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STATE OF ILLINOIS                               HOUSE JOURNAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-SECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY 143RD LEGISLATIVE DAY Perfunctory Session THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2002 11:55 O'CLOCK A.M. NO. 143
[November 7, 2002] 2 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Daily Journal Index 143rd Legislative Day Action Page(s) Adjournment........................................ 42 Introduction and First Reading - HB6294-6314....... 6 Letter of Transmittal.............................. 3 Messages from the Governor......................... 7 Permanent Committee Assignments.................... 3 Bill Number Legislative Action Page(s) HB 3714 Motion Submitted................................... 4 HC 0016 Constitutional Amendment - First Reading........... 7 HJR 0085 Agreed Resolution.................................. 5 HR 1013 Resolution......................................... 4
3 [November 7, 2002] The House met pursuant to adjournment. Anthony D. Rossi, Clerk of the House in the Chair. Prayer by Anthony D. Rossi, Clerk of the House. Minutes Clerk Jennifer L. Timms led the House in the Pledge of Allegiance. PERMANENT COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS Speaker Madigan appointed Representative Julie Hamos as a permanent member of the Committee on Urban Revitalization. LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY STATE OF ILLINOIS MICHAEL J. MADIGAN ROOM 300 SPEAKER STATE HOUSE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62706 June 17, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives RE: House Bill 6061 - An Act making appropriations I am writing to make you aware of a circumstance that surrounded the passage of House Bill 6061 on June 2. HB 6061 is a bill that makes reappropriations for capital projects throughout the State. It should not be confused with SB 2393, the bill making appropriations for the FY '03 budget that was the subject of item and reduction vetoes by the Governor. The House had originally sent HB 6061 to the Senate as a vehicle bill for appropriations that would be agreed to later as part of the FY '03 budget. On June 2, the Senate adopted an amendment to HB 6061 that contained reappropriations for certain capital projects previously authorized in the FY '02 budget. The version of the amendment that was filed with the Secretary of the Senate, however, differed in one respect from the electronic version that appeared on the LIS system and on the Senate members' laptops. The electronic version contained a reappropriation for renovation work on the House and Senate chambers, while the actual hard copy of the amendment filed with the Secretary of the Senate did not contain that language. That discrepancy was carried over to the House when the Senate sent a message on the evening of June 2 that the Senate had adopted the amendment. Accordingly, when House members voted to concur in the Senate amendment the same evening, the version displayed on our laptops contained the reappropriation for the legislative chamber, but the original copy of the Senate amendment that accompanied the Senate's message did not. The discrepancy was not detected because both versions contained the same document identification tag assigned by the Bureau of the Budget - BOB-Capital03. As you may know, the Illinois Constitution requires the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate to certify the form of each bill that passes both houses. In this case, I have certified the version of the bill that does not include the reappropriation for renovation of the Senate and House chambers. This was the form of HB 6061 as amended by Senate Amendment #2 reported to the House via the original message from the Secretary of the Senate. I fully recognize the seriousness of this matter. Like you, my staff and I rely upon the accuracy of the LIS system to know exactly what we are voting on. In this case, I too was unaware of the difference between the original and electronic versions.
[November 7, 2002] 4 None of that, however, relieves me of the constitutional responsibility to certify the form of the bill to the Senate and to the Governor. Although we have come to rely upon the LIS system for our legislative information, it has not replaced the essential and official means of communication between the House and the Senate, through paper copies of original messages sent from one chamber to the other. Please be assured that I will call on all appropriate parties to determine the full circumstances of this incident and take the necessary steps to ensure that is does not happen again. With kindest personal regards, I remain Sincerely yours, s/Michael J. Madigan Speaker of the House GENERAL ASSEMBLY STATE OF ILLINOIS MICHAEL J. MADIGAN ROOM 300 SPEAKER STATE HOUSE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62706 September 18, 2002 Mr. Anthony D. Rossi Chief Clerk of the House Illinois House of Representatives 402 State House Springfield, IL 62706 Dear Clerk Rossi: Please be advised that I am increasing the membership on the following House Committee: Urban Revitalization (increase majority appointment to six (6) members) (Increase minority appointment to five (5) members) I am appointing Representative Julie Hamos as a permanent member of this committee. With kindest personal regards, I remain Sincerely yours, s/Michael J. Madigan Speaker of the House VETO MOTIONS SUBMITTED Representative Hannig submitted the following written motion, which was placed on the order of Motions: MOTION I move that HOUSE BILL 3714 do pass, the Veto of the Governor notwithstanding. RESOLUTION The following resolutions were offered and placed in the Committee on Rules. HOUSE RESOLUTION 1013
5 [November 7, 2002] Offered by Representative Bost: WHEREAS, Amtrak was established in 1971 by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970; and WHEREAS, The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act, passed unanimously in 1997, requires that Amtrak become operationally self-sufficient by December 2, 2002; and WHEREAS, A combination of accumulated operating deficits, cash shortages, management inefficiencies, and delay in full implementation of Acela Express service have created a fiscal emergency at Amtrak, with growing and substantial debt obligations totaling over $3.3 billion; and WHEREAS, The Amtrak Reform Council has found that Amtrak will not be operationally self-sufficient by December 2, 2002, as required by law, citing major inherent flaws and weaknesses in Amtrak's institutional design; and WHEREAS, The Department of Transportation Inspector General Report on the 2001 Assessment of Amtrak's Financial Performance and Requirements found that Amtrak suffered operating losses of $1.1 billion, the largest in Amtrak's history, and that Amtrak is no closer to operating self-sufficiency now than it was in 1997; and WHEREAS, The nation should be afforded the opportunity to receive safe, efficient and cost-effective rail passenger service; and WHEREAS, The current federal formula for transportation funding is heavily skewed towards highways and airports with less than 1% directed at rail passenger service, creating highway and airport congestion and perpetuating an unbalanced transportation system that is vulnerable to emergencies, high traffic volumes, and temporary disruptions; and WHEREAS, Amtrak currently serves over 500 communities across the country, provides energy-efficient mobility, uses 38% less energy per passenger mile than travel by commercial airlines, can reduce congestion which currently costs the U.S. economy $100 billion annually, and can further reduce U.S. dependence on imported foreign oil; therefore be it RESOLVED, BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINETY-SECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, that we urge the Congress of the United States to pass S.1958, the Rail Passenger Service Improvement Act, to eliminate budget deficits and cash shortages of Amtrak through visionary financial planning, sound budgeting, accurate revenue forecasts, and careful spending and to ensure the most efficient and cost effective rail passenger service by Amtrak during a period of fiscal emergency; and be it further RESOLVED, That a suitable copy of this Resolution be presented to each member of the U.S. Illinois Congressional delegation. HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 85 Offered by Representative Watson: WHEREAS, The quality and availability of drinking water is a matter of great importance to the health, safety, and welfare of people throughout this State; and WHEREAS, Despite the existence of numerous federal and State laws and regulations to protect drinking water quality, many people in Illinois, especially in small communities and rural areas, are forced to rely on inferior water supplies or private wells that produce unacceptably hard, smelly, or contaminated water; and WHEREAS, It has been a long time since a coordinated, comprehensive review cf Illinois drinking water protection needs has been undertaken; therefore be it RESOLVED, BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINETY-SECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, THE SENATE CONCURRING HEREIN, that a Task Force on Drinking Water Quality is hereby created, to consist of 2 members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House, 2 members of the House of Representatives appointed by the House Minority Leader, 2 members of the Senate appointed by the President of the Senate, 2 members of the Senate appointed by the Senate Minority Leader, and one representative of each
[November 7, 2002] 6 of the following agencies, appointed by their respective directors: the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Illinois Department of Public Health, and the Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs; and be it further RESOLVED, That the Task Force shall review and consider the drinking water protection needs of people throughout Illinois, especially in the smaller communities and rural areas of the State, and where appropriate shall attempt to develop legislative proposals to address any drinking water quality problems that it may identify; and be it further RESOLVED, That in the course of its duties the Task Force may conduct public hearings or other meetings throughout the State and may request the assistance of any appropriate federal, State, or local governmental agency; and be it further RESOLVED, That in the course of its work the Task Force may consider all problems and issues relating to drinking water quality, regardless of whether the water is provided by a public or private, community or non-community water supply or well, and including any related aquifer, reservoir, or treatment or distribution system; and be it further RESOLVED, That the Task Force shall report its findings, proposals, and recommendations to the House of Representatives and the Senate within 6 months after the adoption of this resolution, and upon filing its report the Task Force is abolished; and be it further RESOLVED, That a copy of this resolution be delivered to the Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Director of Public Health, and the Director of Commerce and Community Affairs. INTRODUCTION AND FIRST READING OF BILLS The following bills were introduced, read by title a first time, ordered printed and placed in the Committee on Rules: HOUSE BILL 6294. Filed by Representatives Hamos - May - Winters - Slone - Garrett, Bassi, Burke, Coulson, Currie, Dart, Delgado, Erwin, Feigenholtz, Hoffman, Kurtz, Lang, Lindner, Mendoza, Novak, Osterman, Pankau, Soto, Tenhouse, Turner and Yarbrough., a bill for AN ACT in relation to taxes. HOUSE BILL 6295. Filed by Representatives Franks - Dart, a bill for AN ACT concerning unemployment insurance. HOUSE BILL 6296. Filed by Representative Acevedo, a bill for AN ACT concerning day care homes. HOUSE BILL 6297. Filed by Representative O'Connor, a bill for AN ACT concerning the General Assembly. HOUSE BILL 6298. Filed by Representative Mathias, a bill for AN ACT in relation to taxes. HOUSE BILL 6299. Filed by Representative Bill Mitchell, a bill for AN ACT concerning the State budget. HOUSE BILL 6300. Filed by Representative Bill Mitchell, a bill for AN ACT concerning State debt. HOUSE BILL 6301. Filed by Representative Bost, a bill for AN ACT in relation to alcoholic liquor. HOUSE BILL 6302. Filed by Representative Mulligan, a bill for AN ACT in relation to check cashing services. HOUSE BILL 6303. Filed by Representative Wojcik, a bill for AN ACT in relation to public health. HOUSE BILL 6304. Filed by Representatives Black - Stephens - Watson - Poe - Bost, Meyer, Myers, Righter and Wait, a bill for AN ACT concerning taxation. HOUSE BILL 6305. Filed by Representatives Mulligan - Stephens - Bost - Meyer - Poe, a bill for AN ACT concerning taxes. HOUSE BILL 6306. Filed by Representative Hannig, Beaubien, Boland, Bost, Bradley, Brady, Brunsvold, Bugielski, Burke, Capparelli, Colvin, Crotty, Dart, Steve Davis, Delgado, Flowers, Forby, Fowler, Franks, Garrett, Granberg, Hamos, Hartke, Hoeft, Hoffman, Howard, Jefferson,
