Cumulative Report of Illinois Statutes
Held Unconstitutional

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Updated December 2014
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INTRODUCTION

The information contained in this Cumulative Report of Illinois Statutes Held Unconstitutional was previously published as Parts 2 and 3 of the Legislative Reference Bureau's Case Report. This information is now located online and available through the Legislative Reference Bureau website, http://ilga.gov/commission/lrb_home.html.
INTRODUCTION TO PART 1

Part 1 of this Report contains all the Illinois statutes that research by the Legislative Reference Bureau has found that have been held unconstitutional and remain in the Illinois Compiled Statutes without having been changed in response to the holding of unconstitutionality.
PART 1
CUMULATIVE REPORT OF STATUTES HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND NOT
AMENDED OR REPEALED IN RESPONSE TO THE HOLDING OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

GENERAL PROVISIONS

5 ILCS 350/2 (P.A. 89-688). State Employee Indemnification Act. Provision amended by P.A. 89-688 is unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. People v. Foster, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and People v. Burdunice, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “Criminal Procedure” and “Corrections”.)

ELECTIONS


10 ILCS 5/7-10. Election Code. Provision (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-10) that requires candidates for ward committeeman in the city of Chicago to meet higher nomination petition signature requirements than candidates for township committeeman in Cook County violates the equal protection clause by burdening the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of voters to cast their votes effectively by creating a geographical classification substantially injuring the voters and candidates of the city of Chicago despite less burdensome alternatives. Smith v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, 587 F.Supp. 1136 (N.D.Ill. 1984), and Gjersten v. Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago, 791 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1986).

10 ILCS 5/7-10.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 46, par. 7-10.1). Election Code. In the Article concerning nominations by political parties, the form for a petition or certificate of nomination contains a loyalty oath. The loyalty oath provision was held unconstitutional as vague and overly broad, violating the U.S. Constitution, Amendments I and XIV. Communist Party of Illinois v. Ogilvie, 357 F.Supp. 105 (N.D.Ill. 1972).

10 ILCS 5/10-2. Election Code. In the Article concerning the making of nominations in certain other cases, a provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, ch. 46, par. 291) prohibits a political organization or group from being qualified as a political party and assigned a place on the ballot if the organization or group is associated, directly or indirectly, with Communist, Fascist, Nazi, or other un-American principles and engages in activities or propaganda designed to teach subservience to the political principles and ideals of foreign nations or the overthrow by violence
of the federal or State constitutional form of government. The provision is unconstitutionally vague, lacking the definiteness required in a statute affecting the rights of a political group to appeal to the electorate. Identical language is used in a similar context in 10 ILCS 5/7-2 and 5/8-2. Feinglass v. Reinecke, 48 F.Supp. 438 (N.D.Ill. 1942).


10 ILCS 5/10-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 46, par. 10-5). Election Code. Prohibition against new party candidates in one political subdivision from using the same party name as that of a party in a different subdivision is broader than necessary to protect the State’s interest in prohibiting candidates from adopting the name of a political party with which they are not affiliated. Violates Amendments I and XIV of the U.S. Constitution. Norman v. Reed, 112 S.Ct. 698 (1992).

EXECUTIVE BRANCH


Provisions of the Children and Family Services Act and the Child Care Act of 1969 that deny AFDC-FC (foster care) payments to foster parents who are related to the foster children they care for conflict with the Social Security Act and are unconstitutional as violating that Act and therefore the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. Youakim v. Miller, 431 F.Supp. 40 (N.D.Ill. 1976).

The transition schedule provided by Section 5 of the Children and Family Services Act for discontinuing foster care payments to any foster family homes other than licensed foster family homes violates the due process rights of pre-approved and approved foster family homes guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, Amend. XIV. Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1995).

LEGISLATURE

25 ILCS 115/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 63, par. 14). General Assembly Compensation Act. Amendatory changes made to this Section by P.A. 86-27 provide for annual, lump sum additional payments to certain legislators in leadership positions. Because P.A. 86-27 further provided that the pay raises were to be effective retroactively, the legislation is unconstitutional to the extent it allowed for a change in a legislator’s salary during the term for which he or she was elected. Rock v. Burris, 139 Ill.2d 494 (1990).

25 ILCS 120/5.5 (West 2002). Compensation Review Act. Section denying the fiscal year 2003 cost-of-living adjustment to the salaries of State officials (previously recommended by the Compensation Review Board and not disapproved by the General Assembly) is unconstitutional with respect to salaries of State judges because it violates the Illinois
Constitution’s separation of powers clause (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1) and prohibition against decreasing a judge’s salary during his or her term (ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14). Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 211 Ill.2d 286 (2004).

FINANCE

30 ILCS 5/3-1  (West 2000). Illinois State Auditing Act. Requirement that the Auditor General perform compliance and management audits of various Chicago airports exceeds the Auditor General’s authority under subsection (b) of Section 3 of Article VIII of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3) to audit public funds of the State, because the airports’ funds are not appropriated by the General Assembly but are derived from user fees and federal grants. City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill.2d 480 (2003).

30 ILCS 105/5.661  (30 ILCS 105/5.640 P.A. 94-677). State Finance Act. Section added by Public Act 94-677 was ruled unconstitutional in Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010), due to the inseverability of other unconstitutional provisions.

30 ILCS 805/8.18  (P.A. 88-669). State Mandates Act. Provisions added by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. People v. Olender, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “Revenue” and “Special Districts”.)

REVENUE

35 ILCS 5/203  (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 2-203). Illinois Income Tax Act. Department of Revenue’s construction of provision that any corporation which is a member of an affiliated group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return, incurring a net operating loss on a separate Illinois income tax return basis, be deemed to have made the election provided in the Internal Revenue Code (that is, to relinquish the entire carryback period and only carry forward the loss) violates the uniformity of taxation clause of Article IX, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution as to corporate taxpayers of an affiliated group which files a consolidated federal income tax return reflecting a net operating loss, which operating loss the parent company does not elect to carry forward. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 117 Ill.2d 454 (1987).

35 ILCS 200/20-180 and 200/20-185. Property Tax Code. Provisions (formerly part of the Uncollectable Tax Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, pars. 891 and 891.1) that allow a municipality to cancel bonds and use moneys collected for similar projects after revenues that were specified to
secure the bonds are deemed uncollectable are an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. *George D. Hardin, Inc. v. Village of Mt. Prospect*, 99 Ill.2d 96 (1983).

35 ILCS 520/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 120, par. 2151 *et seq.*). **Cannabis and Controlled Substances Tax Act.** Statute is invalid and cannot be applied if the defendant has been convicted of criminal charges involving the same contraband. Violates the double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. *Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth*, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994).

35 ILCS 520/9, 520/10, 520/14.1, 520/15, 520/16, 520/19, and 520/23 (P.A. 88-669). **Cannabis and Controlled Substances Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “Finance” and “Special Districts”.)

**PENSIONS**


**TOWNSHIPS**


**MUNICIPALITIES**

65 ILCS 5/11-13-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 24, par. 11-13-1). **Illinois Municipal Code.** Statute authorizing a municipality to exercise zoning powers extraterritorially (that is, within a 1½-mile area contiguous to the municipality) was amended by P.A. 77-1373 (approved August 31, 1971) to add, as a permitted purpose of zoning regulation, the preservation of historically, architecturally, or aesthetically important features. P.A. 77-1373 also provided: “This amendatory Act of 1971 does not apply to any municipality which is a home rule unit.” Because a municipality has extraterritorial zoning authority only as granted by the legislature and not under its home rule powers, that added sentence, if valid, creates the incongruous situation of non-home rule municipalities being able to zone extraterritorially while home rule municipalities cannot. The sentence creates an unconstitutional classification and is void. (The court apparently read “this amendatory Act of 1971” to refer to the entire Section rather than to just the statement of purpose added by P.A. 77-1373.) *City of Carbondale v. Van Natta*, 61 Ill.2d 483 (1975).

65 ILCS 5/11-13-2 (West 1996). **Illinois Municipal Code.** Statute’s minimum constructive notice requirement for public hearings on proposed comprehensive zoning ordinances is unconstitutional as applied to affected property owners because procedural due process guarantees (U.S. CONST. amend. V and amend. XIV, § 1) require that the municipality’s notice be reasonably calculated to inform affected property owners who may easily be notified by other means. *Passalino v. City of Zion*, 237 Ill.2d 118 (2010).

**SPECIAL DISTRICTS**

70 ILCS 705/14.14 (West 1992). **Fire Protection District Act.** Provision permitting disconnection of territory in a non-home rule municipality in a county with a population between 500,000 and 750,000 is unconstitutional as special legislation because the population limit is an arbitrary classification. *In re Petition of Village of Vernon Hills*, 168 Ill.2d 117 (1995).

70 ILCS 705/19a (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983 Supp., ch. 127½, par. 38.2a). **Fire Protection District Act.** Provision permitting transfer of territory in counties with a population of more than 600,000 but less than 1,000,000 is special legislation because the population limit is an arbitrary classification. *In re Belmont Fire Protection District*, 111 Ill.2d 373 (1986).

70 ILCS 805/18.6d (P.A. 88-669). **Downstate Forest Preserve District Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “Finance” and “Revenue”.)
SCHOOLS

105 ILCS 5/1B-20 (West 1994). School Code. Provision that authorizes a State Board of Education-appointed financial oversight panel to remove members of a local school board from office and does not require that the members be given notice of or a hearing on the removal charges is unconstitutional as applied to members who were not given notice or a hearing because that lack of notice or hearing violates the members’ procedural due process rights. East St. Louis Federation of Teachers v. East St. Louis School District, 178 Ill.2d 399 (1997).

105 ILCS 5/3-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, par. 3-1). School Code. Provision requiring candidate for office of regional superintendent to have taught at least 2 of previous 4 years in Illinois is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause because the statute is not rationally related to the State’s interest of ensuring that candidates be familiar with the School Code and other Illinois school regulations. Hammond v. Illinois State Board of Education, 624 F.Supp. 1151 (S.D.Ill. 1986).

105 ILCS 5/24-2. School Code. Section providing that Good Friday is a legal school holiday and that teachers and other school employees shall not be required to work on legal holidays promotes one religion over another and violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution. Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995).

105 ILCS 20/1 (P.A. 95-680). Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act. Provision requiring public school students to participate in the observation of a brief period of silence, for prayer or reflection, conducted by their teachers at the beginning of each school day violates the freedom of religion and due process guarantees of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because it is an endorsement of religion without a clearly secular purpose and is vague as to its implementation. Sherman v. Township High School Dist. 214, 594 F.Supp.2d 984 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

HIGHER EDUCATION


FINANCIAL REGULATION

205 ILCS 105/1-6 and 105/1-10.10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 32, pars. 706 and 710). Illinois Savings and Loan Act. Provisions authorizing a savings and loan association to obtain and maintain insurance on its withdrawable capital by the FSLIC or another federal instrumentality or
federally chartered corporation violates the Illinois Constitution because it deprives both savings
and loan associations and private insurance companies of their freedom to contract and it deprives
private insurance companies of property without due process. (P.A. 86-137 amended the Act to
add the FDIC as an eligible insurance corporation; P.A. 93-271 removed the FSLIC; but neither
P.A. mentioned private insurers.) City Savings Association v. International Guaranty and

HEALTH FACILITIES

nullifying a nursing home resident’s waiver of the right to commence action in circuit court are
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §1 et seq.) in accordance with the supremacy
clause of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). Fosler v. Midwest Care Center II, Inc.,

INSURANCE

215 ILCS 5/143.01 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 73, par. 755.01). Illinois Insurance Code. Subsection (b) of Section 143.01 prohibits the invocation of a vehicle insurance policy provision excluding coverage for bodily injury to members of the insured’s family when the driver is not a
member of the insured’s household and further provides that the prohibition shall apply to any
action filed on or after the effective date of the subsection (that is, the effective date of P.A. 83-
1132, which added Section 143.01 to the Code). Retroactive application of the subsection to
insurance policies issued before the effective date of P.A. 83-1132 constitutes an impairment of
the obligation of contracts in violation of Section 10 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution.

to health care and medical malpractice actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i)
provisions limiting the recovery of damages for non-economic losses in medical malpractice actions violate the separation of powers principle of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1) and (ii) other provisions are inseverable. Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010).

UTILITIES

Provisions relating to review of decisions by the Illinois Commerce Commission are unconstitutional
to the extent that the procedures for direct review conflict with Supreme Court Rule 335 (for instance, subsection (e)(i) gives priority over other cases before the court and is an unwarranted intrusion into the court's power to control its docket). Consumers Gas Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 144 Ill.App.3d 229 (5th Dist. 1986).
PROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS

225 ILCS 10/2.05 and 10/2.17 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, pars. 2212.05 and 2212.17). Child Care Act of 1969. Provisions that deny AFDC-FC (foster care) payments to foster parents who are related to the foster children they care for conflict with the Social Security Act and are unconstitutional as violating that Act and therefore the supremacy clause of the U. S. Constitution. Youakim v. Miller, 431 F.Supp. 40 (N.D.Ill. 1976). (This case is also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “Executive Branch”.)

