coercion by suspects while providing a memorialized account
of interviews at police stations. The technology will also
provide a better means for courts to review confessions of
suspects with direct evidence of demeanor, tone, manner, and
content of statements. The General Assembly intends to create
a Custodial Interview Pilot Program to establish 4 pilot
programs at police stations in the State of Illinois. For
each program, video and audio experts shall install equipment
and train participating law enforcement agencies to
electronically record custodial interviews at their
respective police stations. Participating law enforcement
agencies shall choose how to use the equipment in cooperation
with the local State's Attorney's office. The participating
law enforcement agencies may choose to electronically record
interviews of suspects for offenses other than first degree
murder if they adopt local protocols in cooperation with the
local State's Attorney's office.
(b) Definitions. In this Section:
(1) "Electronically record" means to memorialize by
video and audio electronic equipment.
(2) "Custodial interviews" means interviews of
suspects during first degree murder investigations or
other investigations established by local protocol by law
enforcement authorities that take place at the police
station.
(c) Custodial Interview Pilot Program. The Authority
shall, subject to appropriation, establish a Custodial
Interview Pilot Program to operate 4 custodial interview
pilot programs. The programs shall be established in a police
station in the County of Cook and in 3 other police stations
geographically distributed throughout the State. Each
participating law enforcement agency must:
(1) Promulgate procedures for recording custodial
interviews of suspects during first degree murder
investigations by video and audio means.
(2) Promulgate procedures for maintaining and
storing video and audio recordings.
(d) Each of the 4 pilot programs established by the
Authority shall be in existence for a minimum of 2 years
after its establishment under this Act.
(e) Report. No later than one year after the
establishment of pilot programs under this Section, the
Authority must report to the General Assembly on the efficacy
of the Custodial Interview Pilot Program.
(f) The Authority shall adopt rules in cooperation with
the Illinois Department of State Police to implement this
Section.
Section 6. The Illinois Police Training Act is amended by
changing Section 6.1 as follows:
(50 ILCS 705/6.1)
Sec. 6.1. Decertification of full-time and part-time
police officers.
(a) The Board must review police officer conduct and
records to ensure that no police officer is certified or
provided a valid waiver if that police officer has been
convicted of a felony offense under the laws of this State or
any other state which if committed in this State would be
punishable as a felony. The Board must also ensure that no
police officer is certified or provided a valid waiver if
that police officer has been convicted on or after the
effective date of this amendatory Act of 1999 of any
misdemeanor specified in this Section or if committed in any
other state would be an offense similar to Section 11-6,
11-9.1, 11-14, 11-17, 11-19, 12-2, 12-15, 16-1, 17-1, 17-2,
28-3, 29-1, 31-1, 31-6, 31-7, 32-4a, or 32-7 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 or to Section 5 or 5.2 of the Cannabis Control
Act. The Board must appoint investigators to enforce the
duties conferred upon the Board by this Act.
(b) It is the responsibility of the sheriff or the chief
executive officer of every local law enforcement agency or
department within this State to report to the Board any
arrest or conviction of any officer for an offense identified
in this Section.
(c) It is the duty and responsibility of every full-time
and part-time police officer in this State to report to the
Board within 30 days, and the officer's sheriff or chief
executive officer, of his or her arrest or conviction for an
offense identified in this Section. Any full-time or
part-time police officer who knowingly makes, submits, causes
to be submitted, or files a false or untruthful report to the
Board must have his or her certificate or waiver immediately
decertified or revoked.
(d) Any person, or a local or State agency, or the Board
is immune from liability for submitting, disclosing, or
releasing information of arrests or convictions in this
Section as long as the information is submitted, disclosed,
or released in good faith and without malice. The Board has
qualified immunity for the release of the information.
(e) Any full-time or part-time police officer with a
certificate or waiver issued by the Board who is convicted of
any offense described in this Section immediately becomes
decertified or no longer has a valid waiver. The
decertification and invalidity of waivers occurs as a matter
of law. Failure of a convicted person to report to the Board
his or her conviction as described in this Section or any
continued law enforcement practice after receiving a
conviction is a Class 4 felony.
(f) The Board's investigators are peace officers and
have all the powers possessed by policemen in cities and by
sheriff's, provided that the investigators may exercise those
powers anywhere in the State, only after contact and
cooperation with the appropriate local law enforcement
authorities.
(g) The Board must request and receive information and
assistance from any federal, state, or local governmental
agency as part of the authorized criminal background
investigation. The Department of State Police must process,
retain, and additionally provide and disseminate information
to the Board concerning criminal charges, arrests,
convictions, and their disposition, that have been filed
before, on, or after the effective date of this amendatory
Act of the 91st General Assembly against a basic academy
applicant, law enforcement applicant, or law enforcement
officer whose fingerprint identification cards are on file or
maintained by the Department of State Police. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation must provide the Board any criminal
history record information contained in its files pertaining
to law enforcement officers or any applicant to a Board
certified basic law enforcement academy as described in this
Act based on fingerprint identification. The Board must make
payment of fees to the Department of State Police for each
fingerprint card submission in conformance with the
requirements of paragraph 22 of Section 55a of the Civil
Administrative Code of Illinois.
(h) A police officer who has been certified or granted a
valid waiver may also be decertified or have his or her
waiver revoked upon a determination by the Board that he or
she, while under oath, has knowingly and willfully made false
statements as to a material fact during a homicide
proceeding. A determination may be made only after an
investigation and hearing upon a verified complaint filed
with the Illinois Law Enforcement Training Standards Board.
No action may be taken by the Board regarding a complaint
unless a majority of the members of the Board are present at
the meeting at which the action is taken.
(1) The Board shall adopt rules governing the
investigation and hearing of a verified complaint to
assure the police officer due process and to eliminate
conflicts of interest within the Board itself.
(2) Upon receipt of the initial verified complaint,
the Board must make a finding within 30 days of receipt
of the complaint as to whether sufficient evidence exists
to support the complaint. The Board is empowered to
investigate and dismiss the complaint if it finds, by a
vote of a majority of the members present, that there is
insufficient evidence to support it. Upon the initial
filing, the sheriff or police chief, or other employing
agency, of the accused officer may suspend, with or
without pay, the accused officer pending a decision of
the Board. Upon a Board finding of insufficient evidence,
the police officer shall be reinstated with back pay,
benefits, and seniority status as appropriate. The
sheriff or police chief, or employing agency, shall take
such necessary action as is ordered by the Board.
(3) If the Board finds, by a vote of a majority of
the members present, that sufficient evidence exists to
support the complaint, it shall authorize a hearing
before an administrative law judge within 45 days of the
Board's finding, unless, based upon the complexity and
extent of the allegations and charges, additional time is
needed. In no event may a hearing before an
administrative law judge take place later than 60 days
after the Board's finding.
(i) The Board shall have the power and authority to
appoint administrative law judges on a contractual basis.
The Administrative law judges must be attorneys licensed to
practice law in the State of Illinois. The Board shall also
adopt rules governing the appointment of administrative law
judges and the conduct of hearings consistent with the
requirements of this Section. The administrative law judge
shall hear all evidence and prepare a written recommendation
of his or her findings to the Board. At the hearing the
accused police officer shall be afforded the opportunity to:
(1) Be represented by counsel;
(2) Be heard in his or her own defense;
(3) Produce evidence in his or her defense;
(4) Request that the Board compel the attendance of
witnesses and production of court records and documents.
(j) Once a case has been set for hearing, the person who
filed the verified complaint shall have the opportunity to
produce evidence to support any charge against a police
officer that he or she, while under oath, has knowingly and
willfully made false statements as to a material fact during
a homicide proceeding.
(1) The person who filed the verified complaint
shall have the opportunity to be represented by counsel
and shall produce evidence to support his or her charges;
(2) The person who filed the verified complaint may
request the Board to compel the attendance of witnesses
and production of court records and documents.
(k) The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of court records and documents and shall have the
power to administer oaths.
(l) The administrative law judge shall have the
responsibility of receiving into evidence relevant testimony
and documents, including court records, to support or
disprove the allegations made by the person filing the
verified complaint, and, at the close of the case, hear
arguments. If the administrative law judge finds that there
is not clear and convincing evidence to support the verified
complaint that the police officer has, while under oath,
knowingly and willfully made false statements as to a
material fact during a homicide proceeding, the
administrative law judge shall make a written recommendation
of dismissal to the Board. If the administrative law judge
finds that there is clear and convincing evidence to support
the verified complaint that the police officer has, while
under oath, knowingly and willfully made false statements as
to a material fact during a homicide proceeding, the
administrative law judge shall make a written recommendation
of decertification to the Board.