7 [November 7, 2002] Lou Jones, Shirley Jones, Kenner, Lang, Mautino, May, McGuire, McKeon, Miller, Bill Mitchell, Jerry Mitchell, Moffitt, Morrow, Myers, Novak, O'Brien, Osterman, Poe, Reitz, Saviano, Schoenberg, Smith, Soto, Watson, Winkel and Yarbrough., a bill for AN ACT concerning appropriations. HOUSE BILL 6307. Filed by Representative Berns, a bill for AN ACT concerning sex offenders. HOUSE BILL 6308. Filed by Representative Berns, a bill for AN ACT concerning abduction alerts and prevention. HOUSE BILL 6309. Filed by Representatives Wojcik - Bost, a bill for AN ACT in relation to alcoholic liquor. HOUSE BILL 6310. Filed by Representatives Bill Mitchell - Watson - Poe - Moffitt - Black, a bill for AN ACT concerning State facility closure. HOUSE BILL 6311. Filed by Representative Acevedo, a bill for AN ACT concerning higher education. HOUSE BILL 6312. Filed by Representative McGuire, a bill for AN ACT making appropriations. HOUSE BILL 6313. Introduced by Representative Bellock, a bill for AN ACT concerning animal cremation services. HOUSE BILL 6314. Introduced by Representative Feigenholtz, a bill for AN ACT concerning appropriations. HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTIONS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS FIRST READING Representative Franks introduced the following: HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 16 RESOLVED, BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINETY-SECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, THE SENATE CONCURRING HEREIN, that there shall be submitted to the electors of the State for adoption or rejection at the general election next occurring at least 6 months after the adoption of this resolution a proposition to add Section 25 to Article I of the Illinois Constitution as follows: ARTICLE I BILL OF RIGHTS (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 25 new) SECTION 25. TAXPAYER SUITS Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, each taxpayer of this State, of a unit of local government in this State, of a school district in this State, or of any other taxing district in this State has standing to bring suit in the circuit court to enforce the rights of taxpayers recognized at common law or granted by the General Assembly by law. SCHEDULE This Constitutional Amendment takes effect upon being declared adopted in accordance with Section 7 of the Illinois Constitutional Amendment Act. The foregoing HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 16 was taken up, read in full a first time, ordered printed and placed in the Committee on Rules. MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNOR
[November 7, 2002] 8 STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 24, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(d) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, I hereby veto and return several appropriation items included in House Bill 6061 entitled "AN ACT making appropriations," having taken the actions set forth below. House Bill 6061 is the companion appropriation bill to the State Budget, comprising the majority of capital (bond funded) projects under consideration for Fiscal Year 2003. Unfortunately, not all of the projects included in House Bill 6061 are ready for commencement during Fiscal Year 2003. For example, some projects are lacking the necessary regulatory approvals or site selection decisions. In others, the anticipated construction was to occur at locations or facilities that are slated to close during Fiscal Year 2003. Item Vetoes I hereby veto the following appropriation items: Article Section Page Lines Amount Enacted 2 1 18 21-22 $3,200,000.00 2 3.2 23 12-18 $8,300,000.00 2 6 42 31-32 $70,719.00 2 6 44 4-8 $203,038.00 2 6 44 19-21 $398,354.00 2 6 46 6-9 $905,000.00 2 6 46 10-11 $103,661.00 2 6 46 12 $145,936.00 2 8 68 4-7 $185,062.00 2 8 68 8-10 $608,406.00 2 8 68 11-12 $1,603,317.00 2 8 68 13-15 $1,351,795.00 2 8 71 2-4 $144,992.00 2 8 71 7-10 $4,000,000.00 2 8.3 75 20-21 $292,081.00 2 8a 76 32-33 And 2 8a 77 1-2 $245,000.00 2 13 86 15-19 $46,944,676.00 3 Div.FY01,11 188 28-30 $250,000.00 In addition to these specific item vetoes, I hereby approve all other appropriation items in House Bill 6061. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE JESSE WHITE - Secretary of State November 7, 2002 To the Honorable Speaker of the House:
9 [November 7, 2002] Sir: I am enclosing herewith a copy of the Approval Message from the Governor as filed in my office and directed to the Honorable Members of the House of the 92nd General Assembly as follows: HOUSE MESSAGES HOUSE BILL PUBLIC ACT. NO. DATE OF MESSAGE 2828 92-0596 June 28, 2002 3629 92-0693 July 19, 2002 3645 92-0694 July 19, 2002 3713 92-0695 July 19, 2002 4229 92-0697 July 19, 2002 4720 92-0847 August 23, 2002 4937 92-0699 July 19, 2002 5567 92-0848 August 23, 2002 6004 92-0702 July 19, 2002 Respectfully, s/Jesse White Secretary of State STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR June 28, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Today I sign House Bill 2828, which authorizes the governor to use future proceeds from Illinois' share of the National Tobacco Settlement to pay the interest and principal on the sale of $750 million in State general obligation bonds that could be offered only during Fiscal Year 2003. Although I accept this authority from the General Assembly, I want to make it very clear that no one with a stake in a balanced State budget should view this source of money as a way to maintain programs, services and facilities in the budget. Nor should anyone view this money as a way to restore programs, services and facilities that had to be cut in order to balance the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget. Earlier in June, during the midst of budget negotiations, well-meaning legislators from both parties looked to "tobacco securitization" as a way to "balance" the budget without voting for increased taxes. President Philip, Speaker Madigan and I all agreed that "borrowing" against the receipt of future resources in general is not a sound long-term fiscal policy, and should not be viewed as an easy alternative to more painful spending cuts and tax increases. The General Assembly and I have made those painful spending cuts, and, at the end of Fiscal Year 2002, the State's finances are stable. Nonetheless, President Philip, Speaker Madigan and I did agree that if "borrowing" from future tobacco settlement proceeds is used as a way to maintain a healthy Rainy Day Fund and end-of-year balance, that would be an acceptable part of an overall budget solution for the coming year. In signing this bill today, my firm intention is to use this authority, if necessary, only to build up the State budget's end-of-year balance and Rainy Day Fund. I view this new authority as a limited tool at my disposal that may help strengthen the State's overall financial condition. This authority is not a magic wand that will make the pain of previous
[November 7, 2002] 10 budget cuts disappear. It may be a tool to assist the State if the economy fails to recover as expected. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 19, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 3629 today, I honor the General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates. However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern with the increasing number of special plates. The myriad of designs available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of police to quickly identify suspect vehicles. It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding mechanism within House Bill 3629, the General Assembly has made clear its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I believe it is essential that the State incur the costs of special plate production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a sufficient level of interest to cover those costs. I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications have be received. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 19, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly
11 [November 7, 2002] Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 3645 today, I honor the General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates. However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of police to quickly identify suspect vehicles. It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding mechanism within House Bill 3645, the General Assembly has made clear its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a sufficient level of interest to cover those costs. I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications have been received. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 19, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 3713 today, I honor the General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates. However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of police to quickly identify suspect vehicles. It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding mechanism within House Bill 3713, the General Assembly has made clear its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I
[November 7, 2002] 12 believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a sufficient level of interest to cover those costs. I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications have been received. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 19, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 4229 today, I honor the General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates. However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of police to quickly identify suspect vehicles. It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding mechanism within House Bill 4229, the General Assembly has made clear its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a sufficient level of interest to cover those costs. I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications have been received. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR
13 [November 7, 2002] August 23, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Today I sign House Bill 4720, which requires manufacturers to reimburse retailers for warranty work at an hourly rate that is the same as, or greater than, the hourly labor rate that the retailer charges customers for non-warranty repair work. I approve this legislation because a good case can be made for the idea behind the bill, which is that a fair labor rate should not fluctuate depending on whether or not the work is done related to a warranty. This will mean that consumers of farm implements and machinery who have warranty work performed will be assured that the labor cost for the warranty work will be covered by the manufacturer regardless of where the repair work is completed. Additionally, this bill passed the General Assembly unanimously, so the members of the General Assembly must feel that the provisions of House Bill 4720 are sound public policy. However, I do sign this bill with some reservations. I believe this issue should have been worked out in the private sector by an agreement between the retailers and the manufacturers rather than through legislation. In the future, I would urge the General Assembly to exercise caution before getting involved in issues that should be negotiated between private businesses. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 19, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 4937 today, I honor the General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates. However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of police to quickly identify suspect vehicles. It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding mechanism within House Bill 4937, the General Assembly has made clear its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a
[November 7, 2002] 14 sufficient level of interest to cover those costs. I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications have been received. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR August 23, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Today I sign House Bill 5567, which amends the Public Aid Code to provide that the Department of Public Aid (DPA) must implement a new Medicaid payment methodology for the nursing component of the nursing home rate effective July 1, 2003, using the federal mandated resident assessment instrument, the Minimum Data Set (MDS). It provides for up to a two-year period of transition to the new methodology. The nursing home industry and associated advocacy groups have sought for several years to update the methodology utilized by DPA for setting the nursing component of nursing facilities rates paid by the Illinois Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid). In fact, the 89th General Assembly passed legislation (P.A. 89-415) that established a workgroup to develop a new reimbursement system using the MDS for data collection. The workgroup established under P.A. 89-415 failed to recommend a methodology for determining rates for payment of services provided for Medicaid clients in nursing facilities. I find this illustrative of the complexity of the charge of House Bill 5567. The bill requires DPA to develop and implement this new methodology, but the successful accomplishment of this task will require substantial input and cooperation from certain interested parties, particularly long-term care industry experts. I will, therefore, appoint an advisory panel to consult with DPA in the development of this methodology. This will ensure full recognition of the perspectives of this important industry and also the diverse needs of the citizens served by the long-term care industry. With this clarification, I hereby sign House Bill 5567. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 19, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly
15 [November 7, 2002] Specialty license plates serve an admirable purpose of recognizing and raising funds for organizations and worthy causes throughout the State of Illinois. In signing House Bill 6004 today, I honor the General Assembly's intentions and support a longstanding tradition in Illinois to provide our residents with the opportunity to display their support for a cause or organization through specialty license plates. However, I also recognize that the State is experiencing a proliferation of specialty plates, which holds the potential to impact Illinois citizens with respect to public safety. The Illinois State Police and law enforcement community have indicated a growing concern with the increasing number of special plates. They myriad of designs available make it difficult for law enforcement officers to identify properly issued valid Illinois registrations, impairing the ability of police to quickly identify suspect vehicles. It is also essential, especially in these tight economic times, for the State to curtail any unnecessary spending. In creating a funding mechanism within House Bill 6004, the General Assembly has made clear its intention for the additional fee paid by the recipients of special license plates to cover the cost of their design and production. In order to ensure that the General Assembly's intention is guaranteed, I believe it is essential that the State incur the cost of special plate production only after the applicants for the plates have demonstrated a sufficient level of interest to cover those costs. I encourage the Secretary of State's Office to use the discretionary powers provided to the office by Section 3-600 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-600) which allows the Secretary to produce new special plates only when a sufficient level of applications have been received. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE JESSE WHITE - Secretary of State November 7, 2002 To the Honorable Speaker of the House: Sir: In compliance with the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Illinois, I am forwarding herewith the enclosed House Bills that are being returned by the Governor with specific recommendations for change. HOUSE BILLS 2 2058 2271 4074 4179 4938 5610 5652 Respectfully, s/Jesse White Secretary of State STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706
[November 7, 2002] 16 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR August 28, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV, Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979), People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of the bill, I hereby return House Bill 2 entitled "AN ACT in relation to alternate fuels," with my specific recommendations for change. House Bill 2 contains important provisions to further promote the use of clean alternative fuels in the State, especially in the Chicago area, fostering research, outreach and facility construction for the ethanol and alternative fuel industry. The existing programs for alternate fuel rebates and ethanol research, which will sunset in December of this year, are extended until 2004. In addition, House Bill 2 creates the Alternate Fuel Infrastructure Program and provides that the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA) shall administer a Clean Fuel Education Program. House Bill 2 also creates an Alternate Fuel Infrastructure Advisory Board to provide private sector input into the State's efforts to expand the alternate fuel industry in Illinois. House Bill 2 is the product of cooperative efforts of industry representatives, IEPA, DCCA and state legislators to provide state programming for alternative fuel development, research, facility and continuation of the Clean Fuels Fleet program. Each of these initiatives serves to foster vital components of the alternative fuel industry in Illinois. The State can play a pivotal role in securing the expansion of alternative fuel production and use, bringing both economic and environmental benefits to the State of Illinois. However, the language in House Bill 2, as passed by the General Assembly, creates significant fiscal and legal implications for the State of Illinois. House Bill 2 eliminates the existing funding structure for Fiscal Year 2002, exposing the State to possible litigation for user fees collected and expended during this period. In addition, House Bill 2 mandates that the state agencies continue operation of the existing rebate and education programs and establish new infrastructure and research programs without any identified funding source. House Bill 2 does provide the authority for agencies to accept funds from outside sources for these programs. However, the legislation restricts the distribution of these private contributions, with no consideration for the delegation of funds desired by the funding source. Finally, House Bill 2 establishes an essential advisory board to accommodate private sector involvement, but provides this "advisory" board with excessive levels of authority, allowing the independent board members to determine distribution of state funds with no oversight by state agencies or the General Assembly. I urge the General Assembly to continue the State's efforts to support and expand the alternative fuel industry in Illinois. However, any time we create new programs and mandate the continuation of existing programs, it is essential that the State be fiscally responsible and, when possible, provide sufficient funding sources for
17 [November 7, 2002] the programs we stand behind. For these reasons, I hereby return House Bill 2 with the following recommendations for change: on page 1, line 13, by replacing "electricity.", with "electricity, excluding on-board electric generation."; and on page 3, line 1, by replacing "Act; (2) determine" with "Act and (2) recommend"; and on page 3, line 2, by replacing "grants and review" with "grants."; and on page 3, by deleting lines 3 through 6; and on page 3, by replacing line 19 with "research program shall remain in effect, subject to appropriation after calendar year until December 31,'; and on page 3, line 24, after "1997,", by inserting "and as long as funds are available,"; and on page 3, by replacing lines 27 through 32 with the following: "issued under the provisions of this Act. The Alternate Fuels Advisory Board shall develop and recommend to the Agency rules that provide incentives or other measures to ensure that small fleet operators and owners participate in, and benefit from, the rebate program. Such rules shall define and identify small fleet operators and owners in the covered"; and on page 4, by replacing lines 1 through 8 with the following: "area and make provisions for the establishment of criteria to ensure that funds from the Alternate Fuels Fund specified in this Act are made readily available to these entities. The Advisory Board shall, in the development of its rebate application review criteria, make provisions for preference to be given to applications proposing a partnership between the fleet operator or owner and a fueling service station to make alternate fuels available to the public. An owner may; and on page 4, by replacing lines 26 and 27 with the following: "conversion cost rebates applied for during or after calendar year years 1997,1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 shall"; and on page 4, line 30, by replacing "2004," with "2002,"; and on page 5, by replacing lines 13 and 14 with the following: "or after calendar year years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 shall be 80% of all approved cost differential"; and on page 5, line 16, by replacing "2004," with "2002,"; and on page 5, by replacing lines 31 and 32 with the following: "applied for during or after calendar year years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 and approved rebates shall be 80% of the cost"; and on page 6, by replacing lines 1 through 32 with the following: "year 2002 if funds are still available. Twenty-five percent of the amount appropriated under Section 40 to
[November 7, 2002] 18 be used to fund the programs authorized by this Section during calendar year 1998 shall be designated to fund fuel cost differential rebates. If the total dollar amount of approved fuel cost differential rebate applications as of October 1, 1998 is less than the amount designated for that calendar year, the balance of designated funds shall be immediately available to fund any rebate authorized by this Section and approved in the calendar year. An applicant may include on an application submitted in 1997 all amounts spent within that calendar year on fuel cost differential, even if the expenditure occurred before the promulgation of the Agency rules. Twenty-five percent of the amount appropriated under Section 40 to be used to fund the programs authorized by this Section during calendar year 1999 shall be designated to fund fuel cost differential rebates. If the total dollar amount of approved fuel cost differential rebate applications as of July 1, 1999 is less than the amount designated for that calendar year, the balance of designated funds shall be immediately available to fund any rebate authorized by this Section and approved in the calendar year. Twenty-five percent of the amount appropriated under Section 40 to be used to fund programs authorized by this Section during calendar year 2000 shall be designated to fund fuel cost differential rebates. If the total dollar amount of approved fuel cost differential rebate applications as of July 1, 2000 is less than the amount designated for that calendar year, the balance of designated funds shall be immediately available to fund any rebate authorized by this Section and approved in the calendar year."; and on page 7, line 24 by replacing "The" with "Subject to appropriation, the"; and on page 7, line 32, by deleting "Under the grant program,"; and on page 7, by deleting line 33; and on page 8, by deleting lines 1 and 2; and on page 8, line 4, by replacing "The" with "Subject to appropriation, the"; and on page 8, by replacing line 13, with the following: "(a) During fiscal years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002"; and on page 9, lines 9, 12, 18, and 21 by replacing "and 2001" with "2001, and 2002" each time it appears; and on page 9, line 32 by replacing "2001," with "2002,"; and on page 10, lines 11, 16, and 20, by replacing "2002, 2003," with "2003" each time it appears; and on page 11, by deleting lines 2 through 15; and on page 11, line 16, by deleting "(d) Blank.". With these changes, House Bill 2 will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706
19 [November 7, 2002] GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR August 23, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV, Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979), People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of the bill, I hereby return House Bill 2058, entitled "AN ACT in relation to terrorism", with my specific recommendations for change. House Bill 2058 amends the Criminal Code of 1961, the Solicitation for Charity Act, the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the Boarding Aircraft with Weapon Act, the Statewide Grand Jury Act, the Unified Code of Corrections, the Charitable Trust Act and other Acts with respect to investigating, prosecuting and punishing acts of terrorism. Specifically, the bill amends the Criminal Code of 1961 allow the death penalty to be considered for a first-degree murder committed as a result of or in connection with a terrorism offense. House Bill 2058 is the second terrorism bill to pass the General Assembly. On February 8th of this year, I amendatorily vetoed the first terrorism bill (House Bill 2299) due to, among others, concerns surrounding the over-expansive eavesdropping & wiretapping provisions, the expansion of our death eligibility factors, the need for additional due process protections before seizing and freezing of assets of charitable organizations and persons, and other technical flaws. The proposed amendments were important to protecting the constitutional rights of our citizens from some of the overly broad provisions of this legislation. I am pleased to see that the General Assembly has passed a much-improved anti-terrorism bill by including all but one of my suggested changes in House Bill 2058. However, the one suggested amendatory veto change that the General Assembly did not incorporate into House Bill 2058 is removing the addition of an unnecessary death eligibility factor for a first-degree murder committed as part of a terrorist offense. Our current death penalty statute has numerous provisions that cover just about every conceivable murder circumstance that would be committed by a terrorist. Illinois' legislative response to the tragic events of September 11th should not compromise our state government's integrity by succumbing to the urge to enact largely symbolic legislative changes. House Bill 2058 passed the General Assembly on May 29, 2002. This was a month and a half after my Commission on Capital Punishment delivered its report with 85 proposed reforms to the death penalty system and more than two weeks after I introduced reform legislation that would codify many of the Commission's recommendations. The General Assembly, however, did not address the important issue of comprehensive death penalty reform during the spring legislative session, but rather sent me yet another bill expanding the death penalty. This occurred despite what I believe is a growing consensus to limit eligibility factors in some fashion. The General Assembly has convened committees to look into the issue of death penalty reform, which have been meeting over the summer months. And while I applaud both the House and Senate for convening these committees to look into the issue of death penalty