225 ILCS 25/32 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 2332). Illinois Dental Practice Act. Provision stating that, during review of a suspension under the Administrative Review Law, the suspension shall remain in full force and effect prohibits courts from exercising their inherent equitable powers to issue stays. To this extent, the Section is unconstitutional. (P.A. 88-184 limits the provision to acts or omissions related to direct patient care and states that as a matter of public policy suspension may not be stayed pending final resolution.) Ardt v. Ill. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 154 Ill.2d 138 (1992).

LIQUOR

235 ILCS 5/7-5 and 5/7-9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 43, pars. 149 and 153). Liquor Control Act of 1934. Provision permitting liquor licensees in a municipality of less than 500,000 inhabitants whose licenses are revoked by the local liquor control commissioner and who appeal the revocations to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission to resume the operation of their businesses pending decisions by the Commission but not affording licensees in municipalities of 500,000 or more inhabitants who appeal revocations of their licenses to the License Appeal Commission a similar privilege is unconstitutional as a violation of the special legislation provision of the 1870 Illinois Constitution. (Article IV, Section 13 of the 1970 Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from passing special legislation when a general law can be made applicable.) There is no rational basis for the different treatment of licensees based upon differences in the population of the municipalities where the licensed premises are located. Absent legislative modification of the offending provision, licensees in all municipalities must be permitted to resume operation during the pendency of an administrative appeal from the order of a local liquor control commissioner. Johnkol, Inc. v. License Appeal Commission, 42 Ill.2d 377 (1969).

235 ILCS 5/8-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 158). Liquor Control Act of 1934. Section 8-1 was unconstitutional to the extent that the Department of Revenue taxed wine coolers and certain low-alcohol drinks at different rates in violation of the uniformity clause of Section 2 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution to the extent the provision does not provide for the equal taxation of wine coolers and the low-alcohol drinks. Federated Distributors, Inc. v. Johnson, 125 Ill.2d 1 (1988).

Provision permitting a precinct in a city with a population exceeding 200,000 to vote a single “licensed establishment” dry is an unconstitutional violation of due process because the procedural safeguards inherent in an election to vote the entire precinct dry (also permitted under the statute) are not present. P.A. 88-613 subsequently amended the provision to substitute “street address” for “licensed establishment”. 87 So. Rothschild Liquor Mart v. Kozubowski, 752 F.Supp. 839 (N.D.Ill. 1990).

Provision permitting a precinct in a city with a population exceeding 200,000 to prohibit by referendum the sale of alcoholic beverages at a particular street address is an unconstitutional deprivation of the liquor licensee’s property without due process because due process forbids voters passing judgment on an existing business. Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000).

PUBLIC AID

305 ILCS 5/5-13 (West 2002). Illinois Public Aid Code. Provision permitting the State to recover the amount of medical assistance payments to an individual from the estate of the individual’s surviving spouse violates the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution because the federal Social Security Act prohibits such recovery unless a state expands the definition of the individual’s estate beyond its probate law concept, which Illinois has done only with respect to medical assistance recipients who have long term care insurance. Hines v. Department of Public Aid, 221 Ill.2d 222 (2006).

MENTAL HEALTH

405 ILCS 5/2-110 (West 1994). Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code. Provision authorizing a guardian, with the court’s approval, to provide informed consent for his or her ward to receive unusual, hazardous, or experimental services or psychosurgery that a non-ward may not receive without his or her own written and informed consent violates the due process guarantees of the federal and State constitutions (U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 and Ill. Const. art. I, § 2) by permitting denial of a ward’s interest in choosing treatment without providing adequate safeguards. In re Branning, 285 Ill.App.3d 405 (4th Dist. 1996).

405 ILCS 5/3-806 (West Supp. 1995). Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code. Provisions allowing a civil commitment hearing to take place without the respondent when the respondent has not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his or her right to be present violate the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. In re Barbara H., 288 Ill.App.3d 360 (2nd Dist. 1997). While affirming in part and reversing in part on other grounds, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to review the provision's constitutionality in In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d 482 (1998).
NUCLEAR SAFETY

420 ILCS 15/ (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 111½, par. 230.1 et seq.). **Spent Nuclear Fuel Act.** Act is unconstitutional because (i) by banning the storage and shipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel in Illinois merely because the spent fuel or its shipment originated out of State, the Act arbitrarily burdens interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8) and (ii) the federal Atomic Energy Act preempts state regulation of the storage and shipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel, and Illinois' Spent Nuclear Fuel Act therefore violates the supremacy clause (U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2). *People of the State of Illinois v. General Electric Co.*, 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982).

PUBLIC SAFETY


VEHICLES


625 ILCS 5/4-103.2 (West 2000). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Subsection (b)’s inference that a person exercising unexplained possession of a stolen or converted automobile is presumed to know the car is stolen or converted, regardless of the remote date of its theft or conversion, violates the due process guarantee of Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution as applied to the possessor of special mobile equipment because the same extensive ownership records and procedures that justify the presumption for automobile possession do not exist for special mobile equipment. *People v. Greco*, 204 Ill.2d 400 (2003).


Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501), those changes to Section 11-501 were removed by P.A. 93-800, effective January 1, 2005.) People v. Wooters, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “Criminal Offenses”, “Corrections”, and “Civil Procedure”.)


625 ILCS 5/18c-7402. Illinois Vehicle Code. Subsection (1)(b), which prohibits a rail carrier from permitting a train, railroad car, or engine to block a road-highway grade crossing for more than 10 minutes unless the train, car, or engine is moving or the circumstances causing the obstruction are beyond the carrier’s control, is preempted by federal railroad law and violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). Eagle Marine v. Union Pacific R.R., 227 Ill.2d 377 (2008).

COURTS

705 ILCS 21/. Judicial Redistricting Act of 1997. Entire Act, enacted by P.A. 89-719, is unconstitutional because (i) provisions dividing the First Judicial District into 3 subdistricts for election of Supreme Court judges and splitting judicial circuits between 2 or more judicial districts violate Article VI of the Illinois Constitution and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 181 Ill.2d 65 (1997).


705 ILCS 55/. Compulsory Retirement of Judges Act. Automatic retirement of a supreme court, appellate, circuit, or associate judge at the conclusion of the term of office in which he or she attains the age of 75 is a denial of equal protection under the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2) because the Act applies to sitting judges but does not prohibit a person aged 75 years or older from seeking judicial office if that person has never been a judge or if that person attained age 75 while not in judicial office. Maddux v. Blagojevich, 233 Ill.2d 508 (2009).

705 ILCS 105/27.10. Clerks of Courts Act. Section added by Public Act 94-677 was ruled unconstitutional by Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010), due to the inseverability of other unconstitutional provisions.

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION


CRIMINAL OFFENSES


720 ILCS 5/10-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 10-5). Criminal Code of 2012. Child abduction statute is unconstitutional as applied to the natural father of a child. The parents were not married and there was no paternity action, but the parents had lived together 4½ years and the father had supported the child. Applying the statute to the natural father would deprive him of equal protection of the law. People v. Morrison, 223 Ill.App.3rd 176 (3rd Dist. 1991).


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The Violent Video Games Law and the Sexually Explicit Video Games Law, added by P.A. 94-315, violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. CONST. amend. I) because (1) the definition of a violent video game is vague and there is no showing that the violent content is directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and (2) the statutes do not provide for consideration of the whole content of a sexually explicit video or for consideration of the value of that video. Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich, 404 F.Supp.2d 1051 (N.D.Ill. 2005). The State appealed the decision with respect to only the Sexually Explicit Video Games Law (720 ILCS 5/Art. 12B); the ruling of unconstitutionality was upheld in Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).

The portion of the Code concerning eavesdropping is unconstitutional to the extent that it proscribes the recording of police officers while performing their public duties, in public places, speaking at a volume audible to the unassisted ear. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 2012 WL 6680341 (N.D. Ill.).

Because subdivision (a)(7) of Section 16G-15 does not require a culpable mental state beyond mere knowledge, its provisions criminalize a “wide array of wholly innocent conduct” and, thus, violate the due process guarantees of the State and federal constitutions (U.S. CONST., amends. V and XIV; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2). People v. Madrigal, 241 Ill.2d 463 (2011)

The 25-year to natural life sentence enhancement required under subsection (b) of the Class X felony penalty for armed robbery based on discharging a firearm and causing great bodily harm violates the proportionate penalty requirement of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11) when compared to the lesser sentence for the equivalent offense of armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I weapon (which includes a firearm) under Section 33A-2 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/33A-2). People v. Harvey, 366 Ill.App.3d 119 (1st Dist. 2006) and People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821.

Defining as a public nuisance any building used in the sale of obscene material and permitting injunctive relief against use of a building for one year is unconstitutional in its application to adult bookstores that sell sexually explicit materials. These provisions create a system of prior restraint but do not define the length of the period during which an alleged nuisance can be restrained prior to full judicial review and make no provision for prompt final determination of the matter. People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 127 Ill.2d 271 (1989).
**720 ILCS 510/2 and 510/11** (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 83, pars. 81-22 and 81-31). **Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.** Provisions making nonprescription sale of abortifacients and prescription or administration of abortifacients without informing the recipient a misdemeanor are unconstitutional because they incorporate a definition of “fetus” in which a fetus is classified as a human being from fertilization until death and thus intrude upon the medical discretion of the attending physician and impose the State’s theory of when life begins upon the physician’s patient, impermissibly infringing upon a woman’s right of private decision-making in matters relating to contraception. *Charles v. Daley*, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984).

**720 ILCS 513/10. Partial-birth Abortion Ban Act.** Act’s prohibition against the performance of partial-birth abortions unconstitutionally violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it lacks an exception for preservation of the health of the mother and unduly burdens a woman’s right to choose an abortion. *Hope Clinic v. Ryan*, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001).

**720 ILCS 590/1. Discrimination in Sale of Real Estate Act.** Prohibition against person knowingly soliciting an owner of residential property to sell or list the property after the person has been given notice that the owner does not desire to be solicited unconstitutionally restricts a real estate broker’s freedom of speech. *Pearson v. Edgar*, 153 F.3d 397 (7th Cir. 1998).

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE**

**725 ILCS 5/106D-1** (West 2000). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Section authorizing the court to allow a defendant to personally appear at a pre-trial or post-trial proceeding via closed-circuit television violates an accused person’s right under Section 8 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8) to appear at criminal proceedings, as applied to a defendant who appeared at his guilty plea proceeding via closed-circuit television without his written consent. *People v. Stroud*, 208 Ill.2d 398 (2004).

**725 ILCS 5/110-4** (West 2000). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Subsection (b), which prohibits bail for a person charged with an offense for which a sentence of life imprisonment may be imposed until the person demonstrates at a hearing that proof of his or her guilt is not evident and presumption of his or her guilt is not great, violates the due process clauses of Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution by depriving the accused of a presumption of innocence. *People v. Purcell*, 201 Ill.2d 542 (2002).

**725 ILCS 5/114-9** (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 114-9). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Subsection (c) of Section 114-9, which provides that the State is not required to include rebuttal witnesses in lists of prosecution witnesses given to the defense, is unconstitutional. Previously, Section 114-14, which required the defense to provide notice of an alibi defense to the prosecution upon request, was held unconstitutional by *People v. Fields*, 59 Ill.2d 516 (1974).
These rulings came after the U.S. Supreme Court, in *Wardius v. Oregon*, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), held that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids enforcement of alibi disclosure rules unless the defense has reciprocal discovery rights. Subsection (c) of Section 114-9 has not been amended since these decisions. (Section 114-14 was repealed in 1979 by P.A. 81-290.) *People ex rel. Carey v. Strayhorn*, 61 Ill.2d 85 (1975).

725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2000). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision allowing the hearsay testimony of a non-testifying child under age 13 about sexual assault and abuse violates the defendant’s right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, despite the statute’s requirement that the court must find the statements reliable. *In re E.H.*, 355 Ill.App.3d 564 (1st Dist. 2005), and *In re Rolandis G.*, 352 Ill.App.3d 776 (2nd Dist. 2004).


725 ILCS 207/30 (West 1998). **Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act.** Subsection (c), which prohibits a person who is the subject of a commitment petition under the Act from presenting his or her own expert testimony if the person failed to cooperate with a State-conducted evaluation but which does not prohibit the State from presenting expert testimony based upon an examination of the person’s records, violates the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution as applied to a person against whom the State does present testimony. *In re Detention of Kortte*, 317 Ill.App.3d 111 (2nd Dist. 2000), and *In re Detention of Trevino*, 317 Ill.App.3d 324 (2nd Dist. 2000).

725 ILCS 240/10 (P.A. 89-688). **Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act.** Provision amended by P.A. 89-688 is unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “General Provisions” and “Corrections”.)

