Illinois Compiled Statutes
Information maintained by the Legislative Reference Bureau
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE725 ILCS 5/102-23
(725 ILCS 5/) Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
(725 ILCS 5/102-23)
"Person with a moderate intellectual disability" means a person whose
quotient is between 41 and 55 and who does not suffer from significant mental
illness to the extent that the person's ability to exercise rational judgment
(Source: P.A. 99-143, eff. 7-27-15.)
725 ILCS 5/Art. 103
(725 ILCS 5/Art. 103 heading)
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
725 ILCS 5/103-1
(725 ILCS 5/103-1)
(from Ch. 38, par. 103-1)
Rights on arrest.
(a) After an arrest on a warrant the
person making the arrest shall inform the person arrested that a warrant
has been issued for his arrest and the nature of the offense specified
in the warrant.
(b) After an arrest without a warrant the person making the arrest
shall inform the person arrested of the nature of the offense on which
the arrest is based.
(b-5) This subsection is intended to implement and be interpreted consistently with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of that Convention guarantees that when foreign nationals are arrested or detained, they must be advised of their right to have their consular officials notified, and if an individual chooses to exercise that right, a law enforcement official is required to notify the consulate. It does not create any new substantive State right or remedy.
(1) In accordance with federal law and the provisions
of this Section, the law enforcement official in charge of a custodial facility shall ensure that any individual booked and detained at the facility, within 48 hours of booking or detention, shall be advised that if that individual is a foreign national, he or she has a right to communicate with an official from the consulate of his or her country. This subsection (b-5) does not create any affirmative duty to investigate whether an arrestee or detainee is a foreign national.
(2) If the foreign national requests consular
notification or the notification is mandatory by law, the law enforcement official in charge of the custodial facility shall ensure the notice is given to the appropriate officer at the consulate of the foreign national in accordance with the U.S. Department of State Instructions for Consular Notification and Access.
(3) The law enforcement official in charge of the
custodial facility where a foreign national is located shall ensure that the foreign national is allowed to communicate with, correspond with, and be visited by, a consular officer of his or her country.
(c) No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor
offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled substance,
shall be strip searched unless there is reasonable belief that the
individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance.
(d) "Strip search" means having an arrested person remove or arrange
some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a visual inspection
of the genitals, buttocks, anus, female breasts or undergarments of such
(e) All strip searches conducted under this Section shall be
performed by persons of the same sex as the arrested person and on
premises where the search cannot be observed by persons not physically
conducting the search.
(f) Every peace officer or employee of a police department
conducting a strip search shall:
(1) Obtain the written permission of the police
commander or an agent thereof designated for the purposes of authorizing a strip search in accordance with this Section.
(2) Prepare a report of the strip search. The report
shall include the written authorization required by paragraph (1) of this subsection (f), the name of the person subjected to the search, the names of the persons conducting the search, and the time, date and place of the search. A copy of the report shall be provided to the person subject to the search.
(g) No search of any body cavity other than the mouth shall be
conducted without a duly executed search warrant; any warrant
authorizing a body cavity search shall specify that the search must be
performed under sanitary conditions and conducted either by or under the
supervision of a physician licensed to practice medicine in all of its
branches in this State.
(h) Any peace officer or employee who knowingly or intentionally
fails to comply with any provision of this Section, except subsection (b-5) of this Section, is guilty of official
misconduct as provided in Section 103-8; provided however, that nothing
contained in this Section shall preclude prosecution of a peace officer
or employee under another section of this Code.
(i) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as limiting any
statutory or common law rights of any person for purposes of any civil
action or injunctive relief.
(j) The provisions of subsections (c) through (h) of this Section
shall not apply when the person is taken into custody by or remanded to
the sheriff or correctional institution pursuant to a court order.
(Source: P.A. 99-190, eff. 1-1-16
725 ILCS 5/103-2
(725 ILCS 5/103-2)
(from Ch. 38, par. 103-2)
Treatment while in custody.
(a) On being taken into custody every person shall have the right to
(b) No unlawful means of any kind shall be used to obtain a statement,
admission or confession from any person in custody.
(c) Persons in custody shall be treated humanely and provided with
proper food, shelter and, if required, medical treatment.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
725 ILCS 5/103-2.1
(725 ILCS 5/103-2.1)
When statements by accused may be used.
(a) In this Section, "custodial interrogation" means any interrogation
during which (i) a reasonable person in the subject's position would consider
himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which
a question is asked that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
In this Section, "place of detention" means a building or a police station
that is a place of operation for a municipal police department or county
sheriff department or other law enforcement agency, not a courthouse, that
is owned or operated by a
law enforcement agency at which persons are or may be held in detention in
connection with criminal charges against those persons.
In this Section, "electronic recording" includes motion picture,
audiotape, or videotape, or digital recording.