[November 7, 2002] 20 reform, I am troubled by the relative ease with which a death penalty expansion bill was able to pass before any real legislative attention had been given to carrying out much needed reforms. Given our State's capital punishment track record, there can be little doubt that reform should take precedence over expanding death penalty eligibility in what most believe to be a flawed system. Failure to do so can only serve to demonstrate that Illinois is more concerned with making a symbolic statement with an unnecessary death penalty provision than with ensuring that additional innocent persons do not end up on death row and executed at the hands of the state. While it is true that the General Assembly previously passed the Capital Crimes Litigation Act to better fund defense and prosecution of capital cases and legislation requiring stricter controls over retaining evidence, this year I did not receive a single death penalty reform proposal. For the third time in barely over a year, I am receiving legislation aimed at expanding the death penalty statute, despite my two previous vetoes of the prior attempts to expand the statute. Instead of sending me comprehensive death penalty reform legislation, I have received only death penalty expansion legislation. This, despite the fact that my Commission comprised of intelligent, insightful, experienced, passionate and well-rounded individuals has come up with 85 recommendations for change to our flawed capital punishment system. The Illinois State Bar Association, the Illinois State's Attorney's Association, the Illinois Chiefs of Police, the Illinois Public Defender's Association and many others have gone on record as agreeing with the vast majority of the Commission's recommendations. Since the reinstatement of the death penalty on June 27, 1977, the number of innocent persons exonerated from death row has outnumbered the number of those who have been executed. There may still be innocent persons on death row-sentenced to die by a badly flawed system. If that system is allowed to continue unchanged and unreformed, then there undoubtedly will be more innocent men and women who find themselves awaiting their death at the hands of the people of the State of Illinois for a crime that they did not commit. Now is the time for reform of Illinois' death penalty system. To do anything otherwise is unjust, unfair and unprincipled. Therefore, if the General Assembly wants to expand the death penalty with House Bill 2058, then justice demands that the General Assembly be prepared to adopt some needed reforms to make sure the death penalty is considered and imposed in a fair and just manner. To that end, I am proposing an amendatory veto of House Bill 2058 to include changes in the death penalty system that I believe will help keep Illinois' death penalty statutes constitutional, address technical flaws in the system and begin restoring public confidence in our system of justice. There are additional reforms the General Assembly must consider in November, but the reform proposals contained in this amendatory veto are both applicable and necessary to the death penalty provision in this bill. For these reasons, I hereby return House Bill 2058 with the following recommendations for change: on page 1, by inserting between lines 3 and 4 the following: "Section 2. The Counties Code is amended by changing Section 3-4006 as follows: (55 ILCS 5/3-4006) (from Ch. 34, par. 3-4006) Sec. 3-4006. Duties of public defender. The Public Defender, as directed by the court, shall act as attorney, without fee, before any court within any county for all persons who are held in custody or who
21 [November 7, 2002] are charged with the commission of any criminal offense, and who the court finds are unable to employ counsel. The Public Defender shall be the attorney, without fee, when so appointed by the court under Section 1-20 of the Juvenile Court Act or Section 1-5 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or by any court under Section 5(b) of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 for any party who the court finds is financially unable to employ counsel. The Public Defender may act as attorney, without fee and appointment by the court, for a person in custody during the person's interrogation regarding first degree murder for which the death penalty may be imposed, if the person has requested the advice of counsel and there is a reasonable belief that the person is indigent. Any further representation of the person by the Public Defender shall be pursuant to Section 109-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Every court shall, with the consent of the defendant and where the court finds that the rights of the defendant would be prejudiced by the appointment of the public defender, appoint counsel other than the public defender, except as otherwise provided in Section 113-3 of the "Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963". That counsel shall be compensated as is provided by law. He shall also, in the case of the conviction of any such person, prosecute any proceeding in review which in his judgment the interests of justice require. (Source: P.A. 86-962.)"; and on page 8, by replacing lines 18 through 21 with the following: "(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant: (i) who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more; (ii) and who has been found guilty of first degree murder; and (iii) whose guilt was not, in the determination of the court, based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of one eyewitness, of one accomplice, or of one incarcerated informant; may be sentenced to death if:"; and on page 11, by replacing lines 1 and 2 with the following: "to prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the"; and on page 11, by replacing line 5 with the following: "murder because the murdered individual was a witness or participated in"; and on page 13, by replacing lines 23 through 27 with the following: "For the purpose of this Section: "Torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the victim's death. "Depraved" means the defendant relished the infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain. "Participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity, such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors. (c) Consideration of accomplice or informant testimony and factors in aggravation and mitigation. When the sentence of death is being sought by the State, the court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider that the testimony of an accomplice or incarcerated informant who may provide
[November 7, 2002] 22 evidence against a defendant for pay, immunity from punishment, or personal advantage must be examined and weighed with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the accomplice or informant's testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant must be determined. In making the determination, the jury must consider (i) whether the accomplice or incarcerated informant has received anything, including pay, immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, or personal advantage, in exchange for testimony, (ii) any other case in which the accomplice or informant testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, and whether the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the accomplice or informant received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement, (iii) whether the accomplice or informant has ever changed his or her testimony, (iv) the criminal history of the accomplice or informant, and (v) any other evidence relevant to the credibility of the accomplice or informant. The court shall also consider, or shall also instruct the jury to consider, any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Before the jury makes a determination with respect to the imposition of the death penalty, the court shall also instruct the jury of the applicable alternative sentences under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections that the court may impose for first degree murder if a jury determination precludes the death sentence. Aggravating"; and on page 14, line 10, by replacing the period with "; . (6) the defendant's background includes a history of extreme emotional or physical abuse; (7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity."; and on page 15, line 4, by inserting after the period the following: "The defendant shall be given the opportunity, personally or through counsel, to make a statement that is not subject to cross-examination. If the proceeding is before a jury, the defendant's statement shall be reduced to writing in advance and submitted to the court and the State, so that the court may rule upon any evidentiary objection with respect to admissibility of the statement."; and on page 15, by replacing lines 22 through 29 with the following: "determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence and the court concurs with the jury determination that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not concur with the jury determination that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in writing and shall then sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections. If Unless the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is not the appropriate sentence, finds that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections."; and on page 16, by replacing lines 5 through 13 with the following: "subsection (c). If the Court determines, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.
23 [November 7, 2002] If Unless the court finds that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the sentence of death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections."; and on page 16, line 17, by inserting after the period the following: "Upon the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court must determine whether the sentence was imposed due to some arbitrary factor; whether an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances indicate death was the proper sentence; and whether the sentence of death was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. The Supreme Court may order the collection of data and information to support the review required by this subsection (i)."; and on page 20, line 5, by replacing "and" with "and"; and on page 22, line 3, by replacing the period with the following: "; and (k) Recording the interrogation or statement of a person in custody for first degree murder or a witness in a first degree murder case, when the person in custody or witness knows the interrogation is being conducted by a law enforcement officer or prosecutor. For the purposes of this Section, "interrogation of a person in custody" means any interrogation during which the person being interrogated is not free to leave and the person is being asked questions relevant to the first degree murder investigation."; and on page 41, by replacing line 28 with the following: "108B-11, 108B-12, 108B-14, 114-11, 114-13, 116-3, 122-1, and 122-2.1 and by adding Sections 108B-7.5, 113-7, 114-15, 114-16, 115-16.1, and 115-21 as"; and on page 68, by inserting between lines 1 and 2 the following: "(725 ILCS 5/113-7 new) Sec. 113-7. Notice of intention to seek or decline the death penalty. The State's Attorney or Attorney General shall provide notice of the State's intention to seek or decline the death penalty by filing a Notice of Intent to Seek or Decline the Death Penalty as soon as practicable. In no event shall the filing of the notice be later than 120 days after arraignment, unless, for good cause shown, the court directs otherwise. A notice of intent to seek the death penalty shall also include all of the statutory aggravating factors enumerated in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 which the State intends to introduce during the death penalty sentencing hearing. (725 ILCS 5/114-11) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-11) Sec. 114-11. Motion to Suppress Confession. (a) Prior to the trial of any criminal case a defendant may move to suppress as evidence any confession given by him on the ground that it was not voluntary. (b) The motion shall be in writing and state facts showing wherein the confession is involuntary. (c) If the allegations of the motion state facts which, if true, show that the confession was not voluntarily made the court shall conduct a hearing into the merits of the motion. (d) The burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of proving that a confession was voluntary shall be on the State. Objection to the failure of the State to call all material witnesses on the issue of whether the confession was voluntary must be made in the trial court.