**CORRECTIONS**

730 ILCS 5/3-3-3 and 5/5-8-1 (West 2010). **Unified Code of Corrections.** A statutory scheme that imposes a mandatory natural-life sentence on a minor results in an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. *People v. Luciano*, 2013 IL App (2d) 110792.
730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions added by P.A. 88-311 making certain inmates, previously eligible to receive good-conduct credit toward early release increased by a multiplier, ineligible for the credit multiplier because they were convicted of criminal sexual assault, felony criminal sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or aggravated battery with a firearm, as well as related inchoate offenses, violates the *ex post facto* provisions of Section 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution and Section 16 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution by curtailing the opportunity for an earlier release. *Barger v. Peters*, 163 Ill.2d 357 (1994).

730 ILCS 5/3-7-2, 5/5-5-3, 5/5-6-3, 5/5-6-3.1, and 5/5-7-1 (P.A. 89-688). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-688 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. (Although Public Act 89-688 also amended Sections 3-2-2, 3-5-1, 3-7-6, and 3-8-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-2-2, 5/3-5-1, 5/3-7-6, and 5/3-8-7), identical changes were made to Sections 3-2-2 and 3-5-1 by Public Act 89-689, effective December 31, 1996, Section 3-7-6 was completely rewritten by Public Act 90-85, effective July 10, 1997, and the changes to Section 3-8-7 were re-enacted by Public Act 93-272, effective July 22, 2003.) *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “General Provisions” and “Criminal Procedure”.)


730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2 (West 1998). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Subdivision (b)(4)(i), which authorizes a sentencing court to increase the punishment for a felony based upon the victim’s age, violates the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to the extent the jury was not specifically charged with finding the victim’s age. *People v. Thurow*, 318 Ill.App.3d 128 (3rd Dist. 2001); although the appellate court’s decision was reversed in part, the holding of unconstitutionality was affirmed in *People v. Thurow*, 203 Ill.2d 352 (2003).

730 ILCS 5/5-5-6, 5/5-6-3.1, and 5/5-8-1 (P.A. 89-203). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-203 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Civil Procedure”.)
730 ILCS 5/5-5-7 (P.A. 89-7). **Unified Code of Corrections.** P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff’s medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. IV), or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1) and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).


730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 1996) **Unified Code of Corrections.** Subsection (a)(1)(c)(ii), which mandates life imprisonment for multiple murder, violates the proportionate penalty clause of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution when applied to a juvenile convicted on a theory of accountability whose only participation was to serve as lookout because the statute does not consider the defendant’s age or extent of culpability. *People v. Miller*, 202 Ill.2d 328 (2002).


CIVIL PROCEDURE

735 ILCS 5/2-402, 5/2-604.1, 5/2-621, 5/2-623, 5/2-624, 5/2-1003, 5/2-1107.1, 5/2-1109, 5/2-1115.05, 5/2-1115.1, 5/2-1115.2, 5/2-1116, 5/2-1205.1, 5/2-1702, 5/2-2101, 5/2-2102, 5/2-2103, 5/2-2104, 5/2-2105, 5/2-2106, 5/2-2106.5, 5/2-2107, 5/2-2108, 5/2-2109, 5/13-213, 5/13-214.3, and 5/13-217 (P.A. 89-7). Code of Civil Procedure.

P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff’s medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. IV), or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1) and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

735 ILCS 5/2-1003 (West 1996). Code of Civil Procedure. Provision waiving a party’s privilege of confidentiality with health care providers when he or she alleges a claim for bodily injury or disease is unconstitutional because, by requiring disclosure of all information, it encroaches upon the authority of the judiciary (Supreme Court Rule 201 requires disclosure of only relevant information) and is an unreasonable invasion of privacy. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill.2d 519 (1997).

735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 1994). Code of Civil Procedure. Provision allowing amendment of a complaint for administrative review of a police or firefighter disciplinary decision of a municipality of 500,000 or less population in order to add a police or fire chief as a defendant, while not allowing similar amendment of a similar complaint against a municipality of more than 500,000 population, is special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. Lacny v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 291 Ill.App.3d 397 (1st Dist. 1997).


**735 ILCS 5/20-104** (West 1998). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Section authorizing a private citizen to recover damages from someone who has defrauded a governmental unit when the appropriate governmental official has been notified and has declined to act violates Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution to the extent it purports to confer standing upon a private citizen to initiate action in a case in which the State is the real interested party because neither the legislature nor the judiciary may deprive the Attorney General of his or her inherent power to direct the legal affairs of the State. *Lyons v. Ryan*, 201 Ill.2d 529 (2002), and, when a unit of local government was the real interested party, *County of Cook ex rel. Rifkin v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.*, 215 Ill.2d 466 (2005).

**735 ILCS 5/21-103** (West 1998). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Subsection (b), which requires notice by publication of a petition to change a minor’s name, is unconstitutional as applied to a noncustodial parent who was not given actual notice of a petition by the custodial parent to change their child’s surname. *In re Petition of Sanjuan-Moeller*, 343 Ill.App.3d 202 (2nd Dist. 2003).

**CIVIL LIABILITIES**

**740 ILCS 100/3.5, 100/4, and 100/5** (P.A. 89-7). **Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act.** P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff’s medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. IV), or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1) and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

**740 ILCS 110/10** (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91½, par. 810). **Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act.** Provisions concerning what records of a patient or therapist may be disclosed is unconstitutional to the extent that the Section provides that "any order to disclose or not disclose shall be considered a final order for purposes of appeal and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal". This provision usurps the Supreme Court's rule-making power with respect to appealability of nonfinal judgments. *Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center*, 162 Ill.2d 205 (1994).

**740 ILCS 130/2 and 130/3** (P.A. 89-7). **Premises Liability Act.** P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is unconstitutional in its
entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff’s medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. IV), or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1) and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

CIVIL IMMUNITIES

745 ILCS 10/6A-101 and 10/6A-105 (P.A. 89-7). Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff's medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. IV), or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1) and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

745 ILCS 25/2, 25/3, and 25/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 822, 823, and 824). Tort Liability of Schools Act. Provisions concerning notice of injury and limitation period are invalid as to both public and nonprofit private schools. Enactment of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act eliminated the unconstitutional discrepancy between notice-of-injury provisions applicable to various units of local government (see Lorton v. Brown County School Dist., 35 Ill.2d 362 (1966), reported in Part 2 of this Report under “Civil Immunities”), but because that Act does not apply to private schools, the notice and limitation provisions of the Tort Liability of Schools Act (grouping public schools and nonprofit private schools together) could not be fairly applied to nonprofit private schools. Cleary v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 57 Ill.2d 384 (1974).


Provision of subsection (B) limiting recovery in each separate cause of action against a nonprofit private school to $10,000 is unconstitutional because it is purely arbitrary as compared with the liability of other governmental units and institutions. Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 41 Ill.2d 336 (1968).
745 ILCS 49/30 (P.A. 94-677). **Good Samaritan Act.** Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to health care and medical malpractice actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting the recovery of damages for non-economic losses in medical malpractice actions violate the separation of powers principle of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1) and (ii) other provisions are inseverable. *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010).

**FAMILIES**

750 ILCS 5/501.1 (West 1992). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** “Dissolution action stay” provision is an unconstitutional violation of substantive due process because, in providing for a stay on disposing of any property by either party in a divorce, the statute unfairly restrains the disposition of non-marital property as well as marital property. *Messenger v. Edgar*, 157 Ill.2d 162 (1993).

750 ILCS 5/607 (West 2002). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** Paragraph (1.5) of subsection (b), which authorizes a court to grant petitions for step-parents’ visitation privileges when in the child’s best interests or welfare, unconstitutionally places the petitioner on equal footing with the parent in the determination of those interests. *In re Marriage of Engelkens*, 354 Ill.App.3d 790 (3rd Dist. 2004).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998). **Adoption Act.** Subdivision D(m-1)'s presumption of parental unfitness based on a judicial finding that a child has spent at least 15 of 22 consecutive months in foster care violates due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution by failing to consider periods of foster care unattributable to the parent's inability to care for the child. *In re H.G.*, 197 Ill.2d 317 (2001).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998). **Adoption Act.** Failure to appoint legal counsel for an indigent person for an adoption proceeding that would terminate his or her parental rights violates the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution when the State had chosen not to seek unfit parent status against an indigent woman but had achieved its goal through an adoption proceeding brought by the parties awarded custody of the child. *In re Adoption of K.L.P.*, 198 Ill.2d 448 (2002).

**PROPERTY**

765 ILCS 1025/15 (West 1998). **Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.** Provision that the State Treasurer “may” return to the owner of unliquidated stock the dividends earned on that stock while held by the State as abandoned property is a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Section 15 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution. *Canel v. Topinka*, 212 Ill.2d 311 (2004).
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

815 ILCS 205/4.1a (West 2004). Interest Act. Provision that limits a lender’s non-interest mortgage charges to 3% when the mortgage’s interest rate exceeds 8% is preempted by the federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and thus violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). U.S. Bank National Association v. Clark, 216 Ill.2d 334 (2005).


815 ILCS 505/10a (P.A. 87-1140 and P.A. 89-144). Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Subsections (a), (f), (g), and (h) constitute special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution because they limit and restrict consumers’ claims with respect only to automobile dealers. Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill.2d 12 (2003).

815 ILCS 505/10b (P.A. 89-7). Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff’s medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. art. IV), or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. art. II, § 1) and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

815 ILCS 515/3 (West 1994). Home Repair Fraud Act. The statute creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption of intent or knowledge upon the finding of certain predicate facts. The presumption relieves the State of the burden of persuasion on the element of intent or knowledge in violation of due process guarantees of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. People v. Watts, 181 Ill.2d 133 (1998); People v. Reimer, 2012 IL App (1st) 101253.
EMPLOYMENT


820 ILCS 30/  Employment of Strikebreakers Act. Act, which imposes criminal penalties upon an employer who knowingly contracts with a day and temporary labor service agency for the provision of replacement workers in the event of a strike or lockout, is preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act and thus violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2). Caterpillar Inc. v. Lyons, 318 F.Supp.2d 703 (C.D.Ill. 2004).

820 ILCS 30/2  (P.A. 93-375). Employment of Strikebreakers Act. Provision prohibiting an employer from contracting with day and temporary labor service agencies for replacement labor during a strike or lockout is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, which permits employment of day and temporary workers at such times, and thus violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2). 520 Michigan Ave. Associates v. Devine, 433 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2006).

820 ILCS 105/4a. Minimum Wage Law. Section 4a’s overtime provisions, as applied to interstate railways, are preempted by the federal Railway Labor Act. Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2008).

820 ILCS 135/2.1 and 135/2.2  (P.A. 87-1174). Burial Rights Act. Provisions concerning religiously required interments during labor disputes are preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act because they infringe on the right of cemetery workers to strike and authorize injunctions and fines against striking unions. Cannon v. Edgar, 33 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 1994).

820 ILCS 140/3.1. One Day Rest in Seven Act. Required workplace conditions and enforcement provisions applicable only to hotel room attendants working in a county with a population greater than 3,000,000 are preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act. 520 South Michigan Ave. Associates v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 2008).

820 ILCS 305/5  (P.A. 89-7). Workers’ Compensation Act. Changes made to this Section by P.A. 89-7 were held unconstitutional by Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), due to inseverability of the unconstitutional provisions of that Act.
820 ILCS 310/5 (P.A. 89-7). Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act. Changes made to this Section by P.A. 89-7 were held unconstitutional by Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), due to inseverability of the unconstitutional provisions of that Act.

820 ILCS 405/602 Unemployment Insurance Act. Provision of paragraph B postponing payment of unemployment benefits to people in legal custody or on bail for a work-related felony or theft until the charges are resolved, violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because the provision conflicts with sections of the federal Social Security Act that require administrative methods “reasonably calculated” to ensure prompt payment and an opportunity for a fair hearing for individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied. Jenkins v. Bowling, 691 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1982).
INTRODUCTION TO PART 2

Part 2 of this Report contains Illinois statutes that are representative of (i) statutes that were held unconstitutional and then changed in response to the holding of unconstitutionality or (ii) statutes that were construed in a particular way in order to avoid a holding of unconstitutionality. Part 2 does not include every such statute. Part 2 includes statutes that (i) currently appear or formerly appeared in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or appeared in an Act that was replaced by an Act that currently appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes and (ii) may have some instructional value concerning the requirement that statutes not violate the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution.
PART 2
EXAMPLES OF
STATUTES HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND THEN AMENDED OR REPEALED

GENERAL PROVISIONS

5 ILCS 315/ (West 1992). Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. Application of the Act by the State Labor Relations Board to employees of the Illinois Supreme Court violated the separation of powers doctrine by infringing upon the court’s administrative and supervisory powers granted under the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 18). Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts v. State and Municipal Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local 726, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 167 Ill.2d 180 (1995). P.A. 94-98, eff. 7-1-05, added Section 2.5 to the Act, with the intent "to create a statutory framework to allow Illinois official court reporters to enjoy the same collective bargaining and other labor rights granted to other public employees."


