

2010 CASE REPORT

(and cumulative report of Illinois statutes held unconstitutional)



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November 2010

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November 2010

To the Honorable Members of the General Assembly:

This is the Legislative Reference Bureau's annual review of decisions of the Federal Courts, the Illinois Supreme Court, and the Illinois Appellate Court as required by Section 5.05 of the Legislative Reference Bureau Act, 25 ILCS 135/5.05.

The Bureau's staff attorneys screened all court decisions and prepared the individual case summaries. A cumulative report of statutes held unconstitutional, prepared by the Bureau's staff attorneys, is included. The entire report was edited and compiled by senior attorney Jean McCay.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard C. Edwards
Executive Director

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INTRODUCTION TO PART 1

Part 1 of this 2010 Case Report contains summaries of recent court decisions and is based on a review in the summer of 2010 of federal court, Illinois Supreme Court, and Illinois Appellate Court decisions published since the summer of 2009 .

PART 1
SUMMARIES OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION - RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

Municipal handgun bans are unconstitutional because the right to keep and bear arms is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee of the United States Constitution and applies to the states.

In *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010), the petitioners sought a declaration that 2 Illinois cities' handgun bans and several related ordinances violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Amends. II and XIV). In an earlier case, *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008), the United States Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense and struck down a federal District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. Chicago and the village of Oak Park have ordinances effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. The petitioners contended that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause "incorporates" the Second Amendment right. In *Heller*, the Supreme Court ruled that individual self-defense is the central component of the Second Amendment right. Explaining that the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute in the home, the Supreme Court found that this right applies to handguns because they are the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one's home and family. The right to keep and bear arms was considered no less fundamental by those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights. The right to keep and bear arms also was widely protected by state constitutions at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in *Heller*. The right applies to the states, so the ordinances are unconstitutional.

OPEN MEETINGS ACT – AGENDA AND CONVENIENCE

A public body is not required to keep its principal office open to the public beyond regular business hours during the period its special meeting agenda must be posted at that location.

In *Foxfield Subdivision v. Village of Campton Hills*, 396 Ill.App.3d 989 (2nd Dist. 2009), the plaintiffs contended that a special meeting at which the board of the defendant village adopted an annexation ordinance violated the Open Meetings Act because the posting and wording of the meeting's agenda were insufficient and because the meeting was inconvenient. Section 2.02 of the Act (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2008)) requires that a public body post the agenda of its special meeting in its principal office at least 48 hours before the meeting. The village hall where the agenda was posted was open to the public only during regular business hours, making the agenda inaccessible at other times during the 2 days before the special meeting. No Illinois case having addressed this issue, the court followed Texas' interpretation of its similar statute and held that Section 2.02 does

not obligate a public body to incur the security burden of extending its office's accessibility to satisfy "the nocturnally curious". The court also found that the agenda's reference to an annexation ordinance without naming or describing the particular parcel of land was sufficient to satisfy the Act's purpose of providing notice to interested parties. Section 2.01 of the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2008)) requires that a public body's meetings be open and convenient to the public. The village board began its open meeting at the community center at 7:00 p.m., then held a closed meeting during which the public had to wait in the parking lot in cold and blustery weather until 1:15 a.m. when the village board discussed and voted upon the annexation ordinance in an open session. Those uncomfortable circumstances did not violate the Act because the requirement of convenience demands only that the meeting arrangements not bar public attendance, such as a meeting room too small to accommodate an easily anticipated number of attendees.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT - DUPLICATION FEES

The Act's fee structure does not apply when another Act specifies a different fee for the dissemination of certain public records.

In *Sage Information Services v. Henderson*, 397 Ill.App.3d 1060 (3rd Dist. 2010), the appellants challenged a trial court's ruling that Section 9-20 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/9-20 (West 2006)), rather than Section 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/6 (West 2006)), controlled the assessment of fees for the reproduction of property tax records requested under the Freedom of Information Act. The argument advanced by the appellants was that Section 9-20 should be read *in pari materia* with Section 6 and that, because fees for the duplication of public records are capped under the Freedom of Information Act at actual costs, the fees charged for property tax records under the Property Tax Code must be capped at that same level. As it existed at the time, Section 6 provided that the fee charged by a public body for duplicating public records must "not exceed the actual cost of reproduction and certification, unless otherwise provided by State statute". The appellate court pointed to the text of Section 6 and affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that if a statute other than the Freedom of Information Act provides for the dissemination of information for a stated fee, then the fee structure imposed by the Freedom of Information Act is inapplicable. Although Public Act 96-542, effective January 1, 2010, substantially re-wrote much of the Freedom of Information Act, this exception remains.

ELECTION CODE – QUALIFIED PRIMARY VOTER

A partisan candidate's required status as a qualified primary voter is determined within the election cycle to which his or her statement of candidacy relates.

In *Hossfeld v. Illinois State Board of Elections*, 398 Ill.App.3d 737 (1st Dist. 2010), former State Senator Steven Rauschenberger voted in the February 2009 Democratic consolidated primary election, then filed a nomination petition for the February 2010 Republican general primary election as a State Senate candidate. The petition included the statement of candidacy, required by Section 8-8 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/8-8 (West 2006)), in which a candidate attests that he or she is a

qualified primary voter of the political party to which the petition relates. An objector to the petition challenged the validity of the statement of candidacy, claiming that Rauschenberger was not a qualified Republican primary voter because he cast a Democratic ballot in 2009. Section 8-8 does not define a “qualified primary voter”. Several Election Code provisions, including Section 8-8, previously defined that term for the purpose of signing or filing a nomination petition as a qualified voter who had not voted a different political party’s primary ballot during the 2 years before the petition filing deadline; each entire definition was removed after the 2-year period was ruled unconstitutionally lengthy in a 1974 Illinois appellate court case involving petition signers. In construing “qualified primary voter” in Section 7-10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2006)), the Second District Illinois Appellate Court in *Cullerton v. DuPage County Officers Electoral Board*, 384 Ill.App.3d 989 (2nd Dist. 2008), found that a restriction of some length on a candidate’s switch of party affiliation is valid and held that a 2008 Republican general primary voter could not subsequently file a valid statement of candidacy to fill a vacancy in nomination on the 2008 Democratic general election ballot because he remained a Republican until the next opportunity to vote a different party’s ballot. The objector here argued that Rauschenberger could not be a qualified Republican primary voter when he filed his statement of candidacy because the next opportunity to cast a Republican ballot would occur after the filing deadline. The appellate court disagreed, distinguishing the *Cullerton* restriction as applicable to a candidate’s switch of party affiliation within the election cycle to which the statement of candidacy relates. Prohibiting a candidate’s switch of affiliation may encourage party stability, but requiring Rauschenberger to wait until the 2012 general election cycle to run as a Republican State Senate candidate because of his Democratic vote in 2009 was too lengthy a denial of his right of access to the ballot.

ELECTION CODE – INDEPENDENT CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES

Prohibiting independent campaign expenditures by a corporation using its general treasury funds violates the First Amendment.

In *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010), a non-profit corporation wanted to broadcast advertisements for on-demand viewing of its video documentary about Democratic U.S. presidential candidate Hilary Clinton before the 2008 presidential primary in certain states. The documentary portrayed Clinton as unfit for office. The corporation sought declaratory and injunctive relief against application and enforcement of provisions of the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (2 U.S.C. §441b) that prohibit a corporation or union from using its general treasury funds to make an independent expenditure for speech that is an electioneering communication or for speech that advocates for the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office. An electioneering communication is a broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and that is publically distributed within 30 days before a primary election at which the candidate appears on the ballot. A political action committee established by a corporation or union may make independent expenditures. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 also requires the maker of an independent expenditure to disclose from whom it receives contributions. The United States Supreme Court struck down the prohibition against independent expenditures by

corporations because it violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Amend. I) by suppressing political speech, which is the vital force of democracy. Although a corporation's political action committee may engage in political speech, the committee is not the same entity as the corporation and, therefore, not the same speaker. The court expressly overruled an earlier case, *Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce*, 110 S.Ct. 1391(1990), that had upheld the constitutionality of a Michigan law prohibiting corporate campaign expenditures because of the distorting and corrupting effects on political speech of immense financial resources. Here, the court dismissed the validity of the government distinguishing among political speakers. In response to dissenting opinions' disagreement with affording First Amendment protection to the political speech of entities other than people, the majority of the court characterized a corporation as an assemblage of people whose rights of free speech and of association are constitutionally guaranteed. The court did not invalidate the federal disclosure requirements, finding that any chilling effect on political speech that may result is outweighed by the advantage to the electoral process of fully informed voters.

Article 9 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/Art. 9): (i) requires a natural person who makes independent expenditures in excess of \$3,000 in the aggregate during a 12-month period to disclose the expenditures; (ii) requires an entity that makes independent expenditures in excess of \$3,000 in the aggregate in a 12-month period to organize and report as a political committee; (iii) provides that an expenditure by a natural person or political committee for an electioneering communication in connection, consultation, or concert with a campaign is a contribution and not an independent expenditure; and (iv) authorizes the State to seek an injunction against the making or disseminating of an electioneering communication until the person paying for the communication organizes and reports as a political committee.

ELECTION CODE – VACANCY IN OFFICE

Whether more than 28 months remain in the vacated term of an elective county office is determined from the date the vacancy occurs, not the date the office is filled by appointment.

In *Gardner v. Mullins*, 234 Ill.2d 503 (2009), a Winnebago county board member died with 29 months and 10 days remaining in her term of office. By the time a replacement member was appointed to fill the vacancy, 27 months and 22 days remained in the term of office. Section 25-11 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/25-11 (West 2006)) provides that when a vacancy occurs in an elective county office, the county board must declare the vacancy and notify the appropriate political party committee within 3 days and that the political party committee must appoint a replacement within 60 days. The statute further states that when more than 28 months remain in the term of the vacated office, the appointee shall serve only until a replacement is elected at the next general election; otherwise, the appointee serves the remainder of the term. A dispute arose as to whether the 28 months should be counted from the date the vacancy occurred or from the date the replacement was appointed. Although Section 25-11 does not specify how to measure the period, the court held that the Section's plain meaning dictates use of the date the vacancy occurred because the statute specifically measures the declaration, notification, and appointment deadlines from the date the vacancy occurs and because no

other triggering event is mentioned. Also, measuring the remaining term from the date of the replacement's appointment could enable the appointing authority to manipulate the need for an election by delaying the appointment. The 28-month provision was added to Section 25-11 by the same Public Act that amended the Election Code's provisions governing a vacancy in the office of State Senator to add a similar 28-month period explicitly measured from the occurrence of the vacancy. The defendant argued that the General Assembly's use of different language in the statutes indicated an intent to measure the 28 months differently in vacancies in the 2 offices, but the court rejected that reasoning.

MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ADMINISTRATIVE ACT - ELECTRIC SHOCK THERAPY

The Act's prohibition against electric shock therapy is not subject to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code's unconstitutional authorization of unusual, hazardous, or experimental patient services.

In *Bernstein v. Department of Human Services*, 392 Ill.App.3d 875 (1st Dist. 2009), the mother of a developmentally disabled man challenged the applicability of Section 15f of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Administrative Act (20 ILCS 1705/15f (West 2006)), which proscribes the use of electric shock therapy on mental health patients. In support of her claim, the mother noted that Section 15f explicitly provides that if its provisions conflict "with Article I of Chapter II of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, [then] that Article controls". Under Section 2-110 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/2-110 (West 2006)), a mental health patient may receive "unusual, hazardous, or experimental services or psychosurgery" if the patient's guardian and a court determine that such treatment is in the patient's best interest. The mother interpreted Section 2-110 as creating an exemption to the general proscription against electric shock therapy in Section 15f. The appellate court disagreed, relying on *In re Branning*, 285 Ill.App.3d 405 (4th Dist. 1996), which ruled that Section 2-110 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code is facially unconstitutional. Section 2-110 undermines a patient's federal and State constitutional due process guarantees (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, Sec. 1 and ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2) because it does not require proof of a mental patient's incapacity to determine proper treatment. Furthermore, even if Section 2-110 were constitutional, if the General Assembly had intended electric shock therapy to fall within the category of court-approved "unusual, hazardous, or experimental services or psychosurgery", then the legislature would never have enacted Section 15f, an explicit prohibition against electric shock therapy.

ILLINOIS PENSION CODE – FORFEITURE OF BENEFITS

Forfeiture of pension benefits due to a felony conviction relating to one position necessitates forfeiture of all pension benefits derived from service in any capacity for the same public employer.

In *Ryan v. Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System*, 236 Ill.2d 315 (2010), the board of trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System

terminated all of former Governor George Ryan's pension benefits as a result of his conviction for felonies committed during and related to his service as Secretary of State and Governor. Section 2-156 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/2-156 (West 2006)) prohibits payment of benefits to any person convicted of any felony relating to, arising out of, or in connection with his or her service as a member. The term "member" is defined as a General Assembly member or an executive branch constitutional officer. Ryan earned pension benefits as a General Assembly member and as the Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, and Governor, and he argued that the statute required forfeiture only of that portion attributable to the service to which the felonies related. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that a felony committed with respect to one of the offices comprising the definition of "member" requires forfeiture of all benefits under the General Assembly Retirement System. The court distinguished an earlier decision interpreting a parallel forfeiture provision of the municipal retirement system. In that case, a former holder of an office in each of 2 municipalities was convicted of a felony relating to only one of those offices. That municipal retirement system member was permitted to retain the benefits from the unrelated office. Unlike that former official, Ryan derived all his pension benefits from one public employer, the State of Illinois. The spirit of the forfeiture statute prohibited Ryan from receiving pension benefits funded by the public employer his felonious conduct betrayed.

ILLINOIS PENSION CODE - TRUSTEE CONTROL

A municipal police pension fund's board of trustees, not the municipal treasurer, is authorized to correct pension or benefit overpayments by requiring deductions from future payments.

In *Morris v. Harper*, 393 Ill.App.3d 624 (1st Dist. 2009), the city treasurer of Harrisburg refused to pay police pension benefits to certain beneficiaries in the amounts determined by the trustees of the Harrisburg police pension fund. The treasurer relied on section 3-144.2 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3-144.2 (West 2006)), which states that the "amount of any overpayment, due to fraud, misrepresentation or error, of any pension or benefit granted under this Article may be deducted from future payments to the recipient of such pension or benefit". The pension fund trustees countered that under Section 3-132 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3-132 (West 2006)), the powers and duties of the trustees are to control and manage, exclusively, the pension fund. The court harmonized the 2 Sections by concluding that to the extent Section 3-144.2 authorizes the correction of overpayments, it gives that authority to the trustees, not to the treasurer.

COUNTIES CODE - PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FEE

A "preliminary examination" that entitles a State's Attorney to a fee is a probable cause hearing, not a bail hearing.

In *People v. Smith*, 236 Ill.2d 162 (2010), the trial court imposed on the defendant a \$20 preliminary hearing fee pursuant to subsection (a) of Section 4-2002.1 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1 (West 2006)). Subsection (a) entitles State's Attorneys to fees for "preliminary examinations for each defendant held to bail or

recognizance”. The defendant appealed the imposition of the \$20 fee, arguing that the term “preliminary examination” means a probable cause hearing. The appellate court interpreted “preliminary examination” to mean a bail hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s interpretation for failing to give effect to the language of the entire Section by ignoring the language requiring that the fee be imposed “[f]or preliminary examinations for each defendant held to . . .”. The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted “preliminary examination” to mean a probable cause hearing because the requirement of a probable cause hearing gives full effect to the statutory language and because State’s Attorneys have a larger role in probable cause hearings than in bail hearings. Section 4-2002.1 requires that there be a probable cause hearing before a preliminary examination fee may be imposed. Without expressing an opinion as to the resolution of the issue, the Illinois Supreme Court also pointed out an inconsistency in the imposition of preliminary examination fees under Section 4-2002.1. The Section provides for the imposition of a preliminary examination fee on a defendant who received a probable cause hearing and was “held to bail or recognizance” but appears to exclude a defendant who was in custody and denied bail.

COUNTIES CODE - FINES

The Code’s mental health court fee and youth diversion-peer court fee are fines, not fees, because their imposition punishes the defendant rather than reimburses prosecutorial costs.

In *People v. Graves*, 235 Ill.2d 244 (2009), the defendant was convicted of possessing a stolen vehicle. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a 9-year term of imprisonment and imposed a \$10 mental health court fee and a \$5 youth diversion-peer court fee pursuant to subsections (d-5) and (e), respectively, of Section 5-1101 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1101 (West 2006)). Section 5-1101 requires the collection of those fees if they are adopted by the relevant county board. The defendant challenged the imposition of the fees as an unconstitutional violation of due process, arguing that there was no rational relationship between the fees and the offense of possessing a stolen vehicle. The defendant also argued that the fees could not be rendered permissible by characterizing them as fines because the Counties Code authorizes county boards to adopt only fees, not fines. The Illinois Supreme Court outlined the primary differences between a fee and a fine. A fine is a “pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense”, while a fee is imposed to reimburse the State for costs incurred in prosecuting a defendant. After reviewing the Counties Code provisions concerning ordinance violations, the court found that Section 5-1113 of the Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1113 (West 2006)) includes language specifically authorizing a county board to provide for “fines or penalties as may be deemed proper”. Despite Section 5-1101’s plain language, the mental health court fee and youth diversion-peer court fee assessed against the defendant are fines because the monetary charges constitute a punishment for the criminal conviction and not a reimbursement of prosecutorial costs incurred by the State.

ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL CODE - NOTICE OF ZONING ORDINANCE HEARING

The Code's minimum constructive notice requirement for public hearings on proposed comprehensive zoning ordinances is constitutionally insufficient as applied to affected property owners who may easily be given actual notice.

In *Passalino v. City of Zion*, 237 Ill.2d 118 (2010), the city of Zion gave notice of a public hearing on its proposed comprehensive zoning ordinance. The notice, consisting of advertisement in 2 newspapers published in Zion, complied with the minimum notice requirement for such a hearing in Section 11-13-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-2 (West 1996)). The city adopted the ordinance. The plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of a land trust that owned several of the 85 parcels affected by the ordinance; their undeveloped parcels were re-classified from multi-family residential use to single-family residential use. The plaintiffs claimed that the city's notice of the hearing was insufficient and that they were entitled to actual notice. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Section 11-13-2 is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' procedural due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Amend. V and Amend. XIV, Sec.1) were violated because the city's constructive notice was not reasonably calculated to inform affected property owners who might have been easily notified by other means. The city could have mailed notice of the hearing to the land trustee, whose address as the taxpayer of record could be obtained by the city, and the trustee could have forwarded the notice to the plaintiffs. A dissenting opinion asserted that Section 11-13-2's constructive notice was adequate for these plaintiffs because (i) they possessed an interest in the land trust, not the affected parcels, (ii) the right to use property generally does not include a right to the continuation of a zoning classification, especially when the property is undeveloped, and (iii) identification of land trust beneficiaries and their addresses is more difficult than the court suggested.

SCHOOL CODE - CHARTER SCHOOL EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION

Public Act 96-104's declaration of "existing law" does not make its redefinition of charter schools as educational employers for collective bargaining purposes enforceable retroactively.

In *Northern Kane Educational Corp. v. Cambridge Lakes Educational Association, IEA-NEA*, 394 Ill.App.3d 755 (4th Dist. 2009), an educational employee union filed a petition with the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board to represent the employees of a charter school. The charter school disputed the Board's jurisdiction because the school was not an "educational employer" as defined in Section 2 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/2 (West 2008)). Subsection (g) of Section 27A-5 of the Charter School Law of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/27A-5 (West 2008)) exempts charter schools from the application of State laws other than certain enumerated exceptions. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act is not one of the enumerated exceptions. Public Act 96-104 amended the Charter School Law and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act to provide that the governing body of a charter school is an "educational employer" under, and must comply with, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act. The court ruled that the Board lacked jurisdiction.

Public Act 96-104, which was not effective until January 1, 2010, could not be rendered retroactively enforceable against this charter school by the General Assembly's inclusion in the Public Act of a statement that the amendment was "declaratory of existing law".

NURSING HOME CARE ACT - ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

Provisions nullifying a nursing home resident's waiver of the right to sue are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.

In *Fosler v. Midwest Care Center II, Inc.*, 398 Ill.App.3d 563 (2nd Dist. 2010), the defendants sought to compel arbitration in a negligence dispute with the plaintiff's estate. The defendants argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §1 *et seq.*) preempts Sections 3-606 and 3-607 of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3-606 and 45/3-607 (West 2006)), which aim to nullify a nursing home resident's waiver of the right to commence an action in circuit court. The appellate court agreed, noting 2 limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: (i) the provisions must be part of a written maritime contract or commercial transaction contract and (ii) they must be revocable on the same grounds at law or in equity that exist for the revocation of any contract. The nursing home admission agreement at issue did, in fact, involve interstate commerce. More importantly, Sections 3-606 and 3-607 target arbitration agreements specifically and, therefore, cannot be considered grounds that exist for the revocation of *any* contract. Sections 3-606 and 3-607 "prescribe nursing home residents greater rights in making agreements to arbitrate than in other contracts", effectively placing those Sections in direct conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act's "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements". Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2), when such conflict exists, "the state statute must give way".

REAL ESTATE LICENSE ACT OF 2000 - TRIAL BY JURY

Actions under the Act, or under the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act or the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, are not subject to the constitutional right to a trial by jury.

In *Anderson v. Klasek*, 393 Ill.App.3d 219 (1st Dist. 2009), the plaintiffs, who purchased a house with termite damage, brought action against the seller, alleging a violation of the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act (765 ILCS 77/ (West 2002)), and against the real estate agent for violation of the Real Estate License Act of 2000 (225 ILCS 454/ (West 2002)) and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/ (West 2002)). At trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the seller and agent, and the plaintiffs appealed. The plaintiffs argued that a new bench trial on all counts should be granted because the defendants were not entitled to a jury trial under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act, or the Real Estate License Act of 2000. Section 13 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 13) provides that the "right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate". The appellate court held that Section 13 of Article I means that the right to a jury trial shall continue in all cases where that right existed at common law at the time the Illinois Constitution was adopted; that

constitutional provision has never been held to prohibit the legislature from creating new rights unknown to the common law and providing for their determination without a jury. The court held that the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act is not like common law fraud, and the Act's legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended the action to be tried without a jury. The court also held that neither the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act nor the Real Estate License Act of 2000 existed at common law, that both are statutory creations, and that the defendants were not entitled to a jury trial in the action brought pursuant to those Acts.

SMOKE FREE ILLINOIS ACT - ENFORCEMENT

The Act must be enforced administratively, rather than through criminal proceedings in the circuit courts.