[November 7, 2002] 24 (e) The motion shall be made only before a court with jurisdiction to try the offense. (f) The issue of the admissibility of the confession shall not be submitted to the jury. The circumstances surrounding the making of the confession may be submitted to the jury as bearing upon the credibility or the weight to be given to the confession. (g) The motion shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion. If the motion is made during trial, and the court determines that the motion is not untimely, and the court conducts a hearing on the merits and enters an order suppressing the confession, the court shall terminate the trial with respect to every defendant who was a party to the hearing and who was within the scope of the order of suppression, without further proceedings, unless the State files a written notice that there will be no interlocutory appeal from such order of suppression. In the event of such termination, the court shall proceed with the trial of other defendants not thus affected. Such termination of trial shall be proper and shall not bar subsequent prosecution of the identical charges and defendants; however, if after such termination the State fails to prosecute the interlocutory appeal until a determination of the merits of the appeal by the reviewing court, the termination shall be improper within the meaning of subparagraph (a) (3) of Section 3--4 of the "Criminal Code of 1961", approved July 28, 1961, as amended, and subsequent prosecution of such defendants upon such charges shall be barred. (h) In capital cases, the court may also conduct a hearing pursuant to Section 115-21 on the admissibility of the statement made by the defendant where the statement has not been recorded by electronic video or audio, regardless of whether the defense requests such a hearing. (Source: P.A. 76-1096.) (725 ILCS 5/114-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 114-13) Sec. 114-13. Discovery in criminal cases. (a) Discovery procedures in criminal cases shall be in accordance with Supreme Court Rules. (b) Discovery deposition procedures applicable in cases for which the death penalty may be imposed shall be in accordance with Supreme Court Rules and this subsection (b), unless the State has given notice of its intention not to seek the death penalty. (1) The intent of this subsection is to (i) ensure that capital defendants receive fair and impartial trials and sentencing hearings within the courts of this State and (ii) minimize the occurrence of error to the maximum extent feasible by identifying and correcting with due promptness any error that may occur. (2) A party may, with leave of court upon a showing of good cause, take the discovery deposition upon oral questions of any person disclosed as a witness as provided by law or Supreme Court Rule. In determining whether to allow a deposition, the court should consider (i) the consequences to the party if the deposition is not allowed, (ii) the complexities of the issues involved, (iii) the complexity of the testimony of the witness, and (iv) the other opportunities available to the party to discover the information sought by deposition. Under no circumstances, however, may the defendant be deposed. (3) The taking of depositions shall be in accordance with rules providing for the taking of depositions in civil actions, and the order for the taking of a deposition may provide that any designated books, papers, documents, or tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same time and place. (4) A defendant shall have no right to be physically present at a discovery deposition. If there is any concern regarding witness safety, the court may require that the deposition be held in a place or manner that will ensure the security of the witness. The court may also issue protective orders to restrict the use and disclosure of information provided by a witness. (5) Absent good cause shown to the court, depositions shall
25 [November 7, 2002] be completed within 90 days after the disclosure of witnesses. The parties shall have the right to compel depositions under this subsection by subpoena. No witness may be deposed more than once, except by leave of the court upon a showing of good cause. (6) If the defendant is indigent, the costs of taking depositions shall be paid by the county where the criminal charge is initiated with reimbursement to the county from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund. If the defendant is not indigent, the costs shall be allocated as in civil actions. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.) (725 ILCS 5/114-15 new) Sec. 114-15. Motion for genetic marker groupings comparison analysis. (a) A defendant may make a motion for a court order before trial for comparison analysis by the Department of State Police with those genetic marker groupings maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections if the defendant meets all of the following requirements: (1) The defendant is charged with any offense. (2) The defendant seeks for the Department of State Police to identify genetic marker groupings from evidence collected by criminal justice agencies pursuant to the alleged offense. (3) The defendant seeks comparison analysis of genetic marker groupings of the evidence under subdivision (2) to those of the defendant, to those of other forensic evidence, and to those maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections. (4) Genetic marker grouping analysis must be performed by a laboratory compliant with the quality assurance standards required by the Department of State Police for genetic marker grouping analysis comparisons. (5) Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State. (b) The Department of State Police may promulgate rules for the types of comparisons performed and the quality assurance standards required for submission of genetic marker groupings. The provisions of the Administrative Review Law shall apply to all actions taken under the rules so promulgated. (725 ILCS 5/114-16 new) Sec. 114-16. Motion to preclude death penalty based upon mental retardation. (a) A defendant charged with first degree murder may make a motion prior to trial to preclude the imposition of the death penalty based upon the mental retardation of the defendant. The motion shall be in writing and shall state facts to demonstrate the mental retardation of the defendant. As used in this Section, "mental retardation" means: (1) having significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of 70 or below; and (2) having deficits in adaptive behavior. The mental retardation must have been manifested during the developmental period, or by 18 years of age. (b) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a defendant with mental retardation at the time of committing first degree murder shall not be sentenced to death. (c) The burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of proving the defendant's mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the defendant. The determination of whether the defendant was mentally retarded at the time of the offense of first degree murder shall be made by the court after a hearing. (d) If the issue of mental retardation is raised prior to trial and the court determines that the defendant is not a person with mental retardation, the defendant shall be entitled to offer evidence to the trier of fact of diminished intellectual capacity as a mitigating
[November 7, 2002] 26 circumstance pursuant to clause (c)(7) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961. (e) The determination by the trier of fact on the defendant's motion shall not be appealable by interlocutory appeal, but may be a basis of appeal by either the State or defendant following the sentencing stage of the trial. (725 ILCS 5/115-16.1 new) Sec. 115-16.1. Witness qualification in first degree murder trial. (a) In a prosecution for first degree murder where the State has given notice of its intention to seek the death penalty, the prosecution must promptly notify the court and the defendant's attorney of the intention to introduce testimony at trial from a person who is in custody or who was in custody at the time of the factual matters to which the person will testify. The notice to the defendant's attorney must include the identification, criminal history, and background of the witness. The prosecution must also promptly notify the defendant's attorney of any discussion, inducement, benefit, or agreement between that witness and a law enforcement agency, officer, or prosecutor for that witness. (b) After notice has been given to the court pursuant to subsection (a), the court must prior to trial conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the reliability and admissibility of the testimony of the witness. The prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the reliability of the testimony of the witness. In making its determination, the court may consider: (1) the specific statements or facts to which the witness will testify; (2) the time, place, and other circumstances regarding the statements or facts to which the witness will testify; (3) any discussion, inducement, benefit, or agreement between the witness and a law enforcement agency or officer for that witness; (4) the criminal history of the witness; (5) whether the witness has ever recanted his or her testimony; (6) other criminal cases in which the witness has testified; (7) the presence or absence of any relationship between the accused and the witness; and (8) any other evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness. (725 ILCS 5/115-21 new) Sec. 115-21. Evidence of statement in capital case. (a)The General Assembly believes that justice and fairness are best served if the custodial interrogation and any statement of the defendant that may result from the interrogation in a capital case are recorded by means of electronic video and audio. The General Assembly finds that the video and audio recording of the interrogation and statement produce some of the best evidence with respect to the voluntariness and reliability of the statement and compliance with the constitutional rights of the defendant. The General Assembly understands that to implement such recording practices will require time, training, and funding. Therefore, the General Assembly believes that law enforcement officers, to the extent possible, should record any interrogations and statements of the suspect, defendant, or significant witness in capital cases in video and audio format. However, the General Assembly also recognizes that such video and audio recording may not always be available or practical under the circumstances and resources of a particular case. Further, an interrogation or statement that is not recorded by video or audio may be just as reliable and voluntary as one that is so recorded. Therefore, the purpose of this Section is not to mandate video and audio recording of interrogations and
27 [November 7, 2002] statements in first degree murder cases and compel the exclusion of unrecorded statements or interrogations, but rather to guarantee an admissibility hearing before the court for statements made without a video or audio recording. The State's Attorney for each county and the Attorney General shall each report separately to the General Assembly by August 1, 2003 as to the implementation of these recording procedures in their respective jurisdictions. (b) When a statement of the defendant made during a custodial interrogation without an electronic video and audio recording of the interrogation and statement is to be offered as evidence at trial for first degree murder when the State has given notice of its intention to seek the death penalty, the court must conduct a hearing on the admissibility of the statement regardless of whether an admissibility objection has been made. In making a determination regarding admissibility of the statement, the court must review the facts with respect to the voluntariness of the statement, whether the defendant was properly advised of his or her right to counsel during the interrogation process, and whether a request for counsel by the defendant during the interrogation process was appropriately satisfied. The court shall conduct the hearing in accordance with the applicable court rules, procedures, and case law. The hearing required by this Section may be combined with the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress his or her confession pursuant to Section 114-11 of this Code. (c) For the purposes of this Section, "custodial interrogation" means any interrogation during which the person being interrogated is not free to leave and the person is being asked questions relevant to the first degree murder investigation. (725 ILCS 5/116-3) Sec. 116-3. Motion for fingerprint or forensic testing not available at trial regarding actual innocence. (a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA testing, including comparison analysis of genetic marker groupings of the evidence collected by criminal justice agencies pursuant to the alleged offense, to those of the defendant, to those of other forensic evidence, and to those maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial which resulted in his or her conviction, but which was not subject to the testing which is now requested because the technology for the testing was not available at the time of trial. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State. (b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that: (1) identity was the issue in the trial which resulted in his or her conviction; and (2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect. (c) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable conditions designed to protect the State's interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing process upon a determination that: (1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence that significantly advances the defendant's claim of innocence; (2) the testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. (Source: P.A. 90-141, eff. 1-1-98.) (725 ILCS 5/122-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-1) Sec. 122-1. Petition in the trial court. (a) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary may institute a proceeding under this Article if the person who asserts that: 1) in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction
[November 7, 2002] 28 there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both; or (2) the death penalty was imposed and there is newly discovered evidence not available to the person at the time of the proceeding that resulted in his or her conviction that establishes the person's innocence. (a-5) A proceeding under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) may be commenced at any time after the person's conviction notwithstanding any other provisions of may institute a proceeding under this Article. In such a proceeding regarding actual innocence, if the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry. (b) The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by affidavit. Petitioner shall also serve another copy upon the State's Attorney by any of the methods provided in Rule 7 of the Supreme Court. The clerk shall docket the petition for consideration by the court pursuant to Section 122-2.1 upon his or her receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the attention of the court. (c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a-5), if the petitioner is under sentence of death, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the issuance of the mandate by the Supreme Court following affirmance of the defendant's direct appeal of the trial court verdict. In all other cases,no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline for the filing of the defendant's brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. (d) A person seeking relief by filing a petition under this Section must specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section. A trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this Article. (e) A proceeding under this Article may not be commenced on behalf of a defendant who has been sentenced to death without the written consent of the defendant, unless the defendant, because of a mental or physical condition, is incapable of asserting his or her own claim. (Source: P.A. 89-284, eff. 1-1-96; 89-609, eff. 1-1-97; 89-684, eff. 6-1-97; 90-14, eff. 7-1-97.) (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-2.1) Sec. 122-2.1. (a) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section. (1) If the petitioner is under sentence of death and is without counsel and alleges that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so requested, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel. (2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it
29 [November 7, 2002] shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry. (b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this Section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4 through 122-6. If the petitioner is under sentence of death, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration and hearing within one year of the filing of the petition. (c) In considering a petition pursuant to this Section, the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding and any transcripts of such proceeding. (Source: P.A. 86-655; 87-904.) Section 20.5. The Capital Crimes Litigation Act is amended by changing Sections 10 and 19 as follows: 725 ILCS 124/10) (Section scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2004) Sec. 10. Court appointed trial counsel; compensation and expenses. (a) This Section applies only to compensation and expenses of trial counsel appointed by the court as set forth in Section 5, other than public defenders, for the period after arraignment and so long as the State's Attorney has not, at any time, filed a certificate indicating he or she will not seek the death penalty or stated on the record in open court that the death penalty will not be sought. (b)Appointed trial counsel shall be compensated upon presentment and certification by the circuit court of a claim for services detailing the date, activity, and time duration for which compensation is sought. Compensation for appointed trial counsel may be paid at a reasonable rate not to exceed $125 per hour. Beginning in 2001, every January 20, the statutory rate prescribed in this subsection shall be automatically increased or decreased, as applicable, by a percentage equal to the percentage change in the consumer price index-u during the preceding 12- month calendar year. "Consumer price index-u" means the index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor that measures the average change in prices of goods and services purchased by all urban consumers, United States city average, all items, 1982-84=100. The new rate resulting from each annual adjustment shall be determined by the State Treasurer and made available to the chief judge of each judicial circuit. Payment in excess of the limitations stated in this subsection (b) may be made if the trial court certifies that such payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for representation based upon customary charges in the relevant legal market for attorneys of similar skill, background, and experience. A trial court may entertain the filing of this verified statement before the termination of the cause and may order the provisional payment of sums during the pendency of the cause. (c) Appointed trial counsel may also petition the court for certification of expenses for reasonable and necessary capital litigation expenses including, but not limited to, investigatory and other assistance, expert, forensic, and other witnesses, and mitigation specialists. Counsel may not petition for certification of expenses that may have been provided or compensated by the State Appellate Defender under item (c)(5) of Section 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act. (d) Appointed trial counsel shall petition the court for certification of compensation and expenses under this Section periodically during the course of counsel's representation. If the court determines that the compensation and expenses should be paid from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, the court shall certify, on a
[November 7, 2002] 30 form created by the State Treasurer, that all or a designated portion of the amount requested is reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund. Certification of compensation and expenses by a court in any county other than Cook County shall be delivered by the court to the State Treasurer and paid by the State Treasurer directly from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund if there are sufficient moneys in the Trust Fund to pay the compensation and expenses. Certification of compensation and expenses by a court in Cook County shall be delivered by the court to the county treasurer and paid by the county treasurer from moneys granted to the county from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund. (Source: P.A. 91-589, eff. 1-1-00.) (725 ILCS 124/19) (Section scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2004) Sec. 19. Report; repeal. (a) The Cook County Public Defender, the Cook County State's Attorney, the State Appellate Defender, the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, and the Attorney General shall each report separately to the General Assembly by January 1, 2004 detailing the amounts of money received by them through this Act, the uses for which those funds were expended, the balances then in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund or county accounts, as the case may be, dedicated to them for the use and support of Public Defenders, appointed trial defense counsel, and State's Attorneys, as the case may be. The report shall describe and discuss the need for continued funding through the Fund and contain any suggestions for changes to this Act. (b) (Blank) Unless the General Assembly provides otherwise, this Act is repealed on July 1, 2004. (Source: P.A. 91-589, eff. 1-1-00.)"; and on page 73, line 29, by inserting after "5-4-3" the following: "and by adding Section 5-2-7"; and on page 81, by inserting between lines 27 and 28 the following: "(730 ILCS 5/5-2-7 new) Sec. 5-2-7. Fitness to be executed. (a) A person is unfit to be executed if the person is mentally retarded. For the purposes of this Section, "mentally retarded" means: (1) having significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of 70 or below; and (2) having deficits in adaptive behavior. The mental retardation must have been manifested during the developmental period, or by 18 years of age. (b) The question of fitness to be executed may be raised after pronouncement of the death sentence. The procedure for raising and deciding the question shall be the same as that provided for raising and deciding the question of fitness to stand trial subject to the following specific provisions: (1) the question shall be raised by motion filed in the sentencing court; (2) the question shall be decided by the court; (3) the burden of proving that the offender is unfit to be executed is on the offender; (4) if the offender is found to be mentally retarded, the court must resentence the offender to natural life imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections."; and on page 84, by replacing lines 19 and 20 with the following: "Illinois and to all prosecutorial agencies. Notwithstanding the limits on disclosure stated by this subsection (f), the genetic marker
31 [November 7, 2002] grouping analysis information obtained under this Act also may be released by court order pursuant to a motion under Section 114-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to a defendant who meets all of the requirements under that Section. Notwithstanding any other statutory provision to the contrary, all". With these specific recommendations for change, House Bill 2058 will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR August 21, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV, Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979), People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of the bill, I hereby return House Bill 2271 entitled "AN ACT concerning regulation of professions," with my specific recommendations for change. House Bill 2271 would protect the public in a variety of ways by setting standards of qualifications, education, training and experience for individuals who would like to practice massage therapy in Illinois. This is a worthwhile goal and one that I fully support. In order for the new regulations of this profession to be both effective and efficient, the same rules should apply throughout the state. The City of Chicago currently regulates massage establishments and massage services. A concern has been raised that given the effective date of this bill, and other references in the bill to when individuals must be licensed by the state Department of Professional Regulation, there could be a period of time when these individuals would not be licensed. This bill would not prevent the City of Chicago from continuing to regulate massage establishments. In the case of the actual individuals, a single statewide standard is the right public policy, and in order to ensure that there are no gaps in regulatory coverage, I am making the following recommendations for change: On page 13, line 13, by replacing "The" with "Beginning January 1, 2004, the"; and On page 13, line 15, by replacing "A" with "Beginning January 1, 2004, a".