ELECTIONS

10 ILCS 5/1A-3, 5/1A-5, and 5/1A-7.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 46, pars. 1A-3, 1A-5, and 1A-7.1). Election Code. Method used to select members of State Board of Elections, involving appointments by the Governor from nominees designated by the General Assembly, violated Illinois Constitution prohibition against legislative appointment of executive branch officers. Method used to resolve a tie vote of the State Board of Elections, involving disqualification of one Board member whose name was selected by lot, violated due process and the Illinois Constitution prohibition against a political party having a majority of members of the Board. P.A. 80-1178 deleted the provisions concerning legislative nominees for Board membership and repealed the provision concerning resolution of a tie vote. Walker v. State Board of Elections, 65 Ill.2d 543 (1976).

10 ILCS 5/7-5 and 5/7-12 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, pars. 7-5 and 7-12). Election Code. Provisions directing that no primary election be held if, for each office to be filled by election, the election would be uncontested were unconstitutional because they violated the equal protection clause by preventing electors from voting for write-in candidates. P.A. 84-698 amended the provisions to provide that a primary election shall be held when a person who intends to become

10 ILCS 5/7-10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 46, par. 7-10). **Election Code.** Provisions prohibiting a person from signing a nominating petition or being a candidate of a political party for public office if the person had requested a primary ballot of another political party at a primary election held within 2 years of the date on which the nominating petition must be filed were held to violate the right of free political association under the U.S. Constitution, Amendments I and XIV. Standards governing party changes by candidates may and should be more restrictive than those relating to voters generally, but the restrictions on candidates were not severable from the invalid provisions. P.A. 86-1348 deleted the 2-year restriction on changes of party by persons signing nominating petitions and by candidates. *Sperling v. County Officers Electoral Board*, 57 Ill.2d 81 (1974).

10 ILCS 5/7-10 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-10). **Election Code.** (See *People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. State Bd. of Elections*, 136 Ill.2d 513 (1990), reported in this Part 2 of this Report under “Courts”, concerning legislation subdividing the First Appellate District and the Circuit of Cook County.)

10 ILCS 5/7-42 (Laws 1910 Sp. Sess., p. 50). **Election Code.** Provision of 1910 Act that allowed an employee to leave work for 2 hours without any deduction in salary or wages to vote in a primary election was unconstitutional because it deprived an employer of his or her property without due process. The provision prohibiting a deduction in salary or wages was not continued in the 1927 Act that replaced the 1910 Act, and the current Election Code does not contain such a provision. *McAlpine v. Dimick*, 326 Ill. 240 (1927).

10 ILCS 5/7-43 (Ill Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-43). **Election Code.** Provision prohibiting a person from voting in a political party primary if the person voted in another political party's primary in the preceding 23 months was held to substantially burden that person’s right to vote in derogation of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The court also found the “23 month rule” to be a significant incursion on a person's right of free association and declared the provision null and void. Public Act 95-699, effective November 9, 2007, removed the offending provision. *Kusper v. Pontikes*, 94 S.Ct. 303 (1973).

10 ILCS 5/7-43, 5/10-3, and 5/10-4. **Election Code.** Provisions prohibiting a person who signed an independent candidate’s nominating petition from voting in the primary, requiring more petition signatures for an independent candidate than for a partisan candidate for the same office, and requiring independent and partisan candidates to file petitions at the same time to appear on the ballot at different elections so severely restricted an independent candidate’s ballot access as to burden the right to political association of the candidate and his petition signers under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Public Act 95-699, effective November 9, 2007, amended Sections 7-43, 10-3, and 10-6 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-43, 5/10-3, and 5/10-6) to remove the prohibition against an independent candidate petition signer voting in the primary, decrease the number of signatures required on an independent candidate’s petition, and move the deadline for filing an independent candidate’s petition closer to the general election. Lee v. Keith, 463 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2006).

10 ILCS 5/7-59 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-59). Election Code. Provision excluding from office a write-in candidate in a primary election who received a majority of the votes cast because he or she did not receive at least as many write-in votes as the number of signatures required on a petition for nomination for that office was an unconstitutional violation of the right to freedom of association as expressed by voting. P.A. 84-658 and P.A. 86-867 changed the statute to bar from office only a write-in candidate in a primary election who receives less votes than any person on the ballot. Foster v. Kusper, 587 F.Supp. 1194 (N.D.Ill. 1984).

10 ILCS 5/7A-1 (West 2004). Election Code. The statutory deadline for Illinois Supreme, Appellate, and Circuit Judges to file declarations of candidacy to succeed themselves in office (the first Monday in December before the general election preceding the expiration of their terms of office) impermissibly conflicted with the deadline for filing those declarations to seek judicial retention established in Section 12 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12), which is 6 months before the general election preceding the expiration of their terms of office. Public Act 96-886, effective January 1, 2011, amended the statute to conform with the Constitution’s deadline, although the Public Act did not resolve the problem resulting from the deadline occurring after the general primary (the third Tuesday in March before the general election). O’Brien v. White, 219 Ill.2d 86 (2006).


10 ILCS 5/9-2. Election Code. In the Article concerning the disclosure and regulation of campaign contributions and expenses, there is a provision that prohibits individuals and groups from forming more than one political action committee. This provision was held unconstitutional as applied to independent-expenditure-only political action committees. Personal PAC v. McGuffage, 858 F.Supp.2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2012). This holding was codified by P.A. 97-766.

10 ILCS 5/9-8.5. Election Code. In the Article concerning the disclosure and regulation of campaign contributions and expenses, there is a provision that limits the amount of money a PAC may accept from an individual or group during an election cycle. This provision was held unconstitutional as applied to independent-expenditure-only political action committees. Personal
PAC v. McGuffage, 858 F.Supp.2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2012). This holding was codified by P.A. 97-766.

10 ILCS 5/10-3 (Ill. Ann. Stat. 1978 Supp., ch. 46, par. 10-3). Election Code. Provision requiring more than 25,000 petition signatures for an independent candidate for less than statewide office, when 25,000 was the number needed for statewide office, was unconstitutional as a violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. P.A. 81-926 lowered the number of signatures needed. Socialist Workers Party v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, 99 S.Ct. 983 (1977).

10 ILCS 5/17-15 (Hurd’s Statutes 1917, p. 1350). Election Code. Provision that required employers to pay employees for the 2 hours employers were required to allow employees to be absent from work to vote on election day was void as an unreasonable abridgment of the right to contract for labor. Although a citizen has a constitutional right to vote, he or she does not have a constitutional right to be paid to exercise the right to vote. The requirement to pay employees during their absence while voting was removed by Laws 1963, p. 2532. People v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co., 306 Ill. 486 (1923).

10 ILCS 5/19-9 and 5/19-10. Election Code. Code’s failure to provide an absent voter with timely notice of and a hearing on the rejection of his or her absentee ballot denied due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Public Act 94-1000, effective July 3, 2006, repealed Section 19-9 and amended Section 19-8 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/19-8) to require that an election authority, before the close of the period for counting provisional ballots, notify an absentee voter that his or her ballot was rejected, why it was rejected, and that the voter may appear before a panel of election judges to show cause why the ballot should not be rejected. Zessar v. Helander, 2006 WL 573889, Docket No. 05C 1917, opinion filed March 13, 2006.


10 ILCS 5/25-11 (Ill. Rev Stat. 1973, ch. 46, par. 25-11). Election Code. Provision added by P.A. 79-118 for filling vacancies on the county board and in other county offices that transferred the authority to fill the vacancies from the county board to the county central committee of the political party of the person creating the vacancy was an unconstitutional delegation of power because the power to appoint was delegated to private citizens not accountable to the public. P.A. 80-940 changed the provision to provide that vacancies shall be filled by appointment by the county board chairman with the advice and consent of the county board. People ex rel. Rudman v. Rini, 64 Ill.2d 321 (1976).

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

15 ILCS 335/14B  (West 1998). Illinois Identification Card Act. The Class 4 felony penalty for the offense of knowingly possessing a fraudulent identification card, which includes a mandatory minimum fine or community service, was disproportionate to the Class 4 felony penalty for the more serious offense of knowingly possessing a fraudulent identification card with aggravating elements, which did not include mandatory minimums, in violation of the proportionate penalties requirement of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11). P.A. 94-701, effective June 1, 2006, reclassified the offense of knowingly possessing a fraudulent identification card with aggravating elements as a Class 3 felony. People v. Pizano, 347 Ill.App.3d 128 (1st Dist. 2004).


EXECUTIVE BRANCH


20 ILCS 3505/. Illinois Development Finance Authority Act. Provision of a former Act, the Illinois Industrial Development Authority Act, that required $500,000 to be transferred to a special fund and that the sum should be considered “always appropriated” for the purpose of guaranteeing repayment of bonds violated the constitutional prohibition against pledging the credit of the State and was an unconstitutional continuing appropriation. P.A. 81-454 repealed the Illinois Industrial Development Authority Act and enacted what became the Illinois Development Finance


**FINANCE**


Revenue


Provisions that persons in the business of repairing items of personal property by adding or incorporating other items of personal property shall be deemed to be in the business of selling personal property at retail and not in a service occupation violated the uniformity of taxation provisions of the Illinois Constitution because they attempted to include within a class persons who in fact were not within the class. Laws 1963, pages 1582 and 1600 deleted the offending provisions. Central Television Service v. Isaacs, 27 Ill.2d 420 (1963).


Provisions that exempted from use tax and retailers’ occupation tax all money and medallions issued by a foreign government except those issued by South Africa were unconstitutional because the disapproval of foreign political and social policies was not a reasonable basis for a tax classification and the power to conduct foreign affairs belonged exclusively to the federal government. The offending provisions were subsequently removed by P.A. 85-1135. Springfield Rare Coin Gallery v. Johnson, 115 Ill.2d 221 (1986).
Provisions that made proceeds of sales to the State or local governmental units exempt from use tax and retailers’ occupation tax violated the uniformity of taxation requirement of the Illinois Constitution because they discriminated against the federal government. Laws 1961, pages 2312 and 2314 deleted the offending provisions. People ex rel. Holland Coal Co. v. Isaacs, 22 Ill.2d 477 (1961).

35 ILCS 110/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 120, par. 439.32). **Service Use Tax Act.** 35 ILCS 115/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 120, par. 439.102). **Service Occupation Tax Act.** 1967 amendments, which designated 4 limited subclasses of servicemen who were subject to the tax, were an unconstitutional denial of due process and equal protection because there was no reasonable difference between the 4 subclasses of servicemen subject to the tax and those servicemen not subject to the tax. Several Sections in each Act were held unconstitutional because the court found the provisions of the amendatory Acts inseverable. Subsequent amendments corrected the problem. *Fiorito v. Jones*, 39 Ill.2d 531 (1968).


35 ILCS 120/5a, 120/5b, and 120/5c (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 120, pars. 444a, 444b, and 444c). Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act. Provisions (i) permitting the Department of Revenue to file with the circuit clerk a final assessment or jeopardy assessment and requiring the clerk to immediately enter judgment for that amount and (ii) affording the taxpayer an opportunity to be heard only after entry of the judgment violated due process and attempted to circumvent the courts in violation of the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. Subsequent amendments corrected the problem. People ex rel. Isaacs v. Johnson, 26 Ill.2d 268 (1962).

35 ILCS 130/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 120, par. 453.1). Cigarette Tax Act. Provision that an individual who in any year brought more than 10 cartons of cigarettes into the State for consumption was a “distributor” of cigarettes was unconstitutional as violative of due process and the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The definition of “distributor” was subsequently changed to remove the unconstitutional text. Johnson v. Daley, 403 Ill. 338 (1949).


35 ILCS 200/9-185. Property Tax Code. Provision of prior Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 120, par. 508a) that indirectly required the owner of real property taken by eminent domain to pay the real estate taxes for the period after the petition for condemnation was filed until the compensation award was deposited was an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation. The Property Tax Code, which succeeded the repealed Revenue Act of 1939, now provides that real property is exempt from taxation as of the date the condemnation petition is filed. Board of Jr. College District 504 v. Carey, 43 Ill.2d 82 (1969).

Tax exemption for property used for “mechanical” purposes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.10) was unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of exemptions permitted under Article IX, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 88-455 repealed the Revenue Act of 1939 and replaced it with the Property Tax Code, and the offending provision was not continued in the Code. Bd. of Certified Safety Professionals of the Americas, Inc. v. Johnson, 112 Ill.2d 542 (1986).

Tax exemption for property used for “philosophical” purposes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 120, par. 500) was unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of exemptions permitted under the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 88-455 repealed the Revenue Act of 1939 and replaced it with the Property Tax Code, and the offending provision was not continued in the Code. International College of Surgeons v. Brenza, 8 Ill.2d 141 (1956).


35 ILCS 635/20 (West 1998). Telecommunications Municipal Infrastructure Maintenance Fee Act. Application of the Act’s municipal infrastructure maintenance fee, imposed upon telecommunications providers to compensate a municipality for access to public rights-of-way, equally to wireless telecommunications providers that do not own or operate equipment on public rights-of-way as to landline telecommunications providers that do own or operate equipment on public rights-of-way violates the uniformity clause of Section 2 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution. Primeco Personal Communications, L. P. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 196 Ill.2d 70 (2001). Section 20 was internally repealed on January 1, 2003.
PENSIONS


40 ILCS 5/18-125 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 108½, par. 18-125). Illinois Pension Code. Amendment of Judicial Article provision that changed the definition of salary base used to compute retirement benefits from the salary on the last day of service to the average salary over the last year of service unconstitutionally reduced or impaired retirement benefits of judges in service on or before effective date of amendment. P.A. 86-273 rewrote the provision to define “final average salary” according to the date of termination of service. Felt v. Board of Trustees of Judges Retirement System, 107 Ill.2d 158 (1985).