In *People v. Kane*, 397 Ill.App.3d 851 (3rd Dist. 2010), the defendant was observed smoking in a tavern and was issued a citation accusing her of violating Section 15 of the Smoke Free Illinois Act (410 ILCS 82/15 (West 2008)), which prohibits smoking in a public place, in any place of employment, or within 15 feet of any entrance to a public place or place of employment. The defendant was found guilty at trial in the circuit court, sentenced to 6 months' court supervision, and ordered to pay a fine. Section 40 of the Act (410 ILCS 82/40 (West Supp. 2007)) authorizes the Department of Public Health, State-certified local public health departments, and local law enforcement agencies to enforce the provisions of the Act. The court declared that, reading the Smoke Free Illinois Act as a whole, it is clear that the General Assembly intended that the Act be enforced administratively, not in criminal proceedings, and that nowhere does the Act describe a violation as a criminal act. Accordingly, the State may not enforce violations of the Smoke Free Illinois Act through criminal proceedings in the circuit courts.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT - HOME RULE

The Act implicitly preempts a home rule municipality's ordinance regulating real property containing hazardous wastes or substances because the Illinois Constitution vests the General Assembly with the power to establish uniform pollution control standards.

In *Village of DePue v. Viacom Intern., Inc.*, 632 F.Supp.2d 854 (C.D.Ill. 2009), a home rule municipality sued several corporations for violations of an ordinance that prohibited persons in the municipality from owning, controlling, or possessing real property that contained hazardous wastes or substances. The defendants sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that the State's Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/) preempts the ordinance. Subsection (a) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. VII, Sec. 6) vests home rule municipalities with the power to regulate for the protection of the public health and safety, and the Environmental Protection Act contains no express preemption of that power. However, Article XI of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. XI) states that "[t]he public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of future generations" and that "[t]he General Assembly shall provide by law for the implementation and enforcement of . . . [that] policy". The federal district court granted

the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that Article XI vests the General Assembly with the power to provide uniform pollution control standards and that the municipality's ordinance was at odds with those standards as codified in the Environmental Protection Act.

ILLINOIS VEHICLE CODE - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

The "unlawful use" of a controlled substance refers to the illegality of the substance, not whether the substance is consumed unlawfully.

In *People v. Rodriguez*, 398 Ill.App.3d 436 (1st Dist. 2009), the defendant was found guilty of violating subdivision (a)(6) of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2004)). Subdivision (a)(6) prohibits a person from driving a vehicle when that person's urine contains any amount of a drug, substance, or compound resulting from "the unlawful use or consumption" of a controlled substance. The defendant contended that the State did not meet its burden of proof because it failed to introduce evidence that the controlled substance found in his urine was ingested unlawfully. The appellate court held that unlawfulness is not a separate element of the offense of driving under the influence and that the State must show only that the use or consumption of a controlled substance was in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/). The word "unlawful" in subdivision (a)(6) means in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.

COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUDGES ACT - CONSTITUTIONALITY

The Act's mandatory retirement of a judge who attains age 75 while in office is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection because a person who attained age 75 while not in office may be elected as a judge.

In *Maddux v. Blagojevich*, 233 Ill.2d 508 (2009), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the Compulsory Retirement of Judges Act (705 ILCS 55/ (West 2006)) violates the equal protection guarantee of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2). The Act provides that a supreme court, appellate, circuit, or associate judge is automatically retired at the expiration of the term of office in which the judge attains the age of 75. Section 11 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. VI, Sec. 11) specifies eligibility criteria for a person to serve as a judge but does not include a minimum or maximum age requirement; Section 15 of that Article (ILCON Art. VI, Sec. 15), however, authorizes the General Assembly to establish a mandatory retirement age for judges. The General Assembly's attempt to do so runs afoul of the equal protection clause, though, because the Act prohibits a 75-year-old or older judge from seeking retention in office or running in a judicial election, while a citizen older than 75 who has never been a judge or who was not a judge when he or she turned 75 is eligible for election to judicial office. The court held that there is no rational basis upon which the legislature can make this distinction when the disqualifying characteristic is age. If the legitimate State interest is to ensure a "vigorous judiciary", the classification in the Act cannot be deemed rationally related to that purpose. Further, if age defines ability (and both the constitutional and legislative histories indicate that it was believed to do so), then either *all* those 75 years of age or older are unfit or they are not. The court

acknowledged that reconciling the General Assembly's authority to enact a mandatory judicial retirement age with the prohibition against impermissibly expanding the Illinois Constitution's eligibility criteria for judicial office will require precise navigation; indeed, a constitutional amendment may be the only means to achieve compulsory retirement.

CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961 - CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

A computer user who views images of child pornography without intentionally copying or saving them nonetheless possesses child pornography if he or she has exercised dominion and control over the images.

In *People v. Scolaro*, 391 Ill.App.3d 671 (1st Dist. 2009), a defendant who viewed pornographic images of children on his computer screen but who had not intentionally copied or saved those images to his computer appealed his conviction for child pornography under subdivision (a)(6) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1 (West 2004)), arguing that he did not possess the images. Subdivision (a)(6) provides that a person commits the offense of child pornography when that person, with the knowledge of the nature or content thereof, possesses any film, videotape, photograph, or other similar visual reproduction or depiction by computer of any child, whom the person knows or reasonably should know to be under the age of 18, engaged in certain sexual activities. In this case of first impression, the appellate Court held that the defendant knowingly possessed the images because evidence offered at trial demonstrated that he had (i) sought out the images by subscribing to certain websites and (ii) exercised dominion and control over the images by acting to remove evidence of them from his computer's cache.

CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961 - ANTI-PIRACY OF RECORDINGS

The anti-piracy provision against unlawful use of recorded sounds or images is preempted by the federal Copyright Act of 1976.

In *People v. Williams*, 235 Ill.2d 178 (2009), the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of recorded sounds or images and unlawful use of unidentified sound or audio visual recordings in violation of Sections 16-7 and 16-8, respectively, of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/16-7 and 5/16-8 (West 2004)). The Illinois Supreme Court held that subdivision (a)(2) of Section 16-7, the anti-piracy statute, is preempted by the federal Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. §301). The court found that the presumption that historic State police powers are not superseded by federal law does not apply because the federal Copyright Act of 1976 was first enacted prior to the State statute, protection of sound recordings is traditionally within the realm of federal regulation, and federal concerns predominate in that area. The court also found that Section 16-7 falls within the express preemption provision found in Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 because (i) the works come within the subject matter of copyright and (ii) the elements of a cause of action for copyright infringement are equivalent to the elements set forth in Section 16-7. In addition, the court rejected the defendant's assertions that Section 16-8, which makes it a crime to sell sound recordings for profit if the labeling or packaging on the recording does not display the name and address of the

manufacturer and the name of the performer, impermissibly impedes free speech and violates substantive due process.

CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961 - UNLAWFUL USE OF A WEAPON

Unlawful possession of a shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches long does not require that the shotgun be operational or functional.

In *People v. Williams*, 394 Ill.App.3d 286 (1st Dist. 2009), the defendant challenged his conviction under subdivision (a)(7)(ii) of Section 24-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-1 (West 2006)) for possessing an inoperable, rusty shotgun with a 12-inch barrel. That subdivision makes it unlawful for a person to possess a shotgun if one or more of its barrels is less than 18 inches in length. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that the plain language of the statute does not require the shotgun to be operational or functional in order for a person to be convicted under that provision.

CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961 - AGGRAVATED UNLAWFUL USE OF A WEAPON

Aggravated unlawful use of a weapon is a more serious offense than unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, when both offenses are premised on the same physical act.

In *People v. Johnson*, 237 Ill.2d 81 (2010), the defendant was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon under subdivision (a)(i) of Section 24-1.6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2006)) and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon under subsection (a) of Section 24-1.1 of that Code (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2006)). Aggravated unlawful use of a weapon is a Class 2 felony with a sentence of not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years imprisonment. Unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, on the other hand, is a Class 3 felony that is punishable with imprisonment for no less than 2 years and no more than 10 years. For this defendant, the Class 2 felony of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon was subject to a mandatory supervised release term of 2 years, while the Class 3 felony of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon was subject to a mandatory supervised release term of one year. The defendant argued that aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon are both premised upon the same physical act and both cannot stand under one-act, one-crime principles. The defendant asserted that unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon is the more serious offense and that, therefore, his conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon should be vacated. The Illinois Supreme Court held that aggravated unlawful use of a weapon is a more serious offense than unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and that the defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon must be vacated.

CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961 - WEAPON STORAGE CASE

The center console of a vehicle is a weapon storage "case" within the meaning of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute.

In *People v. Diggins*, 235 Ill.2d 48 (2009), the defendant was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in violation of Section 24-1.6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2006)). Under subdivision (c)(3) of that Section, a person does not commit the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon if the weapon is “unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card”. The defendant had a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card, and the weapons were not loaded. Therefore, the question before the Illinois Supreme Court was whether the center console of a vehicle is a “case” within the meaning of Section 24-1.6. The court looked to the plain meaning of the word “case,” including its dictionary definition, and concluded that a center console is a “case.” The court rejected the analysis of the Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court in *People v. Cameron*, 336 Ill.App.3d 548 (4th Dist. 2003), which interpreted the phrase “other container” within Section 24-1.6 as requiring the container to be portable. The Illinois Supreme Court also acknowledged that if subdivision (c)(3) of Section 24-1.6 had been drafted to read “*firearm* case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container” or “case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other *firearm* container”, the court might have reached a different conclusion.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 1963 - USE IMMUNITY

The provision that a court “shall” grant use immunity is mandatory, not permissive.

In *People v. Ousley*, 235 Ill.2d 299 (2009), the State sought to grant use immunity to a co-defendant under Section 106-2.5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/106-2.5 (West 2006)) in order to compel that co-defendant’s testimony against the defendant. The trial court denied the motion on the basis of common law concerns. The State appealed, arguing that the language of the use immunity statute providing that the court “shall” order that a witness be granted immunity upon motion of the State imposes a mandatory obligation on the court. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed, holding that the use immunity statute is mandatory rather than permissive. Although the court noted that the use of the word “shall” is not determinative when the issue is whether the statute is mandatory or directory, it reasoned that, when the issue is whether the statute is mandatory or permissive, the use of the word “shall” usually indicates that the legislature intended the provision to be mandatory. The court also compared the use immunity statute to the transactional immunity language in Section 106-1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/106-1 (West 2006)), in which the legislature provided that the court “may” grant immunity, and to a similar federal use immunity statute that had been held to be mandatory.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 1963 - ADMONISHMENT

The requirement that a defendant entering a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nullo contendere be advised of the plea’s possible effects upon his or her immigration status is directory, not mandatory.

In *People v. Delvillar*, 235 Ill.2d 507 (2009), the defendant, while entering a guilty plea to various criminal charges, was asked by the judge whether he was a United States citizen. The defendant responded, “Yes”, although he was, in fact, a resident alien. Section 113-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/113-8 (West 2006)) requires that a court admonish a defendant of the possible consequences to his or her immigration status of entering a guilty plea. The judge did not give the defendant that advisory. The trial court denied the defendant’s subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant argued that the admonishment statute is mandatory and that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the court’s failure to issue the admonition invalidated that plea. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, noting the confusion among Illinois courts as to the characterization of statutes as permissive, mandatory, or directory. A statute is permissive if the action described is a power that may be exercised, rather than a duty that must be performed. A statutory duty imposed upon a court is mandatory, rather than directory, if the General Assembly has dictated a specific consequence that will be triggered by the court’s failure to perform the duty. Section 113-8’s admonishment requirement is directory because it does not state in negative terms the outcome of non-compliance and because non-compliance does not generally injure the right the statute is intended to protect, that of a defendant to intelligently waive a jury trial and enter a guilty plea. Any consequences resulting from the court’s failure to admonish a defendant as to the possible effects of a guilty plea upon the defendant’s immigration status are collateral, not direct. The judge’s failure to issue the admonition was merely one factor to consider in deciding the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 1963 - NUMBER OF JURORS

The provision that a criminal trial jury “shall” consist of 12 members is permissive, not mandatory, and a jury of fewer members does not require the State’s consent.

In *People ex rel. Birkett v. Dockery*, 235 Ill.2d 73 (2009), the trial court entered an order granting the criminal defendant’s pre-trial request for a jury of 6 members. The State sought to reverse that order, arguing that the court lacked discretion to empanel a jury of fewer than 12 members because subsection (b) of Section 115-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-4 (West 2008)) provides that a jury in a criminal trial “shall” consist of 12 members. The defendant pointed to committee comments in the annotated publication of the statute (Smith Hurd 2008), which provide that a defendant may waive any part of the right to trial by jury and agree to a jury of fewer than 12 members. The State then interpreted previous case law to require its agreement to a smaller jury, effectively giving the State veto power. The State also noted that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which contain language similar to that of subsection (b) of Section 115-4 of the Code, have been construed to require the government’s agreement to a jury reduction. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the trial court had discretion to seat a jury of 6 because subsection (b)’s use of “shall” is permissive, not mandatory. The State’s consent was unnecessary because the prior case law on which the State relied has been overruled. In addition, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure incorporate a federal right to trial by jury that has been applied to

both the government and defendants; Section 13 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 13) recognizes that right only with respect to individuals.

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES

Public Act 94-677, due to its limits on medical malpractice non-economic damages and its inseverability, is unconstitutional in its entirety.

In *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010), the plaintiffs in consolidated medical malpractice cases challenged the constitutionality of Section 2-1706.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1706.5 (West 2008)). Section 2-1706.5 limits the non-economic damages that all plaintiffs may recover in a medical malpractice action to \$500,000 against a physician and \$1,000,000 against a hospital and its personnel or affiliates. The limits were adopted as part of various civil justice and health care reforms enacted by Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that the non-economic damages caps violate the separation of powers principle of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. II, Sec. 1) by supplanting the judiciary's authority to implement the doctrine of remittitur. Remittitur is the correction of an excessive jury verdict and is ordered by the court only on a case-by-case basis and only with the plaintiff's consent. The statute substitutes a legislative remittitur that is mandatory and applies to all medical malpractice plaintiffs and juries, regardless of individual circumstances. The defendants claimed that the statutory limits are the General Assembly's valid response to the public threat of a health care system in crisis and that application of the limits to a single class of plaintiffs rationally relates to the State's legitimate interest in containing health care costs by lowering medical malpractice insurance premiums. The court deemed those assertions irrelevant because they address the constitutionality of the statute as a valid exercise of the General Assembly's police power and as special legislation, which is not the basis of the court's decision. Public Act 94-677 amended numerous statutes; because it included an inseverability Section, Public Act 94-677 is invalid in its entirety.

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - ORDINANCE AS STATUTE

The statute of limitations on actions for a "statutory penalty" applies to an action for a penalty authorized by a municipal ordinance.

In *Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C.*, 235 Ill.2d 1 (2009), former tenants brought an action, pursuant to Chicago's landlord and tenant ordinance, against their landlord who failed to make a timely return of the tenants' security deposit. The tenants, citing the ordinance, sought an award equal to 2 times the security deposit plus interest. The action was dismissed because the action was barred by the 2-year statute of limitations that applies to actions for a "statutory penalty" under Section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2004)). The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the dismissal and found that the phrase "statutory penalty" is ambiguous. The court stated that an ambiguous statute should be given the fullest possible meaning and determined that the term "statutory" includes actions brought pursuant to a municipal ordinance. The court also determined that because the ordinance provided for an award that was double

the amount of the security deposit, the award was readily calculable and, thus, constituted a “penalty”. A dissenting opinion argued that the meaning of the word “statutory” is determined by the meaning in use at the time that the statute was adopted and, thus, applies only to statutes passed by the General Assembly and not to municipal ordinances.

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - LIMITATIONS ON CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE ACTIONS

The statute of limitations on actions arising from a person’s childhood sexual abuse does not apply to an action for emotional injury based on someone else’s childhood sexual abuse.

In *Doe v. White*, 627 F.Supp.2d 905 (C.D.Ill. 2009), students and parents brought an action against a former teacher, school administrators, and a school district arising from the teacher’s alleged sexual misconduct against the students. The parents’ action was dismissed because that action was barred by the 2-year statute of limitations on actions for personal injury under Section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202). The federal district court found that the longer statute of limitations for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse contained in Section 13-202.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2) applies only to claims by the person abused and not to actions by any other person claiming injury based on someone else’s childhood abuse.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AND GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES TORT IMMUNITY ACT - PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC

Immunity from liability for failure to provide traffic safety devices includes immunity with respect to pedestrian traffic at railroad crosswalks.

In *Chiriboga v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.*, 687 F.Supp.2d 764 (N.D.Ill. 2009), the plaintiff filed a negligence claim against public regional commuter train Metra for the death of his wife, who was killed by an Amtrak train while crossing a railroad crosswalk to board a Metra train. The plaintiff argued that Metra failed to maintain the railroad crosswalk in a reasonably safe condition and owed a duty to pedestrians to: (i) install visual devices at crosswalks at its station, (ii) install a gate at the crosswalk, (iii) announce the approach of Amtrak trains over the existing loudspeaker system, and (iv) install audible devices in addition to the loudspeaker system to alert persons of approaching trains. Metra claimed immunity from liability under Section 3-104 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-104). Section 3-104 immunizes local public entities “for any injury caused by the failure to initially provide regulatory traffic control devices, stop signs . . . or any other traffic regulating or warning sign”. The plaintiff argued that the immunity provisions of that Section were not intended to apply to pedestrian traffic in a railroad crosswalk because the term “traffic” has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 1-207 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-207). In that Section, “traffic” is defined as persons, animals, and vehicles “using any highway for purposes of travel”. The plaintiff claimed that if the definition of “traffic” from the Illinois Vehicle Code applies, then pedestrians must be traveling on a highway in order to be considered “traffic”, and a railroad crosswalk does

not constitute a highway. The federal district court rejected the plaintiff's argument, finding that the Illinois Vehicle Code definition of "traffic" is not applicable to the interpretation of that term as used in Section 3-104 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act because the Illinois Vehicle Code does not address situations pertaining to railroad crossings. Metra was immune from liability under Section 3-104 for failing to install safety devices to alert pedestrians of approaching trains.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AND GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES TORT IMMUNITY ACT - LIMITATIONS

The Act's 2-year limitations period on actions for injuries arising out of patient care does not apply to an action based on a physician's sexual assault of a patient during a stay in the physician's hospital.

In *Kaufmann v. Jersey Community Hospital*, 396 Ill.App.3d 729 (4th Dist. 2009), the plaintiff sought damages based on her physician's sexual assault committed on her while she was hospitalized at the defendant's hospital. The plaintiff filed her complaint more than one year but less than 2 years after the date her cause of action accrued. Section 8-101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2006)) provides for a one-year limitations period generally but a 2-year limitations period in the case of an action for damages for an injury arising out of patient care. The defendant argued that the one-year limitations period applied and that the plaintiff's complaint was thus barred. The appellate court held that the physician's act of sexual assault was not "patient care" but was for his own sexual gratification and separate from any medical care provided to the plaintiff. The General Assembly did not intend that anything a physician does to a patient constitutes patient care. A dissenting opinion asserted that the majority's determination of the source of the plaintiff's alleged injuries was too simplistic; the sexual assault was inextricable from the patient's medical care.

HOME REPAIR AND REMODELING ACT – RESIDENCE

The definition of "residence" does not include part of a commercial building being converted into residential space.

In *Tom Geise Plumbing, Inc. v. Taylor*, 396 Ill.App.3d 289 (4th Dist. 2009), the plaintiff sought payment for plumbing work performed for the defendants. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff had not complied with the requirements of the Home Repair and Remodeling Act. The work consisted of remodeling for the purpose of converting the second and third floors of a commercial building owned by the defendants into residential space. The first floor of the building was divided into 3 separate commercial units, each with a separate address. Section 10 of the Act (815 ILCS 513/10 (West 2006)) defines a "residence" to which the Act applies as a single-family home or dwelling or a multiple-family home or dwelling containing 6 or fewer apartments, condominiums, town houses, or dwelling units, used or intended to be used by occupants as dwelling places. The appellate court held that the defendants' building did not fit within the Act's definition of "residence". The General Assembly did not envision that

part of a commercial building being converted into a loft would fall within the scope of the Act, nor is the owner of a commercial building a homeowner as envisioned by the Act.

ILLINOIS WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION ACT - EARNED BONUS

An “earned bonus” is one that was unequivocally promised by the employer under the terms of the employment contract or agreement.

In *McLaughlin v. Sternberg Lanterns, Inc.*, 395 Ill.App.3d 536 (2nd Dist. 2009), the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment for reasons relating to the plaintiff’s job performance, and the plaintiff sought recovery of final compensation pursuant to the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act. Section 2 of the Act (820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2006)) defines “final compensation” to include “earned bonuses”, and the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to a pro rata share of a bonus for the year in which his employment was terminated. The appellate court held that an “earned bonus” is one that was unequivocally promised by the employer under the terms of the employment contract or agreement. The language in these parties’ contract was not an unequivocal guarantee that the plaintiff would receive the bonus; rather, the bonus was conditional, dependent on whether the defendant’s sales increased over the previous year.

PREVAILING WAGE ACT - PUBLIC WORKS

Mere location in a TIF district does not render an otherwise private construction project a “public work”.

In *Town of Normal v. Hafner*, 395 Ill.App.3d 589 (4th Dist. 2009), the town sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants were obligated to pay prevailing wages under the terms of the Prevailing Wage Act in connection with a redevelopment project they were undertaking. The defendants were redeveloping property to create private residences within a TIF district in the town and argued that the redevelopment project was not a “public work” within the meaning of the Act. Section 2 of the Act (820 ILCS 130/2 (West 2004)) provides that “public works” means works constructed by a public body and includes projects financed in whole or in part with bonds issued under certain specified Acts. The appellate court held that the defendants’ project was not a “public work” within the meaning of the Act. “Public works” does not include individuals’ construction of private residences on privately owned land with financing from a private bank with a mortgage for which the individuals are personally liable. The defendants did not receive public funds from the town or any other government entity; as an incentive to redevelop the property, the town merely agreed to reimburse, out of the increased tax revenue generated as a result of the redevelopment, part of the interest the defendants were obligated to pay for the private financing of the project. In addition, the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (65 ILCS 5/Art. 11, Div. 74.4), which provides for the creation of TIF districts, was not included in the list of Acts set forth in Section 2 of the Prevailing Wage Act under which bonds might be issued to finance public works.

Public Act 96-58, effective January 1, 2010, amended Section 2 of the Prevailing Wage Act to provide that “public works” does not include projects undertaken by the

owner at an owner-occupied single-family residence or at an owner-occupied unit of a multi-family residence.

INTRODUCTION TO PART 2

Part 2 of this 2010 Case Report contains all the Illinois statutes that LRB research has found that have been held unconstitutional and remain in the Illinois Compiled Statutes without having been changed in response to the holding of unconstitutionality.

PART 2
CUMULATIVE REPORT OF STATUTES HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
NOT AMENDED OR REPEALED IN RESPONSE TO THE HOLDING OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

GENERAL PROVISIONS

5 ILCS 315/ (West 1992). **Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.** Application of the Act by the State Labor Relations Board to employees of the Illinois Supreme Court violated the separation of powers doctrine by infringing upon the court’s administrative and supervisory powers granted under the Illinois Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 18. *Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts v. State and Municipal Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local 726, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO*, 167 Ill.2d 180 (1995).