(m) Any person, with the exception of the police officer
who is the subject of the hearing, who is served by the Board
with a subpoena to appear, testify or produce evidence and
refuses to comply with the subpoena is guilty of a Class B
misdemeanor. Any circuit court or judge, upon application by
the Board, may compel compliance with a subpoena issued by
the Board.
(n) Within 15 days of receiving the recommendation, the
Board shall consider the recommendation of the administrative
law judge and the record of the hearing at a Board meeting.
If, by a two-thirds vote of the members present at the Board
meeting, the Board finds that there is clear and convincing
evidence that the police officer has, while under oath,
knowingly and willfully made false statements as to a
material fact during a homicide proceeding, the Board shall
order that the police officer be decertified as a full-time
or part-time police officer. If less than two-thirds of the
members present vote to decertify the police officer, the
Board shall dismiss the complaint.
(o) The provisions of the Administrative Review Law
shall govern all proceedings for the judicial review of any
order rendered by the Board. The moving party shall pay the
reasonable costs of preparing and certifying the record for
review. If the moving party is the police officer and he or
she prevails, the court may award the police officer actual
costs incurred in all proceedings, including reasonable
attorney fees. If the court awards the police officer the
actual costs incurred in a proceeding, including reasonable
attorney fees, the costs and attorney fees shall be paid,
subject to appropriation, from the Illinois Law Enforcement
Training Standards Board Costs and Attorney Fees Fund, a
special fund that is created in the State Treasury. The Fund
shall consist of moneys appropriated or transferred into the
Fund for the purpose of making payments of costs and attorney
fees in accordance with this subsection (o). The Illinois Law
Enforcement Training Standards Board shall administer the
Fund and adopt rules for the administration of the Fund and
for the submission and disposition of claims for costs and
attorney fees in accordance with this subsection (o).
(p) If the police officer is decertified under
subsection (h), the Board shall notify the defendant who was
a party to the proceeding that resulted in the police
officer's decertification and his or her attorney of the
Board's decision. Notification shall be by certified mail,
return receipt requested, sent to the party's last known
address and to the party's attorney if any.
(q) Limitation of action.
(1) No complaint may be filed pursuant to this
Section until after a verdict or other disposition is
rendered in the underlying case or the underlying case is
dismissed in the trial court.
(2) A complaint pursuant to this Section may not be
filed more than 2 years after the final resolution of the
case. For purposes of this Section, final resolution is
defined as the trial court's ruling on the State
post-conviction proceeding in the case in which it is
alleged the police officer, while under oath, knowingly
and willfully made false statements as to a material fact
during a homicide proceeding. In the event a
post-conviction petition is not filed, an action pursuant
to this Section may not be commenced more than 2 years
after the denial of a petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, or if no petition for
certiorari is filed, 2 years after the date such a
petition should have been filed. In the event of an
acquittal, no proceeding may be commenced pursuant to
this Section more than 6 years after the date upon which
judgment on the verdict of acquittal was entered.
(r) Interested parties. Only interested parties to the
criminal prosecution in which the police officer allegedly,
while under oath, knowingly and willfully made false
statements as to a material fact during a homicide proceeding
may file a verified complaint pursuant to this Section. For
purposes of this Section, "interested parties" include the
defendant and any police officer who has personal knowledge
that the police officer who is the subject of the complaint
has, while under oath, knowingly and willfully made false
statements as to a material fact during a homicide
proceeding.
(Source: P.A. 91-495, eff. 1-1-00.)
Section 10. The Criminal Code of 1961 is amended by
changing Sections 9-1 and 14-3 as follows:
(720 ILCS 5/9-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-1)
Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder - Death penalties -
Exceptions - Separate Hearings - Proof - Findings - Appellate
procedures - Reversals.
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits first degree murder if, in performing
the acts which cause the death:
(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily
harm to that individual or another, or knows that such
acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) he knows that such acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to that
individual or another; or
(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible
felony other than second degree murder.
(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of
the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or
more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may
be sentenced to death if:
(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or
fireman killed in the course of performing his official
duties, to prevent the performance of his official
duties, or in retaliation for performing his official
duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that
the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman;
or
(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an
institution or facility of the Department of Corrections,
or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the
course of performing his official duties, to prevent the
performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for
performing his official duties, or the murdered
individual was an inmate at such institution or facility
and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered
individual was otherwise present in such institution or
facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief
administrative officer thereof; or
(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering
two or more individuals under subsection (a) of this
Section or under any law of the United States or of any
state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of
this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred
as the result of the same act or of several related or
unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of
either an intent to kill more than one person or of
separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death
or create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to the murdered individual or another; or
(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result
of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or
other public conveyance; or
(5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to
a contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to
receive money or anything of value in return for
committing the murder or procured another to commit the
murder for money or anything of value; or
(6) the murdered individual was killed in the
course of another felony if:
(a) the murdered individual:
(i) was actually killed by the defendant,
or
(ii) received physical injuries
personally inflicted by the defendant
substantially contemporaneously with physical
injuries caused by one or more persons for
whose conduct the defendant is legally
accountable under Section 5-2 of this Code, and
the physical injuries inflicted by either the
defendant or the other person or persons for
whose conduct he is legally accountable caused
the death of the murdered individual; and
(b) in performing the acts which caused the
death of the murdered individual or which resulted
in physical injuries personally inflicted by the
defendant on the murdered individual under the
circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph
(a) of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this
Section, the defendant acted with the intent to kill
the murdered individual or with the knowledge that
his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to the murdered individual or
another; and
(c) the other felony was an inherently violent
crime one of the following: armed robbery, armed
violence, robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault
of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault,
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular
hijacking, forcible detention, arson, aggravated
arson, aggravated stalking, burglary, residential
burglary, home invasion, calculated criminal drug
conspiracy as defined in Section 405 of the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act, streetgang criminal drug
conspiracy as defined in Section 405.2 of the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or the attempt
to commit an inherently violent crime. In this
subparagraph (c), "inherently violent crime"
includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery,
robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child, aggravated criminal sexual assault,
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular
hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated stalking,
residential burglary, and home invasion any of the
felonies listed in this subsection (c); or
(7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of
age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
(8) the defendant committed the murder with intent
to prevent the murdered individual from testifying or
participating in any criminal investigation or
prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in
any investigation or prosecution, either against the
defendant or another; or the defendant committed the
murder because the murdered individual was a witness in
any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State
in any investigation or prosecution, either against the
defendant or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8),
"participating in any criminal investigation or
prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in
the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses,
or jurors; or
(9) the defendant, while committing an offense
punishable under Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2,
407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a
conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense,
intentionally killed an individual or counseled,
commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional
killing of the murdered individual; or
(10) the defendant was incarcerated in an
institution or facility of the Department of Corrections
at the time of the murder, and while committing an
offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or
while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit
such offense, intentionally killed an individual or
counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the
intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
(11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated
and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means,
and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable
expectation that the death of a human being would result
therefrom; or
(12) the murdered individual was an emergency
medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical
technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician -
paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance
or first aid personnel, employed by a municipality or
other governmental unit, killed in the course of
performing his official duties, to prevent the
performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for
performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or
should have known that the murdered individual was an
emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency
medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical
technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other
medical assistance or first aid personnel; or
(13) the defendant was a principal administrator,
organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug
conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of
authority superior to that of all other members of the
conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of
the murdered person; or
(14) the murder was intentional and involved the
infliction of torture. For the purpose of this Section
torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme
physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or
prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim; or
(15) the murder was committed as a result of the
intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from
a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the
motor vehicle; or
(16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or
older and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
(17) the murdered individual was a disabled person
and the defendant knew or should have known that the
murdered individual was disabled. For purposes of this
paragraph (17), "disabled person" means a person who
suffers from a permanent physical or mental impairment
resulting from disease, an injury, a functional disorder,
or a congenital condition that renders the person
incapable of adequately providing for his or her own
health or personal care; or
(18) the murder was committed by reason of any
person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to
prevent any person from engaging in activity as a
community policing volunteer; or
(19) the murdered individual was subject to an
order of protection and the murder was committed by a
person against whom the same order of protection was
issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986;
or
(20) the murdered individual was known by the
defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any
school and the teacher or other employee is upon the
grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or
is in any part of a building used for school purposes; or
(21) the murder was committed by the defendant in
connection with or as a result of the offense of
terrorism as defined in Section 29D-30 of this Code.