COUNTIES

(See People ex rel. Rudman v. Rini, 64 Ill.2d 321 (1976), reported in this Part 2 of this Report under “Elections”, in relation to filling vacancies on the county board and in other county offices.)


55 ILCS 5/4-12003. Counties Code. Successive amendments to predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 53, par. 73; now Section 4-12003 of the Counties Code), which increased the fee for issuance of a marriage license to $25 from $15 and thereafter to $40 from $25 and which required the county clerk who collected the fee to pay the amount of the increase into the Domestic Violence Shelter and Service Fund for use in funding the administration of domestic violence shelters and service programs, violated the due process guarantees of Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution because the increased portion of the fee (i) constituted an arbitrary tax on the issuance of marriage licenses that bore no reasonable relation to the public interest in sheltering and serving victims of domestic violence and (ii) imposed a direct impediment to the exercise of the fundamental right to marry without supporting a sufficiently important State interest warranting that intrusion. P.A. 84-180 deleted the unconstitutional provisions from the Section that is now Section 4-12003 of the Counties Code, as well as identical provisions (affecting counties of the first and second class) that formerly were contained in a section of the law that is now Section 4-4001 of the Counties Code. Boynton v. Kusper, 112 Ill.2d 356 (1986).


55 ILCS 5/5-1120 (P.A. 89-203). Counties Code. Provision added by P.A. 89-203 was unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. Public Act 94-154, effective July 8, 2005, re-enacted the provision of Section 5-1120 added by P.A. 89-203. People v. Wooters, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in Part 1 of this Report under “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, “Corrections”, and “Civil Procedure”.)

MUNICIPALITIES

was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because the statute offered no guidance to the board in determining what constituted practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships. Laws 1933, p. 288 deleted the offending provision. *Welton v. Hamilton*, 344 Ill. 82 (1931).

65 ILCS 5/11-31-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 24, par. 11-31-1). [Illinois Municipal Code.](#) Provision that excepted home rule units from the application of a power granted to certain county boards to demolish hazardous buildings was unconstitutional special legislation because the legislative classification did not provide a reasonable basis for differentiating between the types of governmental units that could benefit from the application of the demolition powers. The provision was subsequently removed by P.A. 84-1102. *City of Urbana v. Houser*, 67 Ill.2d 268 (1977).

**SPECIAL DISTRICTS**

70 ILCS 915/6 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111½, par. 5009). [Medical Center District Act.](#) Provision authorizing the Medical Center Commission to make a finding as to whether restrictions on property use had been violated was an unconstitutional violation of due process because the Commission had an interest in the outcome of the proceeding. P.A. 83-858 changed the provision to provide that the Commission must file suit for a determination of whether the property should revert to it. *United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical Center Commission*, 689 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1982).

70 ILCS 2205/1, 2205/5, 2205/7, 2205/8, 2205/17, 2205/27b, 2205/27c, 2205/27d, 2205/27e, 2205/27f, and 2205/27g (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973 Supp., ch. 42, pars. 247, 251, 253, 254, 263, 273b, 273c, 273d, 273e, 273f, and 273g). [Sanitary District Act of 1907.](#) P.A. 77-2819 (i) added Sections 27b through 27g to the Act to provide that a sanitary district lying in 2 counties and having an equalized assessed valuation of $100,000,000 or more on the effective date of the amendatory Act was divided “for more effective administrative and fiscal control” into 2 separate districts and (ii) made related changes in other Sections of the Act. P.A. 77-2819 was unconstitutional special legislation because there was no reason for not extending the same advantages of “more effective administrative and fiscal control” to those 2-county districts that reached the minimum valuation level at a time after the effective date of the amendatory Act. Sections 27b through 27g were repealed by P.A. 81-290, and the related provisions added to other Sections of the Act by P.A. 77-2819 were subsequently deleted. *People ex rel. East Side Levee and Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee and Sanitary District*, 54 Ill. 442 (1973).

**SCHOOLS**

105 ILCS 5/7-7 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 122, par. 7-7). [School Code.](#) Provision of the School Code requiring that an appeal from an administrative decision of a county board of school trustees had to be filed within 10 days after the date of service of a copy of the board’s decision, while all other administrative review actions under the Code had to be filed within 35 days,
violated the Illinois Constitution because there was no reasonable basis for the distinction. The period was changed to 35 days by Laws 1963, p. 3041. Board of Education of Gardner School District v. County Board of School Trustees of Peoria County, 28 Ill.2d 15 (1963).

105 ILCS 5/14-7.02 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, par. 14-7.02). School Code. Provision that the school district in which a handicapped child resided must pay the actual cost of tuition charged the child by a non-public school or special education facility to which the child was referred or $2,500, whichever was less, deprived the child of a tuition-free education through the secondary level in violation of Section 1 of Article X of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 80-1405 amended the statute to increase the dollar limit to $4,500 and to provide for the school district’s payment of costs in excess of that amount if approved by the Governor’s Purchased Care Review Board. Elliot v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 64 Ill.App.3d 229 (1st Dist. 1978).

105 ILCS 5/17-2.11a (P.A. 86-4, amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 17-2.11a). School Code. After the appellate court interpreted a provision concerning the maximum allowable interest rate on school bonds, P.A. 86-4 amended that provision to retroactively provide for a maximum rate greater than that construed by the appellate court. The amendment violated the separation of powers principle of the Illinois Constitution. The legislature may prospectively change a judicial construction of a statute if it believes that the judicial interpretation was at odds with the legislative intent, but it may not effect a change in the judicial construction by a later declaration of what it had originally intended. (The legislature also may pass a curative Act to validate bonds that a court has found were issued in a manner not authorized by the legislature.) P.A. 87-984 repealed Section 17-2.11a. Bates v. Bd. of Education, 136 Ill.2d 260 (1990).

105 ILCS 5/Art. 34 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34-1.01 et seq.). School Code. 1988 amendments concerning Chicago school reform were unconstitutional because the voting scheme for the election of the local school councils violated equal protection guarantees (one-person-one-vote principles). Subsequent amendments corrected the voting scheme problem and were upheld in federal court. Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill.2d 54 (1990).

HIGHER EDUCATION

110 ILCS 947/105. Higher Education Student Assistance Act. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 30-15.12) requiring the Illinois State Scholarship Commission (the predecessor of the Illinois Student Assistance Commission) to file all lawsuits on delinquent and defaulted student loans "in the County of Cook where venue shall be deemed to be proper" was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive defendants of their property or liberty in violation of the due process guarantees of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. The provision was amended by P.A. 86-1474, which added language authorizing a defendant to request and a court to grant a change of venue to the county of defendant's residence and requiring the Commission to move the court for a change of venue if a defendant, within 30 days of service
of summons, files a written request by mail with the Commission to change venue. *Williams v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm'n*, 139 Ill.2d 24 (1990).


**FINANCIAL REGULATION**


205 ILCS 405/4. Currency Exchange Act. Provision of a predecessor Act required that an application for a license to do business as a community currency exchange contain certain specified information and “such other information as the Auditor [of Public Accounts] may require”. The provision was unconstitutionally vague because it did not prescribe the actual qualifications necessary for licensure and left the Auditor without any restraint in interpreting the phrase. The current Act does not contain the offending provision. *McDougall v. Lueder*, 389 Ill. 141 (1945).


**INSURANCE**

215 ILCS 5/. Illinois Insurance Code. Former Section 401a of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 73, par. 1013a) regulating medical malpractice insurance rates on policies in existence on a certain date but not on policies written after that date was unconstitutional special legislation because it was as important to regulate the initial rate for a new medical malpractice insurance policy as to regulate the rate for an existing policy. P.A. 81-288 repealed the Section. *Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass’n*, 63 Ill.2d 313 (1976). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Report under “Civil Procedure”.)

215 ILCS 5/Art. XXXV (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 73, pars. 1065.150 through 1065.163). Illinois Insurance Code. Provisions of former Article XXXV of the Code were unconstitutional. Provision limiting damages recoverable in actions for accidental injuries arising out of use of motor vehicles but requiring that only insurance policies for private passenger automobiles must provide coverage affording benefits to certain injured persons was impermissible special legislation because it resulted in different legislative treatment of persons injured by different vehicles. Provision requiring arbitration of certain cases arising out of auto accidents violated constitutional right to trial by jury. Provision for de novo review of arbitration award by the circuit court violated constitutional provision that circuit courts have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters and the power to review administrative actions as provided by law. Provision requiring losing litigant in compulsory arbitration to pay arbitrator’s fees violated constitutional prohibition against fee officers in the judicial system. P.A. 78-1297 repealed Article XXXV. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill.2d 478 (1972).

UTILITIES

220 ILCS 5/8-402.1. Public Utilities Act. Requirements that Illinois utilities, in complying with federal Clean Air Act amendments, take into account the need to use Illinois coal, preserve the Illinois coal industry, and install pollution control devices in order to burn Illinois coal are too great a burden on interstate commerce. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F.Supp. 554 (N.D.Ill. 1993). These requirements were repealed by P.A. 90-561.


PROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS

requiring a funeral director to be a holder of a certificate of registration as a registered embalmer violated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution. The provision was deleted by Laws 1959, p.1518. The 1935 Act was repealed by P.A. 87-966, which created the Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Code. Article 10 of the new Code (225 ILCS 41/Art. 10) creates a combined funeral director and embalmer license. *Gholson v. Engle*, 9 Ill.2d 454 (1956).

**225 ILCS 60/7, 60/22, 60/23, 60/24, 60/24.1, and 60/36** (P.A. 94-677). **Medical Practice Act of 1987.** Provisions amended by P.A. 94-677, effective August 25, 2005, were unconstitutional because P.A. 94-677 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 97-622, effective November 23, 2011, re-enacted the changes made by 94-677.

**225 ILCS 60/26** (West Supp. 1999). **Medical Practice Act of 1987.** Provisions that ban a licensee’s use of testimonials to entice the public violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by disproportionately prohibiting all truthful speech for the State’s goal of regulating the medical profession. *Snell v. Department of Professional Regulation*, 318 Ill.App.3d 972 (4th Dist. 2001). Public Act 97-622, effective November 23, 2011, removed the provisions that banned the use of testimonials for those purposes.

**225 ILCS 100/21. Illinois Podiatric Medical Practice Act of 1987.** Provision that limited advertising by a podiatric physician to certifications approved by the Council on Podiatric Medical Education violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as applied to a podiatric physician who advertised that he had been certified by a board other than the Council on Podiatric Medical Education if the physician’s statements were not actually or potentially misleading and served the public interest and the certification originated from a bona fide certifying board. P.A. 90-76 changed the provision to limit advertising to certifications approved by the Podiatric Medical Licensing Board in accordance with the rules for the administration of the Act. *Tsatsos v. Zollar*, 943 F.Supp. 945 (N.D.Ill. 1996).

**225 ILCS 446/75** (225 ILCS 445/14 (West 1992)). **Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, and Locksmith Act of 1993.** Provision that required an applicant for a private alarm contracting license to have worked as a full-time supervisor, manager, or administrator at a licensed private alarm contracting agency for 3 years out of the 5 years immediately preceding the application for a license was invalid because it conferred upon the regulated industry monopolistic control over entry into the private alarm contracting trade. P.A. 88-363 recodified the Act and added a provision that 3 years of work experience at an unlicensed entity which satisfies standards of alarm industry competence shall meet the requirements for eligibility for licensing as an alternative to working for 3 years at a licensed private alarm contracting agency. P.A. 89-85 added language giving partial credit toward the 3-year employment requirement to applicants who have met certain educational requirements. *Church v. State of Illinois*, 164 Ill.2d 153 (1995). These changes were carried over when the Act was again recodified by P.A. 93-438 as the Private


GAMING

230 ILCS 30/2, 30/4, 30/5, 30/5.1, 30/6, 30/7, 30/8, 30/10, 30/11, and 30/12 (P.A. 88-669). Charitable Games Act. Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-986, effective June 30, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

LIQUOR


235 ILCS 5/6-16 (West 2000). Liquor Control Act of 1934. Subsection (c), which makes it a Class A misdemeanor if a person knowingly permits the departure of an intoxicated minor from a gathering at the person’s residence of which the person has knowledge and at which the person knows a minor is illegally possessing or consuming liquor, is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it fails to provide a person with notice as to how to avoid violating the subsection. *People v. Law*, 202 Ill.2d 578 (2002). P.A. 97-1049 added criteria specifying how to violate the provisions in question.

between 100,000 and 500,000 but requiring de novo review in the case of other municipalities violated the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition against special legislation. There was no rational basis for the difference in treatment accorded municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 (of which there were only 2 in the State) and municipalities with a population less than 100,000. P.A. 77-674 deleted the provision denying de novo review in the case of appeals from municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 and provided instead that in the case of appeals from home rule municipalities with a population under 500,000 (rather than municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000) the appeal was limited to a review of the official record of the local proceedings. *Shepard v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n*, 43 Ill.2d 187 (1969).