5 ILCS 350/2 (P.A. 89-688). **State Employee Indemnification Act.** Provision amended by P.A. 89-688 is unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Criminal Procedure” and “Corrections”.)

ELECTIONS

10 ILCS 5/2A-1 and 5/2A-9 (P.A. 89-719). **Election Code.** (See *Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman*, 181 Ill.2d 65 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Courts”, concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Judicial Redistricting Act of 1997 enacted by P.A. 89-719.)

10 ILCS 5/7-10. **Election Code.** Provision (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-10) that requires candidates for ward committeeman in the city of Chicago to meet higher nomination petition signature requirements than candidates for township committeeman in Cook County violates the equal protection clause by burdening the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of voters to cast their votes effectively by creating a geographical classification substantially injuring the voters and candidates of the city of Chicago despite less burdensome alternatives. *Smith v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago*, 587 F.Supp. 1136 (N.D.Ill. 1984), and *Gjersten v. Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago*, 791 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1986).

10 ILCS 5/7-10.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 46, par. 7-10.1). **Election Code.** In the Article concerning nominations by political parties, the form for a petition or certificate of

nomination contains a loyalty oath. The loyalty oath provision was held unconstitutional as vague and overly broad, violating the U.S. Constitution, Amendments I and XIV. *Communist Party of Illinois v. Ogilvie*, 357 F.Supp. 105 (N.D.Ill. 1972).

10 ILCS 5/10-2. Election Code. In the Article concerning the making of nominations in certain other cases, a provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, ch. 46, par. 291) prohibits a political organization or group from being qualified as a political party and assigned a place on the ballot if the organization or group is associated, directly or indirectly, with Communist, Fascist, Nazi, or other un-American principles and engages in activities or propaganda designed to teach subservience to the political principles and ideals of foreign nations or the overthrow by violence of the federal or State constitutional form of government. The provision is unconstitutionally vague, lacking the definiteness required in a statute affecting the rights of a political group to appeal to the electorate. Identical language is used in a similar context in 10 ILCS 5/7-2 and 5/8-2. *Feinglass v. Reinecke*, 48 F.Supp. 438 (N.D.Ill. 1942).

Provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 46, par. 10-2) regarding establishment of a new political party is invalid to the extent it requires more signatures to form a new political party in a multidistrict subdivision than it does for a statewide new political party. Violates the U.S. Constitution, Amendments I and XIV. *Norman v. Reed*, 112 S.Ct. 698 (1992).

10 ILCS 5/10-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 46, par. 10-5). **Election Code.** Prohibition against new party candidates in one political subdivision from using the same party name as that of a party in a different subdivision is broader than necessary to protect the State's interest in prohibiting candidates from adopting the name of a political party with which they are not affiliated. Violates Amendments I and XIV of the U.S. Constitution. *Norman v. Reed*, 112 S.Ct. 698 (1992).

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

20 ILCS 505/5 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 5005). **Children and Family Services Act.**

225 ILCS 10/2.05 and 10/2.17 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, pars. 2212.05 and 2212.17). **Child Care Act of 1969.**

Provisions of the Children and Family Services Act and the Child Care Act of 1969 that deny AFDC-FC (foster care) payments to foster parents who are related to the foster children they care for conflict with the Social Security Act and are unconstitutional as violating that Act and therefore the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. *Youakim v. Miller*, 431 F.Supp. 40 (N.D.Ill. 1976).

The transition schedule provided by Section 5 of the Children and Family Services Act for discontinuing foster care payments to any foster family homes other than licensed foster family homes violates the due process rights of pre-approved and approved foster family homes guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, Amend. XIV. *Youakim v. McDonald*, 71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1995).

LEGISLATURE

25 ILCS 115/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 63, par. 14). **General Assembly Compensation Act.** Amendatory changes made to this Section by P.A. 86-27 provide for annual, lump sum additional payments to certain legislators in leadership positions. Because P.A. 86-27 further provided that the pay raises were to be effective retroactively, the legislation is unconstitutional to the extent it allowed for a change in a legislator's salary during the term for which he or she was elected. *Rock v. Burriss*, 139 Ill.2d 494 (1990).

25 ILCS 120/5.5 (West 2002). **Compensation Review Act.** Section denying the fiscal year 2003 cost-of-living adjustment to the salaries of State officials (previously recommended by the Compensation Review Board and not disapproved by the General Assembly) is unconstitutional with respect to salaries of State judges because it violates the Illinois Constitution's separation of powers clause (ILCON Art. II, Sec. 1) and prohibition against decreasing a judge's salary during his or her term (ILCON Art. VI, Sec. 14). *Jorgensen v. Blagojevich*, 211 Ill.2d 286 (2004).

FINANCE

30 ILCS 5/3-1 (West 2000). **Illinois State Auditing Act.** Requirement that the Auditor General perform compliance and management audits of various Chicago airports exceeds the Auditor General's authority under subsection (b) of Section 3 of Article VIII of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. VIII, Sec. 3) to audit public funds of the State, because the airports' funds are not appropriated by the General Assembly but are derived from user fees and federal grants. *City of Chicago v. Holland*, 206 Ill.2d 480 (2003).

30 ILCS 105/5.400 (P.A. 88-680). **State Finance Act.** Provision added by P.A. 88-680 is unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Courts" and "Corrections" and in Part 3 of this Case Report under "Criminal Offenses".)

30 ILCS 105/5.661 (30 ILCS 105/5.640 P.A. 94-677). **State Finance Act.** (See *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure", concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure enacted by Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005.)

30 ILCS 805/8.18 (P.A. 88-669). **State Mandates Act.** Provisions added by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Revenue” and “Special Districts”.)

REVENUE

35 ILCS 5/203 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 2-203). **Illinois Income Tax Act.** Department of Revenue’s construction of provision that any corporation which is a member of an affiliated group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return, incurring a net operating loss on a separate Illinois income tax return basis, be deemed to have made the election provided in the Internal Revenue Code (that is, to relinquish the entire carryback period and only carry forward the loss) violates the uniformity of taxation clause of Article IX, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution as to corporate taxpayers of an affiliated group which files a consolidated federal income tax return reflecting a net operating loss, which operating loss the parent company does not elect to carry forward. *Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue*, 117 Ill.2d 454 (1987).

35 ILCS 200/20-180 and 200/20-185. Property Tax Code. Provisions (formerly part of the Uncollectable Tax Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, pars. 891 and 891.1) that allow a municipality to cancel bonds and use moneys collected for similar projects after revenues that were specified to secure the bonds are deemed uncollectable are an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. *George D. Hardin, Inc. v. Village of Mt. Prospect*, 99 Ill.2d 96 (1983).

35 ILCS 520/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 120, par. 2151 *et seq.*). **Cannabis and Controlled Substances Tax Act.** Statute is invalid and cannot be applied if the defendant has been convicted of criminal charges involving the same contraband. Violates the double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. *Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth*, 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994).

35 ILCS 520/9, 520/10, 520/14.1, 520/15, 520/16, 520/19, and 520/23 (P.A. 88-669). **Cannabis and Controlled Substances Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669.

People v. Olender, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Special Districts”.)

35 ILCS 635/20 (West 1998). **Telecommunications Municipal Infrastructure Maintenance Fee Act.** Application of the Act’s municipal infrastructure maintenance fee, imposed upon telecommunications providers to compensate a municipality for access to public rights-of-way, equally to wireless telecommunications providers that do not own or operate equipment on public rights-of-way as to landline telecommunications providers that do own or operate equipment on public rights-of-way violates the uniformity clause of Section 2 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution. *Primeco Personal Communications, L. P. v. Illinois Commerce Commission*, 196 Ill.2d 70 (2001).

PENSIONS

40 ILCS 5/5-128 and 5/5-167.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108 1/2, pars. 5-128 and 5-167.1). **Illinois Pension Code.** Amendatory changes in P.A. 86-272, which fix a police officer's pension as of the date of withdrawal from service rather than attainment of age 63, result in a taking of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when applied to retired police officers whose pensions consequently decreased. *Miller v. Retirement Board of Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago*, 329 Ill.App.3d 589 (1st Dist. 2002).

TOWNSHIPS

60 ILCS 1/65-35 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 53, par. 55.6). **Township Code.** Provision that allows a 2% commission on all moneys collected by a township collector to be deposited into the township treasury and to be used for local, rather than countywide, purposes is an unconstitutional violation of the uniformity of taxation clause of the Illinois Constitution. *Flynn v. Kucharski*, 45 Ill.2d 211 (1970).

MUNICIPALITIES

65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-6 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10-2.1-6). **Illinois Municipal Code.** Provision that prohibits appointing a person with a limb amputated to the police or fire department for anything but clerical or radio operator duties violates the Illinois Constitution, which prohibits discrimination against persons with a physical handicap. *Melvin v. City of West Frankfort*, 93 Ill.App.3d 425 (5th Dist. 1981).

65 ILCS 5/11-13-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 24, par. 11-13-1). **Illinois Municipal Code.** Statute authorizing a municipality to exercise zoning powers extraterritorially (that is, within a 1½-mile area contiguous to the municipality) was amended by P.A. 77-1373 (approved August 31, 1971) to add, as a permitted purpose of zoning regulation, the preservation of historically, architecturally, or aesthetically important features. P.A. 77-1373 also provided: “This amendatory Act of 1971 does not

apply to any municipality which is a home rule unit.”. Because a municipality has extraterritorial zoning authority only as granted by the legislature and not under its home rule powers, that added sentence, if valid, creates the incongruous situation of non-home rule municipalities being able to zone extraterritorially while home rule municipalities cannot. The sentence creates an unconstitutional classification and is void. (The court apparently read “this amendatory Act of 1971” to refer to the entire Section rather than to just the statement of purpose added by P.A. 77-1373.) *City of Carbondale v. Van Natta*, 61 Ill.2d 483 (1975).

65 ILCS 5/11-13-2 (West 1996). **Illinois Municipal Code.** Statute’s minimum constructive notice requirement for public hearings on proposed comprehensive zoning ordinances is unconstitutional as applied to affected property owners because procedural due process guarantees (U.S. Const., Amend. V and Amend. XIV, Sec. 1) require that the municipality’s notice be reasonably calculated to inform affected property owners who may easily be notified by other means. *Passalino v. City of Zion*, 237 Ill.2d 118 (2010).

SPECIAL DISTRICTS

70 ILCS 705/14.14 (West 1992). **Fire Protection District Act.** Provision permitting disconnection of territory in a non-home rule municipality in a county with a population between 500,000 and 750,000 is unconstitutional as special legislation because the population limit is an arbitrary classification. *In re Petition of Village of Vernon Hills*, 168 Ill.2d 117 (1995).

70 ILCS 705/19a (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983 Supp., ch. 127½, par. 38.2a). **Fire Protection District Act.** Provision permitting transfer of territory in counties with a population of more than 600,000 but less than 1,000,000 is special legislation because the population limit is an arbitrary classification. *In re Belmont Fire Protection District*, 111 Ill.2d 373 (1986).

70 ILCS 805/18.6d (P.A. 88-669). **Downstate Forest Preserve District Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Revenue”.)

SCHOOLS

105 ILCS 5/1B-20 (West 1994). **School Code.** Provision that authorizes a State Board of Education-appointed financial oversight panel to remove members of a local school board from office and does not require that the members be given notice of or a

hearing on the removal charges is unconstitutional as applied to members who were not given notice or a hearing because that lack of notice or hearing violates the members' procedural due process rights. *East St. Louis Federation of Teachers v. East St. Louis School District*, 178 Ill.2d 399 (1997).

105 ILCS 5/3-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, par. 3-1). **School Code.** Provision requiring candidate for office of regional superintendent to have taught at least 2 of previous 4 years in Illinois is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause because the statute is not rationally related to the State's interest of ensuring that candidates be familiar with the School Code and other Illinois school regulations. *Hammond v. Illinois State Board of Education*, 624 F.Supp. 1151 (S.D.Ill. 1986).

105 ILCS 5/24-2. School Code. Section providing that Good Friday is a legal school holiday and that teachers and other school employees shall not be required to work on legal holidays promotes one religion over another and violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution. *Metzl v. Leininger*, 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995).

105 ILCS 20/1 (P.A. 95-680). **Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act.** Provision requiring public school students to participate in the observation of a brief period of silence, for prayer or reflection, conducted by their teachers at the beginning of each school day violates the freedom of religion and due process guarantees of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because it is an endorsement of religion without a clearly secular purpose and is vague as to its implementation. *Sherman v. Township High School Dist. 214*, 594 F.Supp.2d 984 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

HIGHER EDUCATION

110 ILCS 310/1 (P.A. 89-5, eff. 1-1-96). **University of Illinois Trustees Act.** A portion of Section 1 removing elected trustees from office midterm in order to create an appointed board violates the right to vote guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 18. *Tully v. Edgar*, 171 Ill.2d 297 (1996).

FINANCIAL REGULATION

205 ILCS 105/1-6 and 105/1-10.10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 32, pars. 706 and 710). **Illinois Savings and Loan Act.** Provisions authorizing a savings and loan association to obtain and maintain insurance on its withdrawable capital by the FSLIC or another federal instrumentality or federally chartered corporation violates the Illinois Constitution because it deprives both savings and loan associations and private insurance companies of their freedom to contract and it deprives private insurance companies of property without due process. There is no indication that a federally chartered corporation is more financially sound or better able to insure the accounts than a private corporation authorized to do business in Illinois and under the supervision of the Director

of Insurance. (P.A. 86-137 amended the Act to add the FDIC as an eligible insurance corporation; P.A. 93-271 removed the FSLIC; but neither P.A. mentioned private insurers.) *City Savings Association v. International Guaranty and Insurance Co.*, 17 Ill.2d 609 (1959).

HEALTH FACILITIES

210 ILCS 45/3-606 and 45/3-607 (West 2006). **Nursing Home Care Act.** Provisions nullifying a nursing home resident's waiver of the right to commence action in circuit court are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §1 *et seq.*) in accordance with the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2). *Fosler v. Midwest Care Center II, Inc.*, 398 Ill.App.3d 563 (2nd Dist. 2010).

INSURANCE

215 ILCS 5/143.01 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 73, par. 755.01). **Illinois Insurance Code.** Subsection (b) of Section 143.01 prohibits the invocation of a vehicle insurance policy provision excluding coverage for bodily injury to members of the insured's family when the driver is not a member of the insured's household and further provides that the prohibition shall apply to any action filed on or after the effective date of the subsection (that is, the effective date of P.A. 83-1132, which added Section 143.01 to the Code). Retroactive application of the subsection to insurance policies issued before the effective date of P.A. 83-1132 constitutes an impairment of the obligation of contracts in violation of Section 10 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution. *Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Scott*, 161 Ill.App.3d 372 (4th Dist. 1987).

215 ILCS 5/155.18, 5/155.18a, 5/155.19, and 5/1204 (P.A. 94-677). **Illinois Insurance Code.** (See *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure", concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure enacted by Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005.)

UTILITIES

220 ILCS 5/8-402.1. Public Utilities Act. Requirements that Illinois utilities, in complying with federal Clean Air Act amendments, take into account the need to use Illinois coal, preserve the Illinois coal industry, and install pollution control devices in order to burn Illinois coal are too great a burden on interstate commerce. *Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig*, 840 F.Supp. 554 (N.D.Ill. 1993).

220 ILCS 5/10-201 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 2/3, par. 10-201). **Public Utilities Act.** Provisions relating to review of decisions by the Illinois Commerce Commission are unconstitutional to the extent that the procedures for direct review conflict with Supreme Court Rule 335 (for instance, subsection (e)(i) gives priority over other cases

before the court and is an unwarranted intrusion into the court's power to control its docket). *Consumers Gas Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm.*, 144 Ill.App.3d 229 (5th Dist. 1986).

PROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS

225 ILCS 10/2.05 and 10/2.17 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, pars. 2212.05 and 2212.17). **Child Care Act of 1969.** Provisions that deny AFDC-FC (foster care) payments to foster parents who are related to the foster children they care for conflict with the Social Security Act and are unconstitutional as violating that Act and therefore the supremacy clause of the U. S. Constitution. *Youakim v. Miller*, 431 F.Supp. 40 (N.D.Ill. 1976). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”.)

225 ILCS 25/31 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 2332). **Illinois Dental Practice Act.** Provision stating that, during review of a suspension under the Administrative Review Law, the suspension shall remain in full force and effect prohibits courts from exercising their inherent equitable powers to issue stays. To this extent, the Section is unconstitutional. (P.A. 88-184 limits the provision to acts or omissions related to direct patient care and states that as a matter of public policy suspension may not be stayed pending final resolution.) *Ardt v. Ill. Dept. of Professional Regulation*, 154 Ill.2d 138 (1992).

225 ILCS 60/7, 60/22, 60/23, 60/24, 60/24.1, and 60/36 (P.A. 94-677). **Medical Practice Act of 1987.** (See *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Civil Procedure”, concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure enacted by Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005.)

225 ILCS 60/26 (West Supp. 1999). **Medical Practice Act of 1987.** Ban on a licensee’s use of testimonials to entice the public violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by disproportionately prohibiting all truthful speech for the State’s goal of regulating the medical profession. *Snell v. Department of Professional Regulation*, 318 Ill.App.3d 972 (4th Dist. 2001).

LIQUOR

235 ILCS 5/6-16 (West 2000). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** Subsection (c), which makes it a Class A misdemeanor if a person knowingly permits the departure of an intoxicated minor from a gathering at the person’s residence of which the person has knowledge and at which the person knows a minor is illegally possessing or consuming liquor, is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it fails to provide a person with notice as to how to avoid violating the subsection. *People v. Law*, 202 Ill.2d 578 (2002).

235 ILCS 5/7-5 and 5/7-9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 43, pars. 149 and 153). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** Provision permitting liquor licensees in a municipality of less than 500,000 inhabitants whose licenses are revoked by the local liquor control commissioner and who appeal the revocations to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission to resume the operation of their businesses pending decisions by the Commission but not affording licensees in municipalities of 500,000 or more inhabitants who appeal revocations of their licenses to the License Appeal Commission a similar privilege is unconstitutional as a violation of the special legislation provision of the 1870 Illinois Constitution. (Article IV, Section 13 of the 1970 Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from passing special legislation when a general law can be made applicable.) There is no rational basis for the different treatment of licensees based upon differences in the population of the municipalities where the licensed premises are located. Absent legislative modification of the offending provision, licensees in all municipalities must be permitted to resume operation during the pendency of an administrative appeal from the order of a local liquor control commissioner. *Johnkol, Inc. v. License Appeal Commission*, 42 Ill.2d 377 (1969).

235 ILCS 5/8-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 158). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** The Department of Revenue taxed wine coolers and certain low-alcohol drinks at different rates pursuant to its interpretation of the Section 8-1 tax classification system. Because there is no real and substantial difference between wine coolers made by adding wine to fruit juices and the low-alcohol drinks made by adding distilled alcohol, the provision violates the uniformity clause of Section 2 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution to the extent the provision does not provide for the equal taxation of wine coolers and the low-alcohol drinks. *Federated Distributors, Inc. v. Johnson*, 125 Ill.2d 1 (1988).

235 ILCS 5/9-2. Liquor Control Act of 1934. Provision (Ill. Ann. Stat. 1990, ch. 43, par. 167) permitting a precinct in a city with a population exceeding 200,000 to vote a single “licensed establishment” dry is an unconstitutional violation of due process because the procedural safeguards inherent in an election to vote the entire precinct dry (also permitted under the statute) are not present. P.A. 88-613 subsequently amended the provision to substitute “street address” for “licensed establishment”. *87 So. Rothschild Liquor Mart v. Kozubowski*, 752 F.Supp. 839 (N.D.Ill. 1990).

Provision permitting a precinct in a city with a population exceeding 200,000 to prohibit by referendum the sale of alcoholic beverages at a particular street address is an unconstitutional deprivation of the liquor licensee’s property without due process because due process forbids voters passing judgment on an existing business. *Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski*, 208 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000).

PUBLIC AID

305 ILCS 5/5-13 (West 2002). **Illinois Public Aid Code.** Provision permitting the State to recover the amount of medical assistance payments to an individual from the estate of the individual's surviving spouse violates the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution because the federal Social Security Act prohibits such recovery unless a state expands the definition of the individual's estate beyond its probate law concept, which Illinois has done only with respect to medical assistance recipients who have long term care insurance. *Hines v. Department of Public Aid*, 221 Ill.2d 222 (2006).

MENTAL HEALTH

405 ILCS 5/2-110 (West 1994). **Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code.** Provision authorizing a guardian, with the court's approval, to provide informed consent for his or her ward to receive unusual, hazardous, or experimental services or psychosurgery that a non-ward may not receive without his or her own written and informed consent violates the due process guarantees of the federal and State constitutions (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, Sec.1 and ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2) by permitting denial of a ward's interest in choosing treatment without providing adequate safeguards. *In re Branning*, 285 Ill.App.3d 405 (4th Dist. 1996).

405 ILCS 5/3-806 (West Supp. 1995). **Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code.** Provisions allowing a civil commitment hearing to take place without the respondent when the respondent has not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his or her right to be present violate the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. *In re Barbara H.*, 288 Ill.App.3d 360 (2nd Dist. 1997). While affirming in part and reversing in part on other grounds, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to review the provision's constitutionality in *In re Barbara H.*, 183 Ill.2d 482 (1998).

NUCLEAR SAFETY

420 ILCS 15/ (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 111½, par. 230.1 *et seq.*). **Spent Nuclear Fuel Act.** Act is unconstitutional because (i) by banning the storage and shipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel in Illinois merely because the spent fuel or its shipment originated out of State, the Act arbitrarily burdens interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8) and (ii) the federal Atomic Energy Act preempts state regulation of the storage and shipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel, and Illinois' Spent Nuclear Fuel Act therefore violates the supremacy clause (U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2). *People of the State of Illinois v. General Electric Co.*, 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982).

PUBLIC SAFETY

430 ILCS 70/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 85-1 *et seq.*). **Illinois Public Demonstrations Law.** The entire Act is unconstitutional because the term "principal law enforcement officer", used throughout the Act, is impermissibly vague. *People v. Bossie*, 108 Ill.2d 236 (1985).

VEHICLES

625 ILCS 5/4-102 (West 1996). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provisions punishing unauthorized tampering with or damaging, moving, or entry of a vehicle, without requiring a criminal mental state, impose absolute liability for unintended conduct in violation of the due process guarantees of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 2 of the Illinois Constitution. *In re K.C.*, 186 Ill.2d 542 (1999).

625 ILCS 5/4-103.2 (West 2000). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Subsection (b)'s inference that a person exercising unexplained possession of a stolen or converted automobile is presumed to know the car is stolen or converted, regardless of the remote date of its theft or conversion, violates the due process guarantee of Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution as applied to the possessor of special mobile equipment because the same extensive ownership records and procedures that justify the presumption for automobile possession do not exist for special mobile equipment. *People v. Greco*, 204 Ill.2d 400 (2003).

625 ILCS 5/4-209 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95½, par. 4-209). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision for post-tow notice by U.S. mail to owner of impounded abandoned vehicle more than 7 years old is unconstitutional. Due process requires notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, for all vehicles. *Kohn v. Mucia*, 776 F.Supp. 348 (N.D.Ill. 1991).