[November 7, 2002] 32 With these changes, House Bill 2271 will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR August 2, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV, Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979), People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill.2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of the bill, I hereby return House Bill 4074 entitled, "AN ACT in relation to criminal law," with my specific recommendation for change. House Bill 4074 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to allow retired police officers to become trained as electronic criminal surveillance officers in order to conduct court authorized non-consensual electronic criminal surveillance. The bill defines retired police officer and prohibits the retired officer from carrying a firearm at any time while carrying out their electronic surveillance duties. Under current law only specially trained and certified law enforcement officers on active duty can carry out court authorized non-consensual electronic criminal surveillance. The current Electronic Criminal Surveillance law requires the State Police to train and certify the officers. There are three levels of training and certification: (1) Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer I (ECSO I) is certified to (i) prepare petitions for the authority to intercept private oral communications in accordance with the provisions of electronic surveillance law; (ii) intercept and supervise the interception of private oral communications; (iii) handle, safeguard, and use evidence derived from such private oral communications; and (iv) operate and maintain equipment used to intercept private oral communications. (2) Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer II is certified to carry out ECSO I duties, plus to install, maintain and remove non-consensual electronic criminal surveillance devices when court authorized non-consensual entry of property is not required. (3) Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer III is certified to carry out ECSO I and ECSO II duties, plus when authorized by the courts to enter property to install, maintain or remove non-consensual electronic criminal surveillance devices. Currently only law enforcement officers assigned to a dedicated electronic criminal surveillance unit may apply for ECSO III training and certification. It is my understanding that during the legislative process, House Bill 4074 was described as allowing retired police officers, who are properly trained and certified by the State Police, to carry out
33 [November 7, 2002] Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer I duties of monitoring intercepted communications. I fully support that purpose, which will free up police officers to carry out other more pressing duties. However, nothing in House Bill 4074 limits retired officers at ECSO I duties or allows the State Police to decline to train retired police officers at ECSO II and ECSO III levels. I believe it is important that this legislation be so limited to avoid any confusion. Also, I do not believe that retired police officers, who by the terms of this bill are prohibited from carrying a firearm, should conduct the ECSO II and ECSO III duties. There are not a large number of non-consensual electronic surveillance operations carried out each year, so there is not any pressing need for anyone other than active duty police officers to carry out ECSO II and ECSO III duties. The intent of House Bill 4074 can be fully satisfied by limiting retired officers to currently defined Electronic Criminal Surveillance Officer I duties. For these reasons, I hereby return House Bill 4074 with the following specific recommendation for change: on page 2, line 34, after the period, by inserting the following: "A retired law enforcement officer may be certified by the Illinois State Police only to (i) prepare petitions for the authority to intercept private oral communications in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (ii) intercept and supervise the interception of private oral communications; (iii) handle, safeguard, and use evidence derived from such private oral communications; and (iv) operate and maintain equipment used to intercept private oral communications.". With this change, House Bill 4074 will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR August 21, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV, Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979), People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of the bill, I hereby return House Bill 4179, entitled "AN ACT in relation to criminal law," with my specific recommendations for change. House Bill 4179 amends the Criminal Code to amend the offense of aggravated assault concerning emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and other medical assistance personnel. It deletes the requirement that the EMT must be an employee of a municipality or other governmental unit. This legislation also ensures that employees of a police or sheriff's department engaged in the performance of authorized duties are protected under the aggravated assault and aggravated battery laws. This legislation also increases the penalty for aggravated assault of
[November 7, 2002] 34 an emergency medical technician when a firearm is used from a Class A misdemeanor (up to 1 year in county jail and/or fine up to $2,500) to a Class 4 felony (1 to 3 years in prison and/or fine up to $25,000). Emergency medical technicians, as well as police officers and firefighters, have a difficult job. The same holds true for employees of a police department. Any protection that these professions can receive from crimes committed against them is important because we depend on these public safety professions to protect us. The least we can do is protect them and penalize those who prevent the performance of their duties. I do not disagree with the purpose of such legislation to equalize such offenses as aggravated assault or aggravated battery when the victim is an EMT or employee of a law enforcement agency. However, there are some inconsistencies in language of this legislation that need to be corrected. Both of the aggravated assault and aggravated battery statutes have sections that reference "official duties", as opposed to "authorized" which is the language being used in this legislation. Furthermore, there were some inadvertent errors that must be corrected. To ensure consistency, clarify other provisions, and prevent court challenges, I recommend the changes set forth below. In addition, because of the importance of this legislation, I request that the effective date of this legislation be amended as to have the original effective date as this legislation had when it came to my desk. Any amendatory veto action would move the effective date to June 1, 2003, unless otherwise stated. Thus, I also recommend that this legislation state the effective date as January 1, 2003. For these reasons, I return House Bill 4179 with the following recommendations for change: On page 3, lines 10 and 14, by replacing "official" each time it appears with "official"; and On page 4, line 20, by replacing "authorized" with "official"; and On page 8, line 13, by inserting "engaged" after "department"; and On page 8, line 14, by replacing "authorized" with "official"; and On page 9, by inserting after line 12 the following: "Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect on January 1, 2003.". With these specific recommendations for change, House Bill 4179 will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR August 2, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV,
35 [November 7, 2002] Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979), People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of the bill, I hereby return House Bill 4938 entitled "AN ACT concerning State records, " with my specific recommendations for change. House Bill 4938 amends the State Records Act to include "digitized electronic material" and "databases" in definition of "record," and exempts "blank forms" from the definition of "record". House Bill 4938 makes changes regarding inspection and copying of certain records covered by the State Records Act. House Bill 4938 provides that the Auditor General shall audit agencies for compliance with the provisions of this Act and shall report findings to both the agency and the Secretary of State. The legislation also makes it a Class 4 felony to knowingly and without authority alter, destroy, deface, remove or conceal any public record. The legislation also adds similar language to Section 3 of the State Records Act to prohibit records from being mutilated, destroyed, transferred, removed, or otherwise damaged or disposed of, except as provided by law. However, the current Section 24 of the State Records Act makes any violation of Section 3 a Class B misdemeanor. These two provisions have a penalty conflict, since both cover nearly the same type of prohibited conduct but have different penalties. When different penalties apply to offenses with the same elements, the courts are constitutionally required to apply only the lower penalty. Therefore, the new Class 4 felony penalty may be partially or totally invalidated by the addition to Section 3. I propose changes that will remove the conflict and make the Class 4 felony the applicable penalty. For these reasons, I hereby return House Bill 4938 with the following specific recommendations for change: on page 2, by replacing line 29 with the following: "Sec. 3. Records as property of State. (a) All records"; and on page 3, by replacing line 5 with the following: "prohibited by law. (b) Reports and records of the obligation,"; and on page 13, line 22, by inserting "subsection (b) of" after "of". With these changes, House Bill 4938 will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR August 16, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV, Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental
[November 7, 2002] 36 Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979), People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of the bill, I hereby return House Bill 5610 entitled "AN ACT in relation to vehicles," with my specific recommendation for change. House Bill 5610 provides an exemption to the Illinois Vehicle Code, which currently prohibits driving on sidewalks, to allow the use of electric personal assistive mobility devices on sidewalks in Illinois. By removing state restrictions against the use of the electric personal assistive mobility devices on sidewalks, HB 5610 provides a framework in which these devices may be used on sidewalks in Illinois. However, since HB 5610 does not specifically defer to local regulation, HB 5610 effectively mandates that the use of electric personal assistive mobility devices be allowed throughout the state. This is inconsistent with current practice for the use of roller blades, bicycles, etc. and unnecessarily supercedes local control over sidewalk use. From the House and Senate floor debate it is clear that the legislature did not intend to preclude or pre-empt Home Rule powers, but merely intended to remove state restrictions against use of electric personal assistive mobility devices on sidewalks. It is essential that the State preserve local communities' right to permit, restrict, or prohibit the use of such devices as they deem appropriate in their respective communities. For this reason, I hereby return House Bill 5610 with the following recommendation for change: on page 1, line 6, by replacing "Section" with "Sections 11-208.2 and "; and on page 1, by inserting between lines 12 and 13 the following: "(625 ILCS 5/11-208.2) Sec. 11-208.2. Limitation on home rule units. The provisions of this Chapter of this Act limit the authority of home rule units to adopt local police regulations inconsistent herewith except pursuant to Sections 11-208, and 11-209, 11-1005.1, 11-1412.1, and 11-1412.2 of this Chapter of this Act."; and on page 1, line 18, by inserting after the period the following: "Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to limit or preempt the authority of any home rule or non-home rule unit of local government from regulating or prohibiting the use of electric personal assistive mobility devices."; and on page 1, line 25 by inserting after the period the following: "Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to limit or preempt the authority of any home rule or non-home rule unit of local government from regulating or prohibiting the use of electric personal assistive mobility devices."; and on page 2, line 2, by inserting "device" after "mobility"; and on page 2, line 3, by inserting after the period the following: "Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to limit or preempt the authority of any home rule or non-home rule unit of local government from regulating or prohibiting the use of electric personal assistive mobility devices.". With these changes, House Bill 5610 will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence.