**WAREHOUSES**


**PUBLIC AID**

**305 ILCS 5/10-2** (West 1992). *Illinois Public Aid Code*. Provision (i) requiring parents to contribute to the support of a child age 18 through 20 who receives aid and resides with the parents and (ii) exempting parents of a child in the same age group who receives aid but does not live with his or her parents was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. The court, while voiding the parental support provision, upheld the remainder of the Section regarding liability for support between spouses and the responsibility for support by other relatives. P.A. 92-876 replaced the
provision with the requirement that parents are severally liable for an unemancipated child under age 18, or an unemancipated child age 18 or over who attends high school, until the child is 19 or graduates from high school, whichever is earlier. *Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid*, 171 Ill.2d 314 (1996).

**305 ILCS 5/11-30. Illinois Public Aid Code.** Provision that a public aid applicant who received public aid within the previous 12 months in another state in a lower amount than the aid Illinois would provide was ineligible for public aid in Illinois for the first 12 months of residency beyond the amount received in the former state violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for an aid applicant who had received a lower amount in her former state of Alabama. P.A. 92-111 repealed the provision. *Hicks v. Peters*, 10 F.Supp.2d 1003 (N.D.Ill. 1998).

**PUBLIC HEALTH**

**410 ILCS 230/4-100** (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 111½, par. 4604-100). *Problem Pregnancy Health Services and Care Act*. Provision prohibiting the Department of Public Health from making grants to nonprofit entities that provide abortion referral or counseling services was unconstitutional: (i) it violated due process because it disqualified entities that agreed not to use the State funds for those particular services and (ii) it violated the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on the information available for a woman’s childbirth decision. P.A. 83-51 amended the statute to enable the entities to receive the grants if they did not use the funds for abortion referral or counseling services. *Planned Parenthood Association v. Kempiners*, 568 F.Supp. 1490 (N.D.Ill. 1983).


**ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY**

**415 ILCS 5/4** (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 111½, par. 1004). *Environmental Protection Act*. Provision that it was the duty of the EPA to investigate violations of the Act and to prepare and present enforcement actions before the Pollution Control Board violated Article V, Section 15 of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that the Attorney General is “the legal officer of the State” and thus is the only officer empowered to represent the people in any proceeding in which the State is the real party in interest. P.A. 81-219 deleted the offending provision and limited the EPA’s

**415 ILCS 5/25** (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1025). *Environmental Protection Act.* Provision exempting a motor racing event from noise standards if the event was endorsed by one of several designated private organizations was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a private group. P.A. 82-654 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Pollution Control Board*, 83 Ill.App.3d 802 (1st Dist. 1980).

**415 ILCS 5/33 and 5/42** (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 111½, pars. 1033 and 1042). *Environmental Protection Act.* Provisions allowing the Pollution Control Board to impose money penalties not to exceed $10,000 for a violation of the Act or regulations or an order of the Board were an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because the provisions failed to provide the Board with any standards to guide it in imposing penalties. The provisions also were an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power because the Board could impose discretionary fines, a distinctly judicial act. P.A. 78-862 amended the statute to allow the Board to impose “civil penalties” instead of “money penalties”. *Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency*, 15 Ill.App.3d 66 (5th Dist. 1973).

**PUBLIC SAFETY**

**430 ILCS 65/2** (West 1994). *Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.* (See *People v. Davis*, 177 Ill.2d 495 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Report under “Corrections”, concerning the disproportionality of penalties for possession of a firearm in violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and unlawful use of a firearm by a felon.)

**ROADS AND BRIDGES**


**VEHICLES**

**625 ILCS 5/. Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision in former Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-theft Act (repealed) providing for an increased registration fee for certain cars purchased in another state was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Laws 1957, p. 2706 repealed the former Act. *Berger v. Barrett*, 414 Ill. 43 (1953).
Provision that a vehicle was considered contraband if the vehicle ID number could not be identified was an unconstitutional denial of due process when applied to a buyer who bought a vehicle from a dealer and the title to the vehicle had an ID number that matched the ID number on the dashboard, but the number was false and it was impossible to determine the confidential vehicle ID number. P.A. 83-1473 added an exception for a person who acquires a vehicle without knowledge that the ID number has been removed, altered, or destroyed. *People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile*, 89 Ill.2d 506 (1982).

625 ILCS 5/5-401.2. **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95½, par. 5-401) authorizing warrantless administrative searches of records and business premises of auto parts dealers was unconstitutional because it did not provide for the regularity and neutrality required by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. P.A. 83-1473 repealed Section 5-401 of the Code and replaced it with new Section 5-401.2, which does not contain the offending provision. *People v. Krull*, 107 Ill.2d 107 (1985).

625 ILCS 5/5-401.2 (West 1996). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision that made the knowing failure by certain licensees to maintain records of the acquisition and disposition of vehicles a Class 2 felony was an unconstitutional violation of due process because the criminalization of an innocent record-keeping error was not a reasonable means of preventing the trafficking of stolen vehicles and parts. P.A. 92-773 reduced the failure to a Class B misdemeanor and made the failure with intent to conceal the identity or origin of a vehicle or its essential parts or with intent to defraud the public in the transfer or sale of vehicles or their essential parts a Class 2 felony. *People v. Wright*, 194 Ill.2d 1 (2000).

625 ILCS 5/6-107  (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95½, par. 6-107). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision requiring parent’s or guardian’s consent for driver’s license for an unmarried emancipated minor under age 21 but not for a married emancipated minor under that age was arbitrary discrimination against unmarried emancipated minors. P.A. 77-2805 reduced the age limit to 18 but kept the distinction. Without expressing an opinion as to the validity of the amended provision, the court noted that there may be justifications for applying such a classification to minors under age 18. *People v. Sherman*, 57 Ill.2d 1 (1974).

625 ILCS 5/6-205  (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 6-205). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision requiring the Secretary of State to revoke a sex offender's driver's license denied the offender due process because there was no relationship to the public interest when a vehicle was not used in the offense. P.A. 85-1259 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Lindner*, 127 Ill.2d 174 (1989).

625 ILCS 5/6-301.2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95½, par. 6-301.2). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision that punished distribution of a fraudulent driver’s license as a Class B misdemeanor but
punished the lesser included offense of possessing a fraudulent driver’s license as a Class 4 felony violated the Illinois Constitution’s due process and proportionality of penalties clauses. P.A. 89-283, effective January 1, 1996, retained the penalties and changed the offense from distributing fraudulent driver’s licenses to distributing information about the availability of fraudulent driver’s licenses. People v. McGee, 257 Ill.App.3d 229 (1st Dist. 1993).

625 ILCS 5/7-205 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1970 Supp., ch. 95½, par. 7-205). Illinois Vehicle Code. Provision of “Safety Responsibility Law” within the Code that permitted the suspension of a driver’s license without a pre-suspension hearing violated due process. P.A. 77-1910 replaced the offending provision with a requirement that the Secretary of State cause a hearing to be held to determine whether a driver’s license should be suspended. P.A. 83-1081 deleted the requirement that the Secretary of State cause a hearing to be held and instead provided that a driver be given an opportunity to request a hearing before suspension of his or her driver’s license. Pollion v. Lewis, 332 F.Supp. 777 (N.D.Ill. 1971).


625 ILCS 5/12-612 (West 2004). Illinois Vehicle Code. Statute that made it unlawful for a person to own or operate a motor vehicle that the person knows to contain a false or secret compartment, and that provides that the person’s intent to use the compartment to conceal its contents from a law enforcement officer may be inferred from the nature of the contents, violated the due process guarantees of the federal and State constitutions (U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV and ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2) because it was too broad and potentially punished innocent behavior. Public Act 96-202, effective January 1, 2010, amended Section 12-612 to require that the person (i) own or operate the vehicle with criminal intent and (ii) know that the compartment is or has been used to conceal specified, prohibited firearms or controlled substances. People v. Carpenter, 228 Ill.2d 250 (2008).
COURTS

705 ILCS 35/2 and 35/2e (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, pars. 72.2 and 72.2e (repealed)). Circuit Courts Act.
P.A. 86-786 amendatory provisions were unconstitutional because (i) the subdividing of the First Appellate District for judicial elections beyond the divisions made by the Illinois Constitution violated the Constitution and (ii) the subdividing of the Circuit of Cook County, while not unconstitutional by itself, was inseverable from the invalid appellate court provisions. P.A. 86-1478 deleted the offending changes made by P.A. 86-786 and restored the law as it existed before P.A. 86-786, stating that its purpose was to conform the law to the Supreme Court’s opinion. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. State Bd. of Elections, 136 Ill.2d 513 (1990).

705 ILCS 35/2c (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 72.2c). Circuit Courts Act. Provision requiring a circuit judge to be a resident of a particular county within a (multiple-county) circuit and yet be elected at large from within that circuit violated subsection (a) of Section 7 and Section 11 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution by creating a hybrid variety judgeship that was not contemplated by the Constitution's drafters. The Section was amended by P.A. 87-410 to remove the provision in question, as well as a similar provision relating to the election of judges in another circuit. Thies v. State Board of Elections, 124 Ill.2d 317 (1988).

705 ILCS 105/27.1 and 105/27.2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 25, par. 27.1 and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1982 Supp., ch. 25, par. 27.2). Clerks of Courts Act. Provisions requiring circuit clerks to collect a special $5 filing fee from petitioners for dissolution of marriage to fund shelters and services for domestic violence victims unreasonably interfered with persons’ access to the courts, were an arbitrary use of the State’s police power, and made an unreasonable or arbitrary classification for tax purposes by imposing a tax to fund a general welfare program only on members of a designated class. P.A. 83-1539 deleted the offending provision from Section 27.1, and P.A. 83-1375 deleted the offending provision from Section 27.2. Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill.2d 444 (1984).


705 ILCS 405/5-4, 405/5-14, 405/5-19, 405/5-23, 405/5-33, and 405/5-34 (P.A. 88-680). Juvenile Court Act of 1987. Provisions amended by P.A. 88-680 are unconstitutional because P.A.
88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. People v. Dainty, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), People v. Williams, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), People v. Edwards, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 1 of this Report under “Finance” and “Corrections” and in Part 2 of this Report under “Criminal Offenses”.) P.A. 90-590 repealed the offending Sections.

CRIMINAL OFFENSES

720 ILCS 5/10-5 (West 1998). Criminal Code of 2012.² Provision that made evidence of luring or attempted luring prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose created a per se unconstitutional, but severable, mandatory presumption that denied due process by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. People v. Woodrum, 223 Ill.2d 286 (2006). P.A. 97-160 amended the provision to authorize the trier of fact to infer that luring or attempted luring is for other than an unlawful purpose.


720 ILCS 5/16-1  (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16-1). Criminal Code of 2012. The theft provision that prohibited obtaining control over property in custody of law enforcement agency that was explicitly represented as being stolen was unconstitutional on its face because it did not require a culpable mental state. P.A. 89-377 rearranged the list of elements of the offense to make it clear that the offense requires that a person “knowingly” obtain control over the property. People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill.2d 36 (1994).

720 ILCS 5/16-7 (West 2004). Criminal Code of 2012. Subdivision (a)(2), the unlawful use of recorded sounds or images, is preempted by Section 301 of the federal Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. 301) because the State statute does not require any additional element that qualitatively distinguishes it from the federal copyright infringement provision. People v. Williams, 235 Ill.2d 178 (2009). This Section was substantially re-written by P.A. 97-597.

720 ILCS 5/16A-4 (West 2000). Criminal Code of 2012. Retail theft provision that a person who conceals and removes merchandise from a retail store without paying for it “shall be presumed” to do so intentionally creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption that denies the trier of fact the discretion of determining that an item was removed inadvertently or thoughtlessly. People v. Taylor, 344 Ill.App.3d 929 (1st Dist. 2003), and People v. Butler, 354 Ill.App.3d 57 (1st Dist. 2004). Public Act 97-597, effective January 1, 2012, made the inference permissive rather than mandatory.


Item (1) of subsection (a) provided that a person committed aggravated arson when the person knowingly damaged a structure by means of fire or explosive and the person knew or reasonably should have known that someone was present in the structure. This provision was unconstitutional because the underlying conduct that was supposed to be enhanced by the aggravated arson statute was not necessarily criminal in nature. *People v. Johnson*, 114 Ill.2d 69 (1986).

Item (3) of subsection (a) provided that a person committed aggravated arson when the person damaged a structure by means of fire or explosive and a fireman or policeman was injured. This provision was unconstitutional because it failed to require a culpable intent. *People v. Wick*, 107 Ill.2d 62 (1985).

P.A. 84-1100 amended the statute to add “in the course of committing arson” after “A person commits aggravated arson when”, thereby adding the requirement of a criminal purpose or intent.