625 ILCS 5/6-208.1 (P.A. 89-203). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision amended by P.A. 89-203 is unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. (Although P.A. 89-203 also amended Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501), those changes to Section 11-501 were removed by Public Act 93-800, effective January 1, 2005.) *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Criminal Offenses", "Corrections", and "Civil Procedure".)

625 ILCS 5/8-105. **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision of 1923 motor vehicle law that surety bond of owner of motor vehicle used for transportation of passengers becomes a lien on real estate scheduled in the bond, without providing for discharge of the lien, is unconstitutional because arbitrarily discriminatory and unreasonable. The provision is continued in the Illinois Vehicle Code. *Weksler v. Collins*, 317 Ill. 132 (1925).

625 ILCS 5/18c-7402 (West 2004). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Subsection (1)(b), which prohibits a rail carrier from permitting a train, railroad car, or engine to block a road-highway grade crossing for more than 10 minutes unless the train, car, or engine is moving or the circumstances causing the obstruction are beyond the carrier's control, is

preempted by federal railroad law and violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8). *Eagle Marine v. Union Pacific R.R.*, 227 Ill.2d 377 (2008).

COURTS

705 ILCS 21/ (West 1996). **Judicial Redistricting Act of 1997.** Entire Act, enacted by P.A. 89-719, is unconstitutional because (i) provisions dividing the First Judicial District into 3 subdistricts for election of Supreme Court judges and splitting judicial circuits between 2 or more judicial districts violate Article VI of the Illinois Constitution and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. *Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman*, 181 Ill.2d 65 (1997).

705 ILCS 25/1 (P.A. 89-719). **Appellate Court Act.** (See *Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman*, 181 Ill.2d 65 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Courts”, concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Judicial Redistricting Act of 1997 enacted by P.A. 89-719.)

705 ILCS 55/ (West 2006). **Compulsory Retirement of Judges Act.** Automatic retirement of a supreme court, appellate, circuit, or associate judge at the conclusion of the term of office in which he or she attains the age of 75 is a denial of equal protection under the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2) because the Act applies to sitting judges but does not prohibit a person aged 75 years or older from seeking judicial office if that person has never been a judge or if that person attained age 75 while not in judicial office. *Maddux v. Blagojevich*, 233 Ill.2d 508 (2009).

705 ILCS 105/27.10 (P.A. 94-677). **Clerks of Courts Act.** (See *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Civil Procedure”, concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure enacted by Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005.)

705 ILCS 205/6 (West 1992). **Attorney Act.** Provision that allows a circuit court judge to suspend an attorney from the practice of law is an unconstitutional encroachment on the Supreme Court's exclusive authority to regulate and discipline attorneys in Illinois. *In re General Order of March 15, 1993*, 258 Ill.App.3d 13 (1st Dist. 1993).

705 ILCS 405/5-4, 405/5-14, 405/5-19, 405/5-23, 405/5-33, and 405/5-34 (P.A. 88-680). **Juvenile Court Act of 1987.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-680 are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-

693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Corrections” and in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Criminal Offenses”).

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

710 ILCS 45/ (P.A. 94-677). **Sorry Works! Pilot Program Act.** (See *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Civil Procedure”, concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure enacted by Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005.)

CRIMINAL OFFENSES

720 ILCS 5/9-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1). **Criminal Code of 1961.** P.A. 84-1450, which amended the homicide statute, provides that “this amendatory Act of 1986 shall only apply to acts occurring on or after January 1, 1987”. Because P.A. 84-1450 does not contain an effective date provision, however, it did not take effect until July 1, 1987, and its retroactive application to January 1, 1987 is a violation of the constitutional prohibitions against *ex post facto* laws. P.A. 84-1450 may be applied only prospectively from the date it became effective, July 1, 1987. *People v. Shumpert*, 126 Ill.2d 344 (1989).

720 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Subsection (b), which authorizes a 15-year sentence enhancement for committing the offense of aggravated kidnapping while armed with a firearm, violates the proportionate penalties clause of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 11) because the resulting penalty is harsher than the penalty for armed violence, which contains the same elements. *People v. Baker*, 341 Ill.App.3d 1083 (4th Dist. 2003).

720 ILCS 5/10-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 10-5). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Child abduction statute is unconstitutional as applied to the natural father of a child. The parents were not married and there was no paternity action, but the parents had lived together 4½ years and the father had supported the child. Applying the statute to the natural father would deprive him of equal protection of the law. *People v. Morrison*, 223 Ill.App.3d 176 (3rd Dist. 1991).

720 ILCS 5/10-5 (West 1998). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Under the child abduction statute (intentionally luring or attempting to lure a child under 16 years of age into specified locations without the consent of the child’s parent or guardian for other than

a lawful purpose), subsection (b)(10)'s provision that such a luring or attempted luring is prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose creates a *per se* unconstitutional, but severable, mandatory presumption that denies due process by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. *People v. Woodrum*, 223 Ill.2d 286 (2006).

720 ILCS 5/11-6, 5/11-6.5, and 5/32-10 (P.A. 89-203). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-203 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Vehicles", "Corrections", and "Civil Procedure".)

720 ILCS 5/11-20.1 (West Supp. 2001). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Clause (f)(7) of Section 11-20.1 violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by including within the definition of "child", for child pornography purposes, computer generated images of children that are not depictions of actual children. *People v. Alexander*, 204 Ill.2d 472 (2003).

720 ILCS 5/12-6 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 12-6). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision of intimidation statute making it an offense to threaten to commit any crime no matter how minor or insubstantial is unconstitutional as being overbroad in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. *U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit*, 624 F.Supp. 68 (N.D.Ill. 1985).

720 ILCS 5/12-21.6 (West 2002). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Subsection (b)'s mandatory rebuttable presumption that leaving a child age 6 years or younger unattended in a motor vehicle for more than 10 minutes endangers the life or health of the child violates the due process clauses of the federal and State constitutions (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV and ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2). *People v. Jordan*, 218 Ill.2d 255 (2006).

720 ILCS 5/12A-1, 5/12A-5, 5/12A-10, 5/12A-15, 5/12A-20, 5/12A-25, 5/12B-1, 5/12B-5, 5/12B-10, 5/12B-15, 5/12B-20, 5/12B-25, 5/12B-30, and 5/12B-35 (P.A. 94-315). **Criminal Code of 1961.** The Violent Video Games Law and the Sexually Explicit Video Games Law, which establish criminal penalties for (i) selling or renting violent or sexually explicit video games to minors, (ii) allowing such games to be purchased using a self-check-out electronic scanner, and (iii) failing to label such games in a specified manner, violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const., Amend I) because (1) the definition of a violent video game is vague and there is no showing that the violent content is directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and (2) the statutes do not provide for consideration of the whole content of a sexually explicit video or for consideration of the value of that video. *Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich*, 404 F.Supp.2d 1051 (N.D.Ill. 2005). The State appealed the decision

with respect to only the Sexually Explicit Video Games Law (720 ILCS 5/Art. 12B); the ruling of unconstitutionality was upheld in *Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich*, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).

720 ILCS 5/16-7 (West 2004). **Criminal Code of 1961**. Subdivision (a)(2), the unlawful use of recorded sounds or images, is preempted by Section 301 of the federal Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. 301) because the State statute does not require any additional element that qualitatively distinguishes it from the federal copyright infringement provision. *People v. Williams*, 235 Ill.2d 178 (2009).

720 ILCS 5/16A-4 (West 2000). **Criminal Code of 1961**. Retail theft provision that a person who conceals and removes merchandise from a retail store without paying for it “shall be presumed” to do so intentionally creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption that denies the trier of fact the discretion of determining that an item was removed inadvertently or thoughtlessly. *People v. Taylor*, 344 Ill.App.3d 929 (1st Dist. 2003), and *People v. Butler*, 354 Ill.App.3d 57 (1st Dist. 2004).

720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000). **Criminal Code of 1961**. The 25-year to natural life sentence enhancement required under subsection (b) of the Class X felony penalty for armed robbery based on discharging a firearm and causing great bodily harm violates the proportionate penalty requirement of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 11) when compared to the lesser sentence for the equivalent offense of armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I weapon (which includes a firearm) under Section 33A-2 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/33A-2). *People v. Harvey*, 366 Ill.App.3d 119 (1st Dist. 2006).

720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 2002). **Criminal Code of 1961**. Sentencing range of 21 to 45 years’ imprisonment for aggravated vehicular hijacking while carrying a firearm under subsection (a)(2) is harsher than the sentencing range of 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for armed violence with a category I weapon predicated upon vehicular hijacking, an offense with identical elements, and thus violates the proportionate penalties clause of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 11). *People v. Andrews*, 364 Ill.App.3d 253 (2nd Dist. 2006).

720 ILCS 5/33A-2 and 5/33A-3. **Criminal Code of 1961**. Penalties for armed violence predicated on certain offenses are unconstitutionally disproportionate to penalties for other offenses.

Armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint. Penalty (a Class X felony) is disproportionate to penalty for aggravated unlawful restraint (a Class 3 felony) under 720 ILCS 5/10-3.1 (West 1992). *People v. Murphy*, 261 Ill.App.3d 1019 (2nd Dist. 1994).

Armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon. Minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years is disproportionate to minimum term of imprisonment (6 years) for robbery committed with a handgun under 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994). *People v. Lewis*, 175 Ill.2d 412 (1996).

Armed violence predicated on aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery. Minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years is disproportionate to minimum terms of imprisonment (7 years and 6 years, respectively) for aggravated vehicular hijacking under 720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 1994) and armed robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994). Public Act 95-688, effective October 23, 2007, amended 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 to remove from the definition of armed violence any offense that makes possession or use of a dangerous weapon an aggravated version of the offense, thus eliminating armed robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18-2. Aggravated vehicular hijacking, however, may be committed under 720 ILCS 5/18-4 with aggravating factors other than possession or use of a dangerous weapon. *People v. Beard*, 287 Ill.App.3d 935 (1st Dist. 1997).

720 ILCS 5/37-4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 37-4). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Defining as a public nuisance any building used in the sale of obscene material and permitting injunctive relief against use of a building for one year is unconstitutional in its application to adult bookstores that sell sexually explicit materials. These provisions create a system of prior restraint but do not define the length of the period during which an alleged nuisance can be restrained prior to full judicial review and make no provision for prompt final determination of the matter. *People v. Sequoia Books, Inc.*, 127 Ill.2d 271 (1989).

720 ILCS 250/16 (West 2002). **Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act.** Provision that possession of 2 or more counterfeit credit or debit cards by someone other than the purported card issuer is prima facie evidence of the possessor's intent to defraud or of the possessor's knowledge that the cards are counterfeit creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption of the intent or knowledge that is an element of a violation of the Act. *People v. Miles*, 344 Ill.App.3d 315 (2nd Dist. 2003).

720 ILCS 510/2 and 510/11 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 83, pars. 81-22 and 81-31). **Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.** Provisions making nonprescription sale of abortifacients and prescription or administration of abortifacients without informing the recipient a misdemeanor are unconstitutional because they incorporate a definition of "fetus" in which a fetus is classified as a human being from fertilization until death and thus intrude upon the medical discretion of the attending physician and impose the State's theory of when life begins upon the physician's patient, impermissibly infringing upon a woman's right of private decision-making in matters relating to contraception. *Charles v. Daley*, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984).

720 ILCS 513/10. Partial-birth Abortion Ban Act. Act's prohibition against the performance of partial-birth abortions unconstitutionally violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it lacks an exception for preservation of the health of the mother and unduly burdens a woman's right to choose an abortion. *Hope Clinic v. Ryan*, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001).

720 ILCS 570/315. Illinois Controlled Substances Act. Prohibition against advertising controlled substances to the public by name violates the commercial speech protection of the First Amendment and the commerce clause of Art. I, Sec. 8 of the U.S. Constitution when applied to the federally approved national advertising campaign of the developer of a Schedule IV controlled substance. *Knoll Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sherman*, 57 F.Supp.2d 615 (N.D.Ill. 1999).

720 ILCS 590/1. Discrimination in Sale of Real Estate Act. Prohibition against person knowingly soliciting an owner of residential property to sell or list the property after the person has been given notice that the owner does not desire to be solicited unconstitutionally restricts a real estate broker's freedom of speech. *Pearson v. Edgar*, 153 F.3d 397 (7th Cir. 1998).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

725 ILCS 5/106D-1 (West 2000). Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Section authorizing the court to allow a defendant to personally appear at a pre-trial or post-trial proceeding via closed-circuit television violates an accused person's right under Section 8 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 8) to appear at criminal proceedings, as applied to a defendant who appeared at his guilty plea proceeding via closed-circuit television without his written consent. *People v. Stroud*, 208 Ill.2d 398 (2004).

725 ILCS 5/110-4 (West 2000). Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Subsection (b), which prohibits bail for a person charged with a capital offense or an offense for which a sentence of life imprisonment may be imposed until the person demonstrates at a hearing that proof of his or her guilt is not evident and presumption of his or her guilt is not great, violates the due process clauses of Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution by depriving the accused of a presumption of innocence. *People v. Purcell*, 201 Ill.2d 542 (2002).

725 ILCS 5/110-6.2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 110-6.2). Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Bail provision permits a court, after a hearing, to deny bail if the court determines that certain facts exist, such as proof evident or presumption great that the defendant committed the offense, the offense requires imprisonment, or the defendant poses a real threat to others. Provision is unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of

powers clause of the Illinois Constitution because it limits the court's authority to set bail and imposes conditions not found in Supreme Court Rule 609 concerning bail. *People v. Williams*, 143 Ill.2d 477 (1991).

725 ILCS 5/114-9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 114-9). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Subsection (c) of Section 114-9, which provides that the State is not required to include rebuttal witnesses in lists of prosecution witnesses given to the defense, is unconstitutional. Previously, Section 114-14, which required the defense to provide notice of an alibi defense to the prosecution upon request, was held unconstitutional by *People v. Fields*, 59 Ill.2d 516 (1974). These rulings came after the U.S. Supreme Court, in *Wardius v. Oregon*, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), held that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids enforcement of alibi disclosure rules unless the defense has reciprocal discovery rights. Subsection (c) of Section 114-9 has not been amended since these decisions. (Section 114-14 was repealed in 1979 by P.A. 81-290.) *People ex rel. Carey v. Strayhorn*, 61 Ill.2d 85 (1975).

725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2000). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision allowing the hearsay testimony of a non-testifying child under age 13 about sexual assault and abuse violates the defendant's right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, despite the statute's requirement that the court must find the statements reliable. *In re E.H.*, 355 Ill.App.3d 564 (1st Dist. 2005), and *In re Rolandis G.*, 352 Ill.App.3d 776 (2nd Dist. 2004).

725 ILCS 5/115-15 (West 1998). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision granting prima facie evidence status to laboratory tests of controlled substances in certain criminal prosecutions unless the defendant, within 7 days after receiving the test report, demands the testimony of the person who signed the report violates the confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 8 of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. McClanahan*, 191 Ill.2d 127 (2000).

725 ILCS 207/30 (West 1998). **Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act.** Subsection (c), which prohibits a person who is the subject of a commitment petition under the Act from presenting his or her own expert testimony if the person failed to cooperate with a State-conducted evaluation but which does not prohibit the State from presenting expert testimony based upon an examination of the person's records, violates the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution as applied to a person against whom the State does present testimony. *In re Detention of Kortte*, 317 Ill.App.3d 111 (2nd Dist. 2000), and *In re Detention of Trevino*, 317 Ill.App.3d 324 (2nd Dist. 2000).

725 ILCS 240/10 (P.A. 89-688). **Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act.** Provision amended by P.A. 89-688 is unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “General Provisions” and “Corrections”.)

CORRECTIONS

730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions added by P.A. 88-311 making certain inmates, previously eligible to receive good-conduct credit toward early release increased by a multiplier, ineligible for the credit multiplier because they were convicted of criminal sexual assault, felony criminal sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or aggravated battery with a firearm, as well as related inchoate offenses, violates the *ex post facto* provisions of Section 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution and Section 16 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution by curtailing the opportunity for an earlier release. *Barger v. Peters*, 163 Ill.2d 357 (1994).

730 ILCS 5/3-7-2, 5/5-5-3, 5/5-6-3, 5/5-6-3.1, and 5/5-7-1 (P.A. 89-688). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-688 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. (Although Public Act 89-688 also amended Sections 3-2-2, 3-5-1, 3-7-6, and 3-8-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-2-2, 5/3-5-1, 5/3-7-6, and 5/3-8-7), identical changes were made to Sections 3-2-2 and 3-5-1 by Public Act 89-689, effective December 31, 1996, Section 3-7-6 was completely rewritten by Public Act 90-85, effective July 10, 1997, and the changes to Section 3-8-7 were re-enacted by Public Act 93-272, effective July 22, 2003.) *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “General Provisions” and “Criminal Procedure”.)

730 ILCS 5/3-10-11 (P.A. 88-680). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provision amended by P.A. 88-680 is unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Courts” and in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Criminal Offenses”.)

730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2 (West 1998). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Subdivision (b)(4)(i), which authorizes a sentencing court to increase the punishment for a felony

based upon the victim's age, violates the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to the extent the jury was not specifically charged with finding the victim's age. *People v. Thurow*, 318 Ill.App.3d 128 (3rd Dist. 2001); although the appellate court's decision was reversed in part, the holding of unconstitutionality was affirmed in *People v. Thurow*, 203 Ill.2d 352 (2003).

730 ILCS 5/5-5-6, 5/5-6-3.1, and 5/5-8-1 (P.A. 89-203). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-203 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Vehicles", "Criminal Offenses", and "Civil Procedure".)

730 ILCS 5/5-5-7 (P.A. 89-7). **Unified Code of Corrections.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-3.1). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provision concerning incidents and conditions of supervision that provides that a disposition of supervision is a final order for the purposes of appeal is unconstitutional and void as an attempt to regulate appellate court jurisdiction. *People v. Tarkowski*, 100 Ill.App.3d 153 (2nd Dist. 1981).

730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 1996) **Unified Code of Corrections.** Subsection (a)(1)(c)(ii), which mandates life imprisonment for multiple murder, violates the proportionate penalty clause of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution when applied to a juvenile convicted on a theory of accountability whose only participation was to serve as lookout because the statute does not consider the defendant's age or extent of culpability. *People v. Miller*, 202 Ill.2d 328 (2002).

730 ILCS 140/3 (P.A. 88-680). **Private Correctional Facility Moratorium Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-680 are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Finance" and "Courts" and in Part 3 of this Case Report under "Criminal Offenses".)

730 ILCS 175/ (P.A. 88-680). **Secure Residential Youth Care Facilities Licensing Act.** Provisions enacted by P.A. 88-680 are unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.s 91-54, 91-155, 91-404, 91-690, 91-691, 91-692, 91-693, 91-694, 91-695, and 91-696 re-enacted portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Cervantes*, 189 Ill.2d 80 (1999). (These cases are also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance” and “Courts” and in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Criminal Offenses”.)

CIVIL PROCEDURE

735 ILCS 5/2-402, 5/2-604.1, 5/2-621, 5/2-623, 5/2-624, 5/2-1003, 5/2-1107.1, 5/2-1109, 5/2-1115.05, 5/2-1115.1, 5/2-1115.2, 5/2-1116, 5/2-1117, 5/2-1205.1, 5/2-1702, 5/2-2101, 5/2-2102, 5/2-2103, 5/2-2104, 5/2-2105, 5/2-2106, 5/2-2106.5, 5/2-2107, 5/2-2108, 5/2-2109, 5/8-802, 5/8-2001, 5/8-2003, 5/8-2004, 5/13-213, 5/13-214.3, and 5/13-217 (P.A. 89-7). **Code of Civil Procedure.**

P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff’s medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution, or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. The provisions of 735 ILCS 5/2-622 and 5/8-2501, amended by Public Act 89-7, were re-enacted and changed by Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

735 ILCS 5/2-622, 5/2-1704.5, 5/2-1706.5, 5/8-1901, and 5/8-2501 (P.A. 94-677). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to health care and medical malpractice actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting the recovery of damages for non-economic losses in medical malpractice actions violate the separation of powers principle of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. II, Sec. 1) and (ii) other provisions are inseverable. *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010).

735 ILCS 5/2-1003 (West 1996). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Provision waiving a party’s privilege of confidentiality with health care providers when he or she alleges a claim for bodily injury or disease is unconstitutional because, by requiring disclosure of all information, it encroaches upon the authority of the judiciary (Supreme Court Rule 201 requires disclosure of only relevant information) and is an unreasonable invasion of privacy. *Kunkel v. Walton*, 179 Ill.2d 519 (1997).

735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 1994). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Provision allowing amendment of a complaint for administrative review of a police or firefighter disciplinary decision of a municipality of 500,000 or less population in order to add a police or fire chief as a defendant, while not allowing similar amendment of a similar complaint against a municipality of more than 500,000 population, is special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *Lacny v. Police Board of the City of Chicago*, 291 Ill.App.3d 397 (1st Dist. 1997).

735 ILCS 5/12-1006 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 12-1006). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Enforcement of judgments provisions concerning exemption for retirement plans is completely unconstitutional as preempted by the federal Bankruptcy Code. *In re Kazi, Bkrcty*, 125 B.R. 981 (S.D.Ill. 1991), and others.

735 ILCS 5/13-202.1 (West 1992). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Limitations provision, added by P.A. 87-941, which purports to revive a damage suit by the murder victim's estate against the murderer after the 2-year statute of limitations had run, violates due process protections afforded to defendants in civil tort cases. *Sepmeyer v. Holman*, 162 Ill.2d 249 (1994).

735 ILCS 5/15-1508 and 5/15-1701 (P.A. 89-203). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-203 are unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violates the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. *People v. Wooters*, 188 Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

735 ILCS 5/20-104 (West 1998). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Section authorizing a private citizen to recover damages from someone who has defrauded a governmental unit when the appropriate governmental official has been notified and has declined to act violates Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution to the extent it purports to confer standing upon a private citizen to initiate action in a case in which the State is the real interested party because neither the legislature nor the judiciary may deprive the Attorney General of his or her inherent power to direct the legal affairs of the State. *Lyons v. Ryan*, 201 Ill.2d 529 (2002), and, when a unit of local government was the real interested party, *County of Cook ex rel. Rifkin v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.*, 215 Ill.2d 466 (2005).

735 ILCS 5/21-103 (West 1998). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Subsection (b), which requires notice by publication of a petition to change a minor's name, is unconstitutional as applied to a noncustodial parent who was not given actual notice of a petition by the custodial parent to change their child's surname. *In re Petition of Sanjuan-Moeller*, 343 Ill.App.3d 202 (2nd Dist. 2003).