(c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and
Mitigation.
The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to
consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are
relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating
factors may include but need not be limited to those factors
set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating factors may include
but need not be limited to the following:
(1) the defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity;
(2) the murder was committed while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense
to prosecution;
(3) the murdered individual was a participant in
the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the
homicidal act;
(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of
threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or
great bodily harm;
(5) the defendant was not personally present during
commission of the act or acts causing death;.
(6) the defendant's background includes a history
of extreme emotional or physical abuse;
(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental
capacity.
(d) Separate sentencing hearing.
Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a
separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of
factors set forth in subsection (b) and to consider any
aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection
(c). The proceeding shall be conducted:
(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's
guilt; or
(2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the
proceeding if:
A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of
guilty; or
B. the defendant was convicted after a trial
before the court sitting without a jury; or
C. the court for good cause shown discharges
the jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or
(3) before the court alone if the defendant waives
a jury for the separate proceeding.
(e) Evidence and Argument.
During the proceeding any information relevant to any of
the factors set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by
either the State or the defendant under the rules governing
the admission of evidence at criminal trials. Any
information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or
any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be
presented by the State or defendant regardless of its
admissibility under the rules governing the admission of
evidence at criminal trials. The State and the defendant
shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information
received at the hearing.
(f) Proof.
The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any
of the factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State
and shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(g) Procedure - Jury.
If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds
that none of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists,
the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury
that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b)
exist, the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating
factors as instructed by the court and shall determine
whether the sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury
determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in
aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate
sentence that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court
shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not
concur with the jury determination that death is the
appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in
writing including what facts or circumstances the court
relied upon, along with any relevant documents, that
compelled the court to non-concur with the sentence. This
document and any attachments shall be part of the record for
appellate review. The court shall be bound by the jury's
sentencing determination.
If after weighing the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, one or more jurors determines that death is not
the appropriate sentence, Unless the jury unanimously finds
that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude
the imposition of the death sentence the court shall sentence
the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of
the Unified Code of Corrections.
(h) Procedure - No Jury.
In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court
finds that none of the factors found in subsection (b)
exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections.
If the Court determines that one or more of the factors
set forth in subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider
any aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in
subsection (c). If the Court determines, after weighing the
factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the
appropriate sentence that there are no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence,
the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.
If Unless the court finds that there are no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the sentence
of death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall
sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under
Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(h-5) Decertification as a capital case.
In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of
first degree murder by a judge or jury, or a case on remand
for resentencing, and the State seeks the death penalty as an
appropriate sentence, on the court's own motion or the
written motion of the defendant, the court may decertify the
case as a death penalty case if the court finds that the only
evidence supporting the defendant's conviction is the
uncorroborated testimony of an informant witness, as defined
in Section 115-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963,
concerning the confession or admission of the defendant or
that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single
eyewitness or single accomplice without any other
corroborating evidence. If the court decertifies the case as
a capital case under either of the grounds set forth above,
the court shall issue a written finding. The State may
pursue its right to appeal the decertification pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If the court does not
decertify the case as a capital case, the matter shall
proceed to the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing.
(i) Appellate Procedure.
The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to
automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be
in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
The Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence,
and order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of
the Unified Code of Corrections if the court finds that the
death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the
particular case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the
death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the
particular case, independent of any procedural grounds for
relief, the Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written
opinion explaining this finding.
(j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held
to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of
first degree murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term
of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections.
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the
sentencing provisions of this Section is declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or
of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over
a person previously sentenced to death shall cause the
defendant to be brought before the court, and the court shall
sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under
Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(k) Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.
The Attorney General and State's Attorneys Association
shall consult on voluntary guidelines for procedures
governing whether or not to seek the death penalty. The
guidelines do not have the force of law and are only advisory
in nature.
(Source: P.A. 91-357, eff. 7-29-99; 91-434, eff. 1-1-00;
92-854, eff. 12-5-02.)
(720 ILCS 5/14-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 14-3)
Sec. 14-3. Exemptions. The following activities shall
be exempt from the provisions of this Article:
(a) Listening to radio, wireless and television
communications of any sort where the same are publicly made;
(b) Hearing conversation when heard by employees of any
common carrier by wire incidental to the normal course of
their employment in the operation, maintenance or repair of
the equipment of such common carrier by wire so long as no
information obtained thereby is used or divulged by the
hearer;
(c) Any broadcast by radio, television or otherwise
whether it be a broadcast or recorded for the purpose of
later broadcasts of any function where the public is in
attendance and the conversations are overheard incidental to
the main purpose for which such broadcasts are then being
made;
(d) Recording or listening with the aid of any device to
any emergency communication made in the normal course of
operations by any federal, state or local law enforcement
agency or institutions dealing in emergency services,
including, but not limited to, hospitals, clinics, ambulance
services, fire fighting agencies, any public utility,
emergency repair facility, civilian defense establishment or
military installation;
(e) Recording the proceedings of any meeting required to
be open by the Open Meetings Act, as amended;
(f) Recording or listening with the aid of any device to
incoming telephone calls of phone lines publicly listed or
advertised as consumer "hotlines" by manufacturers or
retailers of food and drug products. Such recordings must be
destroyed, erased or turned over to local law enforcement
authorities within 24 hours from the time of such recording
and shall not be otherwise disseminated. Failure on the part
of the individual or business operating any such recording or
listening device to comply with the requirements of this
subsection shall eliminate any civil or criminal immunity
conferred upon that individual or business by the operation
of this Section;
(g) With prior notification to the State's Attorney of
the county in which it is to occur, recording or listening
with the aid of any device to any conversation where a law
enforcement officer, or any person acting at the direction of
law enforcement, is a party to the conversation and has
consented to it being intercepted or recorded under
circumstances where the use of the device is necessary for
the protection of the law enforcement officer or any person
acting at the direction of law enforcement, in the course of
an investigation of a forcible felony, a felony violation of
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, a felony violation of
the Cannabis Control Act, or any "streetgang related" or
"gang-related" felony as those terms are defined in the
Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act. Any
recording or evidence derived as the result of this exemption
shall be inadmissible in any proceeding, criminal, civil or
administrative, except (i) where a party to the conversation
suffers great bodily injury or is killed during such
conversation, or (ii) when used as direct impeachment of a
witness concerning matters contained in the interception or
recording. The Director of the Department of State Police
shall issue regulations as are necessary concerning the use
of devices, retention of tape recordings, and reports
regarding their use;
(g-5) With approval of the State's Attorney of the
county in which it is to occur, recording or listening with
the aid of any device to any conversation where a law
enforcement officer, or any person acting at the direction of
law enforcement, is a party to the conversation and has
consented to it being intercepted or recorded in the course
of an investigation of any offense defined in Article 29D of
this Code. In all such cases, an application for an order
approving the previous or continuing use of an eavesdropping
device must be made within 48 hours of the commencement of
such use. In the absence of such an order, or upon its
denial, any continuing use shall immediately terminate. The
Director of State Police shall issue rules as are necessary
concerning the use of devices, retention of tape recordings,
and reports regarding their use.
Any recording or evidence obtained or derived in the
course of an investigation of any offense defined in Article
29D of this Code shall, upon motion of the State's Attorney
or Attorney General prosecuting any violation of Article 29D,
be reviewed in camera with notice to all parties present by
the court presiding over the criminal case, and, if ruled by
the court to be relevant and otherwise admissible, it shall
be admissible at the trial of the criminal case.
This subsection (g-5) is inoperative on and after January
1, 2005. No conversations recorded or monitored pursuant to
this subsection (g-5) shall be inadmissable in a court of law
by virtue of the repeal of this subsection (g-5) on January
1, 2005;.
(h) Recordings made simultaneously with a video
recording of an oral conversation between a peace officer,
who has identified his or her office, and a person stopped
for an investigation of an offense under the Illinois Vehicle
Code;
(i) Recording of a conversation made by or at the
request of a person, not a law enforcement officer or agent
of a law enforcement officer, who is a party to the
conversation, under reasonable suspicion that another party
to the conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has
committed a criminal offense against the person or a member
of his or her immediate household, and there is reason to
believe that evidence of the criminal offense may be obtained
by the recording; and
(j) The use of a telephone monitoring device by either
(1) a corporation or other business entity engaged in
marketing or opinion research or (2) a corporation or other
business entity engaged in telephone solicitation, as defined
in this subsection, to record or listen to oral telephone
solicitation conversations or marketing or opinion research
conversations by an employee of the corporation or other
business entity when:
(i) the monitoring is used for the purpose of
service quality control of marketing or opinion research
or telephone solicitation, the education or training of
employees or contractors engaged in marketing or opinion
research or telephone solicitation, or internal research
related to marketing or opinion research or telephone
solicitation; and
(ii) the monitoring is used with the consent of at
least one person who is an active party to the marketing
or opinion research conversation or telephone
solicitation conversation being monitored.
No communication or conversation or any part, portion, or
aspect of the communication or conversation made, acquired,
or obtained, directly or indirectly, under this exemption
(j), may be, directly or indirectly, furnished to any law
enforcement officer, agency, or official for any purpose or
used in any inquiry or investigation, or used, directly or
indirectly, in any administrative, judicial, or other
proceeding, or divulged to any third party.
When recording or listening authorized by this subsection
(j) on telephone lines used for marketing or opinion research
or telephone solicitation purposes results in recording or
listening to a conversation that does not relate to marketing
or opinion research or telephone solicitation; the person
recording or listening shall, immediately upon determining
that the conversation does not relate to marketing or opinion
research or telephone solicitation, terminate the recording
or listening and destroy any such recording as soon as is
practicable.
Business entities that use a telephone monitoring or
telephone recording system pursuant to this exemption (j)
shall provide current and prospective employees with notice
that the monitoring or recordings may occur during the course
of their employment. The notice shall include prominent
signage notification within the workplace.
Business entities that use a telephone monitoring or
telephone recording system pursuant to this exemption (j)
shall provide their employees or agents with access to
personal-only telephone lines which may be pay telephones,
that are not subject to telephone monitoring or telephone
recording.
For the purposes of this subsection (j), "telephone
solicitation" means a communication through the use of a
telephone by live operators:
(i) soliciting the sale of goods or services;
(ii) receiving orders for the sale of goods or
services;
(iii) assisting in the use of goods or services; or
(iv) engaging in the solicitation, administration,
or collection of bank or retail credit accounts.
For the purposes of this subsection (j), "marketing or
opinion research" means a marketing or opinion research
interview conducted by a live telephone interviewer engaged
by a corporation or other business entity whose principal
business is the design, conduct, and analysis of polls and
surveys measuring the opinions, attitudes, and responses of
respondents toward products and services, or social or
political issues, or both; and
(k) Recording the interview or statement of any person
when the person knows that the interview is being conducted
by a law enforcement officer or prosecutor and the interview
takes place at a police station that is currently
participating in the Custodial Interview Pilot Program
established under the Illinois Criminal Justice Information
Act.
(Source: P.A. 91-357, eff. 7-29-99; 92-854, eff. 12-5-02.)
Section 15. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is
amended by changing Sections 114-13, 116-3, 122-1, and
122-2.1 and adding Article 107A and Sections 114-15, 115-21,
115-22, 116-5, and 122-2.2 as follows:
(725 ILCS 5/107A Art. heading new)
ARTICLE 107A. LINEUP AND PHOTO SPREAD PROCEDURE
(725 ILCS 5/107A-5 new)
Sec. 107A-5. Lineup and photo spread procedure.
(a) All lineups shall be photographed or otherwise
recorded. These photographs shall be disclosed to the accused
and his or her defense counsel during discovery proceedings
as provided in Illinois Supreme Court Rules. All photographs
of suspects shown to an eyewitness during the photo spread
shall be disclosed to the accused and his or her defense
counsel during discovery proceedings as provided in Illinois
Supreme Court Rules.
(b) Each eyewitness who views a lineup or photo spread
shall sign a form containing the following information:
(1) The suspect might not be in the lineup or photo
spread and the eyewitness is not obligated to make an
identification.
(2) The eyewitness should not assume that the
person administering the lineup or photo spread knows
which person is the suspect in the case.
(c) Suspects in a lineup or photo spread should not
appear to be substantially different from "fillers" or
"distracters" in the lineup or photo spread, based on the
eyewitness' previous description of the perpetrator, or based
on other factors that would draw attention to the suspect.
(725 ILCS 5/107A-10 new)
Sec. 107A-10. Pilot study on sequential lineup
procedures.
(a) Legislative intent. Because the goal of a police
investigation is to apprehend the person or persons
responsible for committing a crime, it is useful to conduct a
pilot study in the field on the effectiveness of the
sequential method for lineup procedures.
(b) Establishment of pilot jurisdictions. The Department
of State Police shall select 3 police departments to
participate in a one-year pilot study on the effectiveness of
the sequential lineup method for photo and live lineup
procedures. One such pilot jurisdiction shall be a police
district within a police department in a municipality whose
population is at least 500,000 residents; one such pilot
jurisdiction shall be a police department in a municipality
whose population is at least 100,000 but less than 500,000;
and one such pilot jurisdiction shall be a police department
in a municipality whose population is less than 100,000. All
such pilot jurisdictions shall be selected no later than
January 1, 2004.
(c) Sequential lineup procedures in pilot jurisdictions.
For any offense alleged to have been committed in a pilot
jurisdiction on or after January 1, 2004, selected lineup
identification procedure shall be presented in the sequential
method in which a witness is shown lineup participants one at
a time, using the following procedures:
(1) The witness shall be requested to state whether
the individual shown is the perpetrator of the crime
prior to viewing the next lineup participant. Only one
member of the lineup shall be a suspect and the remainder
shall be "fillers" who are not suspects but fit the
general description of the offender without the suspect
unduly standing out;
(2) The lineup administrator shall be someone who
is not aware of which member of the lineup is the suspect
in the case; and
(3) Prior to presenting the lineup using the
sequential method the lineup administrator shall:
(A) Inform the witness that the perpetrator
may or may not be among those shown, and the witness
should not feel compelled to make an identification;
(B) Inform the witness that he or she will
view individuals one at a time and will be requested
to state whether the individual shown is the
perpetrator of the crime, prior to viewing the next
lineup participant; and
(C) Ask the witness to state in his or her own
words how sure he or she is that the person
identified is the actual offender. During the
statement, or as soon thereafter as reasonably
possible, the witness's actual words shall be
documented.
(d) Application. This Section applies to selected live
lineups that are composed and presented at a police station
and to selected photo lineups regardless of where presented;
provided that this Section does not apply in police
investigations in which a spontaneous identification is
possible and no lineup procedure is being used. This Section
does not affect the right to counsel afforded by the U.S. or
Illinois Constitutions or State law at any stage of a
criminal proceeding.
(e) Selection of lineups. The participating
jurisdictions shall develop a protocol for the selection and
administration of lineups which is practical, designed to
elicit information for comparative evaluation purposes, and
is consistent with objective scientific research methodology.
(f) Training and administrators. The Department of State
Police shall offer training to police officers and any other
appropriate personnel on the sequential method of conducting
lineup procedures in the pilot jurisdictions and the
requirements of this Section. The Department of State Police
may seek funding for training and administration from the
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority and the
Illinois Law Enforcement Training Standards Board if
necessary.
(g) Report on the pilot study. The Department of State
Police shall gather information from each of the
participating police departments selected as a pilot
jurisdiction with respect to the effectiveness of the
sequential method for lineup procedures and shall file a
report of its findings with the Governor and the General
Assembly no later than April 1, 2005.
(725 ILCS 5/114-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-13)
Sec. 114-13. Discovery in criminal cases.
(a) Discovery procedures in criminal cases shall be in
accordance with Supreme Court Rules.
(b) Any public investigative, law enforcement, or other
public agency responsible for investigating any homicide
offense or participating in an investigation of any homicide
offense, other than defense investigators, shall provide to
the authority prosecuting the offense all investigative
material, including but not limited to reports, memoranda,
and field notes, that have been generated by or have come
into the possession of the investigating agency concerning
the homicide offense being investigated. In addition, the
investigating agency shall provide to the prosecuting
authority any material or information, including but not
limited to reports, memoranda, and field notes, within its
possession or control that would tend to negate the guilt of
the accused of the offense charged or reduce his or her
punishment for the homicide offense. Every investigative and
law enforcement agency in this State shall adopt policies to
ensure compliance with these standards. Any investigative,
law enforcement, or other public agency responsible for
investigating any "non-homicide felony" offense or
participating in an investigation of any "non-homicide
felony" offense, other than defense investigators, shall
provide to the authority prosecuting the offense all
investigative material, including but not limited to reports
and memoranda that have been generated by or have come into
the possession of the investigating agency concerning the
"non-homicide felony" offense being investigated. In
addition, the investigating agency shall provide to the
prosecuting authority any material or information, including
but not limited to reports and memoranda, within its
possession or control that would tend to negate the guilt of
the accused of the "non-homicide felony" offense charged or
reduce his or her punishment for the "non-homicide felony"
offense. This obligation to furnish exculpatory evidence
exists whether the information was recorded or documented in
any form. Every investigative and law enforcement agency in
this State shall adopt policies to ensure compliance with
these standards.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/114-15 new)
Sec. 114-15. Mental retardation.
(a) In a first degree murder case in which the State
seeks the death penalty as an appropriate sentence, any party
may raise the issue of the defendant's mental retardation by
motion. A defendant wishing to raise the issue of his or her
mental retardation shall provide written notice to the State
and the court as soon as the defendant reasonably believes
such issue will be raised.
(b) The issue of the defendant's mental retardation
shall be determined in a pretrial hearing. The court shall be
the fact finder on the issue of the defendant's mental
retardation and shall determine the issue by a preponderance
of evidence in which the moving party has the burden of
proof. The court may appoint an expert in the field of mental
retardation. The defendant and the State may offer experts
from the field of mental retardation. The court shall
determine admissibility of evidence and qualification as an
expert.
(c) If after a plea of guilty to first degree murder, or
a finding of guilty of first degree murder in a bench trial,
or a verdict of guilty for first degree murder in a jury
trial, or on a matter remanded from the Supreme Court for
sentencing for first degree murder, and the State seeks the
death penalty as an appropriate sentence, the defendant may
raise the issue of defendant's mental retardation not at
eligibility but at aggravation and mitigation. The defendant
and the State may offer experts from the field of mental
retardation. The court shall determine admissibility of
evidence and qualification as an expert.
(d) In determining whether the defendant is mentally
retarded, the mental retardation must have manifested itself
by the age of 18. IQ tests and psychometric tests
administered to the defendant must be the kind and type
recognized by experts in the field of mental retardation. In
order for the defendant to be considered mentally retarded, a
low IQ must be accompanied by significant deficits in
adaptive behavior in at least 2 of the following skill areas:
communication, self-care, social or interpersonal skills,
home living, self-direction, academics, health and safety,
use of community resources, and work. An intelligence
quotient (IQ) of 75 or below is presumptive evidence of
mental retardation.
(e) Evidence of mental retardation that did not result
in disqualifying the case as a capital case, may be
introduced as evidence in mitigation during a capital
sentencing hearing. A failure of the court to determine that
the defendant is mentally retarded does not preclude the
court during trial from allowing evidence relating to mental
disability should the court deem it appropriate.
(f) If the court determines at a pretrial hearing or
after remand that a capital defendant is mentally retarded,
and the State does not appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
604, the case shall no longer be considered a capital case
and the procedural guidelines established for capital cases
shall no longer be applicable to the defendant. In that
case, the defendant shall be sentenced under the sentencing
provisions of Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(725 ILCS 5/115-21 new)
Sec. 115-21. Informant testimony.
(a) For the purposes of this Section, "informant" means
someone who is purporting to testify about admissions made to
him or her by the accused while incarcerated in a penal
institution contemporaneously.
(b) This Section applies to any capital case in which
the prosecution attempts to introduce evidence of
incriminating statements made by the accused to or overheard
by an informant.
(c) In any case under this Section, the prosecution
shall timely disclose in discovery:
(1) the complete criminal history of the informant;
(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that
the offering party has made or will make in the future to
the informant;
(3) the statements made by the accused;
(4) the time and place of the statements, the time
and place of their disclosure to law enforcement
officials, and the names of all persons who were present
when the statements were made;
(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that
testimony or statement and, if so, the time and place of
the recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the
names of the persons who were present at the recantation;
(6) other cases in which the informant testified,
provided that the existence of such testimony can be
ascertained through reasonable inquiry and whether the
informant received any promise, inducement, or benefit in
exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or
statement; and
(7) any other information relevant to the
informant's credibility.
(d) In any case under this Section, the prosecution must
timely disclose its intent to introduce the testimony of an
informant. The court shall conduct a hearing to determine
whether the testimony of the informant is reliable, unless
the defendant waives such a hearing. If the prosecution
fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
informant's testimony is reliable, the court shall not allow
the testimony to be heard at trial. At this hearing, the
court shall consider the factors enumerated in subsection (c)
as well as any other factors relating to reliability.
(e) A hearing required under subsection (d) does not
apply to statements covered under subsection (b) that are
lawfully recorded.
(f) This Section applies to all death penalty
prosecutions initiated on or after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly.
(725 ILCS 5/115-22 new)
Sec. 115-22. Witness inducements. When the State
intends to introduce the testimony of a witness in a capital
case, the State shall, before trial, disclose to the
defendant and to his or her defense counsel the following
information, which shall be reduced to writing:
(1) whether the witness has received or been
promised anything, including pay, immunity from
prosecution, leniency in prosecution, or personal
advantage, in exchange for testimony;
(2) any other case in which the witness testified
or offered statements against an individual but was not
called, and whether the statements were admitted in the
case, and whether the witness received any deal, promise,
inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or
statement; provided that the existence of such testimony
can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry;
(3) whether the witness has ever changed his or her
testimony;
(4) the criminal history of the witness; and
(5) any other evidence relevant to the credibility
of the witness.
(725 ILCS 5/116-3)
Sec. 116-3. Motion for fingerprint or forensic testing
not available at trial regarding actual innocence.
(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court
that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case
for the performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA testing,
including comparison analysis of genetic marker groupings of
the evidence collected by criminal justice agencies pursuant
to the alleged offense, to those of the defendant, to those
of other forensic evidence, and to those maintained under
subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of
Corrections, on evidence that was secured in relation to the
trial which resulted in his or her conviction, but which was
not subject to the testing which is now requested because the
technology for the testing was not available at the time of
trial. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon
the State.
(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:
(1) identity was the issue in the trial which
resulted in his or her conviction; and
(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a
chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not
been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in
any material aspect.
(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under
reasonable conditions designed to protect the State's
interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing
process upon a determination that:
(1) the result of the testing has the scientific
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence
materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of
actual innocence even though the results may not
completely exonerate the defendant;
(2) the testing requested employs a scientific
method generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community.
(Source: P.A. 90-141, eff. 1-1-98.)
(725 ILCS 5/116-5 new)
Sec. 116-5. Motion for DNA database search (genetic
marker groupings comparison analysis).
(a) Upon motion by a defendant charged with any offense
where DNA evidence may be material to the defense
investigation or relevant at trial, a court may order a DNA
database search by the Department of State Police. Such
analysis may include comparing:
(1) the genetic profile from forensic evidence that
was secured in relation to the trial against the genetic
profile of the defendant,
(2) the genetic profile of items of forensic
evidence secured in relation to trial to the genetic
profile of other forensic evidence secured in relation to
trial, or
(3) the genetic profiles referred to in
subdivisions (1) and (2) against:
(i) genetic profiles of offenders maintained
under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified
Code of Corrections, or
(ii) genetic profiles, including but not
limited to, profiles from unsolved crimes maintained
in state or local DNA databases by law enforcement
agencies.
(b) If appropriate federal criteria are met, the court
may order the Department of State Police to request the
National DNA index system to search its database of genetic
profiles.
(c) If requested by the defense, a defense
representative shall be allowed to view any genetic marker
grouping analysis conducted by the Department of State
Police. The defense shall be provided with copies of all
documentation, correspondence, including digital
correspondence, notes, memoranda, and reports generated in
relation to the analysis.
(d) Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon
the State.
(725 ILCS 5/122-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-1)
Sec. 122-1. Petition in the trial court.
(a) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary may
institute a proceeding under this Article if the person who
asserts that:
(1) in the proceedings which resulted in his or her
conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her
rights under the Constitution of the United States or of
the State of Illinois or both; or may institute a
proceeding under this Article.
(2) the death penalty was imposed and there is
newly discovered evidence not available to the person at
the time of the proceeding that resulted in his or her
conviction that establishes a substantial basis to
believe that the defendant is actually innocent by clear
and convincing evidence.