Provision making peaceful picketing of “a place of employment involved in a labor dispute” exempt from general prohibition against picketing a residence was a denial of equal protection because it accorded preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject: dissemination of information about labor disputes was unrestricted, but discussion of other issues was restricted. P.A. 81-1270 deleted the exception for picketing at “a place of employment involved in a labor dispute". *Carey v. Brown*, 100 S.Ct. 2286 (1980).

720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1994). **Criminal Code of 2012.** (See *People v. Davis*, 177 Ill.2d 495 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Report under “Corrections”, concerning the disproportionality of penalties for possession of a firearm in violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and unlawful use of a firearm by a felon.)

720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) (West 2008). **Criminal Code of 2012.** The Class 4 Felony form of the aggravated unlawful use of weapons statute violates the right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, insofar as it is effectively a "flat ban on carrying read-to-use guns outside the home. P.A. 98-63, effective July 9, 2013, amended the statute to allow for a limited right to carry certain firearms in public. *People v. Aguilar*, 2013 IL 112116.
720 ILCS 5/24-5 (West 2002). Criminal Code of 2012. Subsection (b), which provided that possession of a firearm with a defaced identification mark was prima facie evidence that the possessor committed the offense of knowingly or intentionally defacing identification marks on a firearm, created an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption of guilt. P.A. 93-906, effective August 11, 2004, eliminated the language conveying prima facie evidentiary status to possession of a defaced firearm. People v. Quinones, 362 Ill.App.3d 385 (1st Dist. 2005).

720 ILCS 5/25-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 25-1). Criminal Code of 2012. Provision of mob action offense that prohibited the assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act was unconstitutional for violating due process and the First Amendment because it (i) was too vague to give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct or adjudicatory standards and (ii) was so overbroad as to allow the arbitrary suppression of non-criminal conduct. Public Act 96-710, effective January 1, 2010, changed the offense to prohibit the knowing assembly of 2 or more persons with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanor. Landry v. Daley, 280 F.Supp. 938 (N.D.Ill. 1968).

720 ILCS 5/26-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 26-1). Criminal Code of 2012. Provision that a person commits disorderly conduct when he or she makes a telephone call with the intent to annoy another was impermissibly broad because it applied to any call made with the intent to annoy, including those that might not provoke a breach of the peace. P.A. 80-795 deleted the offending provision. People v. Klick, 66 Ill.2d 269 (1977).

720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1 and 5/31A-1.2 (P.A. 89-688). Criminal Code of 2012. Provisions amended by P.A. 89-688 were unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. (Although Public Act 89-688 also amended Section 8-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/8-1.1), identical changes were made to that Section by Public Act 89-689, effective December 31, 1996.) P.A. 94-1017, effective July 7, 2006, re-enacted the changes made to Section 31A-1.1 by P.A.s 89-688 and 94-556 and to Section 31A-1.2 by P.A.s 89-688, 90-655, 91-357, and 94-556. People v. Foster, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and People v. Burdunice, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in Part 1 of this Report under “General Provisions”, “Criminal Procedure”, and “Corrections”.)


720 ILCS 150/5.1 (West 1992). Wrongs to Children Act. Provision creating the offense of permitting the sexual abuse of a child, one element of which was the failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the abuse, violated the due process guarantees of Amends. V and XIV of the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 2 of the Illinois Constitution by failing to warn as to what was prohibited and failing to provide clear guidelines for enforcement. P.A.s 89-462 and 91-696 amended the provision to add to the list of persons subject to the statute, to add to the list of acts by which a person committed the offense, and to change the penalty from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 1 felony. P.A. 92-827 rewrote the entire Section, replacing the offending element with having actual knowledge of and permitting sexual abuse of the child or permitting the child to engage in prostitution. People v. Maness, 191 Ill.2d 478 (2000).

720 ILCS 250/16 (West 2002). Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act. Provision that possession of 2 or more counterfeit credit or debit cards by someone other than the purported card issuer is prima facie evidence of the possessor’s intent to defraud or of the possessor’s knowledge that the cards are counterfeit creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption of the intent or knowledge that is an element of a violation of the Act. People v. Miles, 344 Ill.App.3d 315 (2nd Dist. 2003). P.A. 96-1551, effective July 1, 2011, replaced the provision that created a mandatory presumption with a provision that authorized the trier of fact to infer that possession of 2 or more credit or debit cards is evidence of the possessor’s intent to defraud or knowledge that the debit or credit cards had been altered or counterfeited. P.A. 96-1551 also moved the provision in question to 720 ILCS 5/17-41 (West 2011).

720 ILCS 510/2, 510/3, 510/5, 510/7, 510/8, 510/9, 510/10, and 510/11 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1976, ch. 38, pars. 81-22, 81-23, 81-25, 81-27, 81-28, 81-29, 81-30, and 81-31). Illinois Abortion Law of 1975. Substantial portions of the Act were unconstitutional because they violated the due process clause of the U. S. Constitution. The definition of “criminal abortion” was vague; physicians were not given fair warning of what information they had to provide to pregnant women; spousal and parental consent requirements unduly infringed on a pregnant woman’s rights; the requirement for additional physician consultations bore no relationship to the needs of
the patient or fetus; there was no provision for notice and an opportunity to contest the termination of parental rights; the ban on saline abortions removed a necessary alternative procedure; and required reports of abortions as fetal deaths failed to preserve a woman’s right to confidentiality. P.A. 81-1078 made numerous changes in the Act in response to the findings of unconstitutionality. *Wynn v. Carey*, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).

720 ILCS 515/3, 515/4, and 515/5 (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1978, ch. 38, pars. 81-53, 81-54, and 81-55). **Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977.** Provision defining “abortion” was unconstitutionally vague, and criminal penalty provision based on that definition was therefore also unconstitutional. Provision for a 48-hour waiting period and parental consent were unconstitutional violations of the federal equal protection clause because they were underinclusive in that they excluded married minors and overinclusive in that they included mature, emancipated minors. P.A. 89-18 repealed the Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977 (as well as the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983) and replaced them with the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 (750 ILCS 70/), which excludes married or emancipated minors. Enforcement of the 1995 Act is presently restrained by a federal court. *Wynn v. Carey*, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).

720 ILCS 520/4 (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 81-64). **Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983.** Requirement of a 24-hour waiting period after notifying parent of minor’s decision to have an abortion was unconstitutional as unduly burdening the minor's right to an abortion in the absence of a compelling state interest. P.A. 89-18 repealed the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 (as well as the Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977) and replaced them with the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 (750 ILCS 70/), which provides for a 48-hour waiting period. Enforcement of the 1995 Act is presently restrained by a federal court. *Zbaraz v. Hartigan*, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985).

720 ILCS 570/201 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56½, par. 1201). **Illinois Controlled Substances Act.** Provision authorizing the Director of Law Enforcement to add or delete substances from the schedules of controlled substances by issuing rules having the immediate effect of law failed to provide constitutionally required due notice to persons affected by such a rule. P.A. 79-454 added provisions requiring publication of a determination to add or delete a substance, allowing time for filing objections to such a determination, and requiring a hearing before issuance of a rule. *People v. Avery*, 67 Ill.2d 182 (1977).

720 ILCS 600/2 and 600/3  (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 56½, pars. 2102 and 2103). Drug Paraphernalia Control Act. Provisions were unconstitutionally vague because they required scienter on the part of a retailer in the definition Section but allowed for constructive knowledge on the part of the retailer in the penalty Section. P.A. 86-271 amended the penalty Section to delete the constructive knowledge provision. People v. Monroe, 118 Ill.2d 298 (1987).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

725 ILCS 5/108-8  (West 1994). Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Subsection authorizing a “no-knock” search warrant based on the mere existence of firearms on the premises resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the United States and Illinois constitutions. P.A. 90-456 amended the Code to base issuance of “no-knock” warrants on the reasonable belief that weapons may be used or evidence may be destroyed if entry is announced. People v. Wright, 183 Ill.2d 16 (1998).


725 ILCS 5/110-6.2  (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 110-6.2). Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Bail provision permits a court, after a hearing, to deny bail if the court determines that certain facts exist, such as proof evident or presumption great that the defendant committed the offense, the offense requires imprisonment, or the defendant poses a real threat to others. Provision violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution because they limited the court's authority to set bail and imposed conditions not found in Supreme Court Rule 609 concerning bail. People v. Williams, 143 Ill.2d 477 (1991).P.A. 96-1200, effective July 22, 2010, amended the provision to make the court's imposition of order’s concerning post-conviction detention discretionary rather than mandatory.

725 ILCS 5/110-7  (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 110-7). Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Provision that required the cost of appointed legal counsel to be reimbursed from a defendant’s bail deposit violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions because other defendants who did not post bail were not required to reimburse the costs of their appointed counsel. P.A. 83-336 removed the provision. People v. Cook, 81 Ill.2d 176 (1980).

725 ILCS 5/115-10  (P.A. 89-428). Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. P.A. 89-428 included a provision amending the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 permitting, in a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated on a child under age 13, the admission of
certain out-of-court statements by the child victim. The entire Public Act was unconstitutional because it violated the single-subject requirement of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-786 amended Section 115-10 to allow such statements provided they are made before the victim attains age 13 or within 3 months after commission of the offense, whichever occurs later. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill.2d 499 (1997).


CORRECTIONS


730 ILCS 5/5-4-1 and 5/5-8-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars 1005-4-1 and 1005-8-1). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Two provisions providing that, in imposing a sentence for a felony conviction, a judge “shall” specify reasons for his or her sentencing determination were constitutional, as held here, when “shall” is construed in that context to be permissive rather than mandatory. By contrast, if “shall” were interpreted to reflect a mandatory intent, the provisions would unconstitutionally infringe upon the inherently separate power of the judiciary. Public Act 95-1052, effective July 1, 2009, removed the offending provision from Section 5-8-1. *People v. Davis*, 93 Ill.2d 155 (1982).

730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 1994). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Requirement that an incarcerated sex offender, ordered by the court to provide a blood specimen, must be punished with contempt when the prisoner is deliberately uncooperative violated the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-793 punishes the deliberate actions as a Class A misdemeanor. *Murneigh v. Gainer*, 177 Ill.2d 287 (1997).


730 ILCS 5/5-5-4.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-4.1). **Unified Code of Corrections.** The statute conflicted with Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4), and was thus invalid because it constituted an undue infringement by the legislature on the powers of the judiciary. Subsequently, P.A. 83-344 removed the offending language. *People v. Cox*, 82 Ill.2d 268 (1980).

730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2000). **Sex Offender Registration Act.** Including a conviction of aggravated kidnapping among the sex offenses that trigger registration as a sex offender unconstitutionally violated the substantive due process rights of an offender when applied to a defendant without a history of sex offenses whose crime was without sexual motivation or purpose. P.A. 94-945, effective June 27, 2006, added the requirement that the offense be sexually motivated. *People v. Johnson*, 363 Ill.App.3d 356 (1st Dist. 2006).

**CIVIL PROCEDURE**

735 ILCS 5/. Code of Civil Procedure. Provision of “An Act to revise the law in relation to medical practice” (P.A. 79-960; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 70, par. 101) that limited recovery in cases involving injuries arising from medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice to $500,000
permitted or denied recovery on an arbitrary basis, thus granting a special privilege in violation of Article IV, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 81-288 repealed the offending provision.

Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, pars. 58.2 through 58.10) establishing medical review panels to hear malpractice claims unconstitutionally delegated judicial functions to non-judicial personnel. Provision establishing malpractice claim review procedure as a condition to a jury trial violated the constitutional right to a trial by jury. P.A. 81-288 repealed the offending provisions. *Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass’n*, 63 Ill.2d 313 (1976). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Report under “Insurance”.)

**735 ILCS 5/. Code of Civil Procedure.** Former provisions of Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-1012 through 2-1020) requiring, as a prerequisite to trial in a healing art malpractice case, that a panel composed of a circuit judge, a practicing attorney, and a health-care professional convene and make a determination regarding liability and, if liability is found, damages violated the Illinois Constitution’s grant of judicial power solely to the courts because the statute was an attempt by the legislature to create new courts. The offending provisions were repealed by P.A. 86-1028. *Bernier v. Burris*, 113 Ill.2d 219 (1986).

**735 ILCS 5/2-622 and 5/8-2501 (P.A. 89-7). Code of Civil Procedure.** Provisions concerning physician affidavits and expert witnesses in healing arts malpractice actions were unconstitutional due to their inseverability, despite inclusion of a severability clause, from P.A. 89-7, which is unconstitutional in its entirety. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997). P.A. 90-579, effective May 1, 1998, in amending 735 ILCS 5/2-622, included language added by P.A. 89-7 without specifying an intentional re-enactment. Public Act 90-579 was deemed a valid resurrection of P.A. 89-7 in *Cargill v. Czelatdko*, 353 Ill.App.3d 654 (4th Dist. 2004); *Cargill* was overruled by *O’Casek v. Children’s Home and Aid Society of Illinois*, 229 Ill.2d 421 (2008). Public Act 94-677 specifically re-enacted and changed 735 ILCS 5/2-622 and 5/8-2501 but was later held unconstitutional in *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010). Public Act 97-1145 restored the provisions of these Sections to their status before the enactment of P.A. 89-7.