(b) An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a
result of a
interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention shall be presumed
to be inadmissible as
evidence against the
accused in any
proceeding brought under Section 9-1, 9-1.2, 9-2, 9-2.1, 9-3, 9-3.2, or 9-3.3
of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or under clause (d)(1)(F) of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code
(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial
(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not
(b-5) Under the following circumstances, an oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused, unless an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation and the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered:
(1) in any criminal proceeding brought under Section
11-1.40 or 20-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if the custodial interrogation was conducted on or after June 1, 2014;
(2) in any criminal proceeding brought under Section
10-2, 18-4, or 19-6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if the custodial interrogation was conducted on or after June 1, 2015; and
(3) in any criminal proceeding brought under Section
11-1.30 or 18-2 or subsection (e) of Section 12-3.05 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if the custodial interrogation was conducted on or after June 1, 2016.
(b-10) If, during the course of an electronically recorded custodial interrogation conducted under this Section, the accused makes a statement that creates a reasonable suspicion to believe the accused has committed an offense other than an offense required to be recorded under subsection (b) or (b-5), the interrogators may, without the accused's consent, continue to record the interrogation as it relates to the other offense notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. Any oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of an interrogation under this subsection shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal proceeding, unless the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered.
(c) Every electronic recording made under this Section
must be preserved
until such time as the
offense relating to the statement is final and all direct and habeas corpus
or the prosecution of such offenses is barred by law.
(d) If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of this Section, then any
defendant during or following that non-recorded custodial interrogation, even
otherwise in compliance with this Section, are presumed to be inadmissible in
proceeding against the defendant except for the purposes of impeachment.
(e) Nothing in this Section precludes the admission (i) of a statement made
accused in open court at his or her trial, before a grand jury, or at
a preliminary hearing, (ii)
statement made during a
custodial interrogation that was not recorded as required by
Section, because electronic recording was not feasible, (iii) of a
whether or not the result of a custodial interrogation, that has a bearing on
credibility of the accused as a witness,
(iv) of a spontaneous statement that is
not made in response to a question,
(v) of a statement made after questioning that is routinely
asked during the processing of the arrest of the suspect, (vi) of a statement
during a custodial interrogation by a suspect who requests, prior to making the
statement, to respond to the
interrogator's questions only if
an electronic recording is not made of the statement, provided that an
recording is made of the statement of agreeing to respond to
the interrogator's question, only if a recording is not made of the statement,
(vii) of a
during a custodial
interrogation that is conducted out-of-state, (viii)
of a statement
given in violation of subsection (b) at a time when the interrogators are unaware that a death has in fact
occurred, (ix) of a statement given in violation of subsection (b-5) at a time when the interrogators are unaware of facts and circumstances that would create probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense required to be recorded under subsection (b-5), or (x) of any other
statement that may be
admissible under law. The State shall bear the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that one of the exceptions described in this
subsection (e) is
this Section precludes the admission of a statement, otherwise inadmissible
this Section, that is used only for impeachment and not as substantive
(f) The presumption of inadmissibility of a statement made by a suspect at
a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention may
be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence
the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of
(g) Any electronic recording of any statement made by an accused during a
custodial interrogation that is compiled by any law enforcement agency as
required by this Section for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements of
Section shall be confidential and exempt from public inspection and copying, as
provided under Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, and the information
shall not be transmitted to anyone except as needed to comply with this
(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13; 98-547, eff. 1-1-14.)
725 ILCS 5/103-3
(725 ILCS 5/103-3)
(from Ch. 38, par. 103-3)
to communicate with attorney and family; transfers.
(a) Persons who are arrested shall have the right to communicate with an
attorney of their choice and a member of their family by making a
reasonable number of telephone calls or in any other reasonable manner.
Such communication shall be permitted within a reasonable time after
arrival at the first place of custody.
(b) In the event the accused is transferred to a new place of custody
his right to communicate with an attorney and a member of his family is
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
725 ILCS 5/103-4
(725 ILCS 5/103-4)
(from Ch. 38, par. 103-4)
to consult with attorney.
Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty for any
cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged with an offense
shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, be allowed to consult
with any licensed attorney at law of this State whom such person may desire
to see or consult, alone and in private at the place of custody, as many
times and for such period each time as is reasonable. When any such person
is about to be moved beyond the limits of this State under any pretense
whatever the person to be moved shall be entitled to a reasonable delay for
the purpose of obtaining counsel and of availing himself of the laws of
this State for the security of personal liberty.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
725 ILCS 5/103-5
(725 ILCS 5/103-5)
(from Ch. 38, par. 103-5)
(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall
be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she
was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an
examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by
a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a
continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's
determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an
interlocutory appeal. Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the
defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for
trial or an oral demand for trial on the record. The provisions of this subsection
(a) do not apply to a person on bail or recognizance for an offense
but who is in custody for a violation of his or her parole, aftercare release, or mandatory
supervised release for another offense.