CIVIL LIABILITIES

740 ILCS 100/3.5, 100/4, and 100/5 (P.A. 89-7). **Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act.** P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries, changing contribution by joint tortfeasors, abolishing joint and several liability, and mandating unlimited disclosure of a plaintiff's medical records during discovery are arbitrary, are special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution, or violate the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution and (ii) other provisions, despite inclusion of a severability clause, are inseverable. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

740 ILCS 110/9 and 110/10 (P.A. 89-7). **Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

740 ILCS 110/10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91½, par. 810). **Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act.** Provisions concerning what records of a patient or therapist may be disclosed is unconstitutional to the extent that the Section provides that "any order to disclose or not disclose shall be considered a final order for purposes of appeal and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal". This provision usurps the Supreme Court's rule-making power with respect to appealability of nonfinal judgments. *Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center*, 162 Ill.2d 205 (1994).

740 ILCS 130/2 and 130/3 (P.A. 89-7). **Premises Liability Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

CIVIL IMMUNITIES

745 ILCS 10/6A-101 and 10/6A-105 (P.A. 89-7). **Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

745 ILCS 25/2, 25/3, and 25/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 822, 823, and 824). **Tort Liability of Schools Act.** Provisions concerning notice of injury and limitation period for commencing action are invalid as to both public and nonprofit private schools. Enactment of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act eliminated the unconstitutional discrepancy between notice-of-injury provisions applicable to various units of local government (see *Lorton v. Brown County School Dist.*, 35 Ill.2d 362 (1966), reported in Part 3 of this Case Report under “Civil Immunities”), but because that Act does not apply to private schools, the notice and limitation provisions of the Tort Liability of Schools Act (which groups public schools and nonprofit private schools together in the same classification) could not be fairly applied to nonprofit private schools. *Cleary v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria*, 57 Ill.2d 384 (1974).

745 ILCS 25/5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959 and 1965, ch. 122, par. 825). **Tort Liability of Schools Act.** Provision of subsection (A) limiting recovery in each separate cause of action against a public school district to \$10,000 is unconstitutional because it is arbitrarily formulated. *Treece v. Shawnee Community School District*, 39 Ill.2d 136 (1968).

Provision of subsection (B) limiting recovery in each separate cause of action against a nonprofit private school to \$10,000 is unconstitutional because it is purely arbitrary as compared with the liability of other governmental units and institutions. *Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago*, 41 Ill.2d 336 (1968).

745 ILCS 49/30 (P.A. 94-677). **Good Samaritan Act.** (See *Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital*, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under “Civil Procedure”, concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure enacted by Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005.)

FAMILIES

750 ILCS 5/501.1 (West 1992). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** “Dissolution action stay” provision is an unconstitutional violation of substantive due process because, in providing for a stay on disposing of any property by either party in a divorce, the statute unfairly restrains the disposition of non-marital property as well as marital property. *Messenger v. Edgar*, 157 Ill.2d 162 (1993).

750 ILCS 5/607 (West 2002). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** Paragraph (1.5) of subsection (b), which authorizes a court to grant petitions for step-parents’ visitation privileges when in the child’s best interests or welfare, unconstitutionally places the petitioner on equal footing with the parent in the determination of those interests. *In re Marriage of Engelkens*, 354 Ill.App.3d 790 (3rd Dist. 2004).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998). **Adoption Act.** Subdivision D(m-1)'s presumption of parental unfitness based on a judicial finding that a child has spent at least 15 of 22 consecutive months in foster care violates due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution by failing to consider periods of foster care unattributable to the parent's inability to care for the child. *In re H.G.*, 197 Ill.2d 317 (2001).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998). **Adoption Act.** Failure to appoint legal counsel for an indigent person for an adoption proceeding that would terminate his or her parental rights violates the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution when the State had chosen not to seek unfit parent status against an indigent woman but had achieved its goal through an adoption proceeding brought by the parties awarded custody of the child. *In re Adoption of K.L.P.*, 198 Ill.2d 448 (2002).

PROPERTY

765 ILCS 1025/15 (West 1998). **Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.** Provision that the State Treasurer “may” return to the owner of unliquidated stock the dividends earned on that stock while held by the State as abandoned property is a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Section 15 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution. *Canel v. Topinka*, 212 Ill.2d 311 (2004).

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

815 ILCS 205/4.1a (West 2004). **Interest Act.** Provision that limits a lender’s non-interest mortgage charges to 3% when the mortgage’s interest rate exceeds 8% is preempted by the federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and thus violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2). *U.S. Bank National Association v. Clark*, 216 Ill.2d 334 (2005).

815 ILCS 505/. **Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.** The Act’s application to cigarette manufacturers for failure to warn of the hazards of smoking is preempted by the federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. *Espinosa v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.*, 500 F.Supp.2d 979 (N.D.Ill. 2007).

815 ILCS 505/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121½, par. 264). **Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.** Provision authorizing Attorney General to issue subpoenas is unconstitutional as applied to person compelled to travel 350-mile round trip without reimbursement because it is arbitrary and unduly burdensome. *People v. McWhorter*, 113 Ill.2d 374 (1986).

815 ILCS 505/10a (P.A. 87-1140 and P.A. 89-144). **Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.** Subsections (a), (f), (g), and (h) constitute special legislation in violation of Section 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution because they limit and restrict consumers' claims with respect only to automobile dealers (penalties for a consumer's failure to settle a claim, limitation on punitive damages, and notice to a dealer before filing suit). *Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc.*, 208 Ill.2d 12 (2003).

815 ILCS 505/10b (P.A. 89-7). **Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

815 ILCS 515/3 (West 1994). **Home Repair Fraud Act.** The statute creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption of intent or knowledge upon the finding of certain predicate facts. The presumption relieves the State of the burden of persuasion on the element of intent or knowledge in violation of due process guarantees of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. *People v. Watts*, 181 Ill.2d 133 (1998).

EMPLOYMENT

820 ILCS 10/1 Collective Bargaining Successor Employer Act. Act is preempted by the federal Labor Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act and therefore violates the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. *Commonwealth Edison Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers*, 961 F.Supp. 1169 (N.D.Ill. 1997).

820 ILCS 30/. Employment of Strikebreakers Act. Act, which imposes criminal penalties upon an employer who knowingly contracts with a day and temporary labor service agency for the provision of replacement workers in the event of a strike or lockout, is preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act and thus violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2). *Caterpillar Inc. v. Lyons*, 318 F.Supp.2d 703 (C.D.Ill. 2004).

820 ILCS 30/2 (P.A. 93-375). **Employment of Strikebreakers Act.** Provision prohibiting an employer from contracting with day and temporary labor service agencies for replacement labor during a strike or lockout is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, which permits employment of day and temporary workers at such times, and thus violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2). *520 Michigan Ave. Associates v. Devine*, 433 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2006).

820 ILCS 105/4a. Minimum Wage Law. Section 4a's overtime provisions, as applied to interstate railways, are preempted by the federal Railway Labor Act. *Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. Shannon*, 539 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2008).

820 ILCS 135/2.1 and 135/2.2 (P.A. 87-1174). **Burial Rights Act.** Provisions concerning religiously required interments during labor disputes are preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act because they infringe on the right of cemetery workers to strike and authorize injunctions and fines against striking unions. *Cannon v. Edgar*, 33 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 1994).

820 ILCS 140/3.1. One Day Rest in Seven Act. Required workplace conditions and enforcement provisions applicable only to hotel room attendants working in a county with a population greater than 3,000,000 are preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act. *520 South Michigan Ave. Associates v. Shannon*, 549 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 2008).

820 ILCS 240/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 48, par. 252). **Industrial Home Work Act.** Provision prohibiting the processing of metal springs by home workers is unconstitutional as an unreasonable restraint on and regulation of business, not being in the interest of the public welfare as required for the proper exercise of the State's police power. *Figura v. Cummins*, 4 Ill.2d 44 (1954).

820 ILCS 305/5 (P.A. 89-7). **Workers' Compensation Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

820 ILCS 310/5 (P.A. 89-7). **Workers' Occupational Diseases Act.** (See *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997), reported in this Part 2 of this Case Report under "Civil Procedure" and under "Civil Liabilities", concerning the inseparability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

820 ILCS 405/602 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 602). **Unemployment Insurance Act.** The "held in abeyance" provision of paragraph B, which postpones payment of unemployment benefits to people in legal custody or on bail for a work-related felony or theft until the charges are resolved, violates the supremacy clause of the

United States Constitution because the provision conflicts with sections of the federal Social Security Act that require administrative methods “reasonably calculated” to ensure prompt payment and an opportunity for a fair hearing for individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied. *Jenkins v. Bowling*, 691 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1982).

INTRODUCTION TO PART 3

Part 3 of this 2010 Case Report contains Illinois statutes that are representative of (i) statutes that were held unconstitutional and then changed in response to the holding of unconstitutionality or (ii) statutes that were construed in a particular way in order to avoid a holding of unconstitutionality. Part 3 does not include every such statute. Part 3 includes statutes that (i) currently appear or formerly appeared in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or appeared in an Act that was replaced by an Act that currently appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes and (ii) may have some instructional value concerning the requirement that statutes not violate the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution.

PART 3
EXAMPLES OF
STATUTES HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND THEN AMENDED OR REPEALED

GENERAL PROVISIONS

5 ILCS 420/4A-106 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971 Supp., ch. 127, par. 604A-106). **Illinois Governmental Ethics Act.** Provisions of Act authorizing the Secretary of State to render advisory opinions on questions concerning the Article of the Act relating to the disclosure of economic interests and to hire legal counsel for those purposes were unconstitutional because they encroached upon duties and powers of the Attorney General that are inherent in that office under Article V, Section 15 of the Illinois Constitution. The unconstitutional provisions were subsequently deleted by P.A. 78-255. *Stein v. Howlett*, 52 Ill.2d 570 (1972).

ELECTIONS

10 ILCS 5/1A-3, 5/1A-5, and 5/1A-7.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 46, pars. 1A-3, 1A-5, and 1A-7.1). **Election Code.** Method used to select members of State Board of Elections, involving appointments by the Governor from nominees designated by the General Assembly, violated Illinois Constitution prohibition against legislative appointment of executive branch officers. Method used to resolve a tie vote of the State Board of Elections, involving disqualification of one Board member whose name was selected by lot, violated due process and the Illinois Constitution prohibition against a political party having a majority of members of the Board. P.A. 80-1178 deleted the provisions concerning legislative nominees for Board membership and repealed the provision concerning resolution of a tie vote. *Walker v. State Board of Elections*, 65 Ill.2d 543 (1976).

10 ILCS 5/7-5 and 5/7-12 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, pars. 7-5 and 7-12). **Election Code.** Provisions directing that no primary election be held if, for each office to be filled by election, the election would be uncontested were unconstitutional because they violated the equal protection clause by preventing electors from voting for write-in candidates. P.A. 84-698 amended the provisions to provide that a primary election shall be held when a person who intends to become a write-in candidate for an uncontested office files a written statement or notice of intent with the proper election official. *Lawlor v. Chicago Board of Election Com'rs*, 395 F.Supp. 692 (N.D.Ill. 1975).

10 ILCS 5/7-10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 46, par. 7-10). **Election Code.** Provisions prohibiting a person from signing a nominating petition or being a candidate of a political party for public office if the person had requested a primary ballot of

another political party at a primary election held within 2 years of the date on which the nominating petition must be filed were held to violate the right of free political association under the U.S. Constitution, Amendments I and XIV. Standards governing party changes by candidates may and should be more restrictive than those relating to voters generally, but the restrictions on candidates were not severable from the invalid provisions. P.A. 86-1348 deleted the 2-year restriction on changes of party by persons signing nominating petitions and by candidates. *Sperling v. County Officers Electoral Board*, 57 Ill.2d 81 (1974).

10 ILCS 5/7-10 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-10). **Election Code.** (See *People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections*, 136 Ill.2d 513 (1990), reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Courts”, concerning legislation subdividing the First Appellate District and the Circuit of Cook County.)

10 ILCS 5/7-42 (Laws 1910 Sp. Sess., p. 50). **Election Code.** Provision of 1910 Act that allowed an employee to leave work for 2 hours without any deduction in salary or wages to vote in a primary election was unconstitutional because it deprived an employer of his or her property without due process. The provision prohibiting a deduction in salary or wages was not continued in the 1927 Act that replaced the 1910 Act, and the current Election Code does not contain such a provision. *McAlpine v. Dimick*, 326 Ill. 240 (1927).

10 ILCS 5/7-43 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-43). **Election Code.** Provision prohibiting a person from voting in a political party primary if the person voted in another political party's primary in the preceding 23 months was held to substantially burden that person's right to vote in derogation of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The court also found the “23 month rule” to be a significant incursion on a person's right of free association and declared the provision null and void. Public Act 95-699, effective November 9, 2007, removed the offending provision. *Kusper v. Pontikes*, 94 S.Ct. 303 (1973).

10 ILCS 5/7-43, 5/10-3, and 5/10-4. **Election Code.** Provisions prohibiting a person who signed an independent candidate's nominating petition from voting in the primary, requiring more petition signatures for an independent candidate than for a partisan candidate for the same office, and requiring independent and partisan candidates to file petitions at the same time to appear on the ballot at different elections so severely restricted an independent candidate's ballot access as to burden the right to political association of the candidate and his petition signers under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Public Act 95-699, effective November 9, 2007, amended Sections 7-43, 10-3, and 10-6 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-43, 5/10-3, and 5/10-6) to remove the prohibition against an independent candidate petition signer voting in the primary, decrease the number of signatures required on an

independent candidate's petition, and move the deadline for filing an independent candidate's petition closer to the general election. *Lee v. Keith*, 463 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2006).

10 ILCS 5/7-59 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, par. 7-59). **Election Code.** Provision excluding from office a write-in candidate in a primary election who received a majority of the votes cast because he or she did not receive at least as many write-in votes as the number of signatures required on a petition for nomination for that office was an unconstitutional violation of the right to freedom of association as expressed by voting. P.A. 84-658 and P.A. 86-867 changed the statute to bar from office only a write-in candidate in a primary election who receives less votes than any person on the ballot. *Foster v. Kusper*, 587 F.Supp. 1194 (N.D.Ill. 1984).

10 ILCS 5/7A-1 (West 2004). **Election Code.** The statutory deadline for Illinois Supreme, Appellate, and Circuit Judges to file declarations of candidacy to succeed themselves in office (the first Monday in December before the general election preceding the expiration of their terms of office) impermissibly conflicted with the deadline for filing those declarations to seek judicial retention established in Section 12 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. VI, Sec. 12), which is 6 months before the general election preceding the expiration of their terms of office. Public Act 96-886, effective January 1, 2011, amended the statute to conform with the Constitution's deadline, although the Public Act did not resolve the problem resulting from the deadline occurring after the general primary (the third Tuesday in March before the general election). *O'Brien v. White*, 219 Ill.2d 86 (2006).

10 ILCS 5/8-10. **Election Code.** Provision granting incumbents priority in ballot positions violated the 14th Amendment to U.S. Constitution. A subsequent amendment completely removed the offending provision. *Netsch v. Lewis*, 344 F.Supp. 1280 (N.D.Ill. 1972).

10 ILCS 5/10-3 (Ill. Ann. Stat. 1978 Supp., ch. 46, par. 10-3). **Election Code.** Provision requiring more than 25,000 petition signatures for an independent candidate for less than statewide office, when 25,000 was the number needed for statewide office, was unconstitutional as a violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. P.A. 81-926 lowered the number of signatures needed. *Socialist Workers Party v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners*, 99 S.Ct. 983 (1977).

10 ILCS 5/17-15 (Hurd's Statutes 1917, p. 1350). **Election Code.** Provision that required employers to pay employees for the 2 hours employers were required to allow employees to be absent from work to vote on election day was void as an unreasonable abridgment of the right to contract for labor. Although a citizen has a

constitutional right to vote, he or she does not have a constitutional right to be paid to exercise the right to vote. The requirement to pay employees during their absence while voting was removed by Laws 1963, p. 2532. *People v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co.*, 306 Ill. 486 (1923).

10 ILCS 5/19-9 and 5/19-10. Election Code. Code's failure to provide an absent voter with timely notice of and a hearing on the rejection of his or her absentee ballot denied due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Public Act 94-1000, effective July 3, 2006, repealed Section 19-9 and amended Section 19-8 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/19-8) to require that an election authority, before the close of the period for counting provisional ballots, notify an absentee voter that his or her ballot was rejected, why it was rejected, and that the voter may appear before a panel of election judges to show cause why the ballot should not be rejected. *Zessar v. Helander*, 2006 WL 573889, Docket No. 05C 1917, opinion filed March 13, 2006.

10 ILCS 5/23-1.4 and 5/23-1.10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, pars. 23-1.4 and 23-1.10). **Election Code.** Provisions granting a 3-judge panel authority to hear election contests violated the Illinois Constitution because it altered the basic character of the circuit courts by creating a new court. P.A. 86-873 repealed the offending provisions. *In re Contest of Election for Governor*, 93 Ill.2d 463 (1983).

10 ILCS 5/25-11 (Ill. Rev Stat. 1973, ch. 46, par. 25-11). **Election Code.** Provision added by P.A. 79-118 for filling vacancies on the county board and in other county offices that transferred the authority to fill the vacancies from the county board to the county central committee of the political party of the person creating the vacancy was an unconstitutional delegation of power because the power to appoint was delegated to private citizens not accountable to the public. P.A. 80-940 changed the provision to provide that vacancies shall be filled by appointment by the county board chairman with the advice and consent of the county board. *People ex rel. Rudman v. Rini*, 64 Ill.2d 321 (1976).

10 ILCS 5/29-14 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 46, par. 29-14). **Election Code.** Provision that prohibited publication of unattributed political literature was a violation of the First Amendment. P.A. 90-737 repealed Section 29-14 but replaced it with Section 9-9.5 (10 ILCS 5/9-9.5), a similar prohibition against publication and distribution of unattributed political literature. *People v. White*, 116 Ill.2d 171 (1987).

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

15 ILCS 335/14B (West 1998). **Illinois Identification Card Act.** The Class 4 felony penalty for the offense of knowingly possessing a fraudulent identification card,

which includes a mandatory minimum fine or community service, was disproportionate to the Class 4 felony penalty for the more serious offense of knowingly possessing a fraudulent identification card with aggravating elements, which did not include mandatory minimums, in violation of the proportionate penalties requirement of Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec. 11). P.A. 94-701, effective June 1, 2006, reclassified the offense of knowingly possessing a fraudulent identification card with aggravating elements as a Class 3 felony. *People v. Pizano*, 347 Ill.App.3d 128 (1st Dist. 2004).

15 ILCS 520/22.5 and 520/22.6. Deposit of State Moneys Act. Public Act 94-79, effective January 27, 2006 and known as the “Sudan Act”, which prohibited the investment of State moneys in relation to Sudan, was preempted by federal law and violated the foreign commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8). Public Act 95-521, effective August 28, 2007, repealed the Sudan Act. *National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulis*, 523 F.Supp.2d 731 (N.D.Ill. 2007). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Pensions”.)

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

20 ILCS 1128/ (P.A. 88-669). Illinois Geographic Information Council Act. Act created by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, was unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-961, effective June 27, 2006, re-enacted the Illinois Geographic Information Council Act. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

20 ILCS 3505/. Illinois Development Finance Authority Act. Provision of a former Act, the Illinois Industrial Development Authority Act, that required \$500,000 to be transferred to a special fund and that the sum should be considered “always appropriated” for the purpose of guaranteeing repayment of bonds violated the constitutional prohibition against pledging the credit of the State and was an unconstitutional continuing appropriation. P.A. 81-454 repealed the Illinois Industrial Development Authority Act and enacted what became the Illinois Development Finance Authority Act without continuing the offending provision in the new Act. *Bowes v. Howlett*, 24 Ill.2d 545 (1962).

20 ILCS 3850/ (P.A. 88-669). Illinois Research Park Authority Act. Act created by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, was unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 93-205, effective January 1, 2004, repealed the Illinois

Research Park Authority Act. P.A. 92-790, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

FINANCE

30 ILCS 340/0.01, 340/1, 340/1.1, 340/2, and 340/3 (P.A. 88-669). **Casual Deficit Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 93-1046, effective October 15, 2004, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

30 ILCS 560/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 269 *et seq.*). **Public Works Preference Act.** Act was completely unconstitutional because it required that only Illinois laborers may be used for building public works, which violates the privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution. Public Act 96-929, effective June 16, 2010, repealed the Public Works Preference Act, although it retained and amended the similar Employment of Illinois Workers on Public Works Act (30 ILCS 570/). *People ex rel. Bernardi v. Leary Construction Co., Inc.*, 102 Ill.2d 295 (1984).

REVENUE

35 ILCS 5/203, 5/502, 5/506.5, 5/917, and 5/1301 (P.A. 88-669). **Illinois Income Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 105/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 439.2). **Use Tax Act.**

35 ILCS 120/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 440). **Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act.** Provisions that persons in the business of repairing items of personal property by adding or incorporating other items of personal property shall be deemed to be in the

business of selling personal property at retail and not in a service occupation violated the uniformity of taxation provisions of the Illinois Constitution because they attempted to include within a class persons who in fact were not within the class. Laws 1963, pages 1582 and 1600 deleted the offending provisions. *Central Television Service v. Isaacs*, 27 Ill.2d 420 (1963).

35 ILCS 105/2 and 105/9 (P.A. 88-669). **Use Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 105/3-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 439.3). **Use Tax Act.**

35 ILCS 120/2-5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 441). **Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act.**

Provisions that exempted from use tax and retailers’ occupation tax all money and medallions issued by a foreign government except those issued by South Africa were unconstitutional because the disapproval of foreign political and social policies was not a reasonable basis for a tax classification and the power to conduct foreign affairs belonged exclusively to the federal government. The offending provisions were subsequently removed by P.A. 85-1135. *Springfield Rare Coin Gallery v. Johnson*, 115 Ill.2d 221 (1986).

Provisions that made proceeds of sales to the State or local governmental units exempt from use tax and retailers’ occupation tax violated the uniformity of taxation requirement of the Illinois Constitution because they discriminated against the federal government. Laws 1961, pages 2312 and 2314 deleted the offending provisions. *People ex rel. Holland Coal Co. v. Isaacs*, 22 Ill.2d 477 (1961).

35 ILCS 105/3-40 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 439.3). **Use Tax Act.** Definition of gasohol, which applied to the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act as well, that provided for a sales tax preference to gasohol containing ethanol distilled in Illinois violated the commerce clause. The preference was deleted by P.A. 85-1135. *Russell Stewart Oil Co. v. State*, 124 Ill.2d 116 (1988).

35 ILCS 110/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 120, par. 439.32). **Service Use Tax Act.**

35 ILCS 115/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 120, par. 439.102). **Service Occupation Tax Act.**

1967 amendments, which designated 4 limited subclasses of servicemen who were subject to the tax, were an unconstitutional denial of due process and equal protection because there was no reasonable difference between the 4 subclasses of servicemen subject to the tax and those servicemen not subject to the tax. Several Sections in each Act were held unconstitutional because the court found the provisions of the amendatory Acts inseverable. Subsequent amendments corrected the problem. *Fiorito v. Jones*, 39 Ill.2d 531 (1968).