**735 ILCS 5/2-622, 5/2-1704.5, 5/2-1706.5, 5/8-1901, and 5/8-2501 (P.A. 94-677). Code of Civil Procedure.** Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to health care and medical malpractice actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting the recovery of damages for non-economic losses in medical malpractice actions violate the separation of powers principle of the Illinois Constitution (ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1) and (ii) other provisions are inseverable. *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010). Public Act 97-1145 restored the provisions of these Sections to their status before the enactment of P.A. 94-677.

**735 ILCS 5/12-701 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 12-701). Code of Civil Procedure.** The statute required the court clerk to issue a summons to a person commanding the person to appear in court as a nonwage garnishee after a judgment creditor filed an affidavit. The statute violated due process because it did not require a judgment debtor to be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard. P.A. 87-1252 added the requirement that a garnishment notice be provided to the judgment debtor and gave a judgment debtor the right to request a hearing. E.J. McKernan Co. v. Gregory, 268 Ill.App.3d 383 (2nd Dist. 1994); Jacobson v. Johnson, 798 F.Supp. 500 (C.D.Ill. 1991).


CIVIL LIABILITIES

740 ILCS 10/. Illinois Antitrust Act. The 1893 antitrust Act was unconstitutional because of a discrimination in favor of agricultural products or livestock in the hands of the producer or raiser exempting them from the prohibition against recovery of the price of articles sold by any trust or combination in restraint of trade or competition in violation of the Act. In 1965, the 1893 Act was repealed by the Illinois Antitrust Act, which did not contain a provision such as that which had been held unconstitutional. Connolly v. Union Server Pipe Co., 22 S.Ct. 431 (1902).

740 ILCS 180/1 and 180/2 (P.A. 89-7). Wrongful Death Act. Provisions amended by P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions that was unconstitutional in its entirety, despite inclusion of a severability clause, were inseverable. P.A. 91-380 re-enacted the changes made in the Wrongful Death Act by P.A. 89-7. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997). (This case is also reported in Part 1 pf this Report under “Civil Procedure” and “Civil Liabilities”, concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

CIVIL IMMUNITIES

745 ILCS 25/3 and 25/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 122, pars. 823 and 824). Tort Liability of Schools Act. Provisions requiring that written notice of injury be filed with the proper school authority within 6 months after the date of the injury and requiring dismissal of an action for failure to file the notice were unconstitutional special legislation. There was no reason why a failure to file such a notice in relation to an injury on school property should bar a recovery while a failure to file such a notice in relation to an injury on property of another governmental unit would not bar a recovery. Enactment of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act eliminated the discrepancy between notice-of-injury provisions applicable to various units of local government. Lorton v. Brown County School Dist., 35 Ill.2d 362 (1966). (See also Cleary v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 57 Ill.2d 384 (1974), reported in Part 1 of this Report under “Civil Immunities”.)
FAMILIES

750 ILCS 5/203 and 5/208 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 89, pars. 3, 3.1, and 6). Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. The statute allowed males to marry without parental consent at age 21 and females at age 18. The age requirement for males and females was also different for marriage with parental consent and marriage by court order. This was held to be a violation of Section 18 of Article 1 of the Illinois Constitution prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. Subsequently, the statute was amended by P.A. 78-1297 to make the ages the same for males and females. Phelps v. Bing, 58 Ill.2d 32 (1974).

750 ILCS 5/401 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 401). Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Amendatory language in P.A. 82-197 that retroactively validated all judgments for dissolution of marriage reserving questions of child custody or support, maintenance, or disposition of property, regardless of whether appropriate circumstances existed for the reservation of those questions, violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. The legislature was attempting to retroactively alter or overrule the appellate court’s interpretation of the statute (that is, that appropriate circumstances must exist before a trial court may reserve those questions). The legislature may alter only for future cases the appellate court’s interpretation of statutes. P.A. 83-247 deleted the offending provisions and provided that a trial court may enter a judgment for dissolution of marriage reserving certain issues upon agreement of the parties or upon the motion of either party and a finding by the court that appropriate circumstances exist. In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill.2d 190 (1982).

750 ILCS 5/607 (West 1998). Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Authorization to grant grandparent visitation when that visitation is in the best interest of the child was unconstitutional as applied to a child both of whose parents objected to grandparent visitation. P.A. 93-911, effective January 1, 2005, amended the provision to condition the visitation petition upon the parent’s unreasonable denial of visitation and to establish a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent’s visitation decisions are not harmful to the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455 (2000).

750 ILCS 5/607 (West 2000). Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (b), which authorized reasonable visitation to a minor child's grandparents, great-grandparents, or siblings in certain situations, violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by interfering with a parent's fundamental right to determine the care, custody, and control of his or her child. Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill.2d 309 (2002). P.A. 93-911 removed the offending paragraphs and added language to condition the visitation petition upon the parent’s unreasonable denial of visitation (and the existence of other factors such as one parent being deceased or parental non-co-habitation) and to establish a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent’s visitation decisions are not harmful to the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health.

750 ILCS 45/11. Illinois Parentage Act of 1984. Provisions of predecessor Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity and Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 106½, pars. 1, 55, and 56) that contemplated that the decision to submit to a blood test was within a defendant’s discretion were an invalid exercise of the legislative power because they conflicted with a court’s power under Supreme Court Rules to order discovery and to compel compliance with discovery orders. P.A. 83-1372 repealed the Paternity Act and replaced it with the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, which provides that if a party refuses to submit to ordered blood tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against that party or otherwise enforce its order. *People ex rel. Coleman v. Ely*, 71 Ill.App.3d 701 (1st Dist. 1979).


750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998). Adoption Act. Subdivision D(f)’s mandatory irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness due to a criminal conviction resulting from the death of a child due to physical abuse, while allowing the State to present evidence as to the best interests of the child in question, unconstitutionally denied equal protection of the law to a mother in an action to terminate her parental rights because of her first degree murder of her other child. P.A. 94-939, effective January 1, 2007, made the presumption rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. *In re S.F.*, 359 Ill.App.3d 63 (1st Dist. 2005).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 2002). Adoption Act. Subsection (D)(q)’s irrebuttable presumption of the unfitness of a parent convicted of aggravated battery, heinous battery, or attempted murder of any child:

(1) Violated State and federal constitutional equal protection guarantees (U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2) because subsection (D)(i) of the same Section created only
a rebuttable presumption of the unfitness of a parent who commits first or second degree murder of any person, which are no less serious offenses. In re D.W., 214 Ill.2d 289 (2005).

(2) Violated State and federal constitutional equal protection and due process guarantees (U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2) because it too broadly affected parents who, due to the time or circumstances of their offense or their rehabilitation, may not threaten the State’s interest in the safety and welfare of children. In re Amanda D., 349 Ill.App.3d 941 (2nd Dist. 2004).

P.A. 94-939, effective January 1, 2007, amended Section 1 of the Adoption Act by removing subsection (D)(q) and by changing subsection (D)(i) to include predatory sexual assault of a child, heinous battery of a child, and aggravated battery of a child among a parent’s crimes that create a rebuttable presumption of his or her parental unfitness.

750 ILCS 65/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1980, ch. 40, par. 1001). Rights of Married Persons Act. Provision prohibiting a husband or wife from suing the other for a tort to the person committed during the marriage denied equal protection in violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it was not rationally related to the purpose of maintaining marital harmony. P.A.’s 82-569, 82-621, 82-783, and 84-1305 amended the offending provision by adding an exception for intentional torts. P.A. 85-625 deleted the exception and provided instead that a husband or wife may sue the other for a tort committed during the marriage. Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1984).

ESTATES

755 ILCS 5/2-2 (West 1994). Probate Act of 1975. Provision permitting mothers but not fathers to inherit by intestate succession from their illegitimate children unlawfully discriminated on basis of gender in violation of equal rights clause of Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-803 changed Section 2-2 to permit eligible parents to inherit by intestate succession from their illegitimate children; an eligible parent is one who, during the child’s lifetime, acknowledged the child, established a parental relationship with the child, and supported the child. In re Estate of Hicks, 174 Ill.2d 433 (1996).

PROPERTY

765 ILCS 705/1. Lessor's Liability Act. Provision in predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 80, par. 15) that prohibited the enforcement of a lease provision that exempted a non-governmental landlord from liability for the landlord's negligence as a violation of public policy was held unconstitutional as special legislation because of the exclusion of governmental landlords. The Act was subsequently replaced with the Lessor’s Liability Act, which contained similar provisions but without the governmental exemption. Sweney Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo P. & W. R. Co., 42 Ill.2d 265 (1969).
765 ILCS 1025/14 and 1025/25 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 141, pars. 114 and 125). **Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.** Provision that required an insurance company to pay to State of Illinois unclaimed amounts payable under insurance policies to persons whose last known address was in Illinois failed to protect the company from multiple payments to other states and denied the company its property without due process. The Act was amended in 1963 to add provisions concerning proceedings in another state with respect to unclaimed property that has been paid or delivered to the State of Illinois. *Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knight*, 210 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.Ill. 1962).

**HUMAN RIGHTS**

775 ILCS 5/. **Illinois Human Rights Act.** Provision of predecessor Act creating a Commission on Human Relations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 127, par. 214.4-1) required the Commission to cause lists of homeowners in an “area” who did not wish to sell their homes to be mailed to realtors “known or believed” to be soliciting homeowners in that “area”. The provision was an unconstitutional delegation of arbitrary powers to an administrative agency because (i) “area” was not defined and no standards were given for the agency to follow in designating “areas” and (ii) no standards were given for establishing a basis on which a “belief” concerning a realtor’s solicitation activities may be formed. P.A. 81-1216 repealed the Act creating a Commission on Human Relations and replaced it with the Illinois Human Rights Act without continuing the offending provision in the new Act. (P.A. 80-920 had previously deleted related provisions, concerning notice from the Human Relations Commission, from what is now the Discrimination in Sale of Real Estate Act, 720 ILCS 590/. ) *People v. Tibbitts*, 56 Ill.2d 56 (1973).


**BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS**

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

815 ILCS 350/. Fraudulent Sales Act. Provision of predecessor Act (Smith’s Stat. 1931, p. 2602) authorizing municipal clerk to issue a license to hold a sale covered by the Act if the clerk was satisfied from the license application that the proposed sale was of the character the applicant desired to conduct and advertise was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative official. It did not define or describe the different types of sales designated as requiring a license and gave the clerk unwarranted discretion in determining whether the facts set out in a license application brought the proposed sale within the terms of the statute. The Act was subsequently repealed. The Fraudulent Sales Act specifies the information that must be contained in an application for a license to conduct a sale covered by the Act and provides that the clerk shall issue a license “upon receipt of an application giving fully and completely the [required] information”. People v. Yonker, 351 Ill. 139 (1932).

815 ILCS 710/4 and 710/12 (West 1992). Motor Vehicle Franchise Act. Provision allowing a court to be the initial arbiter of the propriety of establishing an additional or relocated franchise violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution because it delegated to the courts matters that are for legislative or administrative determination. P.A. 89-145 deleted the offending provision. Fields Jeep-Eagle v. Chrysler Corp., 163 Ill.2d 462 (1994).

EMPLOYMENT

820 ILCS 40/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 2001 et seq.). Personnel Record Review Act. The Act was held unconstitutionally vague because it was not clear with reasonable certainty which records were exempt from inspection by an employee and which records were subject to inspection. The Section concerning records exempt from inspection was subsequently amended by P.A. 85-1393 and P.A. 85-1424 to specify certain employee-related materials. The Attorney General issued an opinion (Ill. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 92-005) that the Act is now constitutional. Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation, 118 Ill.2d 389 (1987).

820 ILCS 130/2 and 130/10a (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 48, pars. 39s-2 and 39s-10a). Prevailing Wage Act. Provision prohibiting allocation of motor fuel tax funds to public bodies if a certificate of compliance with the Act is not filed by the public body requesting approval of a public works project violated the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition against amending a Section of a law (in this case, certain Sections of the Motor Fuel Tax Act and the Illinois Highway Code) without inserting the full text of the Section amended. The Section of the Act containing that provision was subsequently repealed by Laws 1965, p. 3508. Another Section of the Act extending application of the Act to employees of public bodies when engaged in new construction (as opposed to maintenance work) violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and Illinois constitutions. That and other Sections of the Act were thereafter substantially rewritten to correct the problem. City of Monmouth v. Lorenz, 30 Ill.2d 60 (1963).
820 ILCS 130/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, ch. 48, par. 39s-2). **Prevailing Wage Act.** Provision defining the “prevailing rate of wages” in a locality as the wages under a collective bargaining agreement in effect in the locality and covering wages for work of a similar character was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private parties. Laws 1957, p. 2662 deleted the offending provision. *Bradley v. Casey*, 415 Ill. 564 (1953).