The 120-day term must be one continuous period of incarceration. In
computing the 120-day term, separate periods of incarceration may not be
combined. If a defendant is taken into custody a second (or subsequent) time
for the same offense, the term will begin again at day zero.
(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court
having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands
trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for
fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness
hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance
allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's determination
of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory
appeal. The defendant's failure to appear for any court date set by the
court operates to waive the defendant's demand for trial made under this
For purposes of computing the 160 day period under this subsection (b),
every person who was in custody for an alleged offense and demanded trial
and is subsequently released on bail or recognizance and demands trial,
shall be given credit for time spent in custody following the making of the
demand while in custody. Any demand for trial made under this
shall be in writing; and in the
case of a defendant not in custody, the
demand for trial shall include the date of any prior demand made under this
provision while the defendant was in custody.
(c) If the court determines that the State has exercised without
success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be
obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application
of the State for not more than an additional 60 days. If the court
determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to
obtain results of DNA testing that is material to the case and that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that such results may be obtained at a
later day, the court may continue the cause on application of the State for
not more than an additional 120 days.
(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a), (b)
and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from custody or released
from the obligations of his bail or recognizance.
(e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one
charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously demands
trial upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county,
he shall be tried, or adjudged guilty after waiver of trial, upon at
least one such charge before expiration relative to any of such pending
charges of the period prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this
Section. Such person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges
thus pending within 160 days from the date on which judgment relative to
the first charge thus prosecuted is rendered pursuant to the Unified Code of
Corrections or, if such trial upon such first charge is terminated
without judgment and there is no subsequent trial of, or adjudication of
guilt after waiver of trial of, such first charge within a reasonable
time, the person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges thus
pending within 160 days from the date on which such trial is terminated;
if either such period of 160 days expires without the commencement of
trial of, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, any of such
remaining charges thus pending, such charge or charges shall be
dismissed and barred for want of prosecution unless delay is occasioned
by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to
Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication
of unfitness for trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section
114-4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's
physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal; provided,
however, that if the court determines that the State has exercised
without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case
and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may
be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on
application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days.
(f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend for
the time of the delay the period within which a person shall be tried as
prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section and on the
day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue at the
point at which it was suspended. Where such delay occurs within 21 days
of the end of the period within which a person shall be tried as
prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section, the court
may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an
additional 21 days beyond the period prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or
(e). This subsection (f) shall become effective on, and apply to persons
charged with alleged offenses committed on or after, March 1, 1977.
(Source: P.A. 98-558, eff. 1-1-14.)
725 ILCS 5/103-6
(725 ILCS 5/103-6)
(from Ch. 38, par. 103-6)
Waiver of jury trial.
Every person accused of an offense
shall have the right to a trial by jury unless (i) understandingly waived
by defendant in open court or (ii) the offense is an ordinance violation
punishable by fine only and the defendant either fails to file a demand for
a trial by jury at the time of entering his or her plea of not guilty or
fails to pay to the clerk of the circuit court at the time of entering his
or her plea of not guilty any jury fee required to be paid to the clerk.
(Source: P.A. 86-1386.)
725 ILCS 5/103-7
(725 ILCS 5/103-7)
(from Ch. 38, par. 103-7)
Posting notice of rights.
Every sheriff, chief of police or other person who is in charge of any
jail, police station or other building where persons under arrest are held
in custody pending investigation, bail or other criminal proceedings, shall
post in every room, other than cells, of such buildings where persons are
held in custody, in conspicuous places where it may be seen and read by
persons in custody and others, a poster, printed in large type, containing
a verbatim copy in the English language of the provisions of Sections 103-2,
103-3, 103-4, 109-1, 110-2, 110-4, and sub-parts (a) and (b) of
Sections 110-7 and 113-3 of this Code. Each person who is in charge of
any courthouse or other building in which any trial of an offense is
conducted shall post in each room primarily used for such trials and in
each room in which defendants are confined or wait, pending trial, in
conspicuous places where it may be seen and read by persons in custody and
others, a poster, printed in large type, containing a verbatim copy in the
English language of the provisions of Sections 103-6, 113-1, 113-4 and
115-1 and of subparts (a) and (b) of Section 113-3 of this Code.
(Source: Laws 1965, p. 2622
725 ILCS 5/103-8
(725 ILCS 5/103-8)
(from Ch. 38, par. 103-8)
Mandatory duty of officers.
Any peace officer who intentionally prevents the exercise by an accused
of any right conferred by this Article or who intentionally fails to
perform any act required of him by this Article shall be guilty of official
misconduct and may be punished in accordance with Section 33-3 of the
Criminal Code of 2012.
(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)