35 ILCS 110/9 (P.A. 88-669). **Service Use Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 115/9 (P.A. 88-669). **Service Occupation Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 120/3 and 120/11 (P.A. 88-669). **Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 120/5a, 120/5b, and 120/5c (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 120, pars. 444a, 444b, and 444c). **Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act.** Provisions (i) permitting the

Department of Revenue to file with the circuit clerk a final assessment or jeopardy assessment and requiring the clerk to immediately enter judgment for that amount and (ii) affording the taxpayer an opportunity to be heard only after entry of the judgment violated due process and attempted to circumvent the courts in violation of the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. Subsequent amendments corrected the problem. *People ex rel. Isaacs v. Johnson*, 26 Ill.2d 268 (1962).

35 ILCS 130/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 120, par. 453.1). **Cigarette Tax Act.** Provision that an individual who in any year brought more than 10 cartons of cigarettes into the State for consumption was a “distributor” of cigarettes was unconstitutional as violative of due process and the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The definition of “distributor” was subsequently changed to remove the unconstitutional text. *Johnson v. Daley*, 403 Ill. 338 (1949).

35 ILCS 130/10b (P.A. 88-669). **Cigarette Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 135/20 (P.A. 88-669). **Cigarette Use Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 200/9-185. Property Tax Code. Provision of prior Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 120, par. 508a) that indirectly required the owner of real property taken by eminent domain to pay the real estate taxes for the period after the petition for condemnation was filed until the compensation award was deposited was an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation. The Property Tax Code, which succeeded the repealed Revenue Act of 1939, now provides that real property is exempt from taxation as of the date the condemnation petition is filed. *Board of Jr. College District 504 v. Carey*, 43 Ill.2d 82 (1969).

35 ILCS 200/15-85. Property Tax Code.

Tax exemption for property used for “mechanical” purposes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.10) was unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of exemptions permitted under Article IX, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 88-455 repealed the Revenue Act of 1939 and replaced it with the Property Tax Code, and the offending provision was not continued in the Code. *Bd. of Certified Safety Professionals of the Americas, Inc. v. Johnson*, 112 Ill.2d 542 (1986).

Tax exemption for property used for “philosophical” purposes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 120, par. 500) was unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of exemptions permitted under the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 88-455 repealed the Revenue Act of 1939 and replaced it with the Property Tax Code, and the offending provision was not continued in the Code. *International College of Surgeons v. Brenza*, 8 Ill.2d 141 (1956).

35 ILCS 200/15-172 (P.A. 88-669). **Property Tax Code.** Provisions added by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-794, effective May 22, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 250/20 (P.A. 88-669). **Longtime Owner-Occupant Property Tax Relief Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

35 ILCS 505/1.16, 505/13a.3, 505/13a.4, 505/13a.5, 505/13a.6, 505/15, and 505/16 (P.A. 88-669). **Motor Fuel Tax Law.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-

enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 610/11 (P.A. 88-669). **Messages Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 615/11 (P.A. 88-669). **Gas Revenue Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 620/11 (P.A. 88-669). **Public Utilities Revenue Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).)

35 ILCS 630/15 (P.A. 88-669). **Telecommunications Excise Tax Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the

substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

PENSIONS

40 ILCS 5/1-110.5. Illinois Pension Code. Public Act 94-79, effective January 27, 2006 and known as the “Sudan Act”, which prohibited the investment of State moneys in relation to Sudan, was preempted by federal law and violated the foreign commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8). Public Act 95-521, effective August 28, 2007, repealed the Sudan Act. *National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulis*, 523 F.Supp.2d 731 (N.D.Ill. 2007). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Officers”.)

40 ILCS 5/6-210.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108 ½, par. 6-210.1). **Illinois Pension Code.** Requiring Chicago fire department paramedics transferred from Chicago municipal pension fund to Chicago firemen’s fund to tender refunds from the Chicago municipal fund, plus interest, to Chicago firemen’s fund in order to retain service credits diminished vested pension rights of paramedics unable to produce refund money plus interest and violated the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition against diminishing pension rights. P.A. 89-136 amended Section 6-210.1 to permit payment of refunds plus interest through payroll deductions. *Collins v. Board of Trustees of Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago*, 226 Ill.App.3d 316 (1st Dist. 1992).

40 ILCS 5/18-125 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 108½, par. 18-125). **Illinois Pension Code.** Amendment of Judicial Article provision that changed the definition of salary base used to compute retirement benefits from the salary on the last day of service to the average salary over the last year of service unconstitutionally reduced or impaired retirement benefits of judges in service on or before effective date of amendment. P.A. 86-273 rewrote the provision to define “final average salary” according to the date of termination of service. *Felt v. Board of Trustees of Judges Retirement System*, 107 Ill.2d 158 (1985).

COUNTIES

(See *People ex rel. Rudman v. Rini*, 64 Ill.2d 321 (1976), reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Elections”, in relation to filling vacancies on the county board and in other county offices.)

55 ILCS 5/4-5001. Counties Code. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 53, par. 37) in relation to compensation of sheriffs and other county officers that allowed the sheriff of a first or second class county a percentage commission on all sales of real and personal property made by virtue of a court judgment violated the

Illinois Constitution prohibition against basing fees of local governmental officers on funds collected. P.A. 82-204 replaced the percentage commission provisions with a schedule of fees in dollar amounts. *Cardinal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kramer*, 99 Ill.2d 334 (1984).

55 ILCS 5/4-12001. Counties Code. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 53, par. 71) in relation to compensation of sheriffs and other county officers that allowed the sheriff of a third class county a percentage commission on all sales of real and personal property made by virtue of an execution or a court judgment violated the Illinois Constitution prohibition against basing fees of local governmental officers on funds collected. P.A. 81-473 replaced the percentage commission provisions with a schedule of fees in dollar amounts. *DeBruyn v. Elrod*, 84 Ill.2d 128 (1981).

55 ILCS 5/4-12003. Counties Code. Successive amendments to predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 53, par. 73; now Section 4-12003 of the Counties Code), which increased the fee for issuance of a marriage license to \$25 from \$15 and thereafter to \$40 from \$25 and which required the county clerk who collected the fee to pay the amount of the increase into the Domestic Violence Shelter and Service Fund for use in funding the administration of domestic violence shelters and service programs, violated the due process guarantees of Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution because the increased portion of the fee (i) constituted an arbitrary tax on the issuance of marriage licenses that bore no reasonable relation to the public interest in sheltering and serving victims of domestic violence and (ii) imposed a direct impediment to the exercise of the fundamental right to marry without supporting a sufficiently important State interest warranting that intrusion. P.A. 84-180 deleted the unconstitutional provisions from the Section that is now Section 4-12003 of the Counties Code, as well as identical provisions (affecting counties of the first and second class) that formerly were contained in a section of the law that is now Section 4-4001 of the Counties Code. *Boynton v. Kasper*, 112 Ill.2d 356 (1986).

55 ILCS 5/5-1002. Counties Code. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 34, par. 301.1) immunizing counties from liability for personal injuries, property damage, and death caused by the negligence of its agents was a violation of the Illinois Constitution prohibition against special legislation because it made legislative classifications based on the form of a governmental unit instead of making the classifications based on the similarity of functions. The provision was repealed by Laws 1967, p. 3786. *Hutchings v. Kraject*, 34 Ill.2d 379 (1966).

55 ILCS 5/5-1120 (P.A. 89-203). **Counties Code.** Provision added by P.A. 89-203 was unconstitutional because P.A. 89-203 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. Public Act 94-154, effective July 8, 2005, re-enacted the provision of Section 5-1120 added by P.A. 89-203. *People v. Wooters*, 188

Ill.2d 500 (1999). (This case is also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, “Corrections”, and “Civil Procedure”.)

MUNICIPALITIES

65 ILCS 5/11-13-3. Illinois Municipal Code. Provision of predecessor Zoning Act authorizing a local zoning board of appeals to vary or modify application of zoning regulations or provisions of zoning ordinances in the case of “practical difficulties” or “unnecessary hardships” was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because the statute offered no guidance to the board in determining what constituted practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships. Laws 1933, p. 288 deleted the offending provision. *Welton v. Hamilton*, 344 Ill. 82 (1931).

65 ILCS 5/11-31-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 24, par. 11-31-1). **Illinois Municipal Code.** Provision that excepted home rule units from the application of a power granted to certain county boards to demolish hazardous buildings was unconstitutional special legislation because the legislative classification did not provide a reasonable basis for differentiating between the types of governmental units that could benefit from the application of the demolition powers. The provision was subsequently removed by P.A. 84-1102. *City of Urbana v. Houser*, 67 Ill.2d 268 (1977).

SPECIAL DISTRICTS

70 ILCS 915/6 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111½, par. 5009). **Medical Center District Act.** Provision authorizing the Medical Center Commission to conduct a hearing and make a finding as to whether restrictions on property use had been violated so as to cause property to revert to the Commission was an unconstitutional violation of due process because the Commission had an interest in the outcome of the proceeding. P.A. 83-858 changed the provision to provide that the Commission must file suit for a determination of whether the property should revert to it. *United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical Center Commission*, 689 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1982).

70 ILCS 2205/1, 2205/5, 2205/7, 2205/8, 2205/17, 2205/27b, 2205/27c, 2205/27d, 2205/27e, 2205/27f, and 2205/27g (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973 Supp., ch. 42, pars. 247, 251, 253, 254, 263, 273b, 273c, 273d, 273e, 273f, and 273g). **Sanitary District Act of 1907.** P.A. 77-2819 (i) added Sections 27b through 27g to the Act to provide that a sanitary district lying in 2 counties and having an equalized assessed valuation of \$100,000,000 or more on the effective date of the amendatory Act was divided “for more effective administrative and fiscal control” into 2 separate districts and (ii) made related changes in other Sections of the Act. P.A. 77-2819 was unconstitutional special legislation because there was no reason for not extending the same advantages of “more effective administrative and fiscal control” to those 2-county districts that reached the minimum valuation level at a time after the effective date of the amendatory Act. Sections 27b through 27g were repealed by P.A. 81-290, and the related provisions added

to other Sections of the Act by P.A. 77-2819 were subsequently deleted. *People ex rel. East Side Levee and Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee and Sanitary District*, 54 Ill. 442 (1973).

SCHOOLS

105 ILCS 5/7-7 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 122, par. 7-7). **School Code.** Provision of the School Code requiring that an appeal from an administrative decision of a county board of school trustees had to be filed within 10 days after the date of service of a copy of the board's decision, while all other administrative review actions under the Code had to be filed within 35 days, violated the Illinois Constitution because there was no reasonable basis for the distinction. The period was changed to 35 days by Laws 1963, p. 3041. *Board of Education of Gardner School District v. County Board of School Trustees of Peoria County*, 28 Ill.2d 15 (1963).

105 ILCS 5/14-7.02 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, par. 14-7.02). **School Code.** Provision that the school district in which a handicapped child resided must pay the actual cost of tuition charged the child by a non-public school or special education facility to which the child was referred or \$2,500, whichever was less, deprived the child of a tuition-free education through the secondary level in violation of Section 1 of Article X of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 80-1405 amended the statute to increase the dollar limit to \$4,500 and to provide for the school district's payment of costs in excess of that amount if approved by the Governor's Purchased Care Review Board. *Elliot v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago*, 64 Ill.App.3d 229 (1st Dist. 1978).

105 ILCS 5/17-2.11a (P.A. 86-4, amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 17-2.11a). **School Code.** After the appellate court interpreted a provision concerning the maximum allowable interest rate on school bonds, P.A. 86-4 amended that provision to retroactively provide for a maximum rate greater than that construed by the appellate court. The amendment violated the separation of powers principle of the Illinois Constitution. The legislature may prospectively change a judicial construction of a statute if it believes that the judicial interpretation was at odds with the legislative intent, but it may not effect a change in the judicial construction by a later declaration of what it had originally intended. (The legislature also may pass a curative Act to validate bonds that a court has found were issued in a manner not authorized by the legislature.) P.A. 87-984 repealed Section 17-2.11a. *Bates v. Bd. of Education*, 136 Ill.2d 260 (1990).

105 ILCS 5/Art. 34 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34-1.01 *et seq.*). **School Code.** 1988 amendments concerning Chicago school reform were unconstitutional because the voting scheme for the election of the local school councils violated equal protection guarantees (one-person-one-vote principles). Subsequent amendments corrected the voting scheme problem and were upheld in federal court. *Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education*, 142 Ill.2d 54 (1990).

HIGHER EDUCATION

110 ILCS 947/105. Higher Education Student Assistance Act. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 30-15.12) requiring the Illinois State Scholarship Commission (the predecessor of the Illinois Student Assistance Commission) to file all lawsuits on delinquent and defaulted student loans "in the County of Cook where venue shall be deemed to be proper" was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive defendants of their property or liberty in violation of the due process guarantees of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. The provision was amended by P.A. 86-1474, which added language authorizing a defendant to request and a court to grant a change of venue to the county of defendant's residence and requiring the Commission to move the court for a change of venue if a defendant, within 30 days of service of summons, files a written request by mail with the Commission to change venue. *Williams v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm'n*, 139 Ill.2d 24 (1990).

110 ILCS 1015/17 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 144, par. 1317). **Illinois Educational Facilities Authority Act.** Provision that authorized political subdivisions to loan public money to finance construction for religious educational institutions was unconstitutional because it created too much potential for a subdivision's excessive entanglement with religion. P.A. 78-399 removed the unconstitutional provision. *Cecrle v. Educational Facilities Authority*, 52 Ill.2d 312 (1972).

FINANCIAL REGULATION

205 ILCS 405/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 16½, par. 31). **Currency Exchange Act.** Provision that exempted American Express Co. money orders from the regulation of the Act was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection guarantees. The provision was deleted by Laws 1957, p. 2332. *Morey v. Doud*, 77 S.Ct. 1344 (1957).

205 ILCS 405/4. Currency Exchange Act. Provision of a predecessor Act required that an application for a license to do business as a community currency exchange contain certain specified information and "such other information as the Auditor [of Public Accounts] may require". The provision was unconstitutionally vague because it did not prescribe the actual qualifications necessary for licensure and left the Auditor without any restraint in interpreting the phrase. The current Act does not contain the offending provision. *McDougall v. Lueder*, 389 Ill. 141 (1945).

205 ILCS 645/3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 17, par. 2710). **Foreign Banking Office Act.** Provision that imposed an annual nonreciprocal license fee of \$50,000 on foreign banks that did not provide reciprocal licensing authority to Illinois State or national banks violated the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution because it conflicted with the federal International Banking Act and the National Bank Act. P.A.

88-271 deleted the nonreciprocal license fee provision. *National Commercial Banking Corp. of Australia v. Harris*, 125 Ill.2d 448 (1988).

INSURANCE

215 ILCS 5/. Illinois Insurance Code. Former Section 401a of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 73, par. 1013a) regulating medical malpractice insurance rates on policies in existence on a certain date but not on policies written after that date was unconstitutional special legislation because it was as important to regulate the initial rate for a new medical malpractice insurance policy as to regulate the rate for an existing policy. P.A. 81-288 repealed the Section. *Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass'n*, 63 Ill.2d 313 (1976). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Civil Procedure”.)

215 ILCS 5/409 (West 1992). **Illinois Insurance Code.** Premium-based tax imposed upon foreign insurance companies for the privilege of doing business in Illinois but not imposed upon similar companies incorporated in Illinois violated the uniformity of taxation clause of Section 2 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-583 imposes the premium-based privilege tax upon all companies doing business in Illinois regardless of where incorporated. *Milwaukee Safeguard Insurance v. Selcke*, 179 Ill.2d 94 (1997).

215 ILCS 5/Art. XXXV (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 73, pars. 1065.150 through 1065.163). **Illinois Insurance Code.** Provisions of former Article XXXV of the Code were unconstitutional. Provision limiting damages recoverable in actions for accidental injuries arising out of use of motor vehicles but requiring that only insurance policies for private passenger automobiles must provide coverage affording benefits to certain injured persons was impermissible special legislation because it resulted in different legislative treatment of persons injured by different vehicles. Provision requiring arbitration of certain cases arising out of auto accidents violated constitutional right to trial by jury. Provision for *de novo* review of arbitration award by the circuit court violated constitutional provision that circuit courts have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters and the power to review administrative actions as provided by law. Provision requiring losing litigant in compulsory arbitration to pay arbitrator’s fees violated constitutional prohibition against fee officers in the judicial system. P.A. 78-1297 repealed Article XXXV. *Grace v. Howlett*, 51 Ill.2d 478 (1972).

UTILITIES

220 ILCS 10/9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 2/3, par. 909). **Citizens Utility Board Act.** Provisions requiring a utility to include in its billing statements information provided by the Citizens Utility Board with which the utility disagreed infringed upon the utility’s freedom of speech in violation of the U.S. Constitution, Amendment I. P.A. 85-879 replaced the entire Section with provisions requiring State agencies to include in

their mailings information furnished by the Citizens Utility Board. *Central Illinois Light Co. v. Citizens Utility Bd.*, 827 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987).

PROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS

225 ILCS 41/. Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Code. Provision of the Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Act of 1935 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 111 ½, par. 73.4) requiring a funeral director to be a holder of a certificate of registration as a registered embalmer violated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution because the interest of the public did not justify the partial merger of their activities by requiring that a funeral director have the knowledge, skill, and training of an embalmer before he or she can direct a funeral. The provision was deleted by Laws 1959, p.1518. The 1935 Act was repealed by P.A. 87-966, which created the Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Code. Article 10 of the new Code (225 ILCS 41/Art. 10) creates a combined funeral director and embalmer license. *Gholson v. Engle*, 9 Ill.2d 454 (1956).

225 ILCS 100/21. Illinois Podiatric Medical Practice Act of 1987. Provision that limited advertising by a podiatric physician to certifications approved by the Council on Podiatric Medical Education violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as applied to a podiatric physician who advertised that he had been certified by a board other than the Council on Podiatric Medical Education if the physician's statements were not actually or potentially misleading and served the public interest and the certification originated from a bona fide certifying board. P.A. 90-76 changed the provision to limit advertising to certifications approved by the Podiatric Medical Licensing Board in accordance with the rules for the administration of the Act. *Tsatsos v. Zollar*, 943 F.Supp. 945 (N.D.Ill. 1996).

225 ILCS 446/75 (225 ILCS 445/14 (West 1992)). Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, and Locksmith Act of 1993. Provision that required an applicant for a private alarm contracting license to have worked as a full-time supervisor, manager, or administrator at a licensed private alarm contracting agency for 3 years out of the 5 years immediately preceding the application for a license was invalid because it conferred upon the regulated industry monopolistic control over entry into the private alarm contracting trade. P.A. 88-363 recodified the Act and added a provision that 3 years of work experience at an unlicensed entity which satisfies standards of alarm industry competence shall meet the requirements for eligibility for licensing as an alternative to working for 3 years at a licensed private alarm contracting agency. P.A. 89-85 added language giving partial credit toward the 3-year employment requirement to applicants who have met certain educational requirements. *Church v. State of Illinois*, 164 Ill.2d 153 (1995).

225 ILCS 455/18. Real Estate License Act of 1983. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111, par. 5732), continued in 1983 Act, that prohibited real estate

brokers from offering inducements to potential customers was unconstitutional as violating free speech guarantees and because it did not advance the State's interest in consumer protection. P.A. 84-1117 deleted the offending provision. *Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services v. Clayton*, 105 Ill.2d 389 (1985).

GAMING

230 ILCS 30/2, 30/4, 30/5, 30/5.1, 30/6, 30/7, 30/8, 30/10, 30/11, and 30/12 (P.A. 88-669). **Charitable Games Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-986, effective June 30, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

LIQUOR

235 ILCS 5/7-9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 43, par. 153). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** In Section concerning appeals from orders of local liquor commissions, provisions denying *de novo* review by the State Commission in the case of appeals from municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 but requiring *de novo* review in the case of other municipalities violated the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition against special legislation. There was no rational basis for the difference in treatment accorded municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 (of which there were only 2 in the State) and municipalities with a population less than 100,000. P.A. 77-674 deleted the provision denying *de novo* review in the case of appeals from municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 and provided instead that in the case of appeals from home rule municipalities with a population under 500,000 (rather than municipalities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000) the appeal was limited to a review of the official record of the local proceedings. *Shepard v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n*, 43 Ill.2d 187 (1969).

235 ILCS 5/8-9 (P.A. 88-669). **Liquor Control Act of 1934.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”.)

WAREHOUSES

240 ILCS 40/. Grain Code. Provisions of former Grain Dealers Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 306) and former Illinois Grain Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 114, par. 704) requiring federally licensed grain warehousemen located in Illinois to either join the Illinois Grain Insurance Fund or provide financial protection for claimants equal to the protection afforded under the Illinois Grain Insurance Act violated the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution because they were in conflict with and preempted by the United States Warehouse Act. Subsequently, P.A. 87-262 removed the unconstitutional language from the Grain Dealers Act. Thereafter, both that Act and the Illinois Grain Insurance Act were repealed by P.A. 89-287 and replaced by the Grain Code (under which participation by federal warehousemen in the Illinois Grain Insurance Fund is made permissive under cooperative agreements that are permitted by federal law). *Demeter, Inc. v. Werries*, 676 F.Supp. 882 (C.D.Ill. 1988).

PUBLIC AID

305 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 1992). **Illinois Public Aid Code.** Provision (i) requiring parents to contribute to the support of a child age 18 through 20 who receives aid and resides with the parents and (ii) exempting parents of a child in the same age group who receives aid but does not live with his or her parents was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. The court, while voiding the parental support provision, upheld the remainder of the Section regarding liability for support between spouses and the responsibility for support by other relatives. P.A. 92-876 replaced the provision with the requirement that parents are severally liable for an unemancipated child under age 18, or an unemancipated child age 18 or over who attends high school, until the child is 19 or graduates from high school, whichever is earlier. *Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid*, 171 Ill.2d 314 (1996).

305 ILCS 5/11-30. Illinois Public Aid Code. Provision that a public aid applicant who received public aid within the previous 12 months in another state in a lower amount than the aid Illinois would provide was ineligible for public aid in Illinois for the first 12 months of residency beyond the amount received in the former state violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for an aid applicant who had received a lower amount in her former state of Alabama. P.A. 92-111 repealed the provision. *Hicks v. Peters*, 10 F.Supp.2d 1003 (N.D.Ill. 1998).

PUBLIC HEALTH

410 ILCS 230/4-100 (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 111½, par. 4604-100). **Problem Pregnancy Health Services and Care Act.** Provision prohibiting the Department of Public Health from making grants to nonprofit entities that provide abortion referral or counseling services was unconstitutional: (i) it violated due process because it

disqualified entities that agreed not to use the State funds for those particular services and (ii) it violated the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on the information available for a woman's childbirth decision. P.A. 83-51 amended the statute to enable the entities to receive the grants if they did not use the funds for abortion referral or counseling services. *Planned Parenthood Association v. Kempiners*, 568 F.Supp. 1490 (N.D.Ill. 1983).

410 ILCS 315/2c (P.A. 88-669). **Communicable Diseases Prevention Act.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 92-790, effective August 6, 2002, repealed the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, 94-1017, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under "Executive Branch", "Finance", "Revenue", "Gaming", "Liquor", "Vehicles", "Criminal Offenses", and "Corrections".)

ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY

415 ILCS 5/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 111½, par. 1004). **Environmental Protection Act.** Provision that it was the duty of the EPA to investigate violations of the Act and to prepare and present enforcement actions before the Pollution Control Board violated Article V, Section 15 of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that the Attorney General is "the legal officer of the State" and thus is the only officer empowered to represent the people in any proceeding in which the State is the real party in interest. P.A. 81-219 deleted the offending provision and limited the EPA's duty to investigating violations of the Act and regulations and issuing administrative citations. *People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland*, 65 Ill.2d 485 (1976).

415 ILCS 5/25 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1025). **Environmental Protection Act.** Provision exempting a motor racing event from noise standards if the event was endorsed by one of several designated private organizations was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a private group. P.A. 82-654 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Pollution Control Board*, 83 Ill.App.3d 802 (1st Dist. 1980).

415 ILCS 5/33 and 5/42 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 111½, pars. 1033 and 1042). **Environmental Protection Act.** Provisions allowing the Pollution Control Board to impose money penalties not to exceed \$10,000 for a violation of the Act or regulations or an order of the Board were an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because the provisions failed to provide the Board with any standards to guide it in imposing penalties. The provisions also were an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power because the Board could impose discretionary fines, a distinctly judicial act. P.A. 78-862

amended the statute to allow the Board to impose “civil penalties” instead of “money penalties”. *Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency*, 15 Ill.App.3d 66 (5th Dist. 1973).

PUBLIC SAFETY

430 ILCS 65/2 (West 1994). **Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.** (See *People v. Davis*, 177 Ill.2d 495 (1997), reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Corrections”, concerning the disproportionality of penalties for possession of a firearm in violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and unlawful use of a firearm by a felon.)

ROADS AND BRIDGES

605 ILCS 5/9-112 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 121, par. 9-112). **Illinois Highway Code.** Provision authorizing local authorities to permit advertising on public highways with no guidelines was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. P.A. 76-793 deleted the provision. *City of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. Co.*, 41 Ill.2d 245 (1968).

VEHICLES

625 ILCS 5/. **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision in former Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-theft Act (repealed) providing for an increased registration fee for certain cars purchased in another state was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Laws 1957, p. 2706 repealed the former Act. *Berger v. Barrett*, 414 Ill. 43 (1953).

625 ILCS 5/4-107 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95½, par. 4-107). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision that a vehicle was considered contraband if the vehicle ID number could not be identified was an unconstitutional denial of due process when applied to a buyer who bought a vehicle from a dealer and the title to the vehicle had an ID number that matched the ID number on the dashboard, but the number was false and it was impossible to determine the confidential vehicle ID number. P.A. 83-1473 added an exception for a person who acquires a vehicle without knowledge that the ID number has been removed, altered, or destroyed. *People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile*, 89 Ill.2d 506 (1982).

625 ILCS 5/5-401.2. **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95½, par. 5-401) authorizing warrantless administrative searches of records and business premises of auto parts dealers was unconstitutional because it did not provide for the regularity and neutrality required by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. P.A. 83-1473 repealed Section 5-401 of the Code and replaced it with new Section 5-401.2, which does not contain the offending provision. *People v. Krull*, 107 Ill.2d 107 (1985).

625 ILCS 5/5-401.2 (West 1996). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision that made the knowing failure by certain licensees to maintain records of the acquisition and disposition of vehicles a Class 2 felony was an unconstitutional violation of due process because the criminalization of an innocent record-keeping error was not a reasonable means of preventing the trafficking of stolen vehicles and parts. P.A. 92-773 reduced the failure to a Class B misdemeanor and made the failure with intent to conceal the identity or origin of a vehicle or its essential parts or with intent to defraud the public in the transfer or sale of vehicles or their essential parts a Class 2 felony. *People v. Wright*, 194 Ill.2d 1 (2000).

625 ILCS 5/6-107 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95½, par. 6-107). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision requiring parent's or guardian's consent for driver's license for an unmarried emancipated minor under age 21 but not for a married emancipated minor under that age was arbitrary discrimination against unmarried emancipated minors. P.A. 77-2805 reduced the age limit to 18 but kept the distinction. Without expressing an opinion as to the validity of the amended provision, the court noted that there may be justifications for applying such a classification to minors under age 18. *People v. Sherman*, 57 Ill.2d 1 (1974).

625 ILCS 5/6-205 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 6-205). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision requiring the Secretary of State to revoke a sex offender's driver's license denied the offender due process because there was no relationship to the public interest when a vehicle was not used in the offense. P.A. 85-1259 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Lindner*, 127 Ill.2d 174 (1989).

625 ILCS 5/6-301.2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95½, par. 6-301.2). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision that punished distribution of a fraudulent driver's license as a Class B misdemeanor but punished the lesser included offense of possessing a fraudulent driver's license as a Class 4 felony violated the Illinois Constitution's due process and proportionality of penalties clauses. P.A. 89-283, effective January 1, 1996, retained the penalties and changed the offense from distributing fraudulent driver's licenses to distributing information about the availability of fraudulent driver's licenses. *People v. McGee*, 257 Ill.App.3d 229 (1st Dist. 1993).

625 ILCS 5/7-205 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1970 Supp., ch. 95½, par. 7-205). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provision of "Safety Responsibility Law" within the Code that permitted the suspension of a driver's license without a pre-suspension hearing violated due process. P.A. 77-1910 replaced the offending provision with a requirement that the Secretary of State cause a hearing to be held to determine whether a driver's license should be suspended. P.A. 83-1081 deleted the requirement that the Secretary of State cause a hearing to be held and instead provided that a driver be given an opportunity to request a hearing before suspension of his or her driver's license. *Pollion v. Lewis*, 332 F.Supp. 777 (N.D.Ill. 1971).

625 ILCS 5/11-1419.01, 5/11-1419.02, and 5/11-1419.03 (P.A. 88-669). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1074, effective December 26, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1017 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).

625 ILCS 5/12-612 (West 2004). **Illinois Vehicle Code.** Statute that made it unlawful for a person to own or operate a motor vehicle that the person knows to contain a false or secret compartment, and that provides that the person’s intent to use the compartment to conceal its contents from a law enforcement officer may be inferred from the nature of the contents, violated the due process guarantees of the federal and State constitutions (U.S. Const., Amends. V and XIV and ILCON Art. I, Sec.2) because it was too broad and potentially punished innocent behavior. Public Act 96-202, effective January 1, 2010, amended Section 12-612 to require that the person (i) own or operate the vehicle with criminal intent and (ii) know that the compartment is or has been used to conceal specified, prohibited firearms or controlled substances. *People v. Carpenter*, 228 Ill.2d 250 (2008).

COURTS

705 ILCS 25/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 25). **Appellate Court Act.**

705 ILCS 35/2 and 35/2e (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, pars. 72.2 and 72.2e (repealed)). **Circuit Courts Act.**

705 ILCS 40/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 72.42). **Judicial Vacancies Act.**

705 ILCS 45/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 160.2). **Associate Judges Act.**

P.A. 86-786 amendatory provisions were unconstitutional because (i) the subdividing of the First Appellate District for judicial elections beyond the divisions made by the Illinois Constitution violated the Constitution and (ii) the subdividing of the Circuit of Cook County, while not unconstitutional by itself, was inseverable from the invalid appellate court provisions. P.A. 86-1478 deleted the offending changes made by P.A. 86-786 and restored the law as it existed before P.A. 86-786, stating that its purpose was to conform the law to the Supreme Court’s opinion. *People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. State Bd. of Elections*, 136 Ill.2d 513 (1990).

705 ILCS 35/2c (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 72.2c). **Circuit Courts Act.** Provision requiring a circuit judge to be a resident of a particular county within a (multiple-county) circuit and yet be elected at large from within that circuit violated

subsection (a) of Section 7 and Section 11 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution by creating a hybrid variety judgeship that was not contemplated by the Constitution's drafters. The Section was amended by P.A. 87-410 to remove the provision in question, as well as a similar provision relating to the election of judges in another circuit. *Thies v. State Board of Elections*, 124 Ill.2d 317 (1988).

705 ILCS 105/27.1 and 105/27.2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 25, par. 27.1 and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1982 Supp., ch. 25, par. 27.2). **Clerks of Courts Act.** Provisions requiring circuit clerks to collect a special \$5 filing fee from petitioners for dissolution of marriage to fund shelters and services for domestic violence victims unreasonably interfered with persons' access to the courts, were an arbitrary use of the State's police power, and made an unreasonable or arbitrary classification for tax purposes by imposing a tax to fund a general welfare program only on members of a designated class. P.A. 83-1539 deleted the offending provision from Section 27.1, and P.A. 83-1375 deleted the offending provision from Section 27.2. *Crocker v. Finley*, 99 Ill.2d 444 (1984).

705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West 1998). **Juvenile Court Act of 1987.** Portion of subsection (3) that granted an automatic appeal of a court order changing a child's permanency goal violated Section 6 of Article VI of the Illinois Constitution, which assigns to the Illinois Supreme Court the power to establish procedures for appealing non-final judgments. Public Act 95-182, effective August 14, 2007, deleted the offending provision. *In re Curtis B.*, 203 Ill.2d 53 (2002), *In re D.D.H.*, 319 Ill.App.3d 989 (5th Dist. 2001), *In re C.B.*, 322 Ill.App.3d 1011 (4th Dist. 2001), and *In re T.B.*, 325 Ill.App.3d 566 (3rd Dist. 2001).

705 ILCS 405/5-33 (repealed) (West 1996). **Juvenile Court Act of 1987.** Act's silence as to a jury trial for a minor at least 13 years old adjudicated delinquent for first degree murder and committed to the Department of Corrections until age 21 without parole for 5 years was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection guarantees as applied to a 13-year-old whose jury trial request was denied. P.A. 90-590 repealed the offending Section and added Section 5-810, which allows a jury trial in certain circumstances. *In re G.O.*, 304 Ill.App.3d 719 (1st Dist. 1999).

CRIMINAL OFFENSES

720 ILCS 5/10-5.5 (West 1994). **Criminal Code of 1961.** The provision of the unlawful visitation interference statute prohibiting the imposition of civil contempt sanctions under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act after a conviction for unlawful visitation interference was an undue infringement on the court's inherent powers under the separation of powers provision of Article II, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution. Public Act 96-710, effective January 1, 2010, removed the offending provision. *People v. Warren*, 173 Ill.2d 348 (1996).

720 ILCS 5/11-20.1 (P.A. 88-680). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-680 were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 91-54 re-enacted the changes in Section 11-20.1 made by P.A. 88-680. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999). (These cases are also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance”, “Courts”, and “Corrections”).

720 ILCS 5/12-18 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12-18). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision that a person may not be charged by his or her spouse with the offense of criminal sexual abuse or aggravated criminal sexual abuse was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection and due process. P.A. 88-421 deleted the offending provision. *People v. M.D.*, 231 Ill.App.3d 176 (2nd Dist. 1992).

720 ILCS 5/16-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16-1). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Theft provision that prohibited obtaining control over property in custody of law enforcement agency that was explicitly represented as being stolen was unconstitutional on its face because it did not require a culpable mental state. P.A. 89-377 rearranged the list of elements of the offense to make it clear that the offense requires that a person “knowingly” obtain control over the property. *People v. Zaremba*, 158 Ill.2d 36 (1994).

720 ILCS 5/17B-1, 5/17B-5, 5/17B-10, 5/17B-15, 5/17B-20, 5/17B-25, and 5/17B-30 (P.A. 88-680). **Criminal Code of 1961.** WIC Fraud Article added by P.A. 88-680 was unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 91-155 re-enacted the WIC Fraud Article of the Code. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999). (These cases are also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance”, “Courts”, “Criminal Offenses”, and “Corrections”).

720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Subsection (b)’s 15-year sentence enhancement for armed robbery committed under subsection (a)(2) with a firearm resulted in a penalty greater than that for armed violence predicated on robbery with a dangerous weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2), in violation of the proportionate penalty requirement of the Illinois Constitution (ILCON Art. I, Sec.11) for offenses with identical elements. Public Act 95-688, effective October 23, 2007, redefined armed violence to exclude as a predicate any offense that carries a mandatory sentence enhancement for use of a firearm. *People v. Hauschild*, 226 Ill.2d 63 (2007).

720 ILCS 5/20-1.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 20-1.1). **Criminal Code of 1961.**

Item (1) of subsection (a) provided that a person committed aggravated arson when the person knowingly damaged a structure by means of fire or explosive and the person knew or reasonably should have known that someone was present in the structure. This provision was unconstitutional because the underlying conduct that was supposed to be enhanced by the aggravated arson statute was not necessarily criminal in nature. *People v. Johnson*, 114 Ill.2d 69 (1986).

Item (3) of subsection (a) provided that a person committed aggravated arson when the person damaged a structure by means of fire or explosive and a fireman or policeman was injured. This provision was unconstitutional because it failed to require a culpable intent. *People v. Wick*, 107 Ill.2d 62 (1985).

P.A. 84-1100 amended the statute to add “in the course of committing arson” after “A person commits aggravated arson when”, thereby adding the requirement of a criminal purpose or intent.

720 ILCS 5/21.1-2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 21.1-2). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision making peaceful picketing of “a place of employment involved in a labor dispute” exempt from general prohibition against picketing a residence was a denial of equal protection because it accorded preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject: dissemination of information about labor disputes was unrestricted, but discussion of other issues was restricted. P.A. 81-1270 deleted the exception for picketing at “a place of employment involved in a labor dispute”. *Carey v. Brown*, 100 S.Ct. 2286 (1980).

720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1994). **Criminal Code of 1961.** (See *People v. Davis*, 177 Ill.2d 495 (1997), reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Corrections”, concerning the disproportionality of penalties for possession of a firearm in violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and unlawful use of a firearm by a felon.)

720 ILCS 5/24-5 (West 2002). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Subsection (b), which provided that possession of a firearm with a defaced identification mark was prima facie evidence that the possessor committed the offense of knowingly or intentionally defacing identification marks on a firearm, created an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption of guilt. P.A. 93-906, effective August 11, 2004, eliminated the language conveying prima facie evidentiary status to possession of a defaced firearm. *People v. Quinones*, 362 Ill.App.3d 385 (1st Dist. 2005).

720 ILCS 5/25-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 25-1). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision of mob action offense that prohibited the assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act was unconstitutional for violating due process and the First Amendment because it (i) was too vague to give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct or

adjudicatory standards and (ii) was so overbroad as to allow the arbitrary suppression of non-criminal conduct. Public Act 96-710, effective January 1, 2010, changed the offense to prohibit the knowing assembly of 2 or more persons with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanor. *Landry v. Daley*, 280 F.Supp. 938 (N.D.Ill. 1968).

720 ILCS 5/26-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 26-1). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provision that a person commits disorderly conduct when he or she makes a telephone call with the intent to annoy another was impermissibly broad because it applied to any call made with the intent to annoy, including those that might not provoke a breach of the peace. P.A. 80-795 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Klick*, 66 Ill.2d 269 (1977).

720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1 and 5/31A-1.2 (P.A. 89-688). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provisions amended by P.A. 89-688 were unconstitutional because P.A. 89-688 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. (Although Public Act 89-688 also amended Section 8-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/8-1.1), identical changes were made to that Section by Public Act 89-689, effective December 31, 1996.) P.A. 94-1017, effective July 7, 2006, re-enacted the changes made to Section 31A-1.1 by P.A.s 89-688 and 94-556 and to Section 31A-1.2 by P.A.s 89-688, 90-655, 91-357, and 94-556. *People v. Foster*, 316 Ill.App.3d 855 (4th Dist. 2000), and *People v. Burdunice*, 211 Ill.2d 264 (2004). (These cases are also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “General Provisions”, “Criminal Procedure”, and “Corrections”).

720 ILCS 5/33A-1, 5/33A-2, and 5/33A-3 (P.A. 88-680). **Criminal Code of 1961.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-680 were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-680 violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 91-404 provided that should P.A. 88-680 be declared unconstitutional as violative of the single-subject rule, it was the General Assembly’s intent that P.A. 91-404 re-enact the changes made by P.A. 88-680 in Article 33A of the Code. *People v. Dainty*, 299 Ill.App.3d 235 (3rd Dist. 1998), *People v. Williams*, 302 Ill.App.3d 975 (2nd Dist. 1999), and *People v. Edwards*, 304 Ill.App.3d 250 (2nd Dist. 1999). (These cases are also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Finance”, “Courts”, and “Corrections”).

720 ILCS 5/33A-2 and 5/33A-3. Criminal Code of 1961. Penalties for armed violence predicated on certain offenses were unconstitutionally disproportionate to penalties for other offenses.

Penalty for armed violence (a Class X felony) was disproportionate to penalty for aggravated kidnapping other than for ransom under 720 ILCS 5/10-2 (a Class 1 felony) because the elements for both offenses are the same. P.A. 89-707 amended Section 10-2 to provide that aggravated kidnapping, whether or not for ransom, is a Class X felony. *People v. Christy*, 139 Ill.2d 132 (1990).

Armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon. Minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years was disproportionate to minimum term of imprisonment (6 years) for robbery committed with a handgun under 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994). *People v. Lewis*, 175 Ill.2d 412 (1996).

Armed violence predicated on aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery. Minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years was disproportionate to minimum terms of imprisonment (7 years and 6 years, respectively) for aggravated vehicular hijacking under 720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 1994) and armed robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994). *People v. Beard*, 287 Ill.App.3d 935 (1st Dist. 1997).

Public Act 95-688, effective October 23, 2007, amended 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 to remove from the definition of armed violence any offense that makes possession or use of a dangerous weapon an element of the offense or an aggravated version of the offense, thus eliminating robbery committed with a handgun under 720 ILCS 5/18-2, armed robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18-2, and some forms of aggravated vehicular hijacking. Aggravated vehicular hijacking, however, may be committed under 720 ILCS 5/18-4 with aggravating factors other than possession or use of a dangerous weapon.

720 ILCS 5/36-1 (P.A. 88-669). **Criminal Code of 1961**. Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1017, effective July 7, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Executive Branch”, “Finance”, “Revenue”, “Gaming”, “Liquor”, “Public Health”, “Vehicles”, and “Corrections”).

720 ILCS 125/2 (West 1996). **Hunter Interference Prohibition Act**. Prohibition against disrupting a person engaged in lawfully taking a wild animal for the purpose of preventing the taking was a content-based regulation of speech in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. P.A. 90-555 eliminated the offending subsection. *People v. Sanders*, 182 Ill.2d 524 (1998).

720 ILCS 150/5.1 (West 1992). **Wrongs to Children Act**. Provision creating the offense of permitting the sexual abuse of a child, one element of which was the failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the abuse, violated the due process guarantees of Amendments V and XIV of the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 2 of the Illinois Constitution by failing to warn as to what was prohibited and failing to provide clear guidelines for enforcement. P.A.s 89-462 and 91-696 amended the provision to add to the list of persons subject to the statute, to add to the list of acts by which a person committed the offense, and to change the penalty from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 1 felony. P.A. 92-827 rewrote the entire Section, replacing the offending element with having actual knowledge of and permitting

sexual abuse of the child or permitting the child to engage in prostitution. *People v. Maness*, 191 Ill.2d 478 (2000).

720 ILCS 510/2, 510/3, 510/5, 510/7, 510/8, 510/9, 510/10, and 510/11 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1976, ch. 38, pars. 81-22, 81-23, 81-25, 81-27, 81-28, 81-29, 81-30, and 81-31). **Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.** Substantial portions of the Act were unconstitutional because they violated the due process clause of the U. S. Constitution. The definition of “criminal abortion” was vague; physicians were not given fair warning of what information they had to provide to pregnant women; spousal and parental consent requirements unduly infringed on a pregnant woman’s rights; the requirement for additional physician consultations bore no relationship to the needs of the patient or fetus; there was no provision for notice and an opportunity to contest the termination of parental rights; the ban on saline abortions removed a necessary alternative procedure; and required reports of abortions as fetal deaths failed to preserve a woman’s right to confidentiality. P.A. 81-1078 made numerous changes in the Act in response to the findings of unconstitutionality. *Wynn v. Carey*, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).

720 ILCS 515/3, 515/4, and 515/5 (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1978, ch. 38, pars. 81-53, 81-54, and 81-55). **Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977.** Provision defining “abortion” was unconstitutionally vague, and criminal penalty provision based on that definition was therefore also unconstitutional. Provision for a 48-hour waiting period and parental consent were unconstitutional violations of the federal equal protection clause because they were underinclusive in that they excluded married minors and overinclusive in that they included mature, emancipated minors. P.A. 89-18 repealed the Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977 (as well as the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983) and replaced them with the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 (750 ILCS 70/), which excludes married or emancipated minors. Enforcement of the 1995 Act is presently restrained by a federal court. *Wynn v. Carey*, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).

720 ILCS 520/4 (repealed) (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 81-64). **Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983.** Requirement of a 24-hour waiting period after notifying parent of minor’s decision to have an abortion was unconstitutional as unduly burdening the minor’s right to an abortion in the absence of a compelling state interest. P.A. 89-18 repealed the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 (as well as the Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977) and replaced them with the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 (750 ILCS 70/), which provides for a 48-hour waiting period. Enforcement of the 1995 Act is presently restrained by a federal court. *Zbaraz v. Hartigan*, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985).

720 ILCS 570/201 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56½, par. 1201). **Illinois Controlled Substances Act.** Provision authorizing the Director of Law Enforcement to add or delete substances from the schedules of controlled substances by issuing rules having the immediate effect of law failed to provide constitutionally required due notice to persons

affected by such a rule. P.A. 79-454 added provisions requiring publication of a determination to add or delete a substance, allowing time for filing objections to such a determination, and requiring a hearing before issuance of a rule. *People v. Avery*, 67 Ill.2d 182 (1977).

720 ILCS 600/2 and 600/3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 56½, pars. 2102 and 2103). **Drug Paraphernalia Control Act.** Provisions were unconstitutionally vague because they required scienter on the part of a retailer in the definition Section but allowed for constructive knowledge on the part of the retailer in the penalty Section. P.A. 86-271 amended the penalty Section to delete the constructive knowledge provision. *People v. Monroe*, 118 Ill.2d 298 (1987).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

725 ILCS 5/108-8 (West 1994). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Subsection authorizing a “no-knock” search warrant based on the mere existence of firearms on the premises resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the United States and Illinois constitutions. P.A. 90-456 amended the Code to base issuance of “no-knock” warrants on the reasonable belief that weapons may be used or evidence may be destroyed if entry is announced. *People v. Wright*, 183 Ill.2d 16 (1998).

725 ILCS 5/109-3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 109-3). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision that an order of suppression of evidence entered at a preliminary hearing was not an appealable order violated provision of Illinois Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power to provide by rule for appeals. P.A. 79-1360 deleted the offending provision. *People v. Taylor*, 50 Ill.2d 136 (1971).