37 [November 7, 2002] Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 16, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to the authority vested in the Governor by Article IV, Section 9(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and re-affirmed by the People of the State of Illinois by popular referendum in 1974, and conforming to the standard articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex Rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 Ill. 2d 242 (1972), Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Zagel, 78 Ill. 2d 387 (1979), People ex Rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356 (1980), and County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987), that gubernatorial action be consistent with the fundamental purposes and the intent of the bill, I hereby return House Bill 5652, entitled "AN ACT in relation to criminal law," with my specific recommendations for change. House Bill 5652 contains three separate provisions. The first would amend the Unified Code of Corrections to provide that a defendant convicted of cannabis trafficking or controlled substance trafficking may receive only a maximum of 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment. Secondly, House Bill 5652 would further amend the Unified Code of Corrections to add certain reckless homicide offenses involving drugs or alcohol and 2 or more deaths to the list of offenses for which a prisoner may not receive the additional good conduct credit that is provided for participation in drug abuse and certain other correctional programs. Finally, this bill would amend the Criminal Code of 1961 to clarify that the offense of aggravated robbery only applies if the offender had no firearm or other dangerous weapon in his or her possession when he or she committed the robbery. The latter two of these provisions are needed technical changes to insure that the law is applied fairly and equitably. However, the first provision, which would add cannabis trafficking and controlled substance trafficking to the "Truth-In-Sentencing" law (TIS) poses several problems. First, when TIS was first considered, it was known that funds were not available to cover all criminal offenses because of costs of incarceration associated with the longer time spent in prison under the Truth-In-Sentencing law. Since covering only some offenses with TIS raises constitutional proportionality questions, this risk was minimized by the decision to cover only the most serious criminal offenses with TIS. This led to TIS for crimes committed against the person such as murder, criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, etc. Since TIS was enacted in 1996 only one new offense has been added, and that was aggravated arson last year due to its inherent life-endangering nature. Because cannabis and controlled substance trafficking is not a violent crime against the person, including it in a category with only the most violent crimes against the person raises potential constitutional issues. Furthermore, the Federal "Violent Offender
[November 7, 2002] 38 Incarceration-Truth-in-Sentencing" (VOI-TIS) program, which provided funds to states to pay for additional incarceration costs and prison construction costs brought on by increasing prison time was discontinued last year. As discussed, adding drug trafficking to TIS would seem to be a significant departure from the original intent of VOI-TIS and would have a significant fiscal impact particularly given that federal funds are no longer available to pay for any of the existing Truth-In-Sentencing offenses, let alone new offenses. This one component of the bill accounts for the full $3.3 million fiscal impact (over ten years) that the Department of Corrections estimates would result from the enactment of this bill as written. While proponents of this change are likely to argue that the violent nature of most drug trafficking warrants its inclusion in the Truth-In-Sentencing laws, it is difficult to justify spending more money on longer prison terms for drug offenders at the same time that funds are being cut at both the federal and state level for incarceration and prison construction. Moreover, there is a growing consensus that treatment programs, not longer incarceration, may offer better results in combating the scourge of narcotics. Further, as noted earlier, the fiscal impact becomes even more difficult to justify when one considers the inconsistency that this provision would bring to the current list of Truth-In-Sentencing offenses which would include only the most violent crimes. Finally, the current trafficking offenses already double the minimum time in prison from what the sentence would be for the actual delivery of that amount of cannabis or controlled substance to a person. Consequently, under current law the sentence for high-end amounts of controlled substances under the trafficking law is a minimum 30 years imprisonment, which means at least 15 years served (less six months of potential meritorious good time). Requiring that 85% of the 30 years or 25.5 years be served in prison for drug trafficking would result in a longer minimum sentence and length of stay than the minimum sentence and length of stay for murder, which are both only 20 years. Some judges have already criticized the trafficking provisions as too harsh. Our state's prisons are already overcrowded with drug offenders who may be serving more time than warranted by the offense and adding these drug trafficking provisions to our Truth-In-Sentencing laws only creates the risk of the courts invalidating Illinois' other TIS provisions. For these reasons, I return House Bill 5652 with the following recommendations for change: on page 1, line 29, by replacing "Sections 3-6-3 and 5-4-1" with "Section 3-6-3"; and on page 4, by deleting lines 11 through 20; and on page 5, by replacing "or" with "or"; and on page 5, by replacing lines 17 through 21 with "date of this amendatory Act of the 92nd General Assembly."; and on pages 6, by replacing lines 15 through 18 with "Assembly, or first degree murder, a Class X"; and on page 10, by deleting lines 16 through 33; and by deleting all of pages 11 through 16; and on page 17, by deleting lines 1 through 24. With these specific recommendations for change, House Bill 5652 will have my approval. I respectfully request your concurrence. Sincerely,
39 [November 7, 2002] s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE JESSE WHITE - Secretary of State November 7, 2002 To the Honorable Speaker of the House: Sir: In compliance with the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Illinois, I am forwarding herewith the enclosed House Bills, as vetoed by the Governor together with his objections. HOUSE BILLS 4397 4466 5004 5278 5961 Respectfully, s/Jesse White Secretary of State STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 25, 2002 To The Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, I hereby veto and return House Bill 4397 entitled "AN ACT concerning municipalities." House Bill 4397 amends the Illinois Municipal Code to provide that certain municipalities may adopt, by ordinance or resolution, at least 180 days prior to the first municipal election following the municipality's receipt of the new federal decennial census results, certain numbers of aldermen depending on population. I fully support the provisions in House Bill 4397; however, I have already signed into law Senate Bill 1635 that contains identical provisions. For this reason, I hereby veto and return House Bill 4397. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706
[November 7, 2002] 40 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 19, 2002 To The Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, I hereby veto House Bill 4466 entitled "AN ACT in relation to education." House Bill 4466 seeks to restore the categorical system of special education certification that has been altered by the federal courts. It seeks to establish seven categories of certification, including serious emotional disturbance; learning disabilities; autism; mental retardation; orthopedic (physical) impairment; traumatic brain injury; and other health impairments. The bill also requires the State Teacher Certification Board to issue certificates based upon the qualifications for the appropriate areas. Today, however, I have already signed into law Senate Bill 1777 which is identical to this bill. For this reason, I hereby veto and return House Bill 4466. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 19, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, I hereby veto House Bill 5004 entitled "AN ACT in relation to crime victims." House Bill 5004 amends the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act and the Open Parole Hearings Act to require the Prisoner Review Board (the Board) to establish a toll-free telephone number for a small number of crime victims to call regarding parole of an offender. The bill allows a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault to give information to the Board over the toll-free number for consideration at the parole hearing of the person who committed the crime against the victim. The crimes covered by the bill are felonies that involve sexual assault, domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, violation of an order of protection, or other felony that involved force or violence against a household member. House Bill 5004 is well intentioned, but does not enhance our existing victims' rights laws. The bill only applies to a few inmates, because it is limited to inmates still serving a prison sentence under the indeterminate parole system that was abolished for offenses committed after 1977. With current file information, the Department of Corrections found only 34 inmates clearly covered by this bill, though
41 [November 7, 2002] a few others could potentially be included as well. Current law affords these and all other victims in parole cases, not just domestic violence or sexual assault related cases, the right to be notified in advance of their offender's parole hearing. Today, a victim can submit information to the Board for use in the parole hearing by letter, film, videotape, recording, or other electronic means. The victim may also attend the hearing in person if they so choose. This includes the spouse, parent or child of a victim that was killed in the offense. According to the Prisoner Review Board, all victims and interested parties who still file parole protests, now after well over 25 years in most cases, are accustomed to the existing procedures for objecting to parole. Most choose to appear before the Board to object in person believing that a personal appearance is more forceful than a letter or phone call, which suggests that few victims would avail themselves of this new system. Finally, there is established by law a statewide notification system for victims and witnesses to check the status of inmates, including those under the parole system. Implemented in early May, the Illinois Automated Victim Notification (VINE) system is a fully automated service that immediately notifies registered users via telephone, pager, e-mail, fax or letter of any change in an offender's custody status. It also provides access to a live person to assist callers with using the system. Many agencies, including the Board, can utilize this system to fulfill any duties regarding providing notification to crime victims and witnesses. Therefore, I believe current law affords all victims easy and effective ways to provide and receive information from the Prisoner Review Board regarding inmates up for parole and the additional expenditure required to establish and operate this toll-free number is unnecessary. For these reasons, I hereby veto and return House Bill 5004. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR July 25, 2002 To The Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, I hereby veto House Bill 5278, entitled "AN ACT in relation to the regulation of professions." House Bill 5278 amends the Plumbing License Law to require the original registration fee or registration renewal fee for a plumbing contractor to be set at $100. Public Act 92-338, effective August 10, 2001, amended the Plumbing License Law to require that all plumbing contractors register with the Department of Public Health annually, submit proof of bonding and insurance, and pay an annual registration fee. The Department of Public Health was given the authority to set the fees for registration and renewal by administrative rule. The Department has set the fees, by rule, at $100 for both the initial registration and the annual renewal. Since the fee level now in place is exactly the same as the fee level that would be set if House Bill
[November 7, 2002] 42 5278 became law, the bill no longer serves its original purpose and would add unnecessary language to the statute. For this reason, I hereby veto and return House Bill 5278. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR SPRINGFIELD, 62706 GEORGE H. RYAN GOVERNOR August 16, 2002 To the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives 92nd General Assembly Pursuant to Article VI, Section 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, I hereby veto House Bill 5961 entitled "AN ACT concerning well water." House Bill 5961 creates the Contaminated Well Water Revolving Loan Program Fund to be administered by the Illinois Department of Public Health. The state-wide program would provide loans of up to $30,000 to help homeowners with contaminated water wells obtain an alternative water well source. These interest-free loans would be repaid over a thirty-year period. House Bill 5961 originated because of water well quality problems in Downers Grove, Illinois. While I support the concept of House Bill 5961 and believe it would be a useful tool in fighting private water well contamination, it was passed without identifying a funding source for either the loans or additional administrative costs associated with the program. Because I believe this is a very serious problem, my office has worked diligently with the area legislators and the officials in Downers Grove and nearby communities to address the specific water quality problems in the area. To this end, I recently approved House Bill 6061, which included $2 million earmarked specifically to help provide and alternative water source to those affected homeowners in most need of immediate relief. Additionally, I recently signed Senate Bill 2072 into law to assure notification of affected homeowners as a further means of reducing future problems. These recent actions have rendered House Bill 5961 unnecessary. Futhermore, with the State's current fiscal situation, I am not in favor of creating another program that places additional pressure on an already strained State revenue stream. For these reasons, I hereby veto and return House Bill 5961. Sincerely, s/GEORGE H. RYAN Governor At the hour of 12:15 O'CLOCK P.M., Representative Poe moved that the House do now adjourn. The motion prevailed. And in accordance therewith and pursuant to SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 81, the House stood adjourned until Tuesday, November 19, 2002, at 1:00 o'clock p.m.

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