(a-5) A proceeding under paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
may be commenced within a reasonable period of time after the
person's conviction notwithstanding any other provisions of
this Article. In such a proceeding regarding actual
innocence, if the court determines the petition is frivolous
or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition
in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and
conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such
order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served
upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its
entry.
(b) The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the
clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a
petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by
affidavit. Petitioner shall also serve another copy upon the
State's Attorney by any of the methods provided in Rule 7 of
the Supreme Court. The clerk shall docket the petition for
consideration by the court pursuant to Section 122-2.1 upon
his or her receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the
attention of the court.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a-5), if
the petitioner is under sentence of death, no proceedings
under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months
after the denial of a petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court on direct appeal, or more than 6 months
from the date for filing such a petition if none is filed,
unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay
was not due to his or her culpable negligence.
When a defendant has a sentence other than death, no
proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6
months after the denial of the Petition for Leave to Appeal
to the Illinois Supreme Court, or more than 6 months from the
date for filing such a petition if none is filed, unless the
petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due
to his or her culpable negligence.
This limitation does not apply to a petition advancing a
claim of actual innocence. no proceedings under this Article
shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a
petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a
petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the
defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the
sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more than 45
days after the deadline for the filing of the defendant's
brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed)
or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is sooner,
unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay
was not due to his or her culpable negligence.
(d) A person seeking relief by filing a petition under
this Section must specify in the petition or its heading that
it is filed under this Section. A trial court that has
received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence
that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it
is filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition to
determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds
for relief under this Article.
(e) A proceeding under this Article may not be commenced
on behalf of a defendant who has been sentenced to death
without the written consent of the defendant, unless the
defendant, because of a mental or physical condition, is
incapable of asserting his or her own claim.
(Source: P.A. 89-284, eff. 1-1-96; 89-609, eff. 1-1-97;
89-684, eff. 6-1-97; 90-14, eff. 7-1-97.)
(725 ILCS 5/122-2.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-2.1)
Sec. 122-2.1. (a) Within 90 days after the filing and
docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such
petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section.
(1) If the petitioner is under sentence of death
and is without counsel and alleges that he is without
means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not
he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. If
appointment of counsel is so requested, the court shall
appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no
means to procure counsel.
(2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment
and the court determines the petition is frivolous or is
patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in
a written order, specifying the findings of fact and
conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision.
Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be
served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10
days of its entry.
(b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this
Section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed
for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4
through 122-6. If the petitioner is under sentence of death,
the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further
consideration and hearing within one year of the filing of
the petition. Continuances may be granted as the court deems
appropriate.
(c) In considering a petition pursuant to this Section,
the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in
which the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an
appellate court in such proceeding and any transcripts of
such proceeding.
(Source: P.A. 86-655; 87-904.)
(725 ILCS 5/122-2.2 new)
Sec. 122-2.2. Mental retardation and post-conviction
relief.
(a) In cases where no determination of mental
retardation was made and a defendant has been convicted of
first-degree murder, sentenced to death, and is in custody
pending execution of the sentence of death, the following
procedures shall apply:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or
rule of court, a defendant may seek relief from the death
sentence through a petition for post-conviction relief
under this Article alleging that the defendant was
mentally retarded as defined in Section 114-15 at the
time the offense was alleged to have been committed.
(2) The petition must be filed within 180 days of
the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd
General Assembly or within 180 days of the issuance of
the mandate by the Illinois Supreme Court setting the
date of execution, whichever is later.
(3) All other provisions of this Article governing
petitions for post-conviction relief shall apply to a
petition for post-conviction relief alleging mental
retardation.
Section 20. The Capital Crimes Litigation Act is amended
by changing Sections 15 and 19 as follows:
(725 ILCS 124/15)
(Section scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2004)
Sec. 15. Capital Litigation Trust Fund.
(a) The Capital Litigation Trust Fund is created as a
special fund in the State Treasury. The Trust Fund shall be
administered by the State Treasurer to provide moneys for the
appropriations to be made, grants to be awarded, and
compensation and expenses to be paid under this Act. All
interest earned from the investment or deposit of moneys
accumulated in the Trust Fund shall, under Section 4.1 of the
State Finance Act, be deposited into the Trust Fund.
(b) Moneys deposited into the Trust Fund shall not be
considered general revenue of the State of Illinois.
(c) Moneys deposited into the Trust Fund shall be used
exclusively for the purposes of providing funding for the
prosecution and defense of capital cases as provided in this
Act and shall not be appropriated, loaned, or in any manner
transferred to the General Revenue Fund of the State of
Illinois.
(d) Every fiscal year the State Treasurer shall transfer
from the General Revenue Fund to the Capital Litigation Trust
Fund an amount equal to the full amount of moneys
appropriated by the General Assembly (both by original and
supplemental appropriation), less any unexpended balance from
the previous fiscal year, from the Capital Litigation Trust
Fund for the specific purpose of making funding available for
the prosecution and defense of capital cases. The Public
Defender and State's Attorney in Cook County, the State
Appellate Defender, the State's Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor, and the Attorney General shall make annual
requests for appropriations from the Trust Fund.
(1) The Public Defender in Cook County shall
request appropriations to the State Treasurer for
expenses incurred by the Public Defender and for funding
for private appointed defense counsel in Cook County.
(2) The State's Attorney in Cook County shall
request an appropriation to the State Treasurer for
expenses incurred by the State's Attorney.
(3) The State Appellate Defender shall request a
direct appropriation from the Trust Fund for expenses
incurred by the State Appellate Defender in providing
assistance to trial attorneys under item (c)(5) of
Section 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act and an
appropriation to the State Treasurer for payments from
the Trust Fund for the defense of cases in counties other
than Cook County.
(4) The State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor
shall request a direct appropriation from the Trust Fund
to pay expenses incurred by the State's Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor and an appropriation to the State
Treasurer for payments from the Trust Fund for expenses
incurred by State's Attorneys in counties other than Cook
County.
(5) The Attorney General shall request a direct
appropriation from the Trust Fund to pay expenses
incurred by the Attorney General in assisting the State's
Attorneys in counties other than Cook County.
The Public Defender and State's Attorney in Cook County,
the State Appellate Defender, the State's Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor, and the Attorney General may each request
supplemental appropriations from the Trust Fund during the
fiscal year.
(e) Moneys in the Trust Fund shall be expended only as
follows:
(1) To pay the State Treasurer's costs to
administer the Trust Fund. The amount for this purpose
may not exceed 5% in any one fiscal year of the amount
otherwise appropriated from the Trust Fund in the same
fiscal year.
(2) To pay the capital litigation expenses of trial
defense including, but not limited to, DNA testing,
including DNA testing under Section 116-3 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963, analysis, and expert
testimony, investigatory and other assistance, expert,
forensic, and other witnesses, and mitigation
specialists, and grants and aid provided to public
defenders or assistance to attorneys who have been
appointed by the court to represent defendants who are
charged with capital crimes.
(3) To pay the compensation of trial attorneys,
other than public defenders, who have been appointed by
the court to represent defendants who are charged with
capital crimes.
(4) To provide State's Attorneys with funding for
capital litigation expenses including, but not limited
to, investigatory and other assistance and expert,
forensic, and other witnesses necessary to prosecute
capital cases. State's Attorneys in any county other
than Cook County seeking funding for capital litigation
expenses including, but not limited to, investigatory and
other assistance and expert, forensic, or other witnesses
under this Section may request that the State's Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor or the Attorney General, as the case
may be, certify the expenses as reasonable, necessary,
and appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund, on a
form created by the State Treasurer. Upon certification
of the expenses and delivery of the certification to the
State Treasurer, the Treasurer shall pay the expenses
directly from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund if there
are sufficient moneys in the Trust Fund to pay the
expenses.
(5) To provide financial support through the
Attorney General pursuant to the Attorney General Act for
the several county State's Attorneys outside of Cook
County, but shall not be used to increase personnel for
the Attorney General's Office.
(6) To provide financial support through the
State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor pursuant to the
State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Act for the
several county State's Attorneys outside of Cook County,
but shall not be used to increase personnel for the
State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor.
(7) To provide financial support to the State
Appellate Defender pursuant to the State Appellate
Defender Act.
Moneys expended from the Trust Fund shall be in addition
to county funding for Public Defenders and State's Attorneys,
and shall not be used to supplant or reduce ordinary and
customary county funding.
(f) Moneys in the Trust Fund shall be appropriated to
the State Appellate Defender, the State's Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor, the Attorney General, and the State Treasurer.
The State Appellate Defender shall receive an appropriation
from the Trust Fund to enable it to provide assistance to
appointed defense counsel throughout the State and to Public
Defenders in counties other than Cook. The State's Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor and the Attorney General shall receive
appropriations from the Trust Fund to enable them to provide
assistance to State's Attorneys in counties other than Cook
County. Moneys shall be appropriated to the State Treasurer
to enable the Treasurer (i) to make grants to Cook County,
(ii) to pay the expenses of Public Defenders and State's
Attorneys in counties other than Cook County, (iii) to pay
the expenses and compensation of appointed defense counsel in
counties other than Cook County, and (iv) to pay the costs of
administering the Trust Fund. All expenditures and grants
made from the Trust Fund shall be subject to audit by the
Auditor General.
(g) For Cook County, grants from the Trust Fund shall be
made and administered as follows:
(1) For each State fiscal year, the State's
Attorney and Public Defender must each make a separate
application to the State Treasurer for capital litigation
grants.
(2) The State Treasurer shall establish rules and
procedures for grant applications. The rules shall
require the Cook County Treasurer as the grant recipient
to report on a periodic basis to the State Treasurer how
much of the grant has been expended, how much of the
grant is remaining, and the purposes for which the grant
has been used. The rules may also require the Cook
County Treasurer to certify on a periodic basis that
expenditures of the funds have been made for expenses
that are reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for
payment from the Trust Fund.
(3) The State Treasurer shall make the grants to
the Cook County Treasurer as soon as possible after the
beginning of the State fiscal year.
(4) The State's Attorney or Public Defender may
apply for supplemental grants during the fiscal year.
(5) Grant moneys shall be paid to the Cook County
Treasurer in block grants and held in separate accounts
for the State's Attorney, the Public Defender, and court
appointed defense counsel other than the Cook County
Public Defender, respectively, for the designated fiscal
year, and are not subject to county appropriation.
(6) Expenditure of grant moneys under this
subsection (g) is subject to audit by the Auditor
General.
(7) The Cook County Treasurer shall immediately
make payment from the appropriate separate account in the
county treasury for capital litigation expenses to the
State's Attorney, Public Defender, or court appointed
defense counsel other than the Public Defender, as the
case may be, upon order of the State's Attorney, Public
Defender or the court, respectively.
(h) If a defendant in a capital case in Cook County is
represented by court appointed counsel other than the Cook
County Public Defender, the appointed counsel shall petition
the court for an order directing the Cook County Treasurer to
pay the court appointed counsel's reasonable and necessary
compensation and capital litigation expenses from grant
moneys provided from the Trust Fund. These petitions shall be
considered in camera. Orders denying petitions for
compensation or expenses are final. Counsel may not petition
for expenses that may have been provided or compensated by
the State Appellate Defender under item (c)(5) of Section 10
of the State Appellate Defender Act.
(i) In counties other than Cook County, and excluding
capital litigation expenses or services that may have been
provided by the State Appellate Defender under item (c)(5) of
Section 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act:
(1) Upon certification by the circuit court, on a
form created by the State Treasurer, that all or a
portion of the expenses are reasonable, necessary, and
appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund and the
court's delivery of the certification to the Treasurer,
the Treasurer shall pay the certified expenses of Public
Defenders from the money appropriated to the Treasurer
for capital litigation expenses of Public Defenders in
any county other than Cook County, if there are
sufficient moneys in the Trust Fund to pay the expenses.
(2) If a defendant in a capital case is represented
by court appointed counsel other than the Public
Defender, the appointed counsel shall petition the court
to certify compensation and capital litigation expenses
including, but not limited to, investigatory and other
assistance, expert, forensic, and other witnesses, and
mitigation specialists as reasonable, necessary, and
appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund. Upon
certification on a form created by the State Treasurer of
all or a portion of the compensation and expenses
certified as reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for
payment from the Trust Fund and the court's delivery of
the certification to the Treasurer, the State Treasurer
shall pay the certified compensation and expenses from
the money appropriated to the Treasurer for that purpose,
if there are sufficient moneys in the Trust Fund to make
those payments.
(3) A petition for capital litigation expenses
under this subsection shall be considered in camera.
Orders denying petitions for compensation or expenses are
final.
(j) If the Trust Fund is discontinued or dissolved by an
Act of the General Assembly or by operation of law, any
balance remaining in the Trust Fund shall be returned to the
General Revenue Fund after deduction of administrative costs,
any other provision of this Act to the contrary
notwithstanding.
(Source: P.A. 91-589, eff. 1-1-00.)
(725 ILCS 124/19)
(Section scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2004)
Sec. 19. Report; repeal.
(a) The Cook County Public Defender, the Cook County
State's Attorney, the State Appellate Defender, the State's
Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, and the Attorney General
shall each report separately to the General Assembly by
January 1, 2004 detailing the amounts of money received by
them through this Act, the uses for which those funds were
expended, the balances then in the Capital Litigation Trust
Fund or county accounts, as the case may be, dedicated to
them for the use and support of Public Defenders, appointed
trial defense counsel, and State's Attorneys, as the case may
be. The report shall describe and discuss the need for
continued funding through the Fund and contain any
suggestions for changes to this Act.
(b) (Blank). Unless the General Assembly provides
otherwise, this Act is repealed on July 1, 2004.
(Source: P.A. 91-589, eff. 1-1-00.)
Section 25. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended
by changing Section 5-4-3 as follows:
(730 ILCS 5/5-4-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-4-3)
Sec. 5-4-3. Persons convicted of, or found delinquent
for, certain offenses or institutionalized as sexually
dangerous; specimens; genetic marker groups.
(a) Any person convicted of, found guilty under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for, or who received a disposition
of court supervision for, a qualifying offense or attempt of
a qualifying offense, convicted or found guilty of any
offense classified as a felony under Illinois law, found
guilty or given supervision for any offense classified as a
felony under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, or
institutionalized as a sexually dangerous person under the
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, or committed as a sexually
violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment
Act shall, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed,
be required to submit specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue
to the Illinois Department of State Police in accordance with
the provisions of this Section, provided such person is:
(1) convicted of a qualifying offense or attempt of
a qualifying offense on or after July 1, 1990 the
effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, periodic
imprisonment, fine, probation, conditional discharge or
any other form of sentence, or given a disposition of
court supervision for the offense;, or
(1.5) found guilty or given supervision under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for a qualifying offense or
attempt of a qualifying offense on or after January 1,
1997; the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1996,
or
(2) ordered institutionalized as a sexually
dangerous person on or after July 1, 1990; the effective
date of this amendatory Act of 1989, or
(3) convicted of a qualifying offense or attempt of
a qualifying offense before July 1, 1990 the effective
date of this amendatory Act of 1989 and is presently
confined as a result of such conviction in any State
correctional facility or county jail or is presently
serving a sentence of probation, conditional discharge or
periodic imprisonment as a result of such conviction;, or
(3.5) convicted or found guilty of any offense
classified as a felony under Illinois law or found guilty
or given supervision for such an offense under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 on or after August 22, 2002;
the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 92nd
General Assembly, or
(4) presently institutionalized as a sexually
dangerous person or presently institutionalized as a
person found guilty but mentally ill of a sexual offense
or attempt to commit a sexual offense; or
(4.5) ordered committed as a sexually violent
person on or after the effective date of the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act; or
(5) seeking transfer to or residency in Illinois
under Sections 3-3-11.05 through 3-3-11.5 of the Unified
Code of Corrections and the Interstate Compact for Adult
Offender Supervision or the Interstate Agreements on
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.
Notwithstanding other provisions of this Section, any
person incarcerated in a facility of the Illinois Department
of Corrections on or after August 22, 2002 the effective date
of this amendatory Act of the 92nd General Assembly shall be
required to submit a specimen of blood, saliva, or tissue
prior to his or her release on parole or mandatory supervised
release, as a condition of his or her parole or mandatory
supervised release.
(a-5) Any person who was otherwise convicted of or
received a disposition of court supervision for any other
offense under the Criminal Code of 1961 or who was found
guilty or given supervision for such a violation under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987, may, regardless of the sentence
imposed, be required by an order of the court to submit
specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to the Illinois
Department of State Police in accordance with the provisions
of this Section.
(b) Any person required by paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(1.5),
(a)(2), (a)(3.5), and (a-5) to provide specimens of blood,
saliva, or tissue shall provide specimens of blood, saliva,
or tissue within 45 days after sentencing or disposition at a
collection site designated by the Illinois Department of
State Police.
(c) Any person required by paragraphs (a)(3), (a)(4),
and (a)(4.5) to provide specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue
shall be required to provide such samples prior to final
discharge, parole, or release at a collection site designated
by the Illinois Department of State Police.
(c-5) Any person required by paragraph (a)(5) to provide
specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue shall, where feasible,
be required to provide the specimens before being accepted
for conditioned residency in Illinois under the interstate
compact or agreement, but no later than 45 days after arrival
in this State.
(c-6) The Illinois Department of State Police may
determine which type of specimen or specimens, blood, saliva,
or tissue, is acceptable for submission to the Division of
Forensic Services for analysis.
(d) The Illinois Department of State Police shall
provide all equipment and instructions necessary for the
collection of blood samples. The collection of samples shall
be performed in a medically approved manner. Only a
physician authorized to practice medicine, a registered nurse
or other qualified person trained in venipuncture may
withdraw blood for the purposes of this Act. The samples
shall thereafter be forwarded to the Illinois Department of
State Police, Division of Forensic Services, for analysis and
categorizing into genetic marker groupings.
(d-1) The Illinois Department of State Police shall
provide all equipment and instructions necessary for the
collection of saliva samples. The collection of saliva
samples shall be performed in a medically approved manner.
Only a person trained in the instructions promulgated by the
Illinois State Police on collecting saliva may collect saliva
for the purposes of this Section. The samples shall
thereafter be forwarded to the Illinois Department of State
Police, Division of Forensic Services, for analysis and
categorizing into genetic marker groupings.
(d-2) The Illinois Department of State Police shall
provide all equipment and instructions necessary for the
collection of tissue samples. The collection of tissue
samples shall be performed in a medically approved manner.
Only a person trained in the instructions promulgated by the
Illinois State Police on collecting tissue may collect tissue
for the purposes of this Section. The samples shall
thereafter be forwarded to the Illinois Department of State
Police, Division of Forensic Services, for analysis and
categorizing into genetic marker groupings.
(d-5) To the extent that funds are available, the
Illinois Department of State Police shall contract with
qualified personnel and certified laboratories for the
collection, analysis, and categorization of known samples.
(e) The genetic marker groupings shall be maintained by
the Illinois Department of State Police, Division of Forensic
Services.
(f) The genetic marker grouping analysis information
obtained pursuant to this Act shall be confidential and shall
be released only to peace officers of the United States, of
other states or territories, of the insular possessions of
the United States, of foreign countries duly authorized to
receive the same, to all peace officers of the State of
Illinois and to all prosecutorial agencies, and to defense
counsel as provided by Section 116-5 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963. The genetic marker grouping analysis
information obtained pursuant to this Act shall be used only
for (i) valid law enforcement identification purposes and as
required by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
participation in the National DNA database or (ii) technology
validation purposes or (iii) assisting in the defense of the
criminally accused pursuant to Section 116-5 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963. Notwithstanding any other
statutory provision to the contrary, all information obtained
under this Section shall be maintained in a single State data
base, which may be uploaded into a national database, and
which information may be subject to expungement only as set
forth in subsection (f-1).
(f-1) Upon receipt of notification of a reversal of a
conviction based on actual innocence, or of the granting of a
pardon pursuant to Section 12 of Article V of the Illinois
Constitution, if that pardon document specifically states
that the reason for the pardon is the actual innocence of an
individual whose DNA record has been stored in the State or
national DNA identification index in accordance with this
Section by the Illinois Department of State Police, the DNA
record shall be expunged from the DNA identification index,
and the Department shall by rule prescribe procedures to
ensure that the record and any samples, analyses, or other
documents relating to such record, whether in the possession
of the Department or any law enforcement or police agency, or
any forensic DNA laboratory, including any duplicates or
copies thereof, are destroyed and a letter is sent to the
court verifying the expungement is completed.
(f-5) Any person who intentionally uses genetic marker
grouping analysis information, or any other information
derived from a DNA sample, beyond the authorized uses as
provided under this Section, or any other Illinois law, is
guilty of a Class 4 felony, and shall be subject to a fine of
not less than $5,000.
(g) For the purposes of this Section, "qualifying
offense" means any of the following:
(1) any violation or inchoate violation of Section
11-6, 11-9.1, 11-11, 11-18.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the
Criminal Code of 1961;, or
(1.1) any violation or inchoate violation of
Section 9-1, 9-2, 10-1, 10-2, 12-11, 12-11.1, 18-1, 18-2,
18-3, 18-4, 19-1, or 19-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961
for which persons are convicted on or after July 1,
2001;, or
(2) any former statute of this State which defined
a felony sexual offense;, or
(3) (blank);, or
(4) any inchoate violation of Section 9-3.1,
11-9.3, 12-7.3, or 12-7.4 of the Criminal Code of 1961;,
or
(5) any violation or inchoate violation of Article
29D of the Criminal Code of 1961.
(g-5) (Blank).
(h) The Illinois Department of State Police shall be the
State central repository for all genetic marker grouping
analysis information obtained pursuant to this Act. The
Illinois Department of State Police may promulgate rules for
the form and manner of the collection of blood, saliva, or
tissue samples and other procedures for the operation of this
Act. The provisions of the Administrative Review Law shall
apply to all actions taken under the rules so promulgated.
(i) A person required to provide a blood, saliva, or
tissue specimen shall cooperate with the collection of the
specimen and any deliberate act by that person intended to
impede, delay or stop the collection of the blood, saliva, or
tissue specimen is a Class A misdemeanor.
(j) Any person required by subsection (a) to submit
specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to the Illinois
Department of State Police for analysis and categorization
into genetic marker grouping, in addition to any other
disposition, penalty, or fine imposed, shall pay an analysis
fee of $200. If the analysis fee is not paid at the time of
sentencing, the court shall establish a fee schedule by which
the entire amount of the analysis fee shall be paid in full,
such schedule not to exceed 24 months from the time of
conviction. The inability to pay this analysis fee shall not
be the sole ground to incarcerate the person.
(k) All analysis and categorization fees provided for by
subsection (j) shall be regulated as follows:
(1) The State Offender DNA Identification System
Fund is hereby created as a special fund in the State
Treasury.
(2) All fees shall be collected by the clerk of the
court and forwarded to the State Offender DNA
Identification System Fund for deposit. The clerk of the
circuit court may retain the amount of $10 from each
collected analysis fee to offset administrative costs
incurred in carrying out the clerk's responsibilities
under this Section.
(3) Fees deposited into the State Offender DNA
Identification System Fund shall be used by Illinois
State Police crime laboratories as designated by the
Director of State Police. These funds shall be in
addition to any allocations made pursuant to existing
laws and shall be designated for the exclusive use of
State crime laboratories. These uses may include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(A) Costs incurred in providing analysis and
genetic marker categorization as required by
subsection (d).
(B) Costs incurred in maintaining genetic
marker groupings as required by subsection (e).
(C) Costs incurred in the purchase and
maintenance of equipment for use in performing
analyses.
(D) Costs incurred in continuing research and
development of new techniques for analysis and
genetic marker categorization.
(E) Costs incurred in continuing education,
training, and professional development of forensic
scientists regularly employed by these laboratories.
(l) The failure of a person to provide a specimen, or of
any person or agency to collect a specimen, within the 45 day
period shall in no way alter the obligation of the person to
submit such specimen, or the authority of the Illinois
Department of State Police or persons designated by the
Department to collect the specimen, or the authority of the
Illinois Department of State Police to accept, analyze and
maintain the specimen or to maintain or upload results of
genetic marker grouping analysis information into a State or
national database.
(Source: P.A. 91-528, eff. 1-1-00; 92-16, eff. 6-28-01;
92-40, eff. 6-29-01; 92-571, eff. 6-26-02; 92-600, eff.
6-28-02; 92-829, eff. 8-22-02; 92-854, eff. 12-5-02; revised
1-20-03.)
Section 90. The State Finance Act is amended by adding
Section 5.595 as follows:
(30 ILCS 105/5.595 new)
Sec. 5.595. The Illinois Law Enforcement Training
Standards Board Costs and Attorney Fees Fund.
Section 95. Severability. The provisions of this Act
are severable under Section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes.
Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect upon
becoming law.