(735 ILCS 5/2-1304) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1304)
Sec. 2-1304.
Orders for liens and conveyances.
(a) Whenever, by any order, any party to an action is required to perform
any act other than the payment of money, or to refrain from performing any
act, the court may, in such order, provide that the same shall be a lien
upon the real or personal estate, or both, of such party until such order
is fully complied with; and such lien shall have the same force and effect,
and be subject to the same limitations and restrictions, as judgments for
the payment of money, including the time and manner when the same shall
take effect and the time and manner when the lien upon a revival thereof
shall take effect.
(b) Whenever an order is entered, directing the execution of any deed
or other writing, it shall be lawful for any judge of the court to execute
or for the court to direct the sheriff to execute such deed or other writing,
in case the parties under no disability fail to execute such deed or other
writing, in a time to be named in the order, or on behalf of minors or persons
under legal disability who have guardians; and the execution thereof shall
be valid in law to pass, release or extinguish the right, title and interest
of the party on whose behalf it is executed, as if executed by the party
in proper person, and he or she were under no disability; and whenever any
property is sold in open court, it shall be lawful for any judge to execute
a deed, certificate of sale or bill of sale or for the court to direct the
sheriff to execute a deed, certificate of sale or bill of sale to the purchaser
thereat and the execution thereof shall be valid in law to pass, release
or extinguish all right, title and interest of the parties to the action
with the same force and effect as though such sale had been held by the
sheriff pursuant to the court's order; and such deed or other writing, if
it relates to land, shall promptly after its execution by a judge or the
sheriff, be recorded in the recorder's office of the county wherein the
land is situated.
(Source: P.A. 83-351.)
|
(735 ILCS 5/2-1401) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401)
Sec. 2-1401. Relief from judgments.
(a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the
entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in this Section.
Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of review, and bills
in the nature of bills of review are abolished. All relief heretofore
obtainable and the grounds for such relief heretofore available,
whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be
available in every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the
nature of the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the
proceedings in which it was entered. Except as provided in the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, there shall be no distinction
between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise, as to
availability of relief, grounds for relief, or the relief obtainable.
(b) The petition must be filed in the same proceeding in which the
order or judgment was entered but is not a continuation thereof. The
petition must be supported by an affidavit or other appropriate showing as
to matters not of record. A petition to reopen a foreclosure proceeding must include as parties to the petition, but is not limited to, all parties in the original action in addition to the current record title holders of the property, current occupants, and any individual or entity that had a recorded interest in the property before the filing of the petition. All parties to the petition shall be notified
as provided by rule.
(b-5) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony; (2) the movant's participation in the offense was |
| related to him or her previously having been a victim of domestic violence or gender-based violence;
|
|
(3) there is substantial evidence of domestic
|
| violence or gender-based violence against the movant that was not presented at the movant's sentencing hearing;
|
|
(4) (blank); and
(5) the evidence of domestic violence or gender-based
|
| violence against the movant is material and noncumulative to other evidence offered at the sentencing hearing, or previous hearing under this Section filed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 103rd General Assembly, and is of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the sentence imposed by the original trial court.
|
|
Nothing in this subsection (b-5) shall prevent a movant from applying for any other relief under this Section or any other law otherwise available to him or her.
As used in this subsection (b-5):
"Domestic violence" means abuse as defined in Section
|
| 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.
|
|
"Forcible felony" has the meaning ascribed to the
|
| term in Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
|
|
"Gender-based violence" includes evidence of
|
| victimization as a trafficking victim, as defined by paragraph (10) of subsection (a) of Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012, evidence of victimization under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, evidence of victimization under the Stalking No Contact Order Act, or evidence of victimization of any offense under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012, irrespective of criminal prosecution or conviction.
|
|
"Intimate partner" means a spouse or former spouse,
|
| persons who have or allegedly have had a child in common, or persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship.
|
|
"Substantial evidence" means evidence that a
|
| reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
|
|
(b-10) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(A) she was convicted of a forcible felony;
(B) her participation in the offense was a direct
|
| result of her suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis;
|
|
(C) no evidence of post-partum depression or
|
| post-partum psychosis was presented by a qualified medical person at trial or sentencing, or both;
|
|
(D) she was unaware of the mitigating nature of the
|
| evidence or, if aware, was at the time unable to present this defense due to suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis, or, at the time of trial or sentencing, neither was a recognized mental illness and as such, she was unable to receive proper treatment; and
|
|
(E) evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum
|
| psychosis as suffered by the person is material and noncumulative to other evidence offered at the time of trial or sentencing, and it is of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the sentence imposed by the original court.
|
|
Nothing in this subsection (b-10) prevents a person from applying for any other relief under this Article or any other law otherwise available to her.
As used in this subsection (b-10):
"Post-partum depression" means a mood disorder which
|
| strikes many women during and after pregnancy and usually occurs during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This depression can include anxiety disorders.
|
|
"Post-partum psychosis" means an extreme form of
|
| post-partum depression which can occur during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This can include losing touch with reality, distorted thinking, delusions, auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoia, hyperactivity and rapid speech, or mania.
|
|
(c) Except as provided in Section 20b of the Adoption Act and Section
2-32 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, in a petition based
upon Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 or subsection (b-5) or (b-10) of this Section, or in a motion to vacate and expunge convictions under the Cannabis Control Act as provided by subsection (i) of Section 5.2 of the Criminal Identification Act, the petition
must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment.
Time during which the person seeking relief is under legal disability or
duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded
in computing the period of 2 years.
(c-5) Any individual may at any time file a petition and institute proceedings under this Section if his or her final order or judgment, which was entered based on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, has potential consequences under federal immigration law.
(d) The filing of a petition under this Section does not affect the
order or judgment, or suspend its operation.
(e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from the
record proper, the vacation or modification of an order or judgment
pursuant to the provisions of this Section does not affect the right,
title, or interest in or to any real or personal property of any person,
not a party to the original action, acquired for value after the entry
of the order or judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor
affect any right of any person not a party to the original action under
any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the petition,
pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment. When a petition is filed pursuant to this Section to reopen a foreclosure proceeding, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 15-1701 of this Code, the purchaser or successor purchaser of real property subject to a foreclosure sale who was not a party to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings is entitled to remain in possession of the property until the foreclosure action is defeated or the previously foreclosed defendant redeems from the foreclosure sale if the purchaser has been in possession of the property for more than 6 months.
(f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing right to
relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any existing method
to procure that relief.
(Source: P.A. 102-639, eff. 8-27-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22; 103-403, eff. 1-1-24 .)
|