725 ILCS 5/110-7 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 110-7). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision that required the cost of appointed legal counsel to be reimbursed from a defendant’s bail deposit violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Illinois constitutions because other defendants who did not post bail were not required to reimburse the costs of their appointed counsel. P.A. 83-336 removed the provision. *People v. Cook*, 81 Ill.2d 176 (1980).

725 ILCS 5/115-10 (P.A. 89-428). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** P.A. 89-428 included a provision amending the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 permitting, in a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated on a child under age 13, the admission of certain out-of-court statements by the child victim. The entire Public Act was unconstitutional because it violated the single-subject requirement of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-786 amended Section 115-10 to allow such statements provided they are made before the victim attains age 13 or within 3 months after

commission of the offense, whichever occurs later. *Johnson v. Edgar*, 176 Ill.2d 499 (1997).

725 ILCS 5/122-8 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 122-8). **Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.** Provision requiring that all post-conviction proceedings be conducted by a judge who was not involved in the original proceeding that resulted in conviction violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution and also was contrary to a Supreme Court Rule concerning judicial administration and therefore violated Article VI, Section 16 of the Illinois Constitution. Public Act 96-1200, effective July 22, 2010, repealed the offending provision. *People v. Joseph*, 113 Ill.2d 36 (1986).

725 ILCS 150/9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 56½, par. 1679). **Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act.** Provision depriving a claimant in a forfeiture proceeding of a jury trial was unconstitutional. P.A. 89-404 deleted the language that required forfeiture hearings to be heard by the court without a jury. *People ex rel. O'Malley v. 6323 North LaCrosse Ave.*, 158 Ill.2d 453 (1994).

CORRECTIONS

730 ILCS 5/. Unified Code of Corrections. Former provision of Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-1) requiring a criminal defendant to bear the burden of proof that he or she was unfit to stand trial was a denial of due process in violation of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 81-1217 repealed the offending provision. *People v. McCullum*, 66 Ill.2d 306 (1977).

730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (P.A. 89-404). **Unified Code of Corrections.** P.A. 89-404, including amendments to the Code's "truth-in-sentencing" provisions, violated the single-subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution. P.A.'s 89-462, 90-592, and 90-593 re-enacted the Code's "truth-in-sentencing" provisions. *People v. Reedy*, 186 Ill.2d 1 (1999).

730 ILCS 5/3-7-6, 5/3-12-2, and 5/3-12-5 (P.A. 88-669). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Provisions amended by P.A. 88-669, effective November 29, 1994, were unconstitutional because P.A. 88-669 violates the single subject rule of Section 8 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution and is void in its entirety. P.A. 94-1017, effective July 7, 2006, re-enacted the changes made by P.A. 88-669. P.A. 92-790, 93-205, 93-1046, 94-794, 94-961, 94-986, and 94-1074 also re-enacted, amended, or repealed portions, but not all, of the substance of P.A. 88-669. *People v. Olender*, 222 Ill.2d 123 (2005). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under "Executive Branch", "Finance", "Revenue", "Gaming", "Liquor", "Public Health", "Vehicles", and "Criminal Offenses".)

730 ILCS 5/5-4-1 and 5/5-8-1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars 1005-4-1 and 1005-8-1). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Two provisions providing that, in imposing a sentence for a felony conviction, a judge “shall” specify reasons for his or her sentencing determination were constitutional, as held here, when “shall” is construed in that context to be permissive rather than mandatory. By contrast, if “shall” were interpreted to reflect a mandatory intent, the provisions would unconstitutionally infringe upon the inherently separate power of the judiciary. Public Act 95-1052, effective July 1, 2009, removed the offending provision from Section 5-8-1. *People v. Davis*, 93 Ill.2d 155 (1982).

730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 1994). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Requirement that an incarcerated sex offender, ordered by the court to provide a blood specimen, must be punished with contempt when the prisoner is deliberately uncooperative violated the separation of powers doctrine of Section 1 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-793 punishes the deliberate actions as a Class A misdemeanor. *Murneigh v. Gainer*, 177 Ill.2d 287 (1997).

730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 (West Supp. 1995). **Unified Code of Corrections.** Designation of possession of a firearm in violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act as a nonprobationable Class 3 felony, as compared to the designation of unlawful use of a firearm by a felon as a probationable Class 3 felony, violated the prohibition against disproportionate penalties in Section 11 of Article I of the Illinois Constitution. Public Act 94-72, effective January 1, 2006, amended Section 5-5-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections to designate unlawful use of a firearm by a felon as a nonprobationable Class 3 felony. *People v. Davis*, 177 Ill.2d 495 (1997).

730 ILCS 5/5-5-4.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-4.1). **Unified Code of Corrections.** The statute purported to alter the standard of review of a sentence imposed by a trial judge and authorized a court of review to enter any sentence that the trial judge could have entered. This conflicted with Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4). The statute was invalid because it constituted an undue infringement by the legislature on the powers of the judiciary. Although the legislature may enact laws governing judicial practice that do not unduly infringe on inherent judicial powers, if a Supreme Court Rule conflicts with a statute, the Rule prevails. Subsequently, P.A. 83-344 removed the offending language. *People v. Cox*, 82 Ill.2d 268 (1980).

730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2000). **Sex Offender Registration Act.** Including a conviction of aggravated kidnapping among the sex offenses that trigger registration as a sex offender unconstitutionally violated the substantive due process rights of an offender when applied to a defendant without a history of sex offenses whose crime was without sexual motivation or purpose. P.A. 94-945, effective June 27, 2006, added the requirement that the offense was sexually motivated. *People v. Johnson*, 363 Ill.App.3d 356 (1st Dist. 2006).

CIVIL PROCEDURE

735 ILCS 5/. Code of Civil Procedure. Provision of “An Act to revise the law in relation to medical practice” (P.A. 79-960; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 70, par. 101) that limited recovery in cases involving injuries arising from medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice to \$500,000 permitted or denied recovery on an arbitrary basis, thus granting a special privilege in violation of Article IV, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 81-288 repealed the offending provision.

Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, pars. 58.2 through 58.10) establishing medical review panels to hear malpractice claims unconstitutionally delegated judicial functions to non-judicial personnel. Provision establishing malpractice claim review procedure as a condition to a jury trial violated the constitutional right to a trial by jury. P.A. 81-288 repealed the offending provisions. *Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass’n*, 63 Ill.2d 313 (1976). (This case is also reported in this Part 3 of this Case Report under “Insurance”.)

735 ILCS 5/. Code of Civil Procedure. Former provisions of Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-1012 through 2-1020) requiring, as a prerequisite to trial in a healing art malpractice case, that a panel composed of a circuit judge, a practicing attorney, and a health-care professional convene and make a determination regarding liability and, if liability is found, damages violated the Illinois Constitution’s grant of judicial power solely to the courts because the statute was an attempt by the legislature to create new courts. The offending provisions were repealed by P.A. 86-1028. *Bernier v. Burris*, 113 Ill.2d 219 (1986).

735 ILCS 5/2-622 and 5/8-2501. (P.A. 89-7). **Code of Civil Procedure.** Provisions concerning physician affidavits and expert witnesses in healing arts malpractice actions were unconstitutional due to their inseparability, despite inclusion of a severability clause, from P.A. 89-7, which is unconstitutional in its entirety. P.A. 90-579, effective May 1, 1998, in amending 735 ILCS 5/2-622, included language added by P.A. 89-7 without specifying an intentional re-enactment. Public Act 90-579 was deemed a valid resurrection of P.A. 89-7 in *Cargill v. Czelatdtko*, 353 Ill.App.3d 654 (4th Dist. 2004); *Cargill* was overruled by *O’Casek v. Children’s Home and Aid Society of Illinois*, 229 Ill.2d 421 (2008). Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005, specifically re-enacted and changed 735 ILCS 5/2-622 and 5/8-2501. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997).

735 ILCS 5/12-701 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 12-701). **Code of Civil Procedure.** The statute required the court clerk to issue a summons to a person commanding the person to appear in court as a nonwage garnishee after a judgment creditor filed an affidavit. The statute violated due process because it did not require a judgment debtor to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. P.A. 87-1252 added

the requirement that a garnishment notice be provided to the judgment debtor and gave a judgment debtor the right to request a hearing. *E.J. McKernan Co. v. Gregory*, 268 Ill.App.3d 383 (2nd Dist. 1994); *Jacobson v. Johnson*, 798 F.Supp. 500 (C.D.Ill. 1991).

735 ILCS 5/13-208. Code of Civil Procedure. Pre-Code limitations provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 19) concerning the effect an absence from the State had on personal actions was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection guarantees because the statute applied only to Illinois residents. The unconstitutional provision was not continued in the Code of Civil Procedure in 1982. *Haughton v. Haughton*, 76 Ill.2d 439 (1979).

CIVIL LIABILITIES

740 ILCS 10/. Illinois Antitrust Act. The 1893 antitrust Act was unconstitutional because of a discrimination in favor of agricultural products or livestock in the hands of the producer or raiser exempting them from the prohibition against recovery of the price of articles sold by any trust or combination in restraint of trade or competition in violation of the Act. In 1965, the 1893 Act was repealed by the Illinois Antitrust Act, which did not contain a provision such as that which had been held unconstitutional. *Connolly v. Union Server Pipe Co.*, 22 S.Ct. 431 (1902).

740 ILCS 180/1 and 180/2 (P.A. 89-7). Wrongful Death Act. Provisions amended by P.A. 89-7, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to personal injury actions that was unconstitutional in its entirety, despite inclusion of a severability clause, were inseverable. P.A. 91-380 re-enacted the changes made in the Wrongful Death Act by P.A. 89-7. *Best v. Taylor Machine Works*, 179 Ill.2d 367 (1997). (This case is also reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Civil Procedure” and “Civil Liabilities”, concerning the inseverability of unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act enacted by P.A. 89-7.)

CIVIL IMMUNITIES

745 ILCS 25/3 and 25/4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 122, pars. 823 and 824). Tort Liability of Schools Act. Provisions requiring that written notice of injury be filed with the proper school authority within 6 months after the date of the injury and requiring dismissal of an action for failure to file the notice were unconstitutional special legislation. There was no reason why a failure to file such a notice in relation to an injury on school property should bar a recovery while a failure to file such a notice in relation to an injury on property of another governmental unit would not bar a recovery. Enactment of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act eliminated the discrepancy between notice-of-injury provisions applicable to various units of local government. *Lorton v. Brown County School Dist.*, 35 Ill.2d 362 (1966). (See also *Cleary v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria*, 57 Ill.2d 384 (1974), reported in Part 2 of this Case Report under “Civil Immunities”.)

FAMILIES

750 ILCS 5/203 and 5/208 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 89, pars. 3, 3.1, and 6). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** The statute allowed males to marry without parental consent at age 21 and females at age 18. The age requirement for males and females was also different for marriage with parental consent and marriage by court order. This was held to be a violation of Section 18 of Article 1 of the Illinois Constitution prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. Subsequently, the statute was amended by P.A. 78-1297 to make the ages the same for males and females. *Phelps v. Bing*, 58 Ill.2d 32 (1974).

750 ILCS 5/401 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 401). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** Amendatory language in P.A. 82-197 that retroactively validated all judgments for dissolution of marriage reserving questions of child custody or support, maintenance, or disposition of property, regardless of whether appropriate circumstances existed for the reservation of those questions, violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. The legislature was attempting to retroactively alter or overrule the appellate court's interpretation of the statute (that is, that appropriate circumstances must exist before a trial court may reserve those questions). The legislature may alter only for future cases the appellate court's interpretation of statutes. P.A. 83-247 deleted the offending provisions and provided that a trial court may enter a judgment for dissolution of marriage reserving certain issues upon agreement of the parties or upon the motion of either party and a finding by the court that appropriate circumstances exist. *In re Marriage of Cohn*, 93 Ill.2d 190 (1982).

750 ILCS 5/607 (West 1998). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** Authorization to grant grandparent visitation when that visitation is in the best interest of the child was unconstitutional as applied to a child both of whose parents objected to grandparent visitation. P.A. 93-911, effective January 1, 2005, amended the provision to condition the visitation petition upon the parent's unreasonable denial of visitation and to establish a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's visitation decisions are not harmful to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health. *Lulay v. Lulay*, 193 Ill.2d 455 (2000).

750 ILCS 5/607 (West 2000). **Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.** Paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (b), which authorized reasonable visitation to a minor child's grandparents, great-grandparents, or siblings when it is in the child's best interest and (i) the child's parents do not permanently or indefinitely co-habit or (ii) one of the child's parents is dead, violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by interfering with a parent's fundamental right to determine the care, custody, and control of his or her child. P.A. 93-911, effective January 1, 2005, removed the offending paragraphs and added language to condition the visitation petition upon the parent's unreasonable denial of visitation (and the existence of other factors such as one

parent being deceased or parental non-co-habitation) and to establish a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's visitation decisions are not harmful to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health. *Wickham v. Byrne*, 199 Ill.2d 309 (2002).

750 ILCS 45/8. Illinois Parentage Act of 1984. Provision of predecessor Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1354) that, with certain exceptions, no action could be brought under the Act later than 2 years after the birth of the child violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment because it did not afford illegitimate children a reasonable opportunity to bring an action and secure child support. P.A. 83-1372 repealed the Paternity Act and replaced it with the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, which provides that an action under the Act must be brought within 2 years after the child reaches the age of majority. *Jude v. Morrissey*, 117 Ill.App.3d 782 (1st Dist. 1983).

750 ILCS 45/11. Illinois Parentage Act of 1984. Provisions of predecessor Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity and Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 106³/₄, pars. 1, 55, and 56) that contemplated that the decision to submit to a blood test was within a defendant's discretion were an invalid exercise of the legislative power because they conflicted with a court's power under Supreme Court Rules to order discovery and to compel compliance with discovery orders. P.A. 83-1372 repealed the Paternity Act and replaced it with the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, which provides that if a party refuses to submit to ordered blood tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against that party or otherwise enforce its order. *People ex rel. Coleman v. Ely*, 71 Ill.App.3d 701 (1st Dist. 1979).

750 ILCS 45/. Illinois Parentage Act of 1984.

750 ILCS 50/8 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 4, par. 9.1-8). **Adoption Act.**

Provision of predecessor to Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Paternity Act; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 106³/₄, par. 62) and provision of Adoption Act that (i) denied the putative father of an illegitimate child the custody of his child absent his attempt to legally adopt the child and (ii) allowed an adoption to be finalized without the consent of the father of an illegitimate child were unconstitutional. P.A. 78-854 deleted the offending provision of the Adoption Act, and P.A. 81-290 repealed the offending provision of the Paternity Act. *People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home*, 52 Ill.2d 20 (1972).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1998). **Adoption Act.** Subdivision D(f)'s mandatory irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness due to a criminal conviction resulting from the death of a child due to physical abuse, while allowing the State to present evidence as to the best interests of the child in question, unconstitutionally denied equal protection of the law to a mother in an action to terminate her parental rights because of her first degree murder of her other child. P.A. 94-939, effective January 1, 2007, made the

presumption rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. *In re S.F.*, 359 Ill.App.3d 63 (1st Dist. 2005).

750 ILCS 50/1 (West 2002). **Adoption Act.** Subsection (D)(q)'s irrebuttable presumption of the unfitness of a parent convicted of aggravated battery, heinous battery, or attempted murder of any child:

(1) Violated State and federal constitutional equal protection guarantees (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV and ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2) because subsection (D)(i) of the same Section created only a rebuttable presumption of the unfitness of a parent who commits first or second degree murder of any person, which are no less serious offenses. *In re D.W.*, 214 Ill.2d 289 (2005).

(2) Violated State and federal constitutional equal protection and due process guarantees (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV and ILCON Art. I, Sec. 2) because it too broadly affected parents who, due to the time or circumstances of their offense or their rehabilitation, may not threaten the State's interest in the safety and welfare of children. *In re Amanda D.*, 349 Ill.App.3d 941 (2nd Dist. 2004).

P.A. 94-939, effective January 1, 2007, amended Section 1 of the Adoption Act by removing subsection (D)(q) and by changing subsection (D)(i) to include predatory sexual assault of a child, heinous battery of a child, and aggravated battery of a child among a parent's crimes that create a rebuttable presumption of his or her parental unfitness.

750 ILCS 65/1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1980, ch. 40, par. 1001). **Rights of Married Persons Act.** Provision prohibiting a husband or wife from suing the other for a tort to the person committed during the marriage denied equal protection in violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it was not rationally related to the purpose of maintaining marital harmony. P.A.'s 82-569, 82-621, 82-783, and 84-1305 amended the offending provision by adding an exception for intentional torts. P.A. 85-625 deleted the exception and provided instead that a husband or wife may sue the other for a tort committed during the marriage. *Moran v. Beyer*, 734 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1984).

ESTATES

755 ILCS 5/2-2 (West 1994). **Probate Act of 1975.** Provision permitting mothers but not fathers to inherit by intestate succession from their illegitimate children unlawfully discriminated on basis of gender in violation of equal rights clause of Illinois Constitution. P.A. 90-803 changed Section 2-2 to permit eligible parents to inherit by intestate succession from their illegitimate children; an eligible parent is one who, during the child's lifetime, acknowledged the child, established a parental relationship with the child, and supported the child. *In re Estate of Hicks*, 174 Ill.2d 433 (1996).

PROPERTY

765 ILCS 705/1. Lessor's Liability Act. Provision in predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 80, par. 15) that prohibited the enforcement of a lease provision that

exempted a non-governmental landlord from liability for the landlord's negligence as a violation of public policy was held unconstitutional as special legislation because of the exclusion of governmental landlords. The Act was subsequently replaced with the Lessor's Liability Act, which contained similar provisions but without the governmental exemption. *Sweney Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo P. & W. R. Co.*, 42 Ill.2d 265 (1969).

765 ILCS 1025/14 and 1025/25 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 141, pars. 114 and 125). **Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.** Provision that required an insurance company to pay to State of Illinois unclaimed amounts payable under insurance policies to persons whose last known address was in Illinois failed to protect the company from multiple payments to other states and denied the company its property without due process. The Act was amended in 1963 to add provisions concerning proceedings in another state with respect to unclaimed property that has been paid or delivered to the State of Illinois. *Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knight*, 210 F.Supp. 78 (S.D.Ill. 1962).

HUMAN RIGHTS

775 ILCS 5/. Illinois Human Rights Act. Provision of predecessor Act creating a Commission on Human Relations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 127, par. 214.4-1) required the Commission to cause lists of homeowners in an "area" who did not wish to sell their homes to be mailed to realtors "known or believed" to be soliciting homeowners in that "area". The provision was an unconstitutional delegation of arbitrary powers to an administrative agency because (i) "area" was not defined and no standards were given for the agency to follow in designating "areas" and (ii) no standards were given for establishing a basis on which a "belief" concerning a realtor's solicitation activities may be formed. P.A. 81-1216 repealed the Act creating a Commission on Human Relations and replaced it with the Illinois Human Rights Act without continuing the offending provision in the new Act. (P.A. 80-920 had previously deleted related provisions, concerning notice from the Human Relations Commission, from what is now the Discrimination in Sale of Real Estate Act, 720 ILCS 590/.) *People v. Tibbitts*, 56 Ill.2d 56 (1973).

775 ILCS 5/9-102 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1980 Supp., ch. 68, par. 9-102). **Illinois Human Rights Act.** Provision creating new cause of action for a charge of an unfair employment practice that was properly filed with the Fair Employment Practices Commission prior to March 30, 1978 and that was barred by lapse of time, and not similarly favoring those whose claims were filed after March 30, 1978, violated the special legislation provision of Article IV, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution and the due process and equal protection clauses of Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution. P.A. 84-1084 repealed this provision. *Wilson v. All-Steel, Inc.*, 87 Ill.2d 28 (1981).

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

805 ILCS 5/15.65. Business Corporation Act of 1983. Provision of predecessor Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 32, par. 157.138) allowing imposition of franchise tax on foreign corporation authorized to do business in Illinois that was engaged exclusively in interstate business within Illinois violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The provision was amended by Laws 1959, p. 25 and Laws 1959, p. 2123 to provide that the franchise tax shall be imposed on a business for the privilege of exercising its authority to transact business in Illinois rather than for simply being authorized to transact business in this State. *Sinclair Pipeline Co. v. Carpentier*, 10 Ill.2d 295 (1957).

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

815 ILCS 350/. Fraudulent Sales Act. Provision of predecessor Act (Smith's Stat. 1931, p. 2602) authorizing municipal clerk to issue a license to hold a sale covered by the Act if the clerk was satisfied from the license application that the proposed sale was of the character the applicant desired to conduct and advertise was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative official. It did not define or describe the different types of sales designated as requiring a license and gave the clerk unwarranted discretion in determining whether the facts set out in a license application brought the proposed sale within the terms of the statute. The Act was subsequently repealed. The Fraudulent Sales Act specifies the information that must be contained in an application for a license to conduct a sale covered by the Act and provides that the clerk shall issue a license "upon receipt of an application giving fully and completely the [required] information". *People v. Yonker*, 351 Ill. 139 (1932).

815 ILCS 710/4 and 710/12 (West 1992). **Motor Vehicle Franchise Act.** Provision allowing a court to be the initial arbiter of the propriety of establishing an additional or relocated franchise violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution because it delegated to the courts matters that are for legislative or administrative determination. P.A. 89-145 deleted the offending provision. *Fields Jeep-Eagle v. Chrysler Corp.*, 163 Ill.2d 462 (1994).

EMPLOYMENT

820 ILCS 40/ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 2001 *et seq.*). **Personnel Record Review Act.** The Act was held unconstitutionally vague because it was not clear with reasonable certainty which records were exempt from inspection by an employee and which records were subject to inspection. The Section concerning records exempt from inspection was subsequently amended by P.A. 85-1393 and P.A. 85-1424 to specify certain employee-related materials. The Attorney General issued an opinion (Ill. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 92-005) that the Act is now constitutional. *Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation*, 118 Ill.2d 389 (1987).

820 ILCS 130/2 and 130/10a (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 48, pars. 39s-2 and 39s-10a). **Prevailing Wage Act.** Provision prohibiting allocation of motor fuel tax funds to public bodies if a certificate of compliance with the Act is not filed by the public body requesting approval of a public works project violated the Illinois Constitution's prohibition against amending a Section of a law (in this case, certain Sections of the Motor Fuel Tax Act and the Illinois Highway Code) without inserting the full text of the Section amended. The Section of the Act containing that provision was subsequently repealed by Laws 1965, p. 3508. Another Section of the Act extending application of the Act to employees of public bodies when engaged in new construction (as opposed to maintenance work) violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and Illinois constitutions. That and other Sections of the Act were thereafter substantially rewritten to correct the problem. *City of Monmouth v. Lorenz*, 30 Ill.2d 60 (1963).

820 ILCS 130/2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, ch. 48, par. 39s-2). **Prevailing Wage Act.** Provision defining the “prevailing rate of wages” in a locality as the wages under a collective bargaining agreement in effect in the locality and covering wages for work of a similar character was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private parties. Laws 1957, p. 2662 deleted the offending provision. *Bradley v. Casey*, 415 Ill. 564 (1953